SPOUSES EPIFANIO FIGE AND MARTINA FIGE, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MARCELINO E. BAUTISTA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PARAñAQ…

The case^[1]
originated from a simple action for unlawful detainer. Private respondents are the registered
co-owners of a 401-square meter parcel of land with some improvements thereon
located at 634 Quirino Avenue, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila.^[2]
Their ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36798.

One of the improvements on the land is a store built in 1972.^[3]
In September 1984, one of the co-owners, Antonio Camarillo, verbally leased the
store in favor of petitioners. The
agreed rental was SEVEN HUNDRED
PESOS (P700.00) a month.

On February 21, 1989, private respondents wrote to petitioners
terminating the verbal lease by the end of the said month.^[4] The
petitioners were given fifteen (15) days to vacate the store.

In response, petitioners sent a postal money order in the amount
of ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P1,400.00) representing the rental for the
months of January and February 1989.

On March 2, 1989, private respondents reiterated their demand of
terminating the lease. Conciliation
efforts at the barangay level failed, hence a complaint for Unlawful Detainer
was filed by private respondents against petitioners before the Metropolitan
Trial Court, NCJR, Parañaque, Branch 78.

Petitioners contested the complaint. In their answer, they averred that the lot of private respondents
as described in their Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36798 is different from the parcel of land
denominated as No. 634 Quirino Avenue, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila upon
which the store stood.^[5] They
further claimed that they bought the latter lot from a certain Elsie Periquet.

After trial, the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the case for
lack of cause of action.^[6] On
appeal to the Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Parañaque, Metro Manila, the
controverted decision was reversed on February 27, 1992, viz:

“WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered REVERSING the decision appealed from and a new one is entered ordering:

a) defendants-appellees and all persons
claiming rights under them to immediately vacate the premises in question and peaceably surrender
possession thereof to herein plaintiffs-appellants; and

b) defendants-appellees to pay
plaintiffs-appellants the following:

1) 
The sum of P700.00 monthly from March 15, 1989 until they have
vacated the premises in question, representing the reasonable value for the use and occupation thereof;

2) 
The sum of P15,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and

3) 
The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.”^[7]

Petitioners appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals. On August 27, 1992, respondent court
affirmed the questioned decision but deleted the award of attorney’s fees. On November 20, 1992, petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition faulting the respondent court, as follows:

(1)  
In disregarding petitioners’ Exhibits
“1”,”2″ to “2-5”, “4”, “5”,
and “6” as well as the testimony of Geodetic Engineer Cresencio
Supleo despite the weight accorded thereon by the Metropolitan Trial Court who
under the law is in a better position to assess the same;

(2)  
In its failure to consider that private respondents’ complaint
states no cause of action; and

(3)  
In affirming with modification the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque.

The petition lacks merit.

The petition hinges mainly on the allegation by petitioners that
the lot they are occupying is different
from the lot described in the title of private respondents. This submission, petitioners urge in their
first assigned error, is supported by their Exhibits “1”,
“2”, “2-5”, “4”, “5”, and “6”
and the testimony of witness Engineer Cresencio Supleo, which allegedly, were
misappreciated by the respondent court. As a rule, it is not appropriate to raise factual questions in petitions
for certiorari before
this tribunal but nonetheless, we have carefully examined the evidence
presented in view of the contradictory rulings between the trial court and the appellate
courts. We find no reason to reverse
the respondent court in its ruling refusing to give probative value to Exhibit
“1,” Location Plan of Lot 2560; Exhibit “2,” Field Notes
Cover; Exhibits “2-5,” Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate, Survey
Notification Letter, Technical Description of Lot 2560, Traverse Computation,
and Lot Data Computation; Exhibit “4,” Sales Application No. 13-1;
and Exhibit “6,” Survey Verification Report because they were not
verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands as required by paragraph 5,
Section 28 of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the “Cadastral Act” as amended by Section 1862 of
Act No. 2711. Under the said law, it is the duty of private surveyors to
send their original field notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps, and
plots of the property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and
approval. Since the authenticity of
these documents was not established, they cannot be given any consideration.^[8]
On the other hand, Exhibit “5”, is an uncertified xerox copy of the
Technical Description of Lot 2560 Cad. 299, Parañaque Cadastre. It was not also authenticated and attested
under the seal of the Bureau of Lands. Worse, petitioners submitted an entirely different document from what
was marked as Exhibit “5” in the trial court on November 21,
1991. Needless to state, it is
inadmissible in evidence.^[9]

We also stress that the juridical relation between petitioners
and private respondents is that of lessee and lessor. Considering this jural relationship, petitioners cannot claim
that they purchased the questioned lot from Elsie Periquet. Well settled is the rule that a tenant
cannot, in an action involving the possession of the leased premises,
controvert the title of his landlord.^[10] Nor
can a tenant set up any inconsistent right to change the relation existing
between himself and his landlord, without first
delivering up to the landlord the premises acquired by virtue of the
agreement between themselves.^[11]

In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is
primordial while the issue of ownership is generally unessential. The long settled rule is that the issue of
ownership should be raised by the affected party in an appropriate action^[12]
for a certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. In this light, the testimony of Engineer
Supleo which has hardly any relevance to the issue of possession is of little
solace to the petitioners.^[13] Apropos
is the ruling in Tiu vs. Court of Appeals,^[14]
to wit:

“The fact of lease having been admitted by the private
respondent as well as the expiration of the term thereof, there can be no
question that the issue of ownership is foreign to the action. Indeed, it matters not that private
respondent was already an occupant of the leased premises when he executed and
signed the contract of lease, because the basis of the ejectment suit is the
very contract of lease. Private
respondent cannot now be heard to impugn what he had previously admitted, which
includes that petitioner is the owner of the premises. Neither can he confuse the issue by raising
the question of title to defeat the right of petitioner to the possession of
the premises and to eject him therefrom.”

The second and third assignment of errors must necessarily
fail. As discussed above, petitioners’
evidence that the title of private respondents does not include the lot they
are occupying is far from convincing. Their charge that private respondents committed fraud and
misrepresentation about their ownership of the lot is bereft of competent
evidence. Allegations of fraud must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. We are satisfied that private respondents proved their cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27760 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

^[1]
CA-G.R. SP No. 27760, Special Seventeenth Division, Martinez, Antonio A., J. ponente, Guingona, Serafin V.,
and Montoya, Salome A., JJ.,
concurring.

^[2]
RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 63.

^[3]
Id.

^[4]
Id., p. 64.

^[5]
Id.

^[6]
Hon. Vivencio G. Lirio, Presiding Judge.

^[7]
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Paranaque, Metro
Manila; Hon. Marcelino P. Bautista, Jr., Presiding Judge.

^[8]
Bunag vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-39013, February 29, 1988, 158 SCRA
299.

^[9]
Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 25.

^[10]
Civil Code, Article 1456.

^[11]
Manuel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95469, July 25, 1991, 199 SCRA
603.

^[12]
Supra.

^[13]
Supra.

^[14]
No. L-32626, January 28, 1971, 37 SCRA 99.