MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND EDGAR KROHN, JR., RESPONDENTS.

A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented
in evidence before the trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage
grounded on psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on the report is the husband who initiated the
annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the report.

The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn,
invoking the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient,
seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents of the report. After failing to convince the trial court
and the appellate court, she is now before us on a petition for review on certiorari.

On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were
married at the Saint Vincent de Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union produced three children, Edgar Johannes,
Karl Wilhelm and Alexandra. Their
blessings notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple developed into a
stormy one. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent
psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in fact.

In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential
psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr.,
and Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978,
presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree
(“Conclusion”) from the Tribunal
Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in
Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of “incapacitas assumendi onera
conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at the time of the
wedding and thereafter.”^[1] On 10
July 1979, the decree was confirmed and pronounced “Final and
Definite.”^[2]

Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Pasig, Br. II, issued an order granting the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership.

On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of
his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial court.^[3] In
his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma.
Paz merely denied in her Answer as “either unfounded or irrelevant.”^[4]

At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and
tried to testify on the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation
Report. This was objected to on the
ground that it violated the rule on privileged communication between physician
and patient. Subsequently, Ma. Paz
filed a Manifestation expressing her “continuing objection” to any
evidence, oral or documentary, “that would thwart the physician-patient
privileged communication rule,”^[5] and
thereafter submitted a Statement for the Record asserting among others that
“there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to
claim ‘psychological incapacity’ to annul their marriage, such ground being
completely false, fabricated and merely an afterthought.”^[6]
Before leaving for Spain where she has since resided after their separation,
Ma. Paz also authorized and instructed her counsel to oppose the suit and
pursue her counterclaim even during her absence.

On 29 May 1991, Edgar opposed Ma. Paz’ motion to disallow the
introduction of the confidential psychiatric report as evidence,^[7]
and afterwards moved to strike out Ma. Paz’ Statement for the Record.^[8]

On 4 June 1991, the trial court issued an Order admitting the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in evidence and ruling that –

x x x the Court resolves to overrule the objection and to sustain
the Opposition to the respondent’s Motion; first, because the very issue in
this case is whether or not the respondent had been suffering from
psychological incapacity; and secondly, when the said psychiatric report was
referred to in the complaint, the respondent did not object thereto on the
ground of the supposed privileged communication between patient and physician. What was raised by the respondent was that
the said psychiatric report was irrelevant. So, the Court feels that in the interest of justice and for the purpose
of determining whether the respondent as alleged in the petition was suffering
from psychological incapacity, the said psychiatric report is very material and
may be testified to by petitioner (Edgar Krohn, Jr.) without prejudice on the
part of the respondent to dispute the said report or to cross-examine first the
petitioner and later the psychiatrist who prepared the same if the latter will
be presented.^[9]

On 27 November 1991, the trial court denied the Motion to
Reconsider Order dated June 4, 1991, and directed that the Statement for the
Record filed by Ma. Paz be stricken off the record. A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by her counsel was
likewise denied.

Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court of
Appeals. In a Decision promulgated 30
October 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari.^[10]
On 5 February 1993, the motion to reconsider the dismissal was likewise
denied. Hence, the instant petition for
review.

Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of
the contents of the psychiatric report and prays for the admission of her Statement
for the Record to form part of the records of the case. She argues that since Sec. 24, par. (c),
Rule 130, of the Rules of Court^[11]
prohibits a physician from testifying on matters which he may have acquired in
attending to a patient in a professional capacity, “WITH MORE REASON
should a third person (like respondent-husband in this particular instance) be
PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters between a physician and
patient or from submitting any medical report, findings or evaluation prepared
by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential
and privileged relation with a patient.”^[12] She
says that the reason behind the prohibition is –

x x x to facilitate and make safe, full and confidential disclosure
by a patient to his physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and
publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a
correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient.^[13]

She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the
contents of the psychiatric evaluation report “will set a very bad and
dangerous precedent because it abets circumvention of the rule’s intent in
preserving the sanctity, security and confidence to the relation of physician
and his patient.”^[14] Her
thesis is that what cannot be done directly should not be allowed to be done
indirectly.

Petitioner submits that her Statement for the Record simply
reiterates under oath what she asserted in her Answer, which she failed to
verify as she had already left for Spain when her Answer was filed. She maintains that her “Statement for
the Record is a plain and simple pleading and is not as it has never been
intended to take the place of her testimony;”^[15]
hence, there is no factual and legal basis whatsoever to expunge it from the
records.

Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that
“the rules are very explicit: the
prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus x x x x the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the
case at bar where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the
privileged communication is the husband and not the physician of the
petitioner.”^[16] In
fact, according to him, the Rules sanction his testimony considering that a
husband may testify against his wife in a civil case filed by one against the
other.

Besides, private respondent submits that privileged communication
may be waived by the person entitled thereto, and this petitioner expressly did
when she gave her unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric
evaluation report when it was presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum
Matrimoniale which took it into account among others in deciding the case
and declaring their marriage null and void. Private respondent further argues that petitioner also gave her implied
consent when she failed to specifically object to the admissibility of the
report in her Answer where she merely described the evaluation report as
“either unfounded or irrelevant.” At any rate, failure to interpose a
timely objection at the earliest opportunity to the evidence presented on
privileged matters may be construed as an implied waiver.

With regard to the Statement for the Record filed by petitioner,
private respondent posits that this in reality is an amendment of her Answer
and thus should comply with pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, hence,
its exclusion from the records for failure to comply with the Rules is proper.

The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of
the communication between physician and patient, as well as the reasons
therefor, is not doubted. Indeed,
statutes making communications between physician and patient privileged are
intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make a full
disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and condition.^[17]
Consequently, this prevents the physician from making public information that
will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient.^[18] For, the patient should rest assured with
the knowledge that the law recognizes the communication as confidential, and
guards against the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his reputation
tarnished by their subsequent disclosure.^[19] The physician-patient privilege creates a
zone of privacy, intended to preclude the humiliation of the patient that may
follow the disclosure of his ailments. Indeed, certain types of information communicated in the context of the
physician-patient relationship fall within the constitutionally protected zone
of privacy,^[20] including a patient’s interest in keeping
his mental health records confidential.^[21] Thus, it has been observed that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is founded upon the notion that certain forms
of antisocial behavior may be prevented by encouraging those in need of
treatment for emotional problems to secure the services of a psychotherapist.

Petitioner’s discourse
while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim
v. Court of Appeals^[22] clearly lays down the requisites in
order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person
against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while
he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the
information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly
character) of the patient.”

In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics. He is simply the patient’s husband
who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall
within the claimed prohibition. Neither
can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his
testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician
who examined the patient and executed the report.

Counsel or petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the
testimony of private respondent on the ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court
dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on privileged communications but never
questioned the testimony as hearsay. It
was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to
object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his
right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be
admitted.

The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial to merit the
full attention of this Court. The
allegations contained in the Statement for the Records are but refutations of
private respondent’s declarations which may be denied or disproved during the
trial.

The instant appeal has taken its toll on the petition for
annulment. Three years have already
lapsed and private respondent herein, as petitioner before the trial court, has
yet to conclude his testimony thereat. We thus enjoin the trial judge and the parties’ respective counsel to
act with deliberate speed in resolving the main action, and avoid any and all
stratagems that may further delay this case. If all lawyers are allowed to appeal every perceived indiscretion of a
judge in the course of trial and include in their appeals depthless issues,
there will be no end to litigations, and the docket of appellate courts will
forever be clogged with inconsequential cases. Hence, counsel should exercise prudence in appealing lower court rulings
and raise only legitimate issues so as not to retard the resolution of cases. Indeed, there is no point in unreasonably
delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded
couple who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed
blissful life either alone or in the company of each other.^[23]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for
lack of merit. The assailed Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on 30 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex “C,” Comment, Rollo,
p. 128.

^[2]
Annex “D,” Comment, Rollo,
p. 129.

^[3]
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 144,
Judge Candido P. Villanueva, presiding.

^[4]
Answer in Civil Case No. 90-2906, p. 3,
par. 7, Rollo, p. 63.

^[5]
Manifestation, Annex “F,” Rollo,
pp. 74-78.

^[6]
Statement for the Record (Respondent’s
Confirmation and Verification of Her Answer with Special and Affirmative
Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim), p. 2, Annex “G,” Rollo,
p. 80.

^[7]
Annex “H,” Rollo, pp. 83-85.

^[8]
Annex “I,” Rollo, p. 86.

^[9]
Order of the trial court issued 4 June 1991; Rollo, p. 91.

^[10]
Decision penned by Associate Justice Salome A. Montoya and concurred in by
Associate Justices Vicente V. Mendoza, Chairman, and Quirino D. Abad Santos,
Special Third Division.

^[11]
Sec. 24. Disqualification by
reason of privileged communication. – The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases: x x x x (c) A surgeon authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him
or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a
professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in
that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.

^[12]
Memorandum of Petitioner, p. 7, Rollo, p. 189.

^[13]
Citing Will of Bruendi, 102 Wis. 47, 78 N.W. 169.

^[14]
Memorandum of Petitioner, p. 15, Rollo, p. 197.

^[15]
Id., p. 29, Id., p. 211.

^[16]
Memorandum of Private Respondent, p. 6, Rollo, p. 172.

^[17]
81 Am. Jur. 2d 392, citing Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei (CA2 NY) 311 F2d 463, 6 FR Sery 2d 5, 100
ALR2d 634; Binder v. Superior Court (5th Dist) 196 Cal App 3d 893, 242 Cal Rptr 231; and many
others.

^[18]
Id., citing Post v.
State (Alaska) 850 P2d 304; Binder
v. Superior Court (5th
Dist), see Note 17; Steinberg
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 263 45, 188 NE 152, 90 ALR 642; and many
others.

^[19]
Id., citing Binder v.
Superior Court (5th Dist), see Note 18.

^[20]
81 Am Jur 2d 393, citing Falcon
v. Alaska Public Offices Com. (Alaska) 570 P2d 469.

^[21]
81 Am Jur 2d 394, citing Mavroudis
v. Superior Court of San
Mateo County (1st Dist) 102 Cal App
3d 594, 162 Cal Rptr 724.

^[22]
G.R. No. 91114, 25 September 1992, 214
SCRA 273.

^[23]
Salita v. Judge Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, 16 May 1994.