JOSE C. SERMONIA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION, HON. DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BR. 151, AND JOSEPH SINSAY…

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second
or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.^[1]
Bigamy carries with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable by an afflictive penalty,
this crime prescribes in fifteen (15) years.^[2] The
fifteen-year prescriptive period commences to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x
x x”^[3]

That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly
admitted.^[4]
At least, it is not expressly denied. Thus the only issue for resolution is whether his prosecution for bigamy
is already time-barred, which hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have
taken place from the time the offended party actually knew of the second
marriage or from the time the document evidencing the subsequent marriage was
registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the rule on constructive
notice.

The antecedents: In an
information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with
bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage
with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia
C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting.^[5]

Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his
criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by prescription.

In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the
motion to quash. On 27 October 1992, he
likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.

Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of
Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of 21 January 1993,
his petition was dismissed for lack of merit.^[6]

In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability
for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly
registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975,^[7] such
fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes
notice to the whole world. The offended
party therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent
marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day the
marriage contract was registered. For
this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on
or before 1990 and not only in 1992.

Petitioner likewise takes issue with the “alleged
concealment of the bigamous marriage” as declared by the appellate court,
insisting that the second marriage was publicly held at Our Lady of Nativity
Church in Marikina on 15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that from
the moment of registration the marriage contract was open to inspection by any
interested person.

On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the
prescriptive period does not begin from the commission of the crime but from
the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.

While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice
in civil cases may be applied in criminal actions if the factual and legal
circumstances so warrant,^[8] we
agree with the view expounded by the Court of Appeals that it cannot apply in
the crime of bigamy notwithstanding the possibility of its being more favorable
to the accused. The appellate court
succinctly explains –

Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive
notice should be applied in the case at bar, principally citing in support of
his stand, the cases of People v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597); and People v. Dinsay
(40 SCRA 50).

This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice
should not be applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may
be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the
offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a
bigamous marriage is generally
entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married
person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract another marriage.

In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction
involving any right or interest therein is made in the Register of Deeds of the
place where the said property is located. Verification in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned of the
transactions involving the said property can easily be made by any interested
party. In the case of a bigamous
marriage, verification by the offended person or the authorities of the same
would indeed be quite difficult as such a marriage may be entered into in a
place where the offender is not known to be still a married person.

Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner
wherein constructive notice was applied, involved therein were land or property
disputes and certainly, marriage is not property.

The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of
constructive notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal
laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the
offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving
the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open
and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is not
truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the
existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate
spouse his bigamous marriage. And for
these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to
be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under
which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite
difficult and would take time. It is
therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy
should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by
the offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic).

Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the
offender, if the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be
counted from the date of registration thereof, the prosecution of the violators
of the said offense would almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the petitioner would encourage
fearless violations of a social institution cherished and protected by law.^[9]

To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will
make de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the
marriages listed in the National Census Office and in various local civil registries
all over the country to make certain that no second or even third marriage has
been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is too formidable a task to even
contemplate.

More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) provides for constructive notice to all persons of every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or
entry affecting registered land filed or entered in the office of the Register
of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies from
the time of such registering, filing or entering, there is no counterpart
provision either in Act No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in
Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to the conclusion that there
is no legal basis for applying the constructive notice rule to the documents
registered in the Civil Register.

Finally, petitioner would want us to
believe that there was no concealment at all because his marriage contract with
Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all and sundry
for inspection. We cannot go along with
his argument because why did he indicate in the marriage contract that he was
“single” thus obviously hiding his true status as a married man? Or for that matter, why did he not simply
tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage in Marikina so that
everything would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He knew
that no priest or minister would knowingly perform or authorize a bigamous
marriage as this would subject him to punishment under the Marriage Law.^[10]
Obviously, petitioner had no intention of revealing his duplicity to his first
spouse and gambled instead on the probability that she or any third party would
ever go to the local civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the simple expedience of having the
second marriage recorded in the local civil registry, he has set into motion
the running of the fifteen-year prescriptive period against the unwary and the
unsuspecting victim of his philandering.

Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by
petitioner, in all likelihood we would be playing right into the hands of
philanderers. For we would be equating
the contract of marriage with ordinary deeds of conveyance and other similar
documents without due regard for
the stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation
of which is a primary concern of our society.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals, the same is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., no part.

^[1]
Art. 349, The Revised Penal Code.

^[2]
Art. 90, par. 3, id.

^[3]
Art. 91, id.

^[4]
Petitioner has not denied his coverture
with Virginia C. Nievera and has likewise presented his marriage contract with
Ma. Lourdes Unson as Annex “K” to the petition.

^[5]
Crim. Case No. 92582, RTC-Pasig.

^[6]
Decision penned by Mme. Justice Gloria
C. Paras with Justices Luis L. Victor and Fermin A. Martin, Jr., concurring, CA­-G.R.
SP No. 29495; Rollo, pp. 29-32.

^[7]
Entry No. 1572, Bk. No. 36, pp. 96-97;
Annex “K,” Rollo, p. 75.

^[8]
People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos.
74226-27, 27 July 1989, 175 SCRA 597.

^[9]
See Note 6, pp. 30-31.

^[10]
Art. 352. Performance of illegal
marriage ceremony-Priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect,
or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage
ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage
Law (The Revised Penal Code).