🎧 Case Brief Lecture

MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND EDGAR KROHN, JR., RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 108854. June 14, 1994 June 14, 1994

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Krohn versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn against her husband, Edgar Krohn, Junior, and the Court of Appeals. The dispute is evidentiary, not matrimonial in its immediate object: Edgar filed a petition to annul their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, and in that proceeding he sought to testify on the contents of a confidential psychiatric evaluation report prepared about his wife by two physicians. Ma. Paz invoked the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient to stop him. The case matters because it fixes the exact boundaries of that privilege — who may claim it and against whom — and because it teaches a hard lesson on the waiver of objections.

Procedural History

Edgar filed his petition for annulment before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. At the hearing, Ma. Paz objected when Edgar took the witness stand to testify on the psychiatric report, and she filed a manifestation of continuing objection. The trial court issued an order admitting the report in evidence, reasoning that psychological incapacity was the very issue and that she had not objected on privilege grounds in her Answer. It later denied her motion for reconsideration and ordered her Statement for the Record stricken from the record.

Ma. Paz went up to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. The appellate court dismissed the petition, and denied her motion for reconsideration. She then came to the Supreme Court on a petition for review.

Facts

Edgar Krohn, Junior, and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married in June 1964 at the Saint Vincent de Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. They had three children. The marriage turned stormy. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing, apparently to ease the marital strain, but the effort failed, and in 1973 the couple separated in fact.

In 1975, Edgar obtained a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz, prepared and signed by two doctors. In 1978, presenting that report among other evidence, he obtained a decree from the church matrimonial tribunal nullifying his church marriage on the ground of incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage due to lack of due discretion. The decree was confirmed as final and definite in 1979. In 1982, the Court of First Instance of Pasig granted the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership.

In October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for annulment of the marriage before the trial court, citing the confidential psychiatric evaluation report, which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as either unfounded or irrelevant. When Edgar testified on the report at the hearing, she objected on the ground of physician-patient privilege, and the procedural skirmish described above followed.

Issues

  • Whether or not the husband may testify on the contents of a confidential psychiatric evaluation report prepared by physicians about his wife, over her objection based on the physician-patient privilege.
  • Whether or not the wife's failure to object on privilege grounds in her Answer, and her conduct before the church tribunal, amounted to a waiver of the privilege.
  • Whether or not the wife's Statement for the Record should form part of the records of the case.

Applicable Provisions

Section 24, paragraph (c), of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, on disqualification by reason of privileged communication, provides:

A surgeon authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.

This is the provision the wife invoked, and the whole case turns on the fact that it disqualifies only the physician, not a third person such as the husband.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the privilege does not apply. It accepted the wife's treatise on the purpose of the privilege — to encourage full disclosure to the physician and to protect the patient from humiliation — but found her application misplaced. The Court adopted the requisites laid down in Lim versus Court of Appeals, among them that the person against whom the privilege is claimed must be one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. Here, the person sought to be silenced is simply the patient's husband, who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. His testimony is not a circumvention of the prohibition, because it cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report.

On the second issue, the Court found a fatal mistake of a different kind. Counsel invoked privilege but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. In failing to object on that ground, counsel waived the right to make the objection, and the evidence offered may be admitted. The Court did not need to rest on waiver of the privilege itself.

On the third issue, the Court held the matter too trivial to merit full attention. The allegations in the Statement for the Record are but refutations of the husband's declarations, which may be denied or disproved during trial. The Court also rebuked counsel for appealing every perceived indiscretion of a trial judge, warning that such appeals clog the dockets and delay the main action.

Doctrine

First, the physician-patient privilege is a disqualification personal to the physician. It bars the physician from testifying, in a civil case and without the patient's consent, on information acquired while attending the patient in a professional capacity that was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity and that would blacken the patient's reputation. It does not bar a third person, such as the patient's spouse, from testifying on a medical report, because that testimony cannot carry the force and effect of the physician's own testimony.

Second, the requisites of the privilege, as adopted from Lim versus Court of Appeals, are cumulative: the privilege is claimed in a civil case; the person against whom it is claimed is duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; that person acquired the information while attending the patient in a professional capacity; the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the patient's reputation.

Third, the failure to object to evidence on the ground of hearsay at the earliest opportunity is a waiver of that objection, and the evidence offered may be admitted. Counsel who invokes one ground of objection and omits another does so at his peril.

Disposition

The petition for review was denied for lack of merit, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed; the husband may testify on the psychiatric report, subject to the wife's right to dispute it and to cross-examine the psychiatrist if presented.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the privilege disqualifies the physician, not the husband — and a lawyer who objects on privilege but forgets hearsay has waived the better objection. Examiners use this case in Evidence to test the requisites of the physician-patient privilege and the rule on timely objection.