BONIFACIO S. MACEDA, JR. AND TERESITA MACEDA, PETITIONERS, VS. MOREMAN BUILDERS CO., INC., AND HON. BENJAMIN A.G. VEGA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC OF MANILA, BRANCH 39, RESPONDENTS.

The principal issue
presented in this case is whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion in staying his prior order granting a motion for the execution of
the decision until after he shall have appreciated the report of a committee he
created to determine the location of the properties levied on attachment and
their values, both current and as of the time of the levy.

The procedural
antecedents which gave rise to this petition are not disputed.

Petitioners were the
plaintiffs in a civil case^[1] for rescission of contract and damages with
attachment and preliminary injunction assigned to Branch 39 of the then
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila. Private respondent was among the defendants
therein. Upon proper application by
petitioners, a writ of preliminary attachment was issued by the court and pursuant thereto, the Sheriff levied
certain properties which were duly inventoried.

On 28 November 1978, the trial court rendered its decision in
said Civil Case No. 113498 in favor of petitioners, which, among other things,
declared the building contract rescinded and awarded to the latter actual,
moral and liquidated damages in the aggregate sum of P445,000.00; the sum of
P20,000.00 representing the increase in the construction materials; and
P35,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

Defendants appealed said
decision to the Court of Appeals, which, however, dismissed the same on
7 March 1989. The petition to review
the dismissal subsequently filed with this Court^[2] was
denied due course for utter lack of merit. In G.R. No. 88310, this Court, through the Third Division, made the
following pertinent findings and conclusions:

“Petitioners appealed from the decision. The trial court ordered the completion and
transmittal of the record on appeal to the Court of Appeals on 19 March
1979. It appears that the records of
the case were not transmitted to the appellate court. Three (3) years later, on 6 January 1981, private respondents
moved to dismiss the appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Motion was denied
by the appellate court which at the same time ordered the Clerk of the trial
court to forward the complete records of the case to the Court of Appeals
within thirty (30) days and directed petitioners (appellants) to see to it that
the clerk of court complied with the order.

Seven (7) years later, on 14
August 1988, private respondents moved to strike out the reconstituted records
and asked the trial court to dismiss the appeal. The trial court held that it could no longer
complete reconstitution of the records for purposes of the appeal
considering that petitioners-appellants had refused or failed to appear in the
reconstitution proceedings.

On 7 March 1989, upon motion of private respondents, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal finding that petitioner Moreman had become a
phantom and fugitive paper corporation, which had failed to submit its annual
reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) since 1977 and whose
address of record was found by the Sheriff of the trial court to have been
abandoned. Petitioner Moreman’s motion
for reconsideration was denied.

Deliberating on the instant Petition for Review, the Court
considers that petitioners have failed to show any reversible error on the part
of the Court of Appeals in dismissing their appeal. The Court of Appeals found that Moreman’s appeal was dilatory and
frivolous, having prevented the trial court’s decision from becoming final for
more than ten (10) years since its rendition, by failing to act on the
completion of the record on appeal. Petitioners
question these factual findings of the Court of Appeals, which findings are, as
is well-known, binding upon this Court, absent any compelling reason for
overturning such findings of fact. Petitioners have not shown any such compelling reason. On the contrary, the record bears out the conclusions
of the Court of Appeals.”

This resolution was declared
immediately executory.

A motion to reconsider the above order was denied in the
Resolution of this Court of 26 March 1990. The denial was declared final.

Thereafter, herein
petitioners filed a motion to execute the decision of 28 November 1978. As claimed by petitioners, however, private
respondent filed several motions and pleadings “the common thread of which
is that the judgment purportedly had been fully
satisfied or even over satisfied x x x.”^[3]

Eventually, on 26 October
1990, respondent judge issued an Order granting the issuance of a writ of
execution. The respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration alleging therein, as summarized in the Order of respondent
judge of 23 May 1991, that:

“x x x the writ of execution is no longer necessary because the
judgment is more than satisfied by the attached properties at the inception of
the case at bar; that when the instant suit was filed, plaintiffs prayed for, and the same was granted, the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment; that there was in fact levy on attachment
made by the sheriff, the inventory of which amount (sic) to a total of
P1,056,842.01; x x x.”

Over the opposition of
petitioners who asserted that there was no satisfaction of the judgment as
there has been no execution, the respondent judge in his aforesaid Order of 23
May 1991, after making the following disquisition:

“The purpose of preliminary attachment need not be sufficed (sic)
herein. It suffices that the same is
normally availed of by the plaintiffs in order to be assured of the
satisfaction of judgment, if they prevailed after the trial. However, before judgment is rendered, the properties subject
of the attachment are under custodia legis for which the party who secured the
same is accountable together with the attaching officer.

In the instant case, the record shows that almost all the large
portions of the attached properties were at the project site when the writ of
attachment was enforced and that the plaintiffs were in possession of the
attached properties thereafter. They
cannot therefore protest (sic) innocence as to the whereabouts thereof even as
they had denied lack of knowledge thereof.

x x x

At the hearing of the open incidents relative to the enforcement of
the order of execution, the parties while agreed that the decision of the Court
should be enforced, differed on whether the judgment has already been satisfied
considering the attachment of the properties of the defendants earlier made by
the Court. The deputy sheriff, Angel
Borja who executed the writ of attachment has (sic) long been dead and the
record does not already show where the attached properties are now located,
even as they are considered under custodia legis. There is a need for this Court to determine where the properties
are presently located and the values thereof at the time of the attachment and
their present values. A committee
therefore has to be created by the Court in order to determine once and for all
how the writ of execution should be executed, without unnecessary delay.”

ruled:

“WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration filed by the
defendants is hereby DENIED. The order
of execution dated October 26, 1990 hereby stays (sic) as the Court hereby
creates a Committee of 3 members, appointing the Clerk of Court as the Chairman
thereof, and the two members shall be appointed by the parties, one from the
plaintiff and the other from the defendants.

The parties are hereby directed to submit the names of their
representative (sic) and after the members of the Committee shall have
qualified, the committee shall proceed to Tacloban City or to any place where
the attached properties are presently found. This committee shall determine the specific whereabouts of the attached
properties and to make a valuation thereof at the time the writ of attachment
was executed and their present values. The committee shall submit a report within 5 days from the completion of their
field work to the Court for its
proper appreciation and enforcement of the order of execution. The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to
issue the writ of execution after the court shall have appreciated the report
of the Committee.”^[4]

Without first seeking a reconsideration, petitioners commenced
the instant petition claiming that a motion for reconsideration would be an
“exercise in futility”^[5] and
alleging therein that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the above order in that he:

“i. violated ‘res judicata’ in the final
decision of 28 November 1978.

ii. obstructed the Third Division’s Final and
Executory Resolutions of 21 February 1990 and 26 March 1990.”^[6]

They vigorously maintain that the creation, purpose and duty of
the committee imply that after its work is done, the respondent court intends
to credit the value of the unused construction materials against the judgment
awards, which further means that the respondent court has recognized the
ownership of Moreman — contrary to the findings in the final decision. They further claim that per the Resolution
of the Third Division of this Court of 21 February 1990 in G.R. No. 88310, the
decision of 28 November 1978 is “immediately executory,” to which
respondent judge, with the way things proceeded in his court, did not accord
serious fealty.

Petitioners then pray that We give due course to the petition and
issue a restraining order. They further
pray that after hearing, We issue a writ of mandamus directing
respondent judge to vacate and set aside the order of 23 May 1991 and in lieu thereof
to immediately direct the sheriff to speedily enforce the writ of execution.

In the resolution of 26 June 1991, We granted the prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and directed the respondents to
comment on the petition.

In their Comment filed on 18 July 1991, respondents claim that in
issuing the questioned order, the respondent judge merely applied the express
provision of Section 15 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court on satisfaction of
judgment out of property attached; that the attached properties belong to
Moreman, hence it was not only necessary but it was also the duty of the court
to determine where the attached properties are, as well as their present value,
before mandating enforcement of the writ of execution, otherwise, there would
be a violation of the constitutional right against deprivation of life, liberty
and property without due process of law; that res judicata
will not apply as there was no prior adjudication on the ownership of
the properties attached; and, finally, the instant petition for certiorari
is fatally defective for failure of petitioners to ask for a reconsideration of
the questioned order.

Petitioners filed their
Reply to the Comment on 1 August 1991.

We gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their Memoranda which respondents
complied with on 2 October 1991. Petitioners, in their Manifestation filed on 23 September 1991, informed
the Court that they are waiving the submission of their Memorandum and are
submitting the case on the strength of their own pleadings.

We rule for the
petitioners, but not for the reasons advanced and relied upon.

The decision of 28
November 1978 in Civil Case No. 113498 had long become firm, final and
executory. The rule is well-settled
that the prevailing party is entitled, as a matter of right, to a writ of
execution and the issuance thereof is the court’s ministerial duty compellable by
mandamus.^[7]

Execution of a final
judgment cannot be postponed or deferred by the trial court.^[8] Courts should never allow themselves to be
party to maneuvers intended to delay the execution of final decisions. They must “nip in the bud any dilatory
maneuver calculated to defeat or frustrate the ends of justice, fair play and
prompt implementation of final and executory judgments.”^[9]

In Lim Kim
Tho vs. Go Sim
Ko, et al.,^[10] We ruled:

“Litigation must end
and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are
to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong
them.”

In the instant case,
respondent judge was trapped by private respondent into aborting the
implementation of his 26 October 1990 Order for the issuance of a writ of
execution, or preventing the prompt execution thereof, thereby making uncertain
the end of the controversy.

We find no valid reason
or legal justification to stay the implementation of the said Order and to subject its enforcement or
non-enforcement to the appreciation by respondent judge of the report to be
submitted by a committee he created to determine the whereabouts of the
attached properties and their values, both current and as of the date of their
levy. This is certainly an unprecedented
procedure of unusual novelty in which
the inevitability of undue delay
in the execution of the decision logically inheres. No one knows how long the search for the subject properties will
last. And even after finding them, the
parties may not agree on the valuation of the properties. The court then will have to receive the
evidence of the parties in support of their respective valuations. The party aggrieved by any ruling thereon
may appeal therefrom.

What We find to be more unacceptable is the implicit postulation
of respondent judge that in a case where a writ of attachment is issued and the attaching
creditor prevails in the case, determination of the value of the attached
properties is a condition sine qua non for the
execution of the decision. To save the
day for respondent judge, private respondent suggests that this is in accord
with Section 15 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court which provides:

“SEC. 15. Satisfaction
of judgment out of property attached;
return of officer. – If judgment be recovered by the attaching creditor and execution issue
thereon, the sheriff or other proper officer may cause the judgment to be
satisfied out of the property attached, if it be sufficient for that purpose,
in the following manner:

(a)  By paying to the judgment creditor the
proceeds of all sales of perishable or other property sold in pursuance of the
order of the judge, or so much as shall be necessary to satisfy the judgment;

(b)  If any balance remain due, by selling so much of the property, real or
personal, as may be necessary to satisfy the balance, if enough for that
purpose remain in the officer’s hands, or in those of the clerk of the court;

(c)  By collecting from all persons having in their
possession credits belonging to the judgment debtor, or owing debts to the
latter at the time of the attachment of such credits or debts, the amount of
such credits and debts as determined by the court in the action, and stated in
the judgment, and paying the proceeds of such collection over to the judgment
creditor.

The officer shall forthwith make return in writing to the court of
his proceedings under this Section.”

Reliance on the foregoing section is misplaced. Firstly,
it sets the guidelines for the sheriff — not
the court. In the instant case,
no writ of execution had been referred to a sheriff; in fact, none had yet been
issued. The court’s intervention may,
if at all, eventuate only if the sheriff should refuse to follow the outlined
procedure. It was unwarrantedly
premature for respondent court to step into the picture before any breach of
the procedure was
committed. It should, however,
be noted that the procedure is not mandatory. It provides that “the sheriff or other proper officer may
cause the judgment to be satisfied out of the property attached, if it be
sufficient for the purpose.” The use of the word may clearly makes the procedure directory, in
which case the sheriff may disregard the properties attached and proceed
against other properties of the judgment debtor, if necessary. Secondly, the procedure is subject to the
condition explicitly laid down in (b) of the aforesaid provision, to wit: “if enough for the purpose remain in the officer’s
hands, or in those of the
clerk of the court.” In the instant case, while the attached properties are in custodia legis, the fact remains that they are not in
the possession of the officer concerned or of the clerk of court. It was precisely to determine the
whereabouts of the property that a committee was constituted.

Respondent judge then committed grave abuse of discretion in
staying the enforcement of his 26 October 1990 Order granting the issuance of
the writ of execution and in creating a committee to determine the whereabouts
and values of the attached properties. That a motion to reconsider was not filed before the institution of the
instant petition is not, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, a
fatal error as claimed by private respondents, since the petition raises
questions which are essentially legal in nature.^[11]

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby
GRANTED and the questioned Order of 23 May 1991 of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 113498 of
Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, insofar as it stays the Order
of 26 October 1990 and creates a committee to determine the whereabouts of the
attached properties and its values and to submit a report thereon which the court shall then appreciate in
connection with the enforcement of the order of execution, is SET ASIDE and
respondent Judge is DIRECTED to cause the issuance of the writ of execution
which the Sheriff must implement without further delay. This decision is immediately executory.

Costs against private respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Bidin, and
Romero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Civil Case No. 113498.

^[2]
G.R. No. 88310.

^[3]
Rollo, 7.

^[4]
Rollo, 28.

^[5]
Id., 10.

^[6]
Id., 144.

^[7]
Church Assistance Program, Inc. vs. Sibulo, 171 SCRA 408; City Trust
Banking Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 758; Esqueval vs.
Alegre, 172 SCRA 315; International School, Inc. vs. Minister of Labor
and Employment, 175 SCRA 507; Philippine Veterans Bank vs. IAC, 178 SCRA
645; and Alazas vs. Salas, 179 SCRA 804.

^[8]
Suson vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 70.

^[9]
Cateclang, et al. vs. Medina, et al., 91 SCRA 403.

^[10]
82 Phil. 776.

^[11]
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, et al., 170 SCRA 54.