PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE LEONARDO L. SERRANO, MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF PROSPERIDAD, AGUSAN DEL SUR, AND FEDERICO P. LEGASPE, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, to set aside the 24 September 1976 Order of respondent Judge issued
in Criminal Case No. 1127 of the Municipal Court of Prosperidad,
Agusan del Sur, denying the
prosecution’s motion to disqualify him from trying said case and to abate all
further proceedings therein.

The petition is signed by then Provincial Fiscal Antonio Embang Apale of Agusan del Sur and Attorneys
Vicente Galicia
and Dollfuss Go, private prosecutors in Criminal Case
No. 1127.

The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:

On 14 May 1976, a criminal complaint for grave coercion against
Federico Legaspe (hereinafter referred to as Legaspe), then Administrative
Officer of Agusan del Sur
Provincial Hospital, was filed with the Municipal Court of Prosperidad,
Agusan del Sur by one
T/Sgt. Teodoro S. Magturtur,
of the Philippine Constabulary, upon complaint of Dra.
Paz A. Busa, Chief of said hospital, and other
hospital personnel.  The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 1127.^[1]
The court took cognizance of the case in the exercise of its concurrent
original jurisdiction over the offense charged.

On 10 June 1976,
two (2) criminal complaints for
separate acts of estafa through falsification of
public documents involving Time Book
and Payroll No. 251 and No. 457 of the Agusan del Sur Provincial Hospital were filed with the same court
against Dra. Busa by
Emilio P. Alinas, Sub-Station Commander of the
Integrated National Police of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, upon complaint of
Legaspe and other hospital personnel.  The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 1134 and 1135, respectively.^[2]

Subsequently, on 1 July
1976, another criminal complaint, for estafa
through falsification of a public document involving a daily time record, was
filed with the above court against Legaspe by
Sub-Station Commander Alinas, upon complaint of Dra. Busa.  It is alleged therein that although Legaspe was absent on 25-26 September, he maliciously
concealed and suppressed such absence by not indicating it in his daily time record, thereby
enabling him to collect his salary for the full month of September.  The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1148.^[3]

The three (3) complaints for estafa
were filed before respondent judge for preliminary investigation.

After conducting preliminary examinations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 1134, 1135 and 1148,
and while Criminal Case No. 1127 was still pending trial, respondent judge
issued on 19 August 1976 a Resolution^[4]
in the four (4) cases wherein he:

(1)   Claims that Criminal Case No. 1127 is
“mentioned here for information of its
pendency;”

(2)   Prefaces his findings with the following
opening paragraph:

“It is deducible
from the filing of the above-entitled cases who are the principal protagonists
(sic); obviously, these are charges and countercharges, an indication of an
(sic) intramural wranglings among the hospital
personnel and staff;”

(3)   Rules that the acts of respondent Busa, in respect to the questioned payrolls in Criminal
Cases Nos. 1134 and 1135, “are properly chargeable under the provisions of
Section 3 (e) and (g) of Rep. Act. No. 3019,
as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Practices Act (sic), instead of Estafa
thru Falsification of Public Documents,” and indorses said cases to the Provincial Fiscal, or to the State Prosecutor who might be designated for
the purpose, for further investigation or for whatever action he might take
thereon; and

(4)  
Dismisses Criminal Case No. 1148, for the following reasons:

“Considering that this is
a charge for falsification of a public document,
e.g., Daily Time Record (C.S. Form 48), which is grave in nature, the officials
of the hospital ought to have followed the Civil Service rules and regulations,
that is, to let him explain his
absence as respondent might be able to justify it and should he be unable to
explain, his unjustified absence; (sic) if any, is chargeable to ‘absence
without leave’ and ‘without pay,’ and it is incumbent upon the Chief of
hospital to see that this is done.

‘Aside from being
drastic, the court cannot help but entertain the idea, in relation with the other case just mentioned (Crim. Case
No. 1127), that this case is a superfluity as much as a harassment.’

For reasons advanced
herein this case is ordered dismissed.”

On 17 September 1976,
Dra. Busa, through her
counsel, Attys. Vicente Galicia
and Dollfuss R. Go, filed a Motion for Clarification
and/or Reconsideration of the Resolutions^[5]
based on the following grounds:

(1)  The
resolution contains baseless, unjustified and uncalled for statements
casting aspersions on the integrity of counsel;

(2)  Neither
the Rules of Court nor the Judiciary Act, or even jurisprudence, justifies the
making of a joint resolution in these unrelated cases; and

(3)  The
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1148 is not justified
whatsoever, either in law or in fact.

On 20 September 1976,
Atty. Galicia, as private prosecutor, filed in
Criminal Case No. 1127 a Motion for Disqualification^[6]
praying that respondent Judge inhibit himself in said case to dispel doubts as
to his capacity to render a just
decision therein.  In support hereof, movant pointed out that in the aforesaid Resolution of 19
August 1976, Criminal Case No. 1127 was included in the caption and positively
linked with respondent Judge’s findings, particularly in Criminal Case No.
1148, although the latter is not inter-related with the subject matter of the
former.  Moreover, in said Resolution,
respondent Judge “has
unknowingly revealed that he has already formed his mind as to the outcome
of” Criminal Case No. 1127 when he categorically stated:

“Aside from being drastic, the court cannot help but entertain
the idea, in relation with the other case just mentioned (Crim.
Case No. 1127) that this case is a superfluity as much as a harassment.”

The motion for disqualification was heard during the trial of
Criminal Case No. 1127 on 24 July 1976.  Respondent Judge sustained the opposition of
counsel for private respondent and denied said motion in open court.^[7]
Upon the movants‘ request, the order of denial was
reduced into writing that same day.  The
written Order^[8]
denied the motion for disqualification “for not being meritorious.”

Unable to accept the
ruling of respondent Judge, the prosecution filed the instant petition on 5
October 1976, submitting therein the following grounds to justify issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition:

(1)   The
statement of the respondent judge that Criminal Case No.
1127, like Criminal Case
No. 1148, “is a superfluity as much as a harassment” casts doubt in the mind of the prosecution that they will be
meted a fair and impartial judgment.

(2)  
Although “partiality and prejudgment” is not among those
enumerated as grounds for disqualification in Section 1, Rule 137 of
the Rules of Court, the same could fall under “just and valid reasons
other than those mentioned above” as provided in the last paragraph of
said section.

(3)  
While it is true that Section 2, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides
that no appeal or stay of the proceedings shall be allowed whatever is the
ruling of the judge on his competency, said restriction does not apply in
criminal cases where the motion for disqualification was filed by the prosecution
and the same was denied, the
reason being, in the event of acquittal, the prosecution has no remedy
available as double jeopardy will set in.

(4)  
Under Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, the Supreme Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts to issue writs of certiorari
and prohibition against inferior courts. 
As the judge of then Court of First Instance of Agusan
del Sur was on leave and his substitute, the judge of
then Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur, reported only on the first and third weeks of every
month on Mondays and Tuesdays, there was serious doubt as to any immediate
action on this kind of petition.

(5)  
Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration anymore in view of
the fact that the grounds that would be raised therein were already stated in
the motion for disqualification and the issues were discussed lengthily in the
oral arguments.  Moreover, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with in this case due to the urgency of the
writs and because the question raised is purely one of law.^[9]

On 6 October 1976,
We issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent Judge from further
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 1127, and ordered respondents to file their
respective comments to the petition.^[10]
Respondent Judge filed his Comment on 28 October 1976^[11]
wherein, on the main issue of disqualification on the ground of partiality and
prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 1127 by reason of its inclusion in the
questioned 19 August 1976 Resolution, he argued that while it is true that
Criminal Case No. 1127 was mentioned in his discussion of Criminal Case No.
1148, “the expression or phrase ‘superfluity as much as harassment’ thereunder does not refer to Criminal Case  No. 1127 but rather
to Criminal Case No. 1148
which is the topic under discussion.”^[12]

Then on 17 February 1977, respondent Judge filed by mail a Motion
to Dissolve the Restraining Order,^[13]
dated 16 February 1977, alleging therein that complainants in Criminal Case No.
1127 executed an affidavit of desistance on the basis of which the Station
Commander of Prosperidad, Agusan
del Sur filed a motion to dismiss said case and
praying that he be allowed to act on said motion to dismiss.  We required the petitioner to comment on the
motion.^[14]

On 15 April 1977, private respondent filed by mail a Compliance
to the Resolution of 6 October 1976 wherein, for reasons therein stated, he
requested that he be allowed to adopt the answer of respondent Judge as his
own.^[15]
We required private respondent’s counsel to
comply with the 6 October 1976 Resolution.^[16]

In its Comment^[17]
filed on 20 May 1977 in compliance with the Resolution of 7 March 1977,
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, interposed a vigorous
opposition to the motion to dissolve the restraining order on the following
rounds:

(1)   The
motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 1127 was filed by police officer Agustin Dancalan without authority. 
The Provincial Fiscal, Antonio Embang Apale, had already intervened in the case, having filed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition. 
In People vs. Bariales (L-39962, 3 March
1977), the Supreme Court held that while under Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court, police, constabulary and other peace or law enforcement officers and
private prosecutors may prosecute criminal cases in municipal and city courts
which do not have their own fiscals, such authority, however, ceases upon
intervention of the provincial fiscal or their assistants or upon the elevation
of the case to the Court of First Instance (now RTC).

(2)   In any case, respondent judge has actually
prejudged Criminal Case No. 1127 and further proceedings therein conducted by
him will only prejudice the interest of the
State.

(3)   The authenticity of the
motion to dismiss as  well as the joint
affidavit of desistance by the two complainants is “not indubitable.”

On 28 June 1977, private respondent filed a Compliance, dated 25
June 1977,^[18]
wherein he reiterated his request to be relieved from filing an answer (comment) to the instant
petition and instead be allowed to adopt the answer (comment) of respondent
Judge as his own.  Acting thereon, We
decided to consider private respondent’s compliance as comment to this petition
and required petitioner to file a reply thereto,^[19]
which the latter complied with on 15 March 1978.^[20]

In Our Resolution of 15 March 1978,^[21]
We denied respondent Judges’s motion to dissolve the
restraining order.

On 10 May 1978, We resolved to consider respondents’ Comment as
Answer to the petition and to consider the case submitted for decision.^[22]

The petition is impressed with merit.

Disqualification of judges is governed by Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court.  Section 1 thereof reads:

“SECTION 1.  Disqualification
of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case
in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related
to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil
law, or in which he has presided
in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review,
without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those
mentioned above.”

The first paragraph refers to mandatory disqualification and
necessarily excludes the exercise of discretion.  The second paragraph refers to permissive
disqualification and leaves the matter of disqualification to the sound
discretion of the judge.

It may be true that none of
the grounds for mandatory disqualification appear to exist in the instant
case.  Petitioner, however, claims that
respondent Judge’s “partiality and prejudgment would fall under ‘just and
valid reasons’ under the second paragraph of the aforesaid Section 1 of Rule 137.” Since
respondent Judge denied the motion to disqualify on that ground, the issue that
necessarily crops up for Our determination is whether or not a judge against whom none of the specific
grounds for mandatory inhibition exists and who refuses to voluntarily inhibit
himself may, nevertheless, be disqualified from sitting in or acting on a
case.  The issue is not one of first
impression.  A number of cases have
firmly established the affirmative view of this Court on the ground of due
process.  In Gutierrez vs. Santos, etc., et al.,^[23] this Court held:

“Petitioner invoking the provisions of section 1, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, argues that the case of
the respondent judge does not fall under any one of the grounds for the
disqualification of judicial officers stated therein.  Assuming arguendo
that a literal interpretation of
the legal provision relied upon justifies petitioner’s contention to a certain
degree, it should not be forgotten that, in
construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot disregard its true intention nor the real ground for the
disqualification of a judge or judicial officer, which is the impossibility of
rendering an impartial judgment upon the matter before him.  It has been said, in fact, that due process
of law requires a hearing before
an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to
nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge (30 Am. Jur. p.
767).  Moreover, second only to the duty
of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not
arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge.  Consequently, we take it to be the true
intention of the law — stated in general terms — that no judge shall preside
in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent
(30 Am. Jr. Supra) because -?

‘x x x However upright the judge, and
however free from the slightest inclination but to do justice, there is peril
of his unconscious bias or prejudice, or lest any former opinion formed ex parte may still linger to affect unconsciously his present
judgment, or lest he may be moved or swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of
the facts which may not be revealed or stated at the trial, or cannot under the
rules of evidence.  No effort of the will
can shut out memory; there is no
art of forgetting.  We cannot be certain
that the human mind will deliberate and determine unaffected by that which it
knows, but which it should forget in that process.’ x x
x (Ann.  Cas. 1917A, p. 1235).”

In Luque vs. Kayanan,^[24]
where “Petitioner and the respondent judge are really at loggerheads with
each other; hostility runs deep,” this Court, despite the absence of any
grounds for disqualification, prohibited him from sitting in a case, holding:

“All suitors, we must say, are entitled to nothing short of
the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free, disinterested and impartial
tribunal.  It has been said that ‘next in
importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in
such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the
judge.’ Let it not be said that the administration of justice in this country
suffers from too many human imperfections. 
To our mind, respondent judge should inhibit himself since it has become
apparent that his further continuance in Case 4871 would not be in the best
interest of justice, which he is bound to serve.

x x
x

In the circumstances presented, we are constrained to state that
respondent’s taking cognizance of said case does not square with our sense of
justice.  It is to be stressed once again
that parties have a right to have their cases tried fairly by an impartial
tribunal.”

In Paredes, et al. vs. Gopengco, et
al.,^[25]
this Court stated:

“While technically the law firm headed by former Senator Quintin Paredes was not the
counsel of record in the malicious mischief case, and petitioner judge thus
ruled that he was not disqualified by reason of relationship of counsel, it is
nevertheless admitted that said law firm was the counsel of petitioner Villegas
during the preliminary investigation in the fiscal’s
office, but withdrew from the case when it
was assigned by raffle to the branch prescribed (sic) by petitioner
judge.  On the other hand, respondents
assert that said law firm ‘is the retained and continuing private counsel and/or lawyers’ of petitioner
Villegas x x x.  Without in any way casting any reflection on
the fairness and integrity of petitioner judge, but considering the
circumstances of the case and that the City Court of Manila has several other
branches to whom the case may be reassigned by raffle, it is the Court’s view
that it is in the best interests of justice if petitioner judge should
inhibit himself from proceeding with the hearing of the case.”

In Mateo, et al. vs. Villaluz,
et al.,^[26] We
ruled:

“x x x There is thus respectable authority for the
view that with the possibility of a trial being tainted by partiality, this
Court can step in to assure respect for the demands of due process.

‘4.  Petitioners can assert then, and rightly so,
that we have the power to set aside the order denying the motion for
disqualification.  While the discretion
in the first instance belongs to respondent Judge, its exercise is subject to
our corrective authority.  Certain­ly,
there can be no question as to its being considered abused if it can be shown
that to refuse inhibition is to cast doubts as to a court’s
impartiality.'”

In Castillo, et al. vs. Juan,^[27]
where this Court disqualified a judge from further hearing the cases, We held:

“1.  In every litigation, perhaps much more so in
criminal cases, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to
everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused.  It is not for him to indulge or even to give
the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first
impressions.  He is to refrain from
reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters.  It would be deplorable if he lays himself
open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own
sympathies and predilections.  It must be
obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional
mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with patience and
understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a
minimum.  It is not necessary that he
should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to
hold the balance true.  What is equally
important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his
impartiality.  What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. 
It is impressed with constitutional significance.  As set forth in Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz,^[28] ‘It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot
be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a
judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just.  Thereby there is the legitimate
expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the
law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites.  For him, the parties stand on equal
footing.  x x
x’.”

In Martinez vs. Gironella,^[29]
where this Court granted the petition for prohibition, We declared:

“As to the second issue: 
A Judge has the duty not only to render a just and impartial decision,
but also render it in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its
fairness and impartiality, and also as to the judge’s integrity.  While we grant respondent’s capacity to
render a just and impartial decision, his statement in the decision acquitting
Arnold Bayongan to the effect that the ‘crime was
committed by Cresencio Martinez’ renders it
impossible for respondent to be free from the suspicion that in deciding
petitioner’s case, respondent will be biased and prejudiced.  We therefore
hold that under these circumstances petitioner has the right to have his case
decided by another Judge.”

In the recent case of Fecundo vs.
Berjamen, et al.,^[30]
this Court ruled:

“x x
x A spotless dispensation of justice requires
not only that the decision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the judge
rendering it must, at all times, maintain the appearance of fairness and
impartiality.  His language, both written
and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued.

To erase any doubt whatsoever as to the judge’s bias and/or
prejudice against petitioner in Election Case No. M-944, the Court believes it
prudent and better to serve the ends of justice to transfer the said case to
Branch 21, Mambusao, Capiz,
presided over by the newly appointed Judge thereof, Julius L. Abella.”

In the instant case, We
do not hesitate to decide that the actuations of the respondent Judge
legitimately and justly engendered suspicions and doubts as to his fairness and ability to decide Criminal Case No. 1127 with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.  He has demonstrated bias and partiality in
favor of the accused in said case, private respondent Federico Legaspe, as eloquently demonstrated by the following facts:

1.  Although Criminal Case
No. 1127 was before him for trial on the merits and he had already started
receiving evidence therein, and despite absence of any incident which could
justify its consideration with Criminal Cases Nos. 1134, 1135 and 1148, he motu proprio
included it in both the caption and body of his Resolution of 19 August
1976.  Its inclusion has absolutely no
legal, factual and procedural basis since the other three (3) cases were before
him solely for preliminary investigation and the Resolution was for said
cases.  His claim that Criminal Case No.
1127 “is mentioned” in the resolution “for information of its pendency” is a clever ploy to hide his real purpose of
linking it with the other cases and to thereafter
justify his dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1148 on the ground that:

“Aside from being drastic, the court cannot help entertain the
idea, in relation with the other case just mentioned (Criminal Case No. 1127),
that this case is a superfluity as much as a harassment.”

In short, he has concluded that Legaspe
is a victim of harassment and that Criminal Case No. 1148 should not have been
filed at all in view of Criminal Case No. 1127; hence, according to him, the
former is a “superfluity.” Yet, respondent Judge is fully aware of
the fact that the offended parties in Criminal Case No. 1127 are not the
offended parties in Criminal Case No. 1148.  Moreover, the former is for Grave Coercion
while the latter is for Estafa thru Falsification of
Public Documents.  His ratiocination that
the words harassment and superfluity refer
to Criminal Case No. 1148 and not Criminal Case No. 1127 is a lame excuse which
does not detract from the fact that insofar as he is concerned, Legaspe is a victim of harassment.

2.  He dismissed Criminal Case No.
1148 solely on the ground that:

“Considering that this is a charge of falsification of a
public document, e.g., Daily Time Record (C.S. Form 48), which is grave in
nature, the officials of the hospital ought to have followed the civil service
rules and regulations, that is, to let him explain his absence as respondent
might be able to explain, his unjustified absence; (sic) if any, is chargeable
to ‘absence without leave’ and ‘without pay,’ and it is incumbent upon the
Chief of hospital to see that this is done.”

We are not aware
any provision in the Civil Service Decree
(P.D. No. 807) or of any Civil Service rule or regulation which requires that
before a criminal action for falsification of a daily time record may be instituted, the respondent should first
be made to explain his unjustified absence. 
Interestingly, the Resolution of the respondent Judge does not even state that Legaspe
offered evidence to prove that he
was not absent on the questioned
dates or that the entries in his daily time record are true and correct.  Upon the other hand, evidence was presented
by the complainant that Legaspe was in fact absent on 25-26 September
1975.

3.  Despite the pendency of this case, respondent Judge had the temerity to
file a Motion To Dissolve the Restraining Order, issued by this Court on
6 October 1976, on the ground that the offended parties in Criminal Case No.
1127 had executed an affidavit of desistance and the Station Commander of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur had filed the corresponding motion to dismiss the
case.  Respondent Judge knows, or ought
to know; that as stated in the opposition of the Solicitor General adverted to
above, the Station Commander had no authority to file the motion to dismiss since the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal already intervened in the case;^[31]
moreover, the affidavit of desistance of complaining witnesses merely stated
that after a careful, thorough and deliberate consideration of all the facts and circumstances that led to the
filing of said case, they have come to a reasonable conclusion that there is no reason to pursue said case
against Legaspe. 
They did not state that they
have no case against Legaspe.  Besides, under the circumstances, it should
have been the accused therein, private
respondent Legaspe, who should have taken the
initiative of filing the motion.  In short, respondent Judge took the cudgels for said
accused.  It is then palpably clear that
the former was in a hurry to dismiss Criminal Case No.1127.

What this Court stated
thirty-two (32) years ago in Pimentel vs. Salanga^[32] bears
repeating here to remind judges of the norm and standard they must adopt and
pursue when their capacity “to try and decide cases fairly and
judicially” comes to the fore:

“A judge may not
be legally prohibited from sitting in litigation.  But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one
party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination.  He should exercise his discretion in a way
that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.  A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability
that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the
judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of
justice against him.  That passion on the
part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct
against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote.  He is a man, subject to the frailties of
other men.  He should, therefore,
exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw
from a suit where that party or counsel is involved.  He could in good grace inhibit himself where
that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice
would be occasioned to others involved therein. 
On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in
the impartiality of the judiciary.  If
after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be
seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and
substance to the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137.  He serves the cause of the law who forestalls
miscarriage of justice.”

While We are
exacting on the conduct of judges confronted with motions for their
disqualification, We cannot, however, tolerate acts of litigants who, for any
conceivable reason, seek to disqualify a judge for their own purpose, under a
plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment.  We have earlier ruled that this Court does
not approve of the tactic of some litigants of filing baseless motion for
disqualification of the judge as means of delaying the case and/or of
forum-shopping for a more friendly judge.^[33]
Neither is the mere filing of an administrative case against a judge a ground
for disqualifying him from hearing the case, “for if on every occasion the
party apparently aggrieved would be allowed to either stop the proceedings in
order to await the final decision on the desired disqualification, or demand
the immediate inhibition of the judge on the basis alone of his being so
charged, many cases would have to be kept pending or perhaps there would not be
enough judges to handle all the cases pending in all the courts.”^[34]

Mere suspicion that a judge is partial to the accused is not
enough.  There should be evidence to
prove the charge.^[35]

We also agree with petitioner’s contention that the rule laid
down in Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court^[36]
that no appeal shall stay or shall be allowed from a determination by the judge
of his competency after a motion
to disqualify him has been filed until after final judgment in the case does
not apply in criminal cases were such motion is filed by the prosecution or the
offended party.  The reason for this is
so obvious.  As We held in Paredes vs. Gopengco^[37]
“where the prosecution or offended party seeks the disqualification of the
trial judge on one of the grounds expressly provided therefor,
and the trial judge decides in
favor of his own competency, proceeds to try the case and renders a verdict of
acquittal, they (sic) evidently would have no right to appeal in such an event.  Neither would they have any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to have a trial judge’s adverse
ruling on the motion to disqualify him reviewed on appeal together with the judgment
on the merits, as envisaged in the Rule, since no appeal from the judgment of
acquittal could possibly be taken by the prosecution by virtue of the double
jeopardy provision of the Constitution.”

WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the
instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. 
Respondent Judge is hereby DISQUALIFIED to try, hear and decide Criminal
Case No. 1127 and his Order of 24 September 1976 in said case is SET ASIDE and
DECLARED VOID.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 6 October 1976 is MADE
PERMANENT.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Romero,
JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, 13-14.

^[2]
Annexes “B” and “B-1” of Petition; Id.,
28-31.

^[3]  Annex “C” of Petition; Rollo, 32-33.

^[4]
Annex “D” of Petition; Id.,
34-42.

^[5]
Annex “E” of Petition; Rollo, 43-58.

^[6]
Annex “F” of Petition; Rollo, 59-62.

^[7]
Id., 6.

^[8]
Id., 63.

^[9]
Rollo, 7-10.

^[10]
Id., 66.

^[11]
Id., 72-79.

^[12]
Id., 78; underscoring
supplied.

^[13]
Id., 86-89.

^[14]
Resolution of 7 March
1977; Rollo, 92.

^[15]
Id., 99-100.

^[16]
Resolution of 17 May 1977; Id.,
110.

^[17]
Id., 112-118.

^[18]
Resolution of 3 August 1977;
Rollo, 121.

^[19]
Id., 123.

^[20]
Id., 156-169.

^[21]
Id., 155.

^[22]  Id.,
174.

^[23]  2 SCRA 249.

^[24]
29 SCRA 165.

^[25]
29 SCRA 688.

^[26]
50 SCRA 19.

^[27]
62 SCRA 124.

^[28]
Citing Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18.

^[29]
65 SCRA 245.

^[30]
180 SCRA 235.

^[31]
Section 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court.

^[32]
21 SCRA 160.

^[33]
Licas vs. Garduque,
Adm. Matter No. MTJ-89-276, 13
February 1990.

^[34]
Aparicio vs. Andal,
175 SCRA 569.

^[35]
Beltran vs. Garcia, 41 SCRA 175.

^[36]
Said Section 2 provides:

“Section 2.  Objection that judge disqualified,
how made and effect. – If it be claimed that an
official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to
his competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating
the grounds therefor, and the official shall
thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom,
in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification.  His
decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in
the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his
decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case.”

^[37]
Supra., footnote no. 25.  See also Geotina vs.
Gonzalez, 41 SCRA 66.