REPUBLIC RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND UNITED GEOPHYSICAL COMPANY, S.A. (COSTA RICA), RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 41351-R entitled
“United Geophysical Company, S.A. (Costa Rica) versus Republic Resources
and Development Corporation,” promulgated on 26 January 1971, which
affirms in all respects, except as to the amount of attorney’s fees, the
decision of Branch XVI of the then Court of First Instance of Manila (now
Regional Trial Court), Branch XVI, in Civil Case No. 59543.

The facts and procedural antecedents of the case are summarized
by the Court of Appeals, thus:

“The United Geophysical Company, S.A. (Costa Rica), the
plaintiff-appellee herein, is a corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of Costa Rica (Exhibit A). It
is the successor-in-interest of the United Geophysical Company, S.A.
(Venezuela) [hereinafter referred to as United Venezuela], duly licensed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission to engage in geological and geophysical work
in the Philippines (Exhibit K).

On 15 December, 1959, the United Venezuela and the Republic
Resources and Development Corporation, the defendant-appellant herein,
executed, with the approval of the Director of Mines, a seismograph service
contract wherein the United Venezuela undertook to conduct for the
defendant-appellant for a minimum period of 12 months, commencing from January,
1960, geophysical surveys in the Philippines in search of sub-surface
geological structures favorable to the accumulation of oil and gas. On its part, appellant agreed to pay a
contract fee in the amount of U.S.$23,000.00 per month, fifty percent (50%) of
which was to be paid in U.S. dollars and the other fifty percent (50%) to be
paid in Philippine pesos. The
defendant-appellant also agreed to reimburse the United Venezuela at cost plus
5% of the cost of returning to the point of origin all the expatriate
personnel, equipment and supplies utilized by United Venezuela in conducting
the required surveys.

The defendant-appellant paid in full the contract fees payable in Philippine pesos for the whole year
of 1960. But it paid only the contract
fees payable in dollars corresponding to the period from January to July 1960, and a part of the fee
corresponding to August 1960. It failed
to pay the contract fees payable in dollars corresponding to the period from
part of August to December of 1960, amounting to $34,908.33 and the sum of
$3,713.33 representing the cost plus 5% of returning the equipment from the
Philippines to Australia, the point of origin (Exhibit E).

After    several demands made
upon defendant-appellant to pay its total liability of $38,622.66, it made on 8
November, 1963 a part payment in the sum of $10,000.00 with the request that
the balance of $28,622.66 be reduced (Exhibits 1-4 and 1-4-a). Defendant-appellant, by way of amicable
settlement of the said balance, offered to pay another $10,000.00 requesting condonation
of $18,000.00 (sic). This offer was
rejected, and on January 11, 1965 the present action was filed to recover said
balance of U.S.$28,622.66.

When this case was filed, defendant-appellant renewed its offer to
pay its outstanding account provided its obligation would be reduced to $20,000
payable in two equal installment (sic), the first to be due on or before June
30, 1965 and the second installment to be due on or before December 31, 1965
(Exhibit 1-9). Plaintiff-appellee
accepted this offer in (sic) condition that the proposed settlement be
submitted to the Court for approval and such proposed payment be secured by a
surety bond (Exhibit 1-10). Defendant-appellant did not act upon this counter-proposal; and instead,
it filed an answer with counterclaim to the complaint.

The case was then set for trial on the merits on April 2,
1966. On said date, neither the
defendant-appellant nor its counsel appeared; hence, the plaintiff-appellee was
allowed by the trial court to present its evidence ex parte, and
the case was deemed submitted for decision. The defendant-appellant filed a petition to re-open the case, which was
granted by the trial court. The case
was set for the reception of defendant’s evidence on May 14, 1966. On said date, the defendant-appellant,
instead of presenting its evidence, asked for postponement of the hearing on
the ground that it desired to secure the deposition of a vital witness residing
in the United States. The lower court
granted the motion, but the defendant-appellant failed to secure said
deposition despite the lapse of a reasonable period. On motion of the plaintiff, the case was re-set for hearing on
November 24, 1966. The
defendant-appellant asked for and was granted another postponement, and the
case was finally set for hearing on December 8, 1966. Again, neither the defendant-appellant nor its counsel appeared
on said date, and the case was ordered submitted for decision on the evidence
already presented by the plaintiff-appellee.

On March 20, 1967, the court a quo rendered a
decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

‘WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the principal sum of
$28,622.66 converted into Philippine pesos at the rate of exchange prevailing
at the time of payment, with legal interest
thereon from November 8, 1962 and whatever fees the commercial banks will
charge for transmitting the same from the Philippines to the plaintiff’s principal office at Pasadena, California,
U.S.A.; the further sum of
P5,000.00 plus 20% of the amount
due as attorney’s fees; and costs.

Defendant’s counterclaim are (sic) dismissed.

SO ORDERED.’

(underscoring supplied)

From the foregoing decision, defendant has interposed the instant
appeal and assigned the following errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:

I

‘The Court a quo miserably erred in its decision by
not stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which said decision
was based.

II

The Court a quo erred in finding that appellant is
still liable to plaintiff-appellee in (sic) the amount of P28,622.66.

III

The Court a quo erred in awarding P5,000 and 20% of the amount due as
attorney’s fees.

IV

The Court a quo deprived appellant
of its day in court.'”^[1]

The defendant-appellant referred to is the Petitioner in the
instant case.

On 26 January 1971, the respondent Court of Appeals (Second
Division) promulgated a Decision,^[2] the
dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, with the sole modification that the award for
attorney’s fees be reduced to P10,000.00,
the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with costs
against defendant-appellant.”

Petitioner received a copy of said decision on 27 January
1971. Its first and second motions for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the instant petition.

Petitioner does not dispute any of the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals; it, however, raises in issue the legal conclusions drawn
therefrom, to wit:

A) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER’S $28,622.66 OBLIGATION SHOULD BE PAID AT THE RATE OF EXCHANGE
PREVAILING AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT.

B)      THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER’S LIABILITY FOR INTEREST ON ITS UNPAID OBLIGATION SHOULD BEGIN FROM
NOVEMBER 8, 1962.^[3]

Petitioner
and private respondent separately filed their Briefs on 13 August 1971 and 17
December 1971, respectively.

The petition is without merit. Firstly, recourse to this Court is patently dilatory. As shown in the summary of the facts and
procedural antecedents, petitioner chose not to present its evidence despite
the accommodation extended and the opportunity granted it by the trial court to
present and submit its evidence.

Secondly, the grounds raised in this petition were not assigned
as errors before the respondent Court. A party is not permitted to raise before this Court an issue which he
did not raise either in the lower court or in the Court of Appeals.^[4]

Finally, it is clear from Section 1 of R.A. No. 529 that what is
declared null and void is the “provision contained in,
or made with respect
to, any domestic
obligation, to wit, any obligation contracted
in the Philippines which provision purports
to give the obligee the right to
require payment in gold or in a
particular kind of coin or currency other
than Philippine currency or in an amount of money of
the Philippines measured thereby“^[5]
and not the contract or agreement which contains such proscribed provision.^[6]

As to the rate of
exchange, a distinction has to be made between obligations incurred prior to
the Act and those incurred after its enactment. As to the former, Section 1 of the Act explicitly
provides that:

“x x x if the obligation was incurred prior to the enactment of this Act^[7] and required payment in a particular kind of
coin or currency other than Philippine currency, it shall be discharged in
Philippine currency measured at the prevailing rates of exchange at
the time the obligation was
incurred, except in case of a loan made in a foreign currency stipulated
to be payable in the same currency, in which case the rate of exchange
prevailing at the time of the stipulated date of payment shall prevail.”^[8]

As to obligations incurred after enactment such as that of the
petitioner’s in favor of private respondent, Kalalo vs. Luz^[9] ruled that the rate of exchange
should be that prevailing at the time of
payment. Thus:

“x x x Republic Act 529 does not provide for the rate of
exchange for the payment of obligation incurred after the enactment of said
Act. The logical conclusion, therefore,
is that the rate of exchange should be that prevailing at the time of
payment. This view finds support in the
ruling of this Court in the case of Engel vs. Velasco & Co.^[10]
where this court held that even if the obligation assumed by the defendant was
to pay the plaintiff a sum of money expressed in American currency, the
indemnity to be allowed should be expressed in Philippine currency at the rate of exchange at the time of
judgment rather than at the rate
of exchange prevailing on the date of defendant’s breach. This is also the ruling of American Courts,
as follows:

‘The value in domestic money of a payment made in foreign money is
fixed with respect to the rate of exchange at the time of payment.’ (70 CJS, p.
228)

‘According to the weight of authority the amount of recovery
depends upon the current rate of exchange, and not the par value of the
particular money involved.’ (48 C.J. 605-606)

‘The value in domestic money of a payment made in foreign money is
fixed in reference to the rate of exchange at the time of such payment.’ (48
C.J. 605)”

This ruling modified the decision in Arrieta, et al.
vs. National Rice and Corn Corp..^[11] Said this Court:

“This ruling modifies the decision in Arrieta vs. National
Rice and Corn Corporation, L-15645, January 31, 1964 (10 SCRA 79), where it was
held that the obligation based on dollar should be converted into the
Philippine peso at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time the obligation
was incurred, or on July 1,
1952. The provision of Rep. Act 529 was wrongly applied in
this case, because the obligation arose after the enactment of Rep. Act 529
(June 16, 1950). The rate of exchange
prevailing at the time the obligation was incurred would apply only to obligations that were incurred
prior to the enactment of Rep. Act. 529, but not to obligations incurred after the enactment of said Act.”

Petitioner’s appeal then to the Arrieta case is an
exercise in futility.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the petition and AFFIRMING in toto the challenged Decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 41351-R.

Costs against petitioner.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex “A” of Petition;
Rollo, 47-51.

^[2]
Per then Associate Justice Juan P. Enriquez, concurred in by former Associate
Justices Edilberto Soriano and Lourdes P. San Diego.

^[3]
Petitioner’s Brief, 2-3; Rollo, 109.

^[4]
Santos vs. IAC, et al., 145 SCRA 592; Petilla, et al. vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., 151 SCRA 1; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
Wander Philippines, Inc., et al., 160 SCRA 573; Espadera, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 165 SCRA 364; Llantino, et al. vs. Co Liong
Chong, 188 SCRA 592.

^[5]
Underscoring supplied.

^[6]
See Eastboard Navigation, Ltd. vs. Juan Ysmael and Co. Inc., 102 Phil.
1; Ponce vs. Court of Appeals, 90 SCRA 533; San Buenaventura vs.
Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 197; General Insurance & Surety Corp. vs.
Union Insurance Society of Canton Ltd., et al., 179 SCRA 530.

^[7]
The Act was enacted on 16 June
1950.

^[8]
Underscoring supplied for emphasis.

^[9]
34 SCRA 337 (1970).

^[10]
47 Phil. 115.

^[11]
10 SCRA 79 (1964).