PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER, VS. HON. PEDRO SAMSON C. ANIMAS, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SOUTH COTABATO AND ABI OLIPON-DAMBONG, RESPONDENTS.

Appeal by certiorari from an order of the Court of First
Instance of South Cotabato, dismissing the complaint
for Ejectment with Damages, docketed as Civil Case
No. 1044, on the ground that “the principal cause of action is within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court.”

Petitioner Philippine National Bank, on May 13, 1969, filed with
the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch
II, a complaint for “Ejectment with
Damages,” the pertinent allegations of which are as follows:

“3. That the plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of
unregistered agricultural land located at Sitio Lamcanal, Barrio of Malungon,
Municipality of General Santos, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, more particularly described as follows:

Lot No. 458

‘A parcel of unregistered agricultural land, containing an area of
13.0000 hectares, more or less, bounded on the N. by Batigon
Apud; on the S., by Elon Dambong; on the E., by Tinagacan
Road; and on the W., by Hasan Dambong.’

which property formerly formed part of an unsurveyed parcel of land containing an area of 24
hectares, more or less, and is assessed at P3,280.00 under Tax Declaration No.
412 in the name of the Philippine National Bank, the same having been acquired
from Diamalud Dambong
pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Cotabato in Civil Case No. 580 for ‘Sum of Money’ vs. Diamalud Dambong for the bid
price of P100.00 on said whole parcel of 24 hectares, in an auction sale
held by the Provincial Sheriff of Cotabato on
September 11, 1954;

“4.     That in compliance
with law, the corresponding Certificate of Judicial Sale dated September 13,
1954 covering the said 24 hectares of land was executed and delivered by the
Provincial Sheriff of Cotabato in favor of the
plaintiff Bank and was duly registered in the Register of Deeds of Cotabato Province on September 20, 1954 pursuant to Act
3344;

“5.     That after the
expiration of the right to redeem said property within the one-year period
counted from the date of the auction sale, as provided for in the Certificate
of Judicial Sale, and in compliance with law, a Definite Deed of Sale dated
June 11, 1956 was executed and delivered by the said Provincial Sheriff to the
plaintiff Bank which was likewise registered in the Register of Deeds of Cotabato Province on August 20, 1956 pursuant to Act 3344;

“6.     That notwithstanding
said acquisition of ownership by the plaintiff Bank, defendant who is the
surviving spouse of its former owner, Diamalud Dambong, has continued to occupy and possess    said portion of land (Lot No. 458), which
possession by defendant has been merely tolerated by the plaintiff by reason of
the pro­mises of defendant, Abi Olipon-Dambong
and her son, Hasan Dambong
to reacquire said property from the plaintiff Bank;

“7.     That after failure on
the part of defendant to make good her promise to reacquire said parcel of
land, plaintiff thru its representatives, made verbal and written demands on
defendant thru her son, Hasan Dambong,
to vacate the premises thereof, or to deliver plaintiff’s share of the income
derived from the fruits of the land, the written demand being made on December
12, 1968; but defendant refused and still refuses to vacate the premises
thereof or to deliver the plaintiff’s share of the income derived from the
fruits of the land, without any lawful cause or justification;

“8.     That the net income
from the coconuts and other crops such as corn being grown on the land is
conservatively estimated at P1,450.00 per year, which plaintiff could have
received if it were enjoying possession of the same;

“9. That by her deliberate acts of bad faith in not complying with
her promise to reacquire said property from the plaintiff, and in not placing
plaintiff in its peaceful possession thereby de­priving plaintiff its right to
sell the same to interested buyers, defendant should be liable for exemplary
damages, the assess­ment of which is left to the sound discretion of the
Court.” (Underscoring supplied)

Within the time to
answer, private respondent Abi Olipon
Dambong, on August 12, 1969, filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that the allegations in the complaint are clearly statements of
facts which constitute a case of unlawful detainer,
hence, the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action.

On August 26, 1969,
Court of First Instance Judge Pedro Samson C. Animas, finding the motion to
dismiss to be meritorious, issued the following order:

“Finding the MOTION TO DISMISS the complaint to be well taken,
it appearing on the face of the complaint that the defendant unlawfully
detained the property within a period of one-year after she was notified to
vacate the same, hence, the principal cause of action is one of UNLAWFUL
DETAINER which is within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court,
this case is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.”

On September 9, 1969,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid order dated August 26, 1969.  On September
13, 1969, respondent court issued an order as follows:

“For lack of merit, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is hereby
denied.”

Coming to this Court, petitioner alleged that the lower court
erred:  (1) in holding that respondent Abi Olipon-Dambong’s possession
or withholding of the land became unlawful only from the time demand to vacate
the land was made:  (2) in holding that
since the complaint was filed within the period of one year after respondent Abi Olipon-Dambong was notified
to vacate the land, the principal cause of action is one of unlawful detainer which is within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of the city court.

It is the position of herein petitioner that since the ejectment case was filed on May 13, 1969, or almost
fourteen (14) years after the expiration of the one-year period of redemption,
the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
as a case “for illegal possession (accion publiciana)”; that the possession of the land became
illegal after the expiration of the period of redemption which was on September
11, 1956; that for the action to prosper as an “illegal detainer it should have been filed within one year from the
expiration of one-year period of redemption.”

The contention is unmeritorious. 
It is a fact that private respondent was tolerated by herein petitioner
to stay in the property after September 11, 1956.  It was only on December 12, 1968 when petitioner wrote private
respondent “to vacate the premises thereof, or to deliver plaintiff’s
share of the income derived from the fruits of the land.” Thus, it was
only after written demand was made upon the defendant to leave the premises
that her possession became unlawful.  As
held in the case of Prieto vs. Reyes, 14 SCRA 430 –

“x x x since there can be possession by tolerance, this Court has
repeatedly held that possession or detainer becomes
illegal only from the time that there is a demand to vacate.  Hence, the year for bringing the action for
illegal detainer should be counted only from such
demand.”

And, in the case of Casilan
vs. Tomassi, 10 SCRA 267, it was held that
“there is no legal obstacle for the owner to allow a defaulting tenant to
remain in the rented property one month, one year, several years, or even
decades.  That consent, no matter how
long it may last, makes lawful tenant’s possession.  Only when that consent is withdrawn and the
owner demands tenant to leave the property is the owner’s right of possession
asserted and the tenant’s refusal or failure to move out makes his possession
unlawful, because it is violative of the owner’s
preferential right of possession.”

In the case before Us, the demand letter
for the respondent to vacate was on December
12, 1968, and the complaint was filed on May 13, 1969, or within the one-year period.  Hence, the case for unlawful detainer should have been filed in the city court.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated August 26, 1969, dismissing the
complaint is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Vasquez, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., (Chairman), concurs in a separate opinion.