RUFILA Q. ARANAS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FEDERICO ENDONA AND FAUSTO HIJARA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

In a decision rendered by the municipal court of Malabuyoc, Cebu
in an ejectment case, defendants Federico Endona and Fausto Hijara were ordered
to vacate the disputed land and return it to the plaintiff or her
representative, to pay P30.00 monthly rentals from the date of illegal entry up
to the time the disputed land is actually returned, and to pay the plaintiff
P2,000.00 moral damages, P300.00 attorney’s fees, and costs.  The decision was promulgated on August 20,
1965.

On September 15, 1965 and within the reglementary period to
perfect an appeal from the above decision, the defendants filed their notice of
appeal with the municipal court.  They
also filed an appeal bond of P60.00 which was P10.00 more than the P50.00
required by the Rules of Court.*
The second paragraph of the notice of appeal, which is relevant to the case now
before us, reads:

xxx    xxx       xxx

“ENCLOSED HEREWITH is the sum of SIXTY PESOS (P60.00) as Cash
Appeal Bond.”

Three months later, on December 16, 1965, the plaintiff Rufila Q.
Aranas filed a “Motion for Issuance of the Execution of Judgment”
with the Malabuyoc Municipal Court.  Copy
of the motion was received by the defendants on December 23, 1965.

The motion for execution was set for hearing on January 3,
1966.  The defendants did not file any
opposition to the motion and, inspite of notice, did not appear at the hearing
either personally or through counsel.

On February 28, 1966, the municipal court issued the writ of
execution of judgment as prayed for in the motion.

On March 3, 1966, the defendants deposited P10.00 with the
municipal treasurer’s office which, according to them, represented the full
payment of the appellate docket fee of P20.00 required by the Rules of Court.

On March 18, 1966, the defendants filed a “motion to set
aside the execution and to deliberate the right to appeal.”

On April 21, 1966, the municipal court denied the motion to set
aside execution and ordered compliance with the writ of execution of
judgment.  The court ruled that
completion of payment of the appellate docket fee six months after payment of
the first installment was not substantial compliance with the rules on
appeal.  It concluded:

“1. Compliance with this period for appeal considered
absolutely indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and to orderly
and speedy discharge of Judicial business so that if said period is not
complied with, the judgment becomes final and executory.  (De Jesus vs. PNB et al., L-19299, Nov. 28,
1964, pp. 98-101).

“2. Period to appeal cannot be impliedly extended.  Extensions of time must be asked before the
expiration of the original period sought to be extended.  (Vivo vs. Arca et al., April 30, 1965, pp.
132-133).

“3. Under the provisions of Section 2 Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court, in order to perfect an appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court,
an appel­lant must, within 15 days from Notice of Judgment (1) file with the
Municipal Judge a notice of appeal, (2) deliver a certificate of the Municipal
Treasurer or the Clerk of Court of First Instance showing that he has deposited
with the appellate Court Docket fee, (sic) and (3) give a bond.  (Valdez vs. Acumen, et al., L-13536, Jan. 29,
1960 pp. 42-45).

“4. Well settled is the rule that failure to perfect an appeal from
a judgment of the Municipal Court within the period allowed by law, bars an
appeal, and that, if a party does not perfect his appeal within the time
prescribed by law, the appellate Court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and for
that reason the compliance with said requirement is jurisdictional.  (Valdez vs. Acumen et al., L-13536, Jan. 29,
1960, pp. 42-45).  In fine strict not
substantial, compliance therewith is required. 
(id).”

xxxxx             xxxx                 xxxxx

The order denying the motion to set aside execution was appealed
to the Court of First Instance of Cebu. 
On June 27, 1966, the court of first instance affirmed the questioned
order.  A motion for reconsideration was
denied on August 1, 1966.

The defendants have two assignments of errors in this appeal:

First Assigned Error

THE LEGALITY OF THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT DATED AUGUST 1, 1966 IS ASSIGNED AS ERROR, WHICH DENIED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY
THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS THRU THEIR FORMER COUNSEL ATTY. CANDIDO N. JUMAPAO
ATTACKING AN EARLIER ORDER OF THE SAME COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU,
BRANCH VII, DATED JUNE 27, 1966 WHICH ORDER HAS AFFIRMED THE ORDER OF THE
MUNICIPAL COURT OF MALABUYOC, CEBU WHICH RULED THAT THE APPEAL FROM THE
MUNICIPAL COURT TO THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE WAS NOT PERFECTED WITHIN THE
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 2,
RULE 40 OF THE NEW RULES OF COURT.

Second Assigned Error

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING AND DECLARING THAT THE PAYMENT
OF TEN PESOS FOR THE APPELLATE DOCKETING FEE WITHIN THE TIME FOR PERFECTING AN
APPEAL AND THE OTHER TEN PESOS PAID AFTER THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD WAS A
SUFFICIENT AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE AND NOT A FATAL DEFECT UNDER THE LIBERAL
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 2 RULE 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, IN AS MUCH THAT THE
PAYMENT WAS EFFECTED BEFORE THE ORDER OF DENIAL WAS ISSUED BY THE MUNICIPAL
COURT.

The issue raised in this appeal is whether or not under the
circumstances of this case, the defendants-appellants perfected their appeal
from the municipal court to the court of first instance.

Section 2, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:

“Sec. 2.  Appeal, how
perfected.  – An appeal shall be
perfected within fifteen (15) days after notification to the party of the
judgment complained of, (a) by filing with the justice of the peace or
municipal judge a notice of appeal; (b) by delivering a postal money order for
the amount of the appellate court docket fee, or a certificate of the municipal
treasurer showing that the appellant has deposited such appellate court docket
fee, or, in chartered cities, a certificate of the clerk of the municipal court
showing receipt of the said fee; and (c) by giving a bond.”

As earlier stated, the defendants on September 15, 1965, filed a
notice of appeal within the 15 days period to do so.  On the same date, they filed a cash bond of
P60.00.  The defendants did not deliver a
postal money order for the docket fee nor give any certificate of the treasurer
that a deposit of the appellate court docket fee had been effected.  Much, much later when a writ of execution had
already been issued, the defendants raised the argument that the correct appeal
bond was only P50.00, that the overpayment or balance of P10.00 paid within the
15-day period should be considered as a first installment on the P20.00 docket
fee and that a liberal interpretation of the rules should allow the second
installment of P10.00 to be paid around six months later.

The assigned errors have no merit.

The records show that there was a total failure on the part of
the defendants-appellants to pay the required docket fee.  The notice of appeal specifically mentioned
only the “intention to appeal from the decision rendered by this Honorable
Court to the Honorable Court of First Instance of Cebu, Barili Branch, Barili,
Cebu” and the inclosure of Sixty Pesos (P60.00) as cash appeal bond.  There was no mention of any payment of docket
fees whether in full or by installment. 
It is more logical and reasonable to explain the P10.00 overpayment as
based on the appellants’ wrong estimate of the amount required for an appeal
bond rather than an installment payment of docket fees.

Moreover, even if we accept the strained interpretation of the
defendants-appellants in the spirit of liberality, the precedents on the
applicable rule indicate that the appeal cannot be considered as having been
perfected on time.

As early as November 16, 1932 this Court rendered a decision in Lazaro
v. Endencia and Andres (57 Phil. 552) that full payment of docket
fees within the required period is an “indispensable step” for the
perfection of an appeal.  The plaintiffs,
in that case, filed a notice of appeal within the five-day period to do so but
deposited only Eight Pesos (P8.00) docket fee instead of the required Sixteen
Pesos (P16.00).  This Court ruled:

“x x x Examining the statutes there
can be no question that payment of the full amount of the docket fees is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal, which in cases of forcible
entry and detainer, must be within a period of five days from notice.  The statute looks to early determination of
such cases, and if the contention of the respondent should be upheld there
would be no definite rule in such cases. 
There would be as much right to contend for twenty-eight days or
forty-two days as there is to contend for fourteen, as is done herein.  In the absence of an indispensable step, the
appeal was not perfected and the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan was
therefore without jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal.  (Schultz vs. Concepcion, 32 Phil., 1.)”

Payment of the full amount within the reglementary period was
declared jurisdictional.

The jurisdictional nature of this requirement continues to the
present.  However, under exceptional
circumstances its strict interpretation has been mollified or mitigated to
better serve the interest of justice.

Thus, where the defendants deposited less than the full amount
such as three-fourths of the P16.00 docket fee upon the advise of the justice
of the peace that P12.00 was the full amount and the municipal treasurer and
the clerk of the appellate court led the appellants to mistakenly believe that
they had paid the correct fee, we allowed the appeal to proceed upon payment of
the balance.  (Segovia v. Barrios, 75
Phil. 764; and Marasigan v. Palacio, 87 Phil. 839.  See also Gambal et al. v. Hon. Barcelona et
al., 106 Phil. 328; Tagulao v. Judge Padlanmundok et al., 108 Phil. 499; and
Bernido et al. v. Balana, 124 Phil. 137.)

The rule is settled that, in case of appeals from inferior courts
to courts of first instance, the amount of the appellate docket fee must be
deposited in full within fifteen (15) days after notice of the judgment
complained of and that the appeal is not deemed perfected if only a part of the
amount is deposited within the 15 days period and the remainder is tendered
after the expiration of the period.  Only
when the appellants make a clear showing that the appeal should be allowed in
order to prevent a miscarriage of justice may the rule be relaxed.

Where the failure to pay the full and correct amount was due to
the inexcusable negligence of counsel or to his ignorance of the Rules, the
requirement may not be relaxed.  The fact
that the counsel is a new practitioner does not justify his negligence.  (Chan v. Oceanic Wireless Net work, Inc., 26
SCRA 68)

We cannot find in the records any injustice or unfairness nor any
miscarriage of justice that would result from the enforcement of the rule in
this case.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, and Relova, JJ., concur.

*
Under Section 3, Rule 40, an appeal bond with at least one sufficient surety
shall be in the sum of P60.00 but a cash appeal bond, which was filed in this
case, shall be P50.00.