IN RE DISBARMENT OF RODOLFO PAJO.

In an information dated August 10, 1976, respondents Rodolfo Pajo and Clodualdo Origenes were charged before the City
Court of Davao City
with falsification of public document under Article 172, Paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code.

After trial, the two accused were found guilty by the city court
in a decision dated April 14, 1980.  Clodualdo Origenes was sentenced as principal to an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day to three (3) years, six (6) months
and twenty-one (21) days imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1,000.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and costs.

Respondent Rodolfo Pajo was found
guilty as an accomplice and sentenced to a prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day, to pay a
fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and costs.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment of conviction of Clodualdo Origenes was affirmed
with no modification.  Rodolfo Pajo was, however, found guilty as a principal and his
sentence was raised to imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to three
(3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
at the rate of P8.00 per day not
exceeding 1/3 of the principal penalty and in no case to exceed one year and
costs.

The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on February 22, 1982.  An examination of the Court of Appeals rollo
in CA-G.R.  No. 23933-CR indicates that
Atty. Pajo received a copy of the appellate decision
on March 10, 1982
(CA rollo, p. 43) and a copy of the resolution
denying his motion for reconsidera­tion on April 15, 1982.  (CA rollo, p. 91).

On June 7, 1982,
Atty. Rodolfo Pajo filed a petition for review on certiorari
of the appellate decision finding him guilty as co-principal through conspiracy
of the crime of falsification of public document.

The petition was denied
by the First Division of this Court on June 14, 1982 on two grounds – First, the petition had no
statement of material dates to determine the timeliness of its filing; Second, even if the material dates were given, the petition
would nevertheless be denied because it had no merit.  The case was also referred to the Court en
banc for disbarment of Atty. Rodolfo Pajo.

On June 29, 1982,
a motion for reconsideration of the June
14, 1982 resolution was received. 
The motion stated that the docket, legal research, and allied fees in
G.R. No. 60654, the petition for review on certiorari, were all paid on June 7, 1982.  There is nothing in the motion to show that
the petition was filed and these fees paid before the period to appeal the
decision of the Court of Appeals had lapsed except a bare statement that the
fees were paid within the reglementary period.  Parenthetically, the examination of the
records of the Court of Appeals shows that the petition which was filed with
the Supreme Court on June 7, 1982 was filed
fifty-three (53) days after the petitioner received on April 15, 1982 the resolution denying his motion
for reconsideration.  On the falsification
charge, Atty. Pajo merely reiterated the exhibits
filed during trial and passed upon by the Court of Appeals to show that he was
innocent.

On the same date, June
29, 1982, the disbarment proceedings were docketed as
Administrative Case No. 2410.  Atty. Pajo was required to show cause why
he should not be disbarred by reason of final judgment.  In the meantime, he was suspended from the
practice of law.

Atty. Pajo has shown no cause why he
should not be disbarred by reason of final judgment.

Section 27, Rule 138
provides:

“Sec. 27.  Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme
Court on what grounds.  – A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. 
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.”

Rodolfo Pajo and his co-accused Clodualdo
Origenes were found guilty of having conspired in the
execution of a deed of sale of a parcel of land by a vendor who had been
deceased for almost eight (8) years.  Nestoria Origenes who was
supposed to have executed the deed of sale in favor of her nephew Clodualdo Origenes died July 6,
1968.  The deed was executed on February
16, 1976.  Atty. Pajo prepared
and notarized the falsified deed of sale.

The trial court and the
Court of Appeals found on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that Atty.
Rodolfo Pajo had not only grown up from birth in the
vicinity of Nestoria Origenes‘
residence and he, therefore, knew that the supposed affiant was an impostor but
he was also aware when he prepared the falsified deed that Nestoria
had been dead many years and had, in fact, attended the wake and burial of the
supposed vendor.  These are factual
findings amply supported by the records which we should not disturb.  As earlier stated, the First Division of this
Court denied the petition to review on certiorari the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

In the respondent’s
Manifestation – Explanation received by this Court on September
15, 1982, the
arguments given in answer to the “show cause” order on why Atty. Pajo should not be disbarred by reason of final judgment
are:

(1)  
The respondent is an orphan and
nephew of former Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo.  He worked his way through college – both for
his A.B. and LL.B. degrees- as a security guard because he was obsessed with an
ambition to become a lawyer and to serve his fellow citizens.  He was a student leader at the Far Eastern
University.

(2)  
In twelve (12) years of active law
practice, he handled many cases some of which he listed in the mani­festation.  With such a good practice, it is impossible
and improbable that the respondent would cause his own destruction.  He is a victim of circumstances.

(3)  The respondent reiterated his defenses in the
Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals on why he is innocent of the
charge of falsification.

In this disbarment case,
we are no longer called upon to review the judgment of conviction which has now
become final.  The review of the
conviction no longer rests upon this Court. 
(In re Jaranillo, 101 Phil.
323.) The crime of falsification of public document is clearly contrary
to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral
turpitude.  (De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces, 111 Phil.
569.) The respondent’s acts of taking advantage of his office as
attorney to prepare a deed of sale purportedly by one who had been eight years
dead amounted to deceit, malpractice, and misconduct in office as a
lawyer.  (Cf. In re Avanceña,
21 SCRA 1012).  The case comes clearly
under the grounds given in Section 27 of Rule 138.  Disbarment follows as a consequence of the
conviction for the crime.

WHEREFORE, respondent Rodolfo Pajo
is hereby disbarred from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken
off the roll of attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Makasiar,
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin, and Relova, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., and
Vasquez, J., no part.