ANITA M. SEARES, PLAINTIFF, VS. THE HON. JUDGE HAROLD M. HERNANDO, AS JUDGE OF THE CFI OF ABRA, BRANCH I, AND SOLOMON LALUGAN, RESPONDENTS.

In this petition “for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Disqualifica­tion”, which was filed with the Commission on Elections on No­vember
15, 1980, and certified to this Court by the Commission in an order dated
February 6, 1981, pursuant to the case of Pimentel vs. Comelec
(G. R. Nos. 53581-83, December 19, 1980, 101
SCRA. 769), the petitioner seeks to set aside the order dated November 3, 1980,
and the decision dated November 7, 1980, of respondent Judge Harold M. Hernando
of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I; in
Election Case No. 3, on the ground that the same were “rendered with grave
abuse of dis­cretion and/or lack of jurisdiction.”

Petitioner Anita Seares and private
respondent Solomon Lalugan were the candidates for
mayor of the Municipality of Lagayan, Abra, in the elections held on January 30, 1980.  On January 31, 1980, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Lagayan declared that Solomon Lalugan obtained 1,286 votes as against 394 votes garnered
by Anita Seares. 
Charging irregularities in the voting and in the counting of the votes,
Anita Seares filed with the Court of First Instance
of Abra on February 11, 1980, a verified petition of
protest contesting the validity and regularity of the election proceedings in
all the eight (8) voting centers of the Municipality of Lagayan,
Abra.  On March
6, 1980, Solomon Lalugan filed his answer to the
petition of protest.  Issues having been
joined, the Court of First Instance of Abra ordered
the pro­duction of the ballot boxes and of all the documents used in the
election and created a committee of revisors under
whose super­vision the petitioner-protestant segregated, identified, marked and
photographed all the ballots which she wanted to question.  Thereafter, the committee submitted its
report to the court which then set the date for the reception of evidence.

The protestant presented
her direct evidence and rested her case. 
The protestee then presented his evidence and,
on November 3, 1980, rested his case.  The transcript of the stenographic notes
shows that on the same day, the counsel for the protestant, Atty. Constante Pimentel, manifested in open court that from the
evidence presented by the protestee, he discovered
that about 200 to 300 persons who were not registered voters were allowed to
vote in the subject voting centers.  Consequently,
he verbally moved for the reopening of the ballot boxes and for a period of
three (3) days within which to segregate the ballots of the alleged
non-registered voters and to present his evidence relative thereto.  Counsel for the protestant likewise moved
that he be given twenty (20) days after his presentation of additional evidence
within which to submit his written memorandum. 
Counsel for the protestee, Atty. Crisostomo Pariñas opposed the
motion for reopening of the ballot boxes on the ground that it would put no end
to the case and that the evidence sought to be presented by the protestant was
not in the nature of rebuttal evidence and should have therefore been presented
at the time of her presenta­tion of direct evidence.

Acting on the verbal motion presented by the protestant and the
opposition interposed by the protestee, the trial
court, pre­sided by the herein respondent Judge Harold M. Hernando, ruled that
since the evidence sought to be presented by the protestant was not rebuttal in
nature, the same should have been presented before the protestant had rested
her case.  Furthermore, the respondent
judge held that the alleged unregistered voters could well be those persons
authorized by illiterate voters to vote for them.  Accordingly, the respondent judge verbally
denied the protestant’s oral motion for the reopening of the ballot boxes and
for a period of three (3) days within which to present her evidence relative to
the alleged unregistered voters.

Counsel for the protestant verbally sought reconsideration of the
oral order of denial.  He admitted that
the evidence which he wanted to present was in the nature of additional
evidence but he pointed out that he discovered said evidence only after the pro­testee had presented witnesses who testified that they
voted even though their names did not appear in the registry of voters.  As regards the respondent judge’s assumption
that the alleged un­registered voters could well be persons who assisted
illiterate voters, counsel for the protestant contended that the minutes of
voting did not reflect the alleged fact that illiterates voted with the
assistance of other persons.  Despite
said explanations, the respondent judge denied the protestant’s motion for
reconside­ration in a ruling dictated in open court, on the ground that the
reopening of the ballot boxes would violate Sec. 8, Rule V of Comelec Resolution No. 1451 which requires that the
presentation and reception of evidence in election cases should be completed
within 30 days from the commencement thereof. 
The judge, how­ever, gave the protestant fifteen (15) days from receipt of his order within which to question
the same on certiorari.

Before the protestant could receive the written order of denial,
she was notified by telegram, on November 7, 1980, that the de­cision in the
case would be promulgated on that day. 
It was only on the following day, November 8, 1980, that she received the written order
of denial dated November 3, 1980, and learned that the respondent judge had
added in said order the following: “This case is now considered
submitted for decision.  Notify by
telegrams the opposing counsels that promulgation shall take place on November
7, 1980.  No postponement shall be
entertained.“

On November 10, 1980,
protestant’s counsel received the decision dated November 7, 1980, which dismissed the election protest
and upheld the election of Solomon Lalugan as
Municipal Mayor of Lagayan, Abra.  Five days thereafter, or on November 15, 1980, counsel for the
protestant filed with the Commission on Elections the instant petition for certiorari,
prohibition and dis­qualification.  A
copy of the petition was received by the respondent judge on November 18, 1980 — as noted in his
order dated November 24, 1980.  In another order of the same date, said judge
declared his decision dated November
7, 1980, as final and executory and
directed the Deputy Clerk of Court to furnish a copy of the decision to the
Commission on Elections, the Ministry of Local Government and Community
Development and the Commission on Audit.

On December 2, 1980,
the Second Division of the Commission on Elections issued an order restraining
the respondent judge from conducting further proceedings in Election Protest
No. 3 and requiring him, as well as
private respondent Solomon Lalugan, to answer the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and disqualification.

On December 19, 1980,
the petitioner, thru counsel, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition
to declare the respondent judge in contempt for having declared as final and executory, in his order dated November 24, 1980, his decision dated November 7, 1980, despite receipt of
a copy of the petition for certiorari, prohibition and disqualification.

The respondent judge and the private respondent filed their
answers to the petition on December
29, 1980, and January 13,
1981, respectively.

Respondent Judge Hernando did not file any answer to the petition
to declare him in contempt despite notices given by the Commission on
Elections.  On January 19, 1981, the Com­mission on Elections
received a telegram from the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Abra informing the commission that Judge Hernando was no
longer reporting for duty.  [On December 16, 1980, this Court
ordered Judge Harold M.  Hernando to refrain
from discharging the functions of his office in view of the information filed
against him in Criminal Case No. 2264 before the Sandiganbayan
for violation of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.]

On January 23, 1981,
counsel for the petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a motion to
certify the records of the case to this Court. 
And in an order dated February
6, 1981, the Commission on Elections did so pursuant
to the Pimentel ruling.

The respondents were required to file their comments to the
petition.  In a manifestation dated March 30, 1981, Judge Hernando stated
that he was adopting the comment he had filed with the Commission on Elections. 
Private respondent Solomon Lalugan filed his comment
on April 13, 1981.  On June 18, 1981, We sent for a copy
of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during the hearing on November
3, 1980, which was
actually received on September 14, 1981.

While the issues raised in this petition may be resolved in the
review of the decision on appeal, the peculiar circumstances and nature of the
case require that the same be now laid to rest in this special civil action for
certiorari.  Consequently, We give due course to the petition which is impressed with
merit.

The respondent judge’s refusal to allow the presentation of the
newly discovered evidence concerning the alleged unregistered voters, as well
as the undue haste with which he rendered the decision in the electoral protest
manifested his arbitrariness and are indicative of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The first reason given by the respondent judge in denying the
protestant’s motion was that the evidence sought to be pre­sented was not
rebuttal in nature and could not therefore be allowed after the protestant had
finished presenting her direct evidence. 
But the protestant never claimed that the evidence sought to be
presented was of that nature.  She
admitted that the same was additional evidence which was discovered only after
the protestee had presented witnesses whose testimony
revealed the fact that many unregistered voters (numbering around 200-300)
actually voted in Lagayan.

The respondent judge erred when he held as an absolute rule that
the presentation of additional evidence could not be allowed after the pasty
had finished presenting his direct evidence. 
For a trial judge has the discretion to allow, in the furtherance of
justice, the presentation of additional evidence after the parties have
produced their respective direct proofs (Sec. 1 [f], Rule 30, Rules of Court).

The second reason advanced by the respondent judge to justify his
denial of the protestant”s motion was that the
alleged unregistered voters could very well be those authorized by illiterate
voters to prepare and cast their ballots for them.

But the protestant’s counsel pointed out — without contradiction
from the protestee — that the minutes of voting in
all the 8 voting centers did not indicate that illiterate voters actually voted
in the subject voting centers with the assistance of other persons.  In the face of such circumstance, the judge’s
assumption that the alleged 200-300 unregistered voters were persons authorized
by illiterate voters to vote for them was clearly unfounded and speculative.

Apparently aware of the insufficiency of the reasons given by him
in denying the motion to be allowed to present additional evidence, the
respondent judge advanced another ground to support his denial of the
protestant’s motion for reconsideration of the order of denial, namely: that to
allow the presentation of additional evidence would violate Sec. 8, Rule V of Comelec Resolution No. 1451 which requires that the
presentation and reception of evidence in election cases should be completed
within 30 days from the commencement thereof. 
But such requirement had already been violated long before the day it
was being invoked.  For
while the presentation of the protestant’s evidence began on April 17, 1980, the protestee rested his case only on November 3, 1980.  The 30-day
requirement has to be subordinated to a more substantial requirement, namely:
to ascertain in a more accurate way the will of the voters each of which is a
particle of sovereignty.  Thus, We hold as arbitrary the act of the respondent judge
invoking the 30-day requirement (which he had already long violated) without
regard for a substantive necessity.  For
plainly the pre­sentation of evidence concerning the alleged 200-300
unregistered voters (constituting almost 20% of the total number of voters who
actually voted in the municipality of
Lagayan)
could result in a more accurate determination of the will of the people.  Moreover, the judge’s avowal of speedy
disposition of the electoral protest was betrayed by his own act.  For while he denied the requested period of
three (3) days; he nevertheless gave the protestant a much longer period of
fifteen (15) days within which to question the order of denial on certiorari.

The pattern of arbitrariness pursued by the respondent judge
became more manifest when, after denying the protestant”s
motion to present additional evidence and giving her 15 days from receipt of
the written order of denial within which to question the same on certiorari,
in apparent bad faith he inserted in the written order of denial a statement
declaring the case submitted for decision on November 3, 1980 and ordering promulgation on November 7, 1980 without
postponement.  The respondent judge
obviously acted in unseemly haste.

Finally, in an attempt to prevent the nullification of his order
of denial, the respondent judge, upon notice of the filing of the special civil
action of certiorari, immediately declared his de­cision as final and executory and insisted, in his answer to the petition for certiorari,
that the issue of the validity of said order of denial had become moot and
academic.

Finding grave abuse of discretion in the respondent judge’s acts
of denying the protestant’s motion to be allowed to present evidence relative
to the alleged 200-300 unregistered voters and of precipitately rendering his
decision in the subject electoral protest, We hold as null and void the
respondent judge’s order dated November 3, 1980 and his decision dated November
7, 1980.

WHEREFORE, the order dated November 3, 1980 and the decision dated November 7, 1980 in Election Case No.
3 are declared null and void and respondent Judge Harold M.  Hernando, or whoever succeeds him as Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, is
directed to conduct further proceedings in said case by ordering the re-opening
of the ballot boxes in the eight (8) voting centers and giving the
petitioner-protestant a reasonable period within which to present her evidence
relative to the alleged 200-300 unregistered voters.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera,
Ericta, Plana, and Escolin, JJ., concur.

De Castro, J., concurring in
the result.

Makasiar, J., in the result.