ANITA M. SEARES, PLAINTIFF, VS. THE HON. JUDGE HAROLD M. HERNANDO, AS JUDGE OF THE CFI OF ABRA, BRANCH I, AND SOLOMON LALUGAN, RESPONDENTS.

Seares versus Hernando

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and disqualification brought by Anita Seares against Judge Harold Hernando of the Court of First Instance of Abra and against her rival candidate Solomon Lalugan. Seares lost the mayoralty race of Lagayan, Abra, filed an election protest, and then found herself shut out of the courtroom when the trial judge refused to let her present newly discovered evidence and rushed out a decision against her. The case matters because the Supreme Court uses it to mark the outer boundary of judicial discretion in election cases: a judge who blocks relevant evidence and acts with unseemly haste commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and his orders will be struck down as null and void.

Procedural History

Anita Seares filed a verified petition of protest with the Court of First Instance of Abra, contesting the validity and regularity of the election proceedings in all eight voting centers of Lagayan. Solomon Lalugan answered, issues were joined, and the trial court ordered the ballot boxes produced and created a committee of revisors. The protestant presented her direct evidence and rested. The protestee presented his evidence and rested on November 3, 1980. On that same day the protestant orally moved to reopen the ballot boxes to prove that two hundred to three hundred unregistered persons had voted. Judge Hernando denied the motion, and denied reconsideration, giving her fifteen days within which to question the denial on certiorari. He then declared the case submitted and set promulgation for November 7, 1980. The decision dismissing the protest was promulgated on November 7, and received by protestant's counsel on November 10. Five days later, on November 15, 1980, counsel filed the petition with the Commission on Elections. The Commission restrained the respondent judge and later certified the case to the Supreme Court pursuant to its ruling in the Pimentel case. The Supreme Court gave due course to the petition and decided it as a special civil action for certiorari.

Facts

Anita Seares and Solomon Lalugan were candidates for mayor of Lagayan, Abra, in the elections held on January 30, 1980. On January 31, the Municipal Board of Canvassers declared Lalugan the winner with one thousand two hundred eighty-six votes against the three hundred ninety-four votes of Seares. Charging irregularities in the voting and in the counting, Seares filed her protest on February 11, 1980.

After the ballot boxes were produced and a committee of revisors had segregated, identified, marked and photographed the questioned ballots, the case proceeded to trial. The protestant presented her evidence and rested. The protestee then presented his witnesses, and on November 3, 1980, he rested. On that same day, protestant's counsel manifested in open court that from the protestee's own evidence he had discovered that about two hundred to three hundred persons who were not registered voters had been allowed to vote. He orally moved to reopen the ballot boxes and asked for three days to segregate the ballots of the alleged non-registered voters and present evidence. The protestee opposed, arguing that the evidence was not rebuttal in nature and should have been presented earlier.

Judge Hernando denied the motion, ruling that the evidence was not rebuttal and should have been offered before the protestant rested, and adding that the alleged unregistered voters could well be persons authorized by illiterate voters to vote for them. On reconsideration, counsel explained that he discovered the evidence only after the protestee's witnesses testified that they voted although their names did not appear in the registry, and that the minutes of voting in all eight centers did not show that illiterate voters had voted with assistance. The judge still denied reconsideration, now invoking the thirty-day period for completing the presentation and reception of evidence in election cases. Yet he gave the protestant fifteen days to question the denial on certiorari. Before she could even receive the written order, she was notified by telegram that the decision would be promulgated on November 7, 1980. The written order, received the next day, had been expanded to declare the case submitted for decision and to forbid any postponement of promulgation. The decision dismissing the protest and upholding the election of Solomon Lalugan was received on November 10, 1980. Upon notice of the certiorari petition, the judge declared his decision final and executory.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in refusing to allow the protestant to present newly discovered additional evidence concerning the alleged two hundred to three hundred unregistered voters.
• Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in precipitately rendering his decision in the electoral protest, and whether or not his order of denial and his decision are null and void.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1, paragraph f, of Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, on the court's power to allow additional evidence, provides:

For a trial judge has the discretion to allow, in the furtherance of justice, the presentation of additional evidence after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs (Sec. 1 [f], Rule 30, Rules of Court).

This is the provision the Court invokes to hold that the presentation of additional evidence after direct proofs is not absolutely prohibited but lies in the sound discretion of the trial judge, exercised in the furtherance of justice.

Section 8, Rule V of Comelec Resolution No. 1451, on the thirty-day period for evidence in election cases, provides:

the presentation and reception of evidence in election cases should be completed within 30 days from the commencement thereof.

The respondent judge used this period as his ground for denying reconsideration, but the Court holds that it must be subordinated to the more substantial requirement of ascertaining the true will of the voters, and that it had in any event already been violated long before it was invoked.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court holds that the respondent judge erred in treating as an absolute rule the proposition that additional evidence may not be allowed after a party has finished presenting direct evidence. The protestant never claimed the evidence was rebuttal; she candidly admitted it was additional evidence discovered only after the protestee's witnesses revealed that many unregistered voters had actually voted. The Court quotes the governing rule:

For a trial judge has the discretion to allow, in the furtherance of justice, the presentation of additional evidence after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs (Sec. 1 [f], Rule 30, Rules of Court).

The judge's second ground, that the unregistered voters might be persons authorized by illiterate voters, is unfounded and speculative, because the minutes of voting in all eight centers did not indicate that illiterate voters had voted with assistance. His third ground, the thirty-day period, is arbitrary: the period had already been violated, since the protestant began presenting evidence on April 17, 1980, while the protestee rested only on November 3, 1980. The Court holds that the thirty-day requirement must yield to the more substantial requirement of ascertaining in a more accurate way the will of the voters, each of which is a particle of sovereignty, especially since the excluded evidence concerned almost twenty percent of the total number of voters who actually voted.

On the second issue, the Court finds a pattern of arbitrariness. The judge denied a three-day request yet granted fifteen days to go to a higher court; he inserted in the written order a declaration that the case was submitted and a fixed promulgation date without postponement; and upon notice of the certiorari petition he immediately declared his decision final and executory and insisted the issue had become moot. The refusal to allow the evidence and the undue haste in rendering the decision are indicative of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The order of denial and the decision are therefore null and void.

Doctrine

A trial judge has the discretion, in the furtherance of justice, to allow the presentation of additional evidence after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs; the presentation of such evidence is not absolutely barred merely because a party has rested. The thirty-day period for completing the presentation and reception of evidence in election cases is not absolute and must be subordinated to the more substantial requirement of ascertaining the true will of the voters. A judge who refuses relevant evidence and acts with unseemly haste, in a manner that betrays arbitrariness, commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and his orders and decision are null and void.

Disposition

The petition was given due course and granted; the order of November 3, 1980 and the decision of November 7, 1980 were declared null and void, and Judge Hernando, or whoever succeeds him, was directed to conduct further proceedings by reopening the ballot boxes in the eight voting centers and giving the protestant a reasonable period to present her evidence, without costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the thirty-day period in election cases yields to the ascertainment of the will of the voters, each of which is a particle of sovereignty, and a judge's arbitrary refusal of relevant evidence is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Examiners use this case on the discretion to admit additional evidence after direct proofs, and on grave abuse of discretion as a ground for certiorari in election protests.