THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EMANNUEL FELIPE, VELASCO, ET AL., ACCUSED, EMMANUEL FELIPE VELASCO Y SARNO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court
of Cebu convicting the appellant, Emmanuel F. Velasco
of the crime of murder and sentencing him as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Emmanuel Felipe
Velasco y Sarno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder des­cribed in the aforequoted
information.  Appreciating in favor of
the accused the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which
circumstance is offset by the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the accused
should be, as he is, hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory pe­nalties of
the law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Ricardo Barbado
in the sum of P15,000.00 by way of actual and compensatory damages and the sum
of P50, 000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages; and to pay the
costs.”^[1]

The appealed judgment is mainly based on appellant’s sworn
statement which the trial court considered as an extra-judicial con­fession
perfectly admissible under the Constitution with its strict requirement on the
admissibility of extra-judicial confessions given during custodial
investigation.^[2]

The thrust of the appeal is that the supposed extra-judicial
statement was improperly admitted, and that assuming it to be admissible, it is
insufficient to support conviction.  For
its decisive import­ance in the resolution of the issues as above intimated the
statement of appellant must be, as it is hereunder reproduced in full:

“PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:

“You are hereby
informed that you are here investigated in connection with a certain case
wherein you were involved.  According to
Our Constitution, you have the right to remain silent and to answer or not to
answer the questions propounded to you in this investiga­tion because all what you
will state here will be used as an evidence in your favor or against you in any
court of justice here in the Philippines.  You have also the right to avail the services
of counsel of your own choice to assist you. 
Do you clearly understand all these?

“ANSWER:

“Yes, sir.

“1.  Q. – After
you were informed of your constitutional rights, are you willing to give your
statement and to answer the questions in this investigation?

      A. – Yes, sir.

“2. Q. – Will you swear to tell the truth and nothing
but the truth in this investigation?

      A. – Yes, sir.

“3. Q. – Please state your name and other personal
circumstances?

      A. – EMMANUEL
FELIPE VELASCO, ye SARNO, 27 years old, married and a resident of 1460-A M.J.
Ave., Mabolo, Cebu City.

“4. Q. – Do you know why are you here in the Police
Station?

      A – I’m here
because I surrendered after knowing that I was hunted.

“5.  Q. – After you
surrendered, were you told by the police why you were hunted?

      A. – Yes, I know.
It is about the driver of an Elite taxi who was killed on March 21, 1978.

“6.  Q. – Do you
have some knowledge about that incident wherein the driver of an Elite taxi was
killed on March 21, 1978?

      A – Yes.

“7. Q. – Will you please narrate to us all what you know
about that incident?

     A – Last March 21,
1978, at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, I, together with Ben Verano, Boy Kho (Agustin Kho) and Ben del Rosario were strolling at Barracks, Mabolo, Cebu City and not long
after, we agreed that I and Boy Kho will go ahead and
the two Ben will be left behind because they have to go to the house of Cesar Pelonio at Cabantan St., Boy Kho then hailed a taxi, an Elite taxi, and then we
boarded.  I was sitted
at the back while Boy Kho was sitted
at the front seat besides the driver and Boy Kho
ordered the driver to deliver us to M.J. Cuenco Ave.  When we arrived at San Jose dela Montaña, at the corner of
the street leading to Casal’s Village, Boy Kho ordered the driver to stop the vehicle and pointed a
revolver at the driver and said, “DON’T MOVE’BAY, WE NEED YOUR
VEHICLE” and at this moment, the driver attempted to fight back but was
prevented to by Boy Kho who was a little bigger than
the driver and I was ordered by Boy Kho to be the one
to drive the vehicle and the driver transferred at the back seat and who was at
all times being pointed to by Boy Kho of his
revolver.  I was the one who drove the
taxi and from there we went back to Barracks and then we picked-up Ben Verano and Ben del Rosario and the two Ben were sitted at the back. 
Ben Verano was sitted
at the right side of the driver and Ben del Rosario was at the left side.  Ben Verano and Boy Kho agreed to proceed to Opra Village
passing thru Capitol Site.  While on our
way to Opra I saw that Ben Verano
also got his revolver and pointed it to the driver and when we arrived at the Caltex Station at Escario St.,
the driver attempted to jump (this is the place where the Office of the Elite
taxi is located), and so there-was a commotion at the back and all of a sudden
I heard two shots coming from the revolver of Boy Kho
and at this moment we were already ascending to Opra
and I saw the driver leaning at the back seat and was no longer moving and Ben Verano said: “I was hit”.  When we arrived at Camp
Marina, I stopped the vehicle and
Ben Verano, Ben del Rosario and Boy Kho immediately alighted and not long after Boy Kho returned and we ran but we parted our ways and I went
home together with Ben del Rosario at Gil Tudtud, Mabolo.  I left Ben
del Rosario at home and I looked for Ben Verano and I
found him in the house of Cesar Pelonio at Cabantan St. and Ben Verano had a
gunshot wound and was treated by Cesar Pelonio and
the ammuni­tion was already removed from his wrist and Ben Verano
accompanied me to my house and there I treated his wound again.

“8.Q. – Do you know what happened to the driver which
you left behind inside the taxi at Camp
Marina?

     A – I know that he
is already dead.

“9. Q. Do you know the name of that driver who is
already dead?

      A – I was told
that the name of that driver is Ricardo Barbado.

“10. Q. – What was your purpose why you brought the
driver and his vehicle to Opra
Village?

      A. – We intend to
get his money.

“11. Q. – Were you already aware of that intention at
that time when Boy Kho pointed his revolver at the
driver when you were still at San Jose
dela Montaña?

      A. – I do not know
about it but I came to know about that when Ben Verano
searched the driver about his money.

“12. Q. – Do you know already your companions before
that incident on March 21, 1978?

      A – I know this
Ben Verano for about two weeks and also Boy Kho.  This Ben del
Rosario, I know him for quite a long time already because he is a security
guard of my father.

“13. Q. – You said that Boy Kho
and Ben Verano were armed with a revolver during that
incident.  How about you and Ben del
Rosario, do you have also a revolver at that time?

      A. – No, sir.

“14. Q. – Who is the owner of that revolver used by Ben Verano and Boy Kho?

       A – The one brought by Boy Kho
belonged to Rudy Inot and Ben Verano
brought his own.

“15. Q. – Why
did you say that the revolver brought by Boy Kho
belonged to Rudy Inot?

      A – Because a week before that
incident of March 21, 1978,
Boy Kho, Ben Verano and I
were in the house of Rudy Inot at Mandaue City
and while we were in the office of Rudy Inot, I saw
Rudy handed the .30 cal. revolver to Boy Kho.

“16. Q. – That weapon used by Boy Kho
in killing the driver was the same weapon given by Rudy Inot?

      A. – Yes, sir.

“17. Q. – How do you know that the weapon used by Boy Kho belonged to Rudy Inot?

      A – Because from
the time Rudy Inot gave that weapon to Boy Kho, I had borrowed many times when we were in the house
and I did not see any weapon of Boy Kho except that
one given by Rudy Inot.

“18. Q. – Do you know the caliber of that weapon used by
Boy Kho and Ben Verano?

      A – Both cal. .38.

“19. Q. – I have nothing to ask you about that killing
of the driver, Ricardo Barbado.  Do you have something to say?

      A – No more sir.

“20. Q. – Do you confirm to the truth of the statement
you made before this investigation?

      A – Yes, sir.

“21. Q. – Was there somebody who coerced, intimidated
you or were you promised by a prize in order to say what you have stated in
this investigation?

      A. – No, sir.

“22. Q. – Do you have some complaint about this investi­gation?

      A. – No,
sir.”^[3]

The People’s brief also reproduced the entire statement prefacing
it, however, with a narration of facts relevant to the determination of the
question of its admissibility as an extra-judicial confession, which We quote
from said brief as follows:

“Ricardo Barbado was one of the
drivers of Manuel Concepcion, operator of
“Allied Taxi” at Cebu
City.  On March
21, 1978, at or about 7:00 a.m.,
Barbado submitted his earning of P90.00 to his
employer at the latter’s house at 100 Escario St., Cebu City.  Later in the day or about 8:30 p.m., the
taxicab driven by Barbado passed by the house of Concepcion and immediately thereafter Concepcion,
who was then outside his house waiting for a ride, heard two shots.  Before he heard the shots, Concepcion noticed that the
taxicab was being driven recklessly as though the driver was drunk and the rear
left door was open.  Not long thereafter
or at about 9:00 p.m., Concepcion received a call
informing him that Barbado was killed at Marina
Camp.  He went to the place and saw Barbado’s body lying on the back seat of the taxi.  There was blood inside the car and a bullet
hole in the driver’s seat.  (pp. 3-7, 9,
12-17, 19-20, Hearing of October 26,
1978).

“The case was investigated by Lt. Domiciano
Angel of the Police Force of Cebu City after he re­ceived
a dead person alarm at Marina Hill at about 8:00
o’clock in the evening of March
21, 1978 through a member of the barangay
police.  He proceeded to the place and
found the body of Ricardo Barbado inside the taxi in
the front seat.  Lt. Angel contacted
police in­formers and sometime on March
23, 1978, he received information that one Cesar Pelonio extracted a bullet from the hand of a certain Ben Verano.  The house of
Pelonio at Cabantan, Mabolo and the Peter Line Ga­rage where Pelonio
was employed as driver were placed under surveilance.  In the evening of the same day, Pelonio was arrested at the garage.  Verano who was at
the wheel escaped arrest.  Pelonio admitted having extracted a bullet from the hand of
Verano and he men­tioned the names of Boy Kho @ Agustin Kho, Ben Verano, Ben del Rosario and Emmanuel Velasco as the persons
responsible for the killing of Ricardo Barbado.  Lt. Angel did not know the persons named by Pelonio except Velasco who resided at Mabolo
and whose father was a compadre of his superior
officer Captain Ruiz.  He contacted the
father of Emmanuel Velasco and advised him to surrender his son.  Following this advice of Lt. Angel, Velasco’s
father surrendered his son at the house of Lt. Angel who then brought Emmanuel
to headquarters so that his statement may be taken.  Atty. Maximino Ylaya rep­resented Velasco even before the latter gave his
statement to the police and was present at the office of Lt. Angel and at the
house of Velasco (pp. 2-12, 21, tsn, Hearing of May 11, 1979).

“The affidavit or statement of Emmanuel Velasco was taken down
by police corporal Romeo Cordova after Velasco was turned over to him by Lt.
Angel.  Before the investigation was
conducted, Cordova informed Velasco of his constitutional rights among others,
to remain silent and to secure a lawyer. 
He was also told that anything he said might be used against him and
Velasco offered no ob­jection saying only that he was willing to tell the truth
(pp. 4-7, tsn, Hearing of April 30, 1979).”^[4]

Hinting that there was some degree of threats and intimidation in
the giving of his statement and signing it before the swearing officer,
appellant would, however, more strongly rely for the inadmissibility of his
extra-judicial confession, as he contends, an alleged promise of immunity by
making him a state witness and thus impugn the volun­tariness
of the confession.  The non-attendance of
counsel during its execution is also averred as further ground for its
inadmissibility.

Appellant listed a number of circumstances which to him would
show lack of free will or spontaneity on his part in giving his statement.  Thus –

“First: appellant surrendered on April 1, 1978, yet he was investigated on April 4, 1978.  He was not charged with a crime in court yet
he had to stay under custody for three (3) days before investigation.

“Second: while the investigator admits the investigation to
have been on April 4, 1978,
the statements were sworn 22 days later on April 26, 1978 and all the time the appellant continued
to be detained.

“Third: after the statements were sworn on April 26, 1978, the information was filed more
than a month later on May 29, 1978,
with appellant continuously deprived of his liberty.

“Fourth: while the actual surrender of appellant was on April 1, 1978, the prosecution has not
denied the tes­timony of the appellant that in the police blotter he was
officially entered as having surrendered only on May 26, 1978 (Cf. Tsn-Sept.
18, 1979-p. 100).

“Fifth: knowing that the appellant was represented by a lawyer
as early as the former’s surrender, it sounds
unnatural that such a lawyer would not be called upon to attend the
investigation of the appel­lant by the police. 
(Cf. Tsn-May 11, 1979-p.20).

“Sixth: that the statements in Exhibit “C” were made
“in consideration” of affiant’s becoming a state wit­ness.  (Tsn-May 11, 1979
of Lt. Angel-pp. 21;16-17).

“Seventh: while appellant was not mauled before the taking of the
affidavit, there is the uncontradicted statement of
the appellant (Tsn-Sept. 18, 1979-p.99) that after
his surrender, nightly he would be threat­ened with bodily harm and before he
was to have signed the statements before State Prosecutor Arzadon,
Pat. Romeo Cordova reminded him of the mauling of Mauricio Petalcorin
to near death, the lot which would befall appellant should he back out from
signing the affidavit before the State Prosecutor (Tsn-Sept.
18, 1979-p.96).

“Eighth: there is no statement whatsoever from Lt. Angel or
Romeo Cordova that appellant was made to read the finished typewritten
statements of the latter; on the other hand, the positive declarations of the
appellant that he was in front of the typewriter during the typing of the
affidavit in question-and-answer form and there­fore could not read what was
typed has never been contradicted (Tsn-Sept. 18,
1979-pp. 89-91), nor is there a denial of the testimony of the appellant that
he has not read the typed affidavit from the time it was taken until 22 days
later when sworn before the State Prosecutor (Tsn-Sept.
18, 1979-pp. 92-93).

“Ninth: before the swearing appellant invited the attention of
the Secretary of the State Prosecutor and Pat. Romeo Cordova that
“some” portions of the affidavit were not appellant’s.  There is no rebuttal or contra­diction to
this piece of evidence purporting to show that what appellant declared was not
faithfully recorded or typed by the Investigator (Tsn-Sept.
18, 1979-p. 93).

“Tenth: Atty. Ylaya for the
appellant was promised by Lt. Angel that the former would be notified of the
taking of the statements of the appellant (Tsn-Oct.
26, 1979-p. 18).  This has not been
denied or rebutted, thus it is odd that when the taking of appellant’s
statements was held on April 4, 1978,
the same was done without the benefit of counsel’s presence.”^[5]

What is immediately striking from the foregoing circumstances as
set forth in appellant’s brief is that there was a mixture of threat and
cajolery employed in the execution of the extra-judicial confession.  Either or both would vitiate the confession
for lack of voluntariness, the one essential element
for the admissibility of an extra-judicial con­fession, aside, of course, from
the need of attendance of counsel in the execution thereof.

How does the prosecution try to show that the execution of the
extra-judicial confession was attended with voluntariness?
We quote from the appellee’s brief:

“The alleged extra-judicial confession’ referred to by
appellant’s counsel is Exhibit C (p. 6, folder of Exhibits) which is the
statement given by the accused-appellant to Corporal Romeo Cordova of the Cebu City Police Department regarding the incidents that
led to the death of Ricardo Barbado.  According to appellant it was error for the
lower court to admit Exhibit C because it “has been vitiated with
involuntariness and executed without the attendance of counsel.’  In the first place, appellant admitted in
court his desire to surrender to the authorities and ‘to give (his) side to the
police so that the police will be enlighted about the
incident’ (p. 121, tsn.  September
19, 1979; pp. 8, 10-11, 13, tsn, Hearing
of September 20, 1979).  He also iden­tified Exh.
C as the affidavit he gave on April 4 and sworn to on April 26, 1978 before
State Prosecutor Benicio Arzadon
(pp. 78-79, tsn, Hearing of September 18, 1979; p.
41, tsn, Hearing of September 20, 1979).  It is also a fact admitted by appellant that
while he was at the Mabolo Police Station for
safekeeping following his surrender, he was not mauled or harmed (p. 99, tsn, September 18, 1979; pp. 27-28, tsn,
September 20, 1979).”^[6]

The Government counsels, after reproducing in full, appellant’s
sworn statement^[7]
concluded without any explanation that appellant’s, claim of involuntariness in
the execution of his sworn statement is with­out merit.  If the conclusion is based on the abundance
of details as set forth in the statement which appellant alone could have
supplied, as the lower court expressly so stated, and the fact that it tends to
be ex­culpatory in the portions appellant gave as his answers (he denied
certain portions as not given by him), We find the conclusions not
well-founded.

What was stated in the statement to be the purpose of the hold-up
was to get the money of the driver.  But
appellant, clarifying this matter, stated that he did not know of such an
intention, even when Boy Kho pointed his gun at the
driver.  He came to know of it only when
Ben Verano searched the driver about his money.  This circumstance tends to exclude appellant
from a previous understanding, if any, to rob the driver as to make him a
co-conspirator in the commission of that crime. 
What is more, no robbery was actually committed, and so the charge is
only for murder.

In the case of People vs. Ibañez,^[8]
quite correctly cited by appellant, this Court had occasion to state:

“x x x In
other words, the accused must be shown to have had guilty participation in the
criminal design entertained by the slayer, and this presupposes knowledge on
his part of such criminal design.  It is
not enough that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and
those attributed to the person charged as co-principal or accomplice; it is,
further­more, necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the former’s criminal intent, should cooperate with moral or
material aid in the consummation of the crime.”

With respect to the killing, it appears abundantly clear that
same was a sudden and unexpected act of Boy Kho and
merely on a likewise sudden, unreflected impulse,
when the driver made a sudden attempt to jump out of the taxi.  So much so that when Boy Kho
suddenly shot at the driver, Ben Verano was also
hit.  The manner the killing happened
would thus seem also to exclude appellant from a previous conspiracy or under­standing
to make him equally liable for the act of Boy Kho who
took it upon himself to shoot at the driver prompted by the unexpected move of
the driver of attempting to jump out of the taxi.  There is, therefore, no circumstance upon
which to base a finding of appellant participating in the criminal design of
killing the driver, an element considered essential to make one a principal, or
even as a mere accomplice, in the commission of a particular crime.^[9]

In his uncontradicted testimony,
appellant also brought out some significant facts that tend to firm up the
conclusion already in­timated earlier that he could not be tagged as a
co-conspirator in the crime charged.

Thus, appellant, feeling tired begged leave to go ahead from the
party which they attended at Cesar Pelonio’s
residence, but Boy Kho, Ben Verano
and Ben del Rosario accompanied him to the corner for a taxi.  Once a taxi was hailed, Boy Kho decided to leave with appellant, while Ben Verano and Ben del Rosario went back to the party.  In the taxi at the back seat, appellant felt
very sleepy with heavy eyes, but opened them when the taxi stopped, surprised
to see Boy Kho pointing his gun at the driver and
commanding the latter to transfer to the back seat, appellant to take the
driver’s seat and drive the car. 
Appellant’s protest against Boy Kho’s order
met with Kho’s gun pointed at him.

After the killing, appellant stopped the car as if it had run out
of gas, prompting his companions to rush into the darkness, hut appel­lant
stayed behind to wait for the police or someone to come at the scene.  But Boy Kho
returned to urge appellant to leave the place for he may only be
“salvaged” by the police. 
Appellant also left, afraid that Boy Kho might
shoot him if he insisted on waiting for the police, but in the dark, he lost
contact with Boy Kho. 
He and Ben del Rosario took a PU car from some distance and headed for
the Velasco residence.

The foregoing acts, as testified to by appellant without rebuttal
or contradiction, would establish the validity of appellant’s claim of not
being a conspirator in the commission of the crime.  Conspiracy, like the guilt itself for the
crime charged, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.^[10]

The Government of course tries to show that appellant’s testimo­ny
is not quite believable.  Thus, the fact
that after the shooting, appel­lant and Boy Kho were
together in an island of Bohol is pointed to as
showing appellant’s sharing in the criminal design.  But Boy Kho went to
appellant’s house to fetch him. 
Appellant had to go with Boy Kho, obviously
under threat, for at the earliest opportunity, he managed by some pretense or
another, to break away from Kho’s company.

The apparent contradiction in his testimony that he does not
drink because of heart ailment, and that he was driving slowly because he was
under the influence of beer, can be easily explained that he is supposed not to
drink because of his heart ailment, but that on isolated occasion he may take
to beer, which, however, would easily affect him because he is not a drinker.

As to why appellant acted too submissively to the orders of Boy Kho, which the Government also points to as rendering
appellant’s ver­sion unbelievable, considering that appellant had one of his
father’s security guard with him, Boy Kho must have drunked unrestrainedly that he was acting with unreasoning
boldness over appellant, himself rendered more easily cowed by a mild drink of
beer.

Appellant’s testimony that although his companions left to escape
when the taxi stopped for lack of fuel, he stayed behind intend­ing to wait for
the police, is, likewise, branded as a mere afterthought, for he had many
opportunities to give himself up.  The
state counsels forgot that Boy Kho returned to urge
appellant to leave the taxi, and the following morning, he fetched again appellant
from the latter’s home from which time Boy Kho kept
appellant always with him until appellant succeeded, by some trick, in breaking
away from Kho’s company.

We, therefore, find, notwithstanding the attempt of the prose­cution
to discredit appellant’s testimony, which as just demonstrated, is not quite
convincing, that appellant’s testimony is worthy of belief.  The absence of contradictory testimony by a
state witness makes the evidence of the prosecution insufficient to establish
guilt beyond rea­sonable doubt, which thus consists of appellant’s supposed
extra­judicial confession which, as presently to be shown, is also inadmis­sible
under the strict standard established by our New Constitution.

From the evidence, We are constrained to hold that the requirement
of counsel being present during the taking of statement of a suspect in a
custodial investigation, was not fulfilled. 
This is evident from the trial court’s own statement relevant to this
matter, which the People merely quoted in reliance thereof in meeting appel­lant’s
contention that the requirement of attendance of counsel during the taking of
the statement has not been satisfied. 
Thus, the trial court said:

“x x x.
Defendant’s father and Atty. Ylaya accompanied the
accused when the accused surrendered to the police authorities.  Upon such a surrender, the police authorities
could rightfully be assumed to imme­diately question and interrogate the
accused in respect to the murder of Ricardo Barbado.  That the accused’s
father and Atty. Ylaya would leave the accused to his
own devices when questioned by the police is acquies­cent of defendant’s giving
out a statement respecting the charge or charges against him.  We are of the be­lief that the accused was
indeed appraised of his consti­tutional rights under custodial interrogation
but that he averred that he did not wish to avail himself of the services of a
lawyer, to advice or guide him in the making of his statement.  His lawyer, Atty. Maximino
Ylaya, his father and five of his father’s retained
counsel was at defendant’s back and call. 
What could have been easier for the accused to do than to give a ring by
tele­phone to these lawyers or send a messenger to secure their appearance, had
he felt that he needed one.  It will be
remembered that it was at the initiative of Atty. Maximino
Ylaya that Lt. Domiciano
Angel arranged with defendant’s father for the surrender of the accused.”^[11]

It is clear from the trial court’s own observation that there was
no counsel in actual attendance during the taking down of the statement.  The lower court actually found that there was
a waiver on the part of appellant of his right to the assistance of counsel as
required for the admissibility of the statement as an extra­judicial
confession.  We see no such waiver from
the mere fact that the appellant had lawyers at his beck and call.  What is more reasonable to infer from the
non-attendance of counsel is that ap­pellant was not informed of said specific
right, as he ought to have been.  As the
statement itself shows unequivocally, appellant was allegedly informed of his
constitutional rights, but was not even asked whether he wanted to exercise or
avail himself of such rights.  There is a
manifest failure to comply with the constitutional require­ment for the admissibility
of extra-judicial confession. 
Consequently, the alleged extra-judicial confession of appellant was
improperly admitted in evidence, resulting in utter lack of support of the
lower court’s judgment of conviction.

WHEREFORE, the guilt of appellant not having been
established beyond reasonable doubt, appellant is entitled to an
acquittal.  Accord­ingly, the judgment
appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant, acquitted, with cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED

Concepcion, Jr., Ericta,
and Escolin,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, (Chairman), J., concurs in a separate opinion.

Abad Santos, joins J. Aquino in his dissenting opinion.

---

^[1]
p. 2, Appellant’s brief, p. 53, Rollo.

^[2]
Sec. 20, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution. “No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. Any person under investi­gation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in viola­tion of this section shall be admissible in evidence.”

^[3]
pp. 5-8, Appellant’s brief, p. 53, Rollo.

^[4]
pp. 3-5, Appellee’s brief, p. 64, Rollo.

^[5]
pp. 16-18, Appellant’s brief, p. 53, Rollo.

^[6]
page 14, Appellee’s brief, p. 64, Rollo.

^[7]
pp. 15-19, Appellee’s brief, p. 64, Rollo.

^[8]
77 Phil. 664.

^[9]
People vs. Portugueza, 20 SCRA 901, 906.

^[10]
People vs. Geronimo, 53 SCRA 246; People vs. Llamera,
51 SCRA 48; People vs. Custodio 47 SCRA 289;
People vs. Bortolay, et al. 42 SCRA 1; People vs.
Clemente, 21 SCRA 261; People vs. Por­tugueza, supra.

^[11]
p. 21, Appellee’s brief, p. 64, Rollo.

---

Clean

6 pt
6 pt
0
3

MicrosoftInternetExplorer4

st1:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) }

/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:”Table Normal”;
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-parent:””;
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:”Times New Roman”;}

---

Clean

6 pt
6 pt
0
3

MicrosoftInternetExplorer4

st1:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) }

/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:”Table Normal”;
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-parent:””;
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:”Times New Roman”;}