G.R. No. L-28107. March 15, 1977
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF, VS. TOMAS NAVASCA, FLORENCIO GERALDES, LORENZO SOBERANO AND MANUEL MARQUEZ, DEFENDANTS.
PER CURIAM:
On December 18, 1962,
Tomas Navasca, Florencio Geraldes, Lorenzo Soberano and
Manuel Marquez were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide committed
by a band before the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch III (Criminal Case 7712), the information reading as follows:
“That on or about March 17, 1959, in the Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-mentioned
accused, all armed with deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, and with intent to gain
and by means of force upon things and violence against persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and Criminally take, steal and carry away the sum of One Thousand Eight Hundred (P1,800.00) Pesos belonging to Go So alias OWA, to the damage and prejudice of
the latter ,in the aforesaid amount, and on the same occasion
thereof, and in pursuance of said conspiracy the abovementioned accused; with
intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally attack, assault and shoot said GO SO alias OWA, thereby inflicting upon him injuries which
caused his death.”
Before arraignment, the commitment of the accused Tomas Navasca to the National Mental Hospital was ordered and proceedings against him
suspended after the court had adjudged him as suffering from mental disorder,
on the strength of the report and recommendation of a court-appointed doctor
(Exhibit “A”), and after the court had satisfied itself “that he
cannot under, stand the nature of the proceedings to be conducted against him.”
Due trial proceeded
against the remaining accused, and on January 7, 1966, the court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in conformity to Art. 294, paragraph 1 in relation
to Art. 296 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused FLORENCIO GERALDES and
MANUEL MARQUEZ are hereby sentenced each of them to the supreme and extreme
penalty of death.
“The Court holds the
view that (each of) the accused:
‘xxx has proven himself to be a dangerous enemy of society. The latter must protect
itself from such enemy by taking his life in retribution for his offense as an example
and warning to others. In
these days of rampant criminality it should have a salutary effect to the
criminally-minded to know that the Courts
do not shirk their disagreeable
duty to impose the death penalty in cases where the law so requires. People v. Carillo,
No. L-2043, Feb. 28, 1950; 85 Phil 611.’
“Relative to accused Soberano,
although he was not actually present at the time of the killing of the deceased
Owa, for he was then acting as guard, yet, he is as much liable as his other co-accused,
considering the following authorities:
x x x
“Considering however, accused Lorenzo Soberano’s
act of testifying for the prosecution and revealing voluntarily in Open Court,
the sordid details of this crime, the Court considers this a mitigating
circumstance in his favor similar to a plea of guilty, that is a mitigating
circumstance of ‘similar analogous nature’, and, hence, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA.
“All the accused are likewise ordered to indemnify jointly
and severally the offended parties in the sum of P1,800.00 and to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased GO SO alias OWA in the amount
of P6,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason
of the penalty imposed, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs
proportionately.
“Considering further that the accused Navasca
is presently mentally ill and uncertain as to when he shall regain his sanity
the case against him is ordered archived to be retrieved immediately as soon as
the accused regained his sanity and in
a position to stand trial for this crime.”
By reason of the penalty imposed, this case is now before us on
automatic appeal.
From the extra-judicial admission (Exhibit “B”) and
testimony of Lorenzo Soberano, the following facts
can be gathered.
At about 5:00 o’clock
in the afternoon of March 17, 1959
on his way home after buying DDT for his corn, he saw his co-accused sitting on
the road by the river at Bo. Rizal: Manuel
Marquez holding a thompson, Tomas Navasca
armed with a pistol and Florencio Geraldes
carrying a carbine. He bought tuba as
requested by Navasca and after the same was consumed
by Navasca and Geraldes, he
was invited to go with the group to serenade.
On their way, as they passed the house of a certain Primo, the latter
was slapped by Navasca and threatened with a .45 cal.
pistol should he not consent to go with the group to rob. Out of
fear, he did not refuse and as they
reached the house of their intended victim, he was given a hunting knife by Navasca and told to stand guard outside the house.
From where he stood, he heard gunshots coming from the house,
after which his companions went out of the same and they altogether fled.
From the account of Mrs. Josefa Delejeros, widow of Go So, the following transpired inside
their house which led to the robbery and death of her husband.
At about 6:00 o’clock in the evening of March 17, 1959, she was
having dinner with her husband Go So at their house in Curbada,
Bansalan, when three persons armed with
“short” and “long” “articles” entered their
house, ordered them to go upstairs and directed her husband to open a trunk
where their money was kept. Go So gave
the money amounting to P1,800.00 to the men, after which the man with the
“short article” fired at Go So many times. The “long articles” were not
used. After shooting the victim, the men
fled, and her husband was brought to the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital where he died as a result of “gunshot wound through and
through, with involvement of abdominal organs” and severe, secondary
hemorrhage (Exhibit “C”). The
witness further testified that because of fear, she could neither identify the
armed men who shot and robbed her husband, nor remember their size and height (t.s.n. January 13,
1965, p. 85).
From the records of the case, the vital link between the accused
and the crime consists in the extra-judicial confession of Florencio
Geraldes (Exhibit “A”) and the
extra-judicial admission (Exhibits “B” & “B-1”) and
testimony of Lorenzo Soberano in court. Notably, both Geraldes
and Soberano repudiated their respective statements,
claiming that their so-called statements were prepared by the police and that
they were compelled to affix their signatures thereto after they had been
maltreated, and, in the case of Soberano, after he
had, in addition, been promised freedom.
After a meticulous study of the records and mature deliberation,
it is unnecessary for us to discuss the question squarely raised by Geraldes regarding
the voluntariness and truth of his statement (Exhibit
“A”), for it is our view that even without the extra-judicial
statement of Geraldes, the extrajudicial statement
and testimony of Lorenzo Soberano in open court,
corroborated by the other evidence for the prosecution, suffice to justify the affirmance of the conviction of all the accused by the
trial court.
We cannot sustain the argument of Lorenzo Soberano
that his statement was prepared by the Chief of Police and that he affixed his thumbmark thereto after he had been maltreated and promised
freedom because there are certain characteristic features in his statement that
refute his claim of involuntariness. To
cite a few: If it be true that the
police prepared his statement, it would
not contain details which are inconsistent with the details mentioned in the
extra-judicial confession of Geraldes. But inconsistencies do exist between the
statements of Geraldes and Soberano. Thus, said Geraldes:
“Q. Where
and when the robbery was planned? (sic)
“A. I
do not know sir. But when they were on
their way to the house of GO SO ALIAS OWA, they passed in my house and invited
me to join them.” (Exhibit: “A”)
On the other hand, Soberano
stated that even before he knew of the plan to rob and even before they started on their way, Florencio
Geraldes was already with the group of Navasca, Marquez
and another person whom he did
not know.
“Q. Would you please relate to the
investigator the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime?
“A. Yes, sir. At about 3:00
o’clock in the afternoon
of March 17, 1959,
I went to the poblacion of Bansalan
to buy DDT. On my way home, I saw Maning Marquez,
Tomas Navasca and Florencio
Geraldes sitting on the side of the creek in barrio
Rizal.” (Exhibit “B”)
Another reason which argues against the involuntariness of Soberano’s statement ‘is that it contains details which only he
could distinctly know such as his previous conviction for the theft of a plow
and the number of years of his sentence.
Besides, Soberano complained of the
maltreatment and the alleged inducement only after he had previously testified
and had been convicted by the trial court.
Heretofore, this Court has held that these features in an extra-judicial
admission are proofs not of involuntariness and falsity but rather of voluntariness and truth.[1]
The paramount
consideration, however, which, to our mind, weighs heavily in favor of the voluntariness and truth of Soberano’s
admission, and testimony in court is the significant fact that he took the
witness stand as witness for the prosecution notwithstanding the severe
admonition by the trial judge of the consequences of his testimony. Verily, the trial judge had painstakingly
advised and informed the accused of
his rights as an accused and could not be indicted for dereliction of his duties as
judge, as shown by the following portion of the transcript:
“QUESTIONS BY THE COURT:
“COURT:
“Q. You
are one of the accused in this case?
“A. Yes,
sir.
“Q. As
an accused in this case, under the constitution, you cannot be compelled to testify
for the prosecution.
“Q. Do
you understand that?
“A. Yes,
your Honor.
“Q. Do you also understand that under the
Constitution if you remained silent and do not testify, your silence will not be taken in any way against
you?
“A. Yes, your Honor.
“Q. Now, the Fiscal desires to present you
as one of the witnesses for the prosecution against you and your other
co-accused. Do you kow
that?
“A. Yes, your Honor.
“Q. And
you know you have every right under our law to refuse?
“A. I
cannot refuse, your Honor. What I will
do is to tell the truth.
“Q. Do
you understand that … do you know that anything you say during this time maybe
taken against you?
“A. Never
mind, if it will be taken against me, but I will do so to tell the truth.
“Q. Does
the Court understand that you waived the right granted to you by our
constitution under our law and
not incriminating yourself? (sic)
“A. What
I will do, sir, is only to tell the truth.
“Q. Now,
were you promised any reward or money by the Fiscal for the act which you are
about to do?
“A. No,
your Honor.
“Q. So,
you are aware of the consequences of what will happen to you if you testify and
notwithstanding that you assure this Court that you are waiving your right not
to testify against yourself?
“A. I
will just tell the truth, sir.” (t.s.n. January
13, 1965, pp. 96-98)
No more express waiver of the right of not testifying against
oneself can be had than what Soberano had done in the
trial court. His statements clearly,
indicate an awareness and understanding of
the consequences of his testimony, yet, notwithstanding, he insisted as
in fact he did testify against himself and his co-accused. Nor can it be suspected that his act of
testifying was prompted by his belief that in doing so, he would be released,
for, in his own words:
“Q. Now,
when you affix your thumbmark on Exhibit 1, thereof,
you understand the impression that you would be discharge from this case. Is that correct? (sic)
x x x
“COURT:
The import of the
question Mr. Fiscal is the answer of the witness that he was not promised any
reward by the Fiscal. So, by this
question he want to show that he was testifying now for the prosecution
precisely of the promise that he will be
released in this case if you file
the Motion to Dismiss. That is the
point. Let the witness answer. (sic)
“A. I
did not believe that I will be
discharged. But, what I did was to tell
the truth.” (t.s.n., January 14, 1965, p. 138)
The subsequent retraction by Soberano
of his extra-judicial statement and his testimony in court regarding the same
cannot detract from its truth and voluntariness, considering
that his retraction came, not at
the trial — for he affirmed the truth of the contents of his statement at the
trial but only after he had been convicted and sentenced, together with
some of his co-accused. Nor was the
denial of the motion for new trial which was filed by his counsel on the ground
of the retraction by Soberano of his testimony in
court, an improvident act by the trial judge, for, time and again, it has been
held by this Court that
retraction of previous testimony is not a ground for new trial.[2]
The testimonies of two witnesses for the prosecution fortify the
finding that the extra-judicial statement of Soberano
was voluntarily made. Thus, Chief of
Police Alfonso Gomez testified that the questions therein were asked and
answered in the Visayan dialect which Soberano speaks and understands and later on translated
into English Municipal Judge Hermenegildo Cabreros testified
that when Soberano was brought before him to
subscribe to his statement, he asked the said accused if he understood English
and upon receiving a negative reply, he read the document in the Cebu-Visayan
dialect. Thereafter, he asked the
accused if he understood what were read to him and if they were correct, to
which the accused gave his affirmation.
In addition, the finding of the trial court as to the earnestness and
fidelity of the prosecuting fiscal as against the accusation of the accused
that he was promised freedom by the same fiscal — a finding which will not
ordinarily be disturbed by the appellate courts in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary — is determinative of the
unreliability and incredibility of the grounds relied upon in the motion for
new trial and retraction of his testimony by Soberano.
Having allayed all fears as to the involuntariness and falsity
of Soberano’s testimony,
we now proceed to correlate the same with the other evidence for the
prosecution.
The testimony of Soberano that Navasca Marquez and Geraldes and
another person whom he could not identify were armed with a .45 cal. pistol, a thompson, a carbine and a bolo, respectively, when they
went up into the house of the
victim is corroborated by the testimony of Mrs. Josefa
Delejeros, the wife of the victim and only eyewitness
to the commission of the crime, when she testified that three men armed with
“short and long articles” entered their house at about 6:00 o’clock
in the evening (exactly the same time that Soberano
said they reached the house of their intended victim) and proceeded to
accomplish their criminal scheme. From
the testimony of Soberano and Mrs. Delejeros, the identities of the three men with “short
and long articles” have thus been
established (t.s.n. January 13, 1965, pp. 79-80;
110-114).
The testimony of Soberano that the
fatal weapon was a .45 cal. pistol is corroborated by Mrs. Delejeros
when she stated that the man with the “short article” fired at her
husband but the “long articles” were not used (t.s.n.
January 13, 1965, p. 112; p. 84).
The ensnaring net of collective responsibility was cast with the
admission of Soberano that he was armed with a
hunting knife as he stood guard outside the house of Go So while his companions
perpetrated the crime inside the house.
Take this together with the
testimony of the lone eyewitness — Mrs. Delejeros —
that the three men who entered their house were armed with “short and long
articles” which Soberano himself described as a
.45 cal. pistol, a thompson and a carbine, and there
converges into sharp focus the responsibility appertaining to a band without
having to consider the statement of Soberano that one
of the men was armed with a bolo, for it suffices to establish the existence of
a band that more than three armed men take part in the commission of a crime.
The evidence for the prosecution clearly established that the
members of the band committed the crime of
robbery on the occasion of which a homicide was committed, thus
classifying the crime as one of robbery with homicide. It has also been established that the aggravating circumstance of band attended the commission of the crime and
none of the members thereof attempted to prevent the
same. The state of the evidence for the
prosecution being such, we now assay the defense of the accused.
The defense of all the accused is anchored on the inadmissibility of the extra-judicial confession of Florencio Geraldes (Exhibit
“A”) and the extra-judicial admission of Lorenzo Soberano
(Exhibits”B” & “B-1”) on the
ground that these were obtained by force and promise of freedom and hence,
involuntary. As we have mentioned
earlier, it does not behoove this Court to determine the voluntariness
or involuntariness of both extrajudicial statements, it being
enough that other evidence adduced at the trial fulfill the required quantum of
evidence to convict the accused. Likewise,
we have found that the extra-judicial statement of Soberano
contains the indicia of voluntariness and his
testimony in the court as prosecution witness negates the suspicion of a
promise of freedom. Woven together with
the other evidence of the prosecution, the pattern for the crime has thus been
formed, and the claim of Soberano as to the
involuntariness of his admission as well as that of his testimony must fall.
The crime established by the evidence for the prosecution is
robbery with homicide attended by the aggravating circumstance of band. In the case of People vs. Apduhan[3],
we held that if the crime of robbery
with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still
be robbery with homicide with the aggravating circumstance of band and not
robbery in band with homicide.
The penalty for the crime of robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. The crime having been committed by a band,
all the members thereof are liable for each of the assaults committed,[4]
unless any one of them attempted to prevent their commission. No evidence was adduced by any of the accused
that he had attempted to prevent the commission of the crime, hence all must be
held liable for the crime of robbery with homicide. There being one aggravating circumstance and
no mitigating circumstance to offset the same in the case of Florencio Geraldes and Manuel
Marquez, the penalty of death was correctly imposed on them. The act of testifying for the prosecution,
without previous discharge, by Lorenzo Soberano
should be considered in his favor as a mitigating circumstance analogous to a
plea of guilty, hence there exist, in the case of Lorenzo Soberano,
one mitigating circumstance and one aggravating circumstance which offset each
other. Consequently, Lorenzo Soberano was properly sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Considering the length of time that has elapsed from the time the
accused Tomas Navasca was committed to the National
Mental Hospital, the Director of the said hospital should now conduct a
full-blown examination of the mental state of the said accused for the purpose
of determining his mental capacity to stand trial, and thereafter submit the
proper report and recommendations to this Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo finding Florencio
Geraldes, Manuel Marquez and Lorenzo Soberano guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and
sentencing Florencio Geraldes
and Manuel Marquez to the supreme penalty of death and Lorenzo Soberano to reclusion
perpetua, is hereby affirmed. All
the accused are ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Go So
alias Owa in the
amount of P1,800 representing the
money stolen and the increased amount of P12,000[5]
as indemnity for the death of Go So alias Owa. The Director of the National Mental Hospital
is hereby directed to conduct without delay a full-blown examination of the
mental state of the accused Tomas Navasca for the
purpose of determining his mental capacity to stand trial, and thereafter
submit the proper report and recommendations to this Court. Costs against the appellants.
Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and
Martin, JJ., concur.
[1]
People vs. Viernes, 84 Phil. 144; People vs.
Alcantara, L-16832, Nov. 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 906; People vs. Gomez,
L-25815, May 31, 1969, 28
SCRA 440.
[2]
People vs. Concepcion, 84 Phil. 787; People vs.
Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil. 906; People vs. Farol, 103 Phil.
1166; Poople vs. Rodriquez, 103 Phil. 1008;
People vs. Casalme 101 Phil. 1205; People vs.
Valeriano, 90 Phil. 15; People vs. Genilla, L-23681, September 3, 1966, 18 SCRA
12.
[3]
L-19491, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 798.
[4]
Art. 296, Revised Penal Code.
[5]
People vs. Pantoja, L-18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468.