BAYANI A. FERRERA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XXII; FISCAL EMMANUEL C. PEÑA, IN HIS…

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, premised upon the
following facts:

On January 14, 1976, the private respondent Erlinda Ortega filed,
for and in behalf of her minor children, namely, Leynnie and Liza, both
surnamed FERRERA, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII, a
complaint^[1]
for support against the petitioner Bayani A. Ferrera, incumbent mayor of Baras, Rizal, docketed therein as
Civil Case No. 22719.

The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss,^[2] on
the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of action for lack of any
allegation therein that the alleged illegitimate minor children have been duly
recognized or acknowledged by him.

Instead of resolving the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, the
respondent Judge issued, on February 5, 1976, an order^[3]
directing the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, B. Jose Castillo and/or District
State Prosecutor, Emmanuel C. Peña, to investigate the petitioner, pursuant to
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, on the ground that the
complaint alleges immorality, and to
file the necessary charges with the proper tribunal if the evidence so
warrants; and at the same time directed that copies of the said order be
furnished the Sangguniang Bayan ng Baras, Rizal, Sangguniang Lalawigan ng
Rizal, and the Governor of Metro Manila.

Accordingly, the Acting District State Prosecutor, Emmanuel C.
Peña, wrote the petitioner a letter^[4]
informing the latter of the issuance of the said order of res­pondent Judge,
and pursuant thereto, inviting him “on February 23, 1976 in order to
discuss the aforestated matter preparatory to the setting of a date for formal
investigation.”

On February 18, 1976, the petitioner filed a motion to reconsider
and delete from the records the order of February 5, 1976,^[5] on
the ground that Section 13, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Court refers to a “criminal complaint or information
filed” in court without previous preliminary investigation conducted by
the Fiscal, which motion was denied by respondent Judge in his order^[6] dated February 24, 1976.

Whereupon, the petitioner instituted the present petition,
claiming that respondent Judge acted without and/or in excess of his
jurisdiction as with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated
February 5, 1976, and in refusing to reconsider and set aside the said
order. Accordingly, he prays that the
said orders be annuled and set aside and that the respondents be restrained
from enforcing the orders in question.

On March 5, 1976,
this Court issued a temporary restraining
order,^[7] enjoining the respondent public officials
from enforcing and/or carrying out the orders dated February 5 and 24, 1976.

This Court gave due
course to the petition, and considered the comment^[8] filed
for and in behalf of respondent public officials by the Solicitor General as
their answer to the petition.^[9]

The issue to be resolved the instant case is whether or not
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and/or in excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the disputed order
of February 5, 1976 as well as the order dated February 24, 1976 denying the
petitioner’s motion to reconsider the said order.

In issuing the order of
February 5, 1976, the respondent Judge relied on Section 13, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which reads as follows;

“Sec. 13. Preliminary
examination and investigation by the judge of the Court of First Instance. Upon complaint filed directly with the Court
of First Instance, without previous preliminary examination and investigation
conducted by the fiscal, the judge thereof shall either refer the complaint to the municipal judge referred to
in the second paragraph of Section 2 hereof for preliminary examination and
investigation simultaneously in the manner provided in the preceding section,
and should he find reason­able ground to believe that the defendant has
committed the offense charged, he shall issue a warrant for his arrest, and
thereafter refer the case to the fiscal for the filing of the corresponding
information.”

It should be noted that the above quoted rule speaks of
preliminary examination and investigation by the judge of the Court of First
Instance in cases where a complaint is filed directly thereto without previous preliminary
exam­ination and investigation conducted by the fiscal. The complaint mentioned therein does not
refer to a civil complaint but to a criminal complaint as defined in Section 2,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the instant case what was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal is not a criminal complaint but a civil complaint, that is, a complaint
for support. Obviously, respondent
Judge’s reliance on the provisions of Section 13, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Court in issuing the order of
February 5, 1976 is erroneous.^[10]

Respondent public officials, however, maintain that petitioner
being the incumbent mayor of Baras, Rizal, the allegation of immorality in the
complaint against him constitutes an actionable act of a public official which
requires investigation, and that is the duty of respondent Judge to have it
investigated by the proper authorities in order to weed out irresponsible
government officials from the govern­ment service. While We agree with the avowed purpose of respondent public
officials in initiating the investigation of the petitioner, nevertheless, the
procedure laid down by law in
conducting such investigation should be observed. Such procedure is by filing an administrative complaint against
the petitioner, which must be in writing, subscribed and sworn to by the
complainant,^[11]
which shall be investigated and decided
by the Secretary of Local Government and Community Development.^[12]

Besides, it may also be pointed out that administrative
proceedings against a public official in this jurisdiction is accusatorial and
not inquisitorial in nature. It
contemplates two contending parties, the complainant and the respondent. This procedure would be violated if the
respondent public officials were to conduct the projected investigation of the petitioner without any
administrative complaint being filed against him.

It may not be amiss to state that judges or any public official
for that matter, in their desire to help the government remove allegedly
irresponsible, corrupt, and immoral public officials from the government
service, should see to it that they do not go beyond the limits of their
jurisdiction or authority as laid down by law and rules of procedure. If they were to encroach upon the authority
allocated to other officials, there would be confusion in the adminis­tration of justice, which may
result in the violation of the basic requirement of due process.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted, and the
restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., no part.

^[1]
Annex “A”, p. 21, Rollo.

^[2]
Annex “B”, p. 28, Rollo.

^[3]
Annex “C”, p. 31, Rollo.

^[4]
Annex “D”, p. 32, Rollo.

^[5]
Annex “E”, p. 34, Rollo.

^[6]
Annex “F”, p. 37, Rollo.

^[7]
pp. 39-40, Rollo.

^[8]
p. 69, Rollo.

^[9]
p. 111, Rollo.

^[10]
Albano, et al., vs. Arranz, et al., L-24403, Dec. 22, 1965, 15 SCRA 518.

^[11]
Letter of Instruction Nos. 147 and 180, dated November 14, 1973 and April 3,
1974, respectively.

^[12]
Letter of Instruction No. 231, dated Dec. 5, 1974, modifying Letter of
Instruction Nos. 147 and 180, supra.