FELICIDAD GUERRA VDA. DE LAPEÑA, COMPLAINANT, VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE JOSE L. COLLADO, RESPONDENT.

Respondent Municipal Judge was charged with falsely certifying,
on two occasions, that all petitions and motions which had been submitted to
him for determination for a period of ninety (90) days had been determined by
him on or before the respective
dates of the certifications.

Pursuant to the Resolution of this Court dated July 9, 1974, the
verified complaint filed by com­plainant Felicidad Guerra Vda. de Lapeña was
for­warded to the District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
for investigation, report and recommendation. The District Judge submitted his Report to this Court, with the
following findings of fact:

“The respondent Jose L. Collado is the in­cumbent Municipal
Judge of Bautista, Pangasinan. Two
verified complaints for forcible entry, one dated March 5, and another, March
12, 1973, were filed in his Court by the herein complainant against several
persons, which were docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 382 and 383 (Exhs. 3, 3-E, 4 and 4-A). Embodied in the complaints were peti­tions
for the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction against the defendants
therein to en­join them from further committing acts of dis­possession against
the herein complainant and disturbing her peaceful possession or the parcels of land subject matter of the
complaints. In due time, answers
dated. March 26 and May 2, 1973 were
filed by the defendants therein (Exhibits 3-B, 3­C, 4-B and 4-C).

“In Civil Case No. 382, the herein complain­ant further filed
a motion dated April 12 and an amended motion dated April. 23, 1973, praying
that during the pendency of the hearing of the case on the merits, the corn and
tobacco crops harvested from the parcel of land in question he deposited with
the nearest bonded warehouse and sold at the prevailing price in the locality,
the proceeds to be deposited with the Municipal Court (Exhibits 5, 5-A, 5-B and
5-C).

“On July 2 and August 1, 1973, the herein respondent
certified, among others, that all peti­tions and motions which had been under
submission or determination for a period of ninety days or more had been
determined by him on or before those dates (Exhibits A, A-1, 1 and 1-A), which
enabled him to collect his salary for those months.

“The complainant now claims that the respondent had committed
multiple falsification or public
documents in making the certifications (Exhibits A, A-1, 1 and 1-A) because in
truth and in fact, on those dates, July 2 and August 1, 1973, he had not yet
resolved the pending petitions for issuance of writs of preliminary injunction
in Civil Cases Nos. 382 and 383 and the motion and amended motion to deposit the
tobacco and corn crops in Civil Case No. 382 (Exhibit B).”

As per the Investigator’s Report, respondent denied having
falsified his certifications on the given dates, alleging that the petitions
for preli­minary injunction had been denied by him in open court in the
presence of the parties, and that the resolution of the motion and amended
motion for the deposit of the tobacco and corn crops had been def­erred by him
pending final determination of whether the defendants involved were really
squatters. Fur­thermore, respondent
alleged that since the Muni­cipal Court of Bautista, Pangasinan was not yet a
court of record, no written order resolving the foregoing petitions and motions
was issued by him.

As found by the Investigating Judge, respondent properly deferred
the resolution of the motion and amended motion for the deposit of the tobacco
and corn crops, pending the determination of a vital issue involved in the
corresponding civil case. Furthermore,
land transfer certificates had been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
in favor of the 128 tenants of the Philippine National Bank on the property in question, now owned by the Bank, which formerly belonged to the complainant and was the subject matter of the civil case before
res­pondent’s court. However, with
respect to the peti­tions for the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction,
the findings are as follows:

“* * * it appears that the complaint with prayer for issuance
of writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 382 was received in the
Municipal Court on March 11, 1973 (Exhibit 4); that defendants’ answer thereto
was received on March 26, 1973 (Exhibit 4-B); and that the plaintiff’s reply was dated April 3, 1973 (Exhibit 4?D). While there is no showing when the incident
was considered submitted for resolution, yet it may be safely assumed it was
submitted as of the filing of
the last pleading, that is on April 3, 1973. The ninety day period, therefore, must have commenced therefrom and
ended July 2, 1973. Hence, in
certifying on August 1, 1973, that he had already resolved all petitions and
motions which had been submitted to him for a period of ninety days or more,
when in truth and in fact he had not, as he had not yet resolved the peti­tion
for injunction in the case, the respondent had committed a falsehood.

“This may not, however, he said in Case No. 383 where it
appears that the complaint with pray­er for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunc­tion was received in the Municipal Court on April 18. 1973 (Exhibits 3
and 3-A); that the answer thereto was dated May 2, 1973 (Exhihits 3-B and 3-C);
and that an amended complaint with the same prayer was received in the same
Court on May 22, 1973 (Exhibit 3-D). Hence, at the time of the certification on July 2, 1973 and August 1,
1973, the ninety day period within which the respondent should have resolved
the petition for injunction had not yet expired.”

Respondent’s allegation
that no written order was issued by him for the reason that his court was not
yet a court of record is not tenable. As found by the Investigating Judge, the Municipal Court of Bautista,
Pangasinan was already court of record with an official stenographer who took
down the proceedings therein, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6031. Indeed, as observed by the Investigating
Judge, if respondent had denied the petition for injunction in open Court on
April 25, 1973, it would not have been
necessary for him to assure complain­ant that he will issue the preliminary
injunction should the same be necessary during the course of the trial.

It is however, obvious that this single aberration was not due to malice or bad faith of respondent. Rather, it was due to his
carelessness, negligence or reliance upon his employee. In the environment of the attendant facts, such false statement
could not ho classified as a
serious misconduct.

Thus, in Secretary of
Justice v. Bullecer,^[1] We stated:

“* * * It is desirable that a judge should at all times
manifest fidelity to the trust reposed in him. Necessarily, an adequate grasp of the codal and statutory provisions,
not to mention the Constitution, as well as of legal doc­trines is of the
essence. That he should be impartial is
likewise a truism. Of equal importance,
however, is the promptness with which cases in his Sala are disposed of. The people’s faith in the administration of
justice, especially those who belong to the low income group, would be greatly
impaired if decisions arc long in coming, more so from trial courts, which
unlike collegiate tribunals where there is need for extended deli­beration,
could he expected to act with dispatch. Unfortunately, it cannot he denied that delay still attends the
performance of the judicial task. It
could amount to serious inefficiency, arising either from lack of skill in the
handling of authoritative legal materials or the lack of a proper system in the
handling of court business. For that
matter, negligence, if reckless in char­acter, could amount to serious
inefficiency. * * *”

WHEREFORE, respondent Municipal Judge Jose L. Collado is
hereby exonerated of the charges against him,
but he is admonished to act with due care in executing his Certificates of Service.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
56 SCRA 25.