ATTY. BENJAMIN RELOVA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ANTONIO M. ROSALES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, BRANCH 43, RESPONDENT.

Under Circular No. 13-92, clerks of court are mandated to deposit
fiduciary funds immediately with authorized government depository banks. Their failure to do so cannot directly be
blamed on the judges concerned, absent any showing of bad faith, malice,
dishonesty, arbitrariness or rank failure/negligence to supervise the clerks of
court. This Court is determined to
implement its judicial reform program and will not hesitate to discipline and sanction erring members of the judiciary. However, it is also duty-bound to protect the innocent from
baseless or unreasonable charges. While it favors cleansing its ranks of the
inept, the incompetent and the corrupt, it must at the same time attract the
competent and ethical to join the judiciary and to remain there, so as to be
able to dispense speedy quality justice for all.

The Case and the Facts

In a letter dated January 30, 2001 addressed to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), Atty. Benjamin Relova charged Judge Antonio M.
Rosales of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro (Branch
43), with violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92. The letter-complaint states:

“This pertains to Security Bank Manager’s Check No. 0000019511
dated May 24, 1999 in the amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00)
PESOS which our client, MR. EUGENIO C. GONZALES deposited for consignation
before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 43 in Civil
Case No. C-351 entitled: DIANA GONZALES & EUGENIO C. GONZALES vs. MRS. VERA
P. QUIANZON, ET AL. A photocopy of the
motion to deposit and the Manager’s Check above-mentioned are hereto attached
as ANNEXES ‘A’ and ‘B’ hereof, respectively for ready reference.

“Since the time the said check was deposited with said court up to
the present time, the said check ha[s] not been acted upon since the court
neither approved nor disapproved the deposit, nor has it ordered the deposit of
the said check before a government depository bank as mandated by Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92, dated March 1, 1992,
so that the court’s inaction has not only deprived the National Treasury of
interest which the above-mentioned check should have earned had the same been
deposited, but also caused prejudice to our client in terms of interest had the
deposit been disapproved, more importantly because the check has now become
stale (per certification of the issuing bank).

“In view of the trial court’s failure to observe Circular No. 13-92
aforesaid, we are, for and in behalf of our client, most respectfully call[ing]
the attention of your Honorable Office so that appropriate action in the
premises against the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro, Branch 43, for violation of Circular No. 13-92. The Judge is the Hon. Antonio M. Rosales.”^[1]

Respondent judge regarded the instant case as harassment, as
indicated in his Comment^[2] dated
March 28, 2001:

“x x x. It seems clear from
the foregoing baseless charge that Atty. Benjamin Relova would like to picture
the undersigned as to be so remiss even in the performance of a simple
administrative function of instructing his Clerk of Court to deposit the check
in question with the depository bank – the Land Bank branch here in Roxas, this
province. It is not that simple. As the succeeding paragraphs will show the
decision of the court regarding the said check has been interwoven with the
undersigned’s exercise of judicial function which has been hampered by the
series of actions taken by the complainant’s law office like the filing of a
petition [for] certiorari (CA G.R. No. SP – 57597) assailing the twin orders of
this court denying the plaintiff’s Application For Injunction With Temporary
Restraining Order in the Court of Appeals, and then by filing an appeal by
certiorari (G.R. No. 145914), before the Honorable Supreme Court from the
decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals which sustained the twin orders of
this court, and then by filing numerous motions for postponements invoking
various reasons, the last of which pertains to the scheduled hearing on March
30, 2001. Thus, for reasons
attributable to the complainant the court has yet to rule on the propriety of
the petition/complaint for consignation filed by their clients.

x x x                          x
x x                             x x x

‘It will be noted that on page 3 of the pre-trial order, plaintiffs
marked as their Exhibit ‘N’, the Manager’s Check in question and that
defendants are not willing to accept the unpaid balance of the purchase price
for reasons advanced by them. x x x.

x x x                          x
x x                             x x x

‘3.13  Under date of September
18, 2000, plaintiffs filed a Motion For Reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals and this time they changed their theory by arguing that the
circumstances obtaining in this case could justify the grant of preliminary
mandatory injunction when their application before this court is one for
preliminary prohibitory injunction.

‘And as an afterthought, plaintiffs assailed the failure of the
Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Mariano S. Familara III, of this court to exercise
simple administrative function of depositing the Manager’s Check, (plaintiffs’s
Exhibit ‘N’) in question which is payable to defendants and/or the RTC in
compliance with Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92, the pertinent portion of
which states:

‘All collections from bailbonds, rental deposits and other
fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court
concerned, upon receipt thereof, with an authorized government depository
bank.’

‘3.14  Again, the Court of
Appeals denied the Motion For Reconsideration in a resolution handed down on
November 13, 2000.

‘Concerning the check in question, the Honorable Court of Appeals
made the following pronouncement:

‘As to petitioners’ claim for interest which the check they had
consigned may have earned if deposited with an authorized government depository
bank in accordance with Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92 which took effect
March 1, 1992 (p. 9, Motion for Reconsideration, p. 202, Rollo), it is
premature in the present petition for certiorari to claim any contingent
interest which may accrue by reason of the consignment of the check for the
reason that petitioners’ main case below is for consignment, the propriety of
which is yet to be determined on the merits by the court a quo.’

‘A photocopy of the said resolution is hereto attached as Annex
‘E’.

‘3.15       From the adverse
resolution of the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs filed before the Honorable
Supreme Court an appeal by way of petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure where the said petition is now pending.

‘3.16       Instead of filing
with this court a motion to cancel and/or consider their obligation as
extinguished so that the court could immediately rule on the propriety of the
consignation, plaintiffs through the law office of the complainant here, Atty.
Benjamin Relova filed numerous postpon[e]ments citing various reasons and had
they x x x the courage to pursue the case on the merits before this court, the
check in question could not have been rendered stale.

‘3.17       In fact, the case
is set for hearing before this court on March 30, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. and
plaintiffs have again filed a very Urgent Motion To Defer/Suspend Proceedings.
A photocopy of plaintiff’s Very Urgent Motion is hereto attached as Annex ‘F’.

“4.     From the foregoing
discussion, it can easily be deduced that complainant has turned his ire on the
undersigned for the purpose of taking him out of the case. On the other hand, the undersigned did not
instruct his Clerk of Court to deposit the check in the depository bank because
of his honest impression that this court has to rule first on the propriety or
impropriety of consignation. This
impression was further bolstered by the fact that plaintiffs have even adopted
and marked the check as one of their documentary evidence. Thus, the decision to deposit the said check
or not does not involve a mere routinary exercise of administrative
function. It has been interwoven with
the exercise of judicial function which cannot be interfered with unless done
in bad faith and/or patently erroneous.”^[3]

In short, respondent argues that the present case is designed to
force him to inhibit himself from hearing the aforesaid civil case. He also points out that the check would not
have become stale were it not for the numerous hearing postponements requested
by complainant, as well as the review Petitions the latter had filed with the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

OCA’s Evaluation and Recommendation

The OCA found that respondent judge had violated Supreme Court
Circular No. 13-92, mandating the immediate deposit of all fiduciary
collections with the authorized government depository bank.^[4] The OCA then recommended the imposition of a
fine of P10,000.^[5]

This Court’s Ruling

We disagree with the OCA that SC Circular No. 13-92 was violated
by respondent.

Administrative Liability

Respondent judge has been charged with violating SC Circular No.
13-92, the full text of which reads:

“Our attention has been called by the Treasurer of the Philippines
that collections from bailbonds, rental deposits and other fiduciary
collections are being deposited with the Provincial, City and Municipal
Treasurers in compliance with Circular No. 5 dated November 25, 1982, issued by
then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, which procedure runs counter to the
provisions embodied in the General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1992,
specifically Sections 4 and 12 of its General Provisions, to wit:

‘1)           Section 4 provides that trust receipts
shall be treated as a trust liability of the agency concerned and deposited in
an authorized government depository bank or in the National Treasury as the
case may be x x x; Provided, x x x, that if the amount is deposited in a
savings account, the interest shall accrue to the General Fund and shall be
remitted to the National Treasury at the end of each quarter.

‘2)           Section 12 provides that performance
bonds and deposits filed or posted by private entities with agencies of the
government shall be deposited in an authorized government depository bank as
trust liabilities under the name of the agency concerned, the interests thereon
and any forfeited amounts to be recorded as income of the General Fund and
remitted to the National Treasury.

“Conformably herewith, Circular No. 5, dated November 25, 1982, is
hereby revoked and declared of no further force or effect. The following procedure is therefore
prescribed in the administration of Court Fiduciary Funds:

Guidelines in Making Deposits

1)      Deposits shall be made
under a savings account. Current
account can also be maintained provided that it is on an automatic transfer of
current account from savings.

2)      Deposits shall be made
in the name of the Court.

3)      The Clerk of Court
shall be custodian of the Passbook to be issued by the depository bank and
shall advise the Executive Judge of the bank’s name, branch and savings/current
account number.

Guidelines in Making Withdrawals

1)      Withdrawal slips shall
be signed by the Executive Judge and countersigned by the Clerk of Court.

2)      If maintaining a
current account, withdrawals shall be made by checks. Signatories on the check shall likewise be the Executive Judge
and the Clerk of Court.

“All collections from bailbonds, rental deposits and other
fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court
concerned, upon receipt thereof, with an authorized government depository
bank.

“Interests earned on these deposits and any forfeited amounts shall
accrue to the General Fund of the government. Within two (2) weeks after the end of each quarter, the Clerk of Court
shall withdraw such interests and forfeited amounts and shall remit the same to
the National Treasury under a separate Remittance Advice, duplicate copy
thereof to be furnished the Chief Accountant of the Supreme Court for record
and control purposes.

“No withdrawals, except as specifically provided in the immediately
preceeding paragraph, shall be allowed unless there is a lawful order from the
Court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter involved.

“Only one depository bank shall be maintained and said bank must be
formally informed by the Executive Judge as to who are the authorized
signatories to the withdrawal slips.

“Except in instances specifically mentioned in the immediately
succeeding paragraph, all fiduciary collections currently deposited with the
local treasurers shall be withdrawn therefrom and deposited with the
savings/current accounts maintained by the courts for these collections.

“In localities where there are no branches of authorized government
depository banks or, even if there be a branch but it is impractical, for
justifiable reasons, to maintain deposits therein, all fiduciary fund
collections shall be deposited by the Clerk of Court with the Provincial, City
or Municipal Treasurer. In either case,
the Clerk of Court must first seek a favorable recommendation from the
Executive Judge.

“Within two (2) weeks after the end of each quarter, all Clerks of
Court are hereby required to submit to the Chief Accountant of the Supreme
Court a quarterly report indicating the outstanding balance maintained with the
depository bank or local treasurer, and the date, nature and amount of all
deposits and withdrawals made within such period.” (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Circular, clerks of court
are the custodians of all bail bonds, rental deposits and other fiduciary
collections. In the ordinary course of
proceedings, judges have nothing to do with the collections, because clerks of
court are the officers mandated to deposit them with an authorized government
depository bank. Hence, judges cannot
be directly faulted if these funds are not immediately deposited, especially
since they would not normally know exactly when the clerks of court received
them. To repeat, the clerks of court
are the ones responsible for such matters.^[6]

Hence, by singling out the judge and sparing the clerk of court
from administrative liability, complainant has demonstrated partiality. On the other hand, complainant alludes to
respondent’s administrative nonfeasance by harping on his failure to instruct
the clerk of court to deposit the subject check.

Such failure does not make respondent directly liable for
violating the subject Circular. First, he is not required to give such
instructions. From the tenor of the
Circular, it is evident that the clerk of court is expected to deposit
fiduciary collections automatically without waiting for instructions from the
judge.

Second, complainant has
failed to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the subject manager’s
check had been received by the clerk of court as a cash equivalent to be
deposited, and not as a document or annex of the Complaint/Petition for
consignation. Conspicuously absent from
the records is a copy of an official receipt showing that the lower court
indeed received the manager’s check. Neither was there any allegation of the existence of such receipt to
show that the check was received by the court as a cash equivalent.

On the other hand, we have on record the fact that the check was
presented as a document and marked as Exhibit “N” by complainant’s client, the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. C-351.^[7] Since the check was not received directly as
a fiduciary collection, we cannot expect the clerk of court to deposit the
check immediately, as the situation did not squarely and strictly fall — for
purposes of administrative penalty — under SC Circular No. 13-92.

Third, it is clear from
respondent’s Comment that after the non-deposit of the check was brought to his
attention, respondent judge studied the matter. Exercising his supervisory duties, he determined that the check
should not be deposited immediately, since the consignation case was still
undecided and the check had been marked in evidence. He believed that the decision to deposit it was “interwoven with
the exercise of judicial function.” Thus, his decision not to deposit it was not arbitrarily arrived
at. Neither was it patently erroneous,
facetious or unreasonable.

Even granting for the sake of argument that complainant’s client
intended to give the check to the court as a cash equivalent, and that it
should have been duly receipted and deposited by the clerk of court with the
court’s depositary bank, still we cannot directly fault respondent with its
non-deposit. He may have erred by not
instructing his clerk of court to deposit it, but in the absence of bad faith,
we cannot penalize him for such inaction. Judges are, after all, mortals and are thus prone to make simple
mistakes once in a while.

“x x x             [J]udges
may not be held administratively responsible for every error or mistake in the
performance of their duties; otherwise, that would make their position
unbearable. To merit disciplinary
sanction, the error or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate,
or in bad faith. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, defective or erroneous decision or order is presumed to
have been issued in good faith.^[8]

“x x x. As a matter of
public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his
official duties make him liable therefor. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge
in his official capacity does not always amount to misconduct although such
acts may be erroneous. A judge may not
be disciplined for error of judgment unless there is proof that the error was
made with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. Nevertheless, this is not to say that a
judge need not observe due care in the performance of his functions.”^[9]

In determining whether to impose any sanction on respondent
judge, we take into consideration the fact that the alleged error he committed
was not gross or patent. Also, no
malice, corrupt motive or improper consideration on his part was shown. Neither has he heretofore been found guilty
of any administrative offense.

The most that can be said in this situation is that respondent
should merely be advised to be more careful and diligent in supervising the
administrative acts of the court personnel. Judges presiding over branches of a court are, in legal contemplation,
the heads thereof since they have effective control and authority over all
employees in those branches.^[10] More specifically, in the performance of
their duties judges have supervisory powers over clerks of court and employees
under them.^[11]

WHEREFORE, Judge Antonio M. Rosales is ACQUITTED of any administrative
violation of Circular 13-92. However,
he is ADVISED to be more careful and
diligent in the performance of his supervisory functions over his court
personnel.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur

Puno, J., (Chairman), Abroad on official business.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 1.

^[2]
Id., pp. 12-22.

^[3]
Comment, pp. 2-10; rollo, pp. 13-21.

^[4]
Report of the Office of the Court Administrator, p. 2; rollo, p. 76.

^[5]
Id., pp. 3 & 77.

^[6]
Manual for Clerks of Court, 1991, pp.
123-128.

^[7]
Pre-trial Order, p. 3; rollo, p. 106.

^[8]
Del Callar v. Salvador,
268 SCRA 320, 330, February 17, 1997, per Davide Jr., J. (now CJ).

^[9]
Riego v^.
Leachon Jr., 268 SCRA 777, 784,
February 27, 1997, per Puno, J.

^[10]
Poco-Deslate v. Mendoza-Arce,
318 SCRA 465, 489-490, November 19, 1999.

^[11]
Section F, Chapter I, Manual for Clerks
of Court, 1991, p. 9.