MARVIN MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

MARVIN MERCADO, together with Rommel Flores, Michael Cummins,
Mark Vasques and Enrile Bertumen, was charged with and convicted of violation
of R.A. 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act
of 1972, as amended, for which he and his co-accused were sentenced to a
prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.^[1]

The case before us concerns only the petition for review of
accused Marvin Mercado where he assails his conviction, and arguing that the
Court of Appeals having increased the penalty imposed by the court a quo to a prison term of seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, should have certified
the case to this Court as the penalty of thirty (30) years was already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the last
paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124,^[2] of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

We cannot sustain the petition; we agree instead with the Court
of Appeals.

In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of Appeals
correctly held that the provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124, relied upon by
petitioner, was applicable only when the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua or higher as a single
indivisible penalty, i.e., the penalty was at least reclusion perpetua. Hence, the penalty imposed by the appellate
court on the accused was clearly in accordance with Sec. 14 of RA 6538,^[3]
which is not considered reclusion
perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13, Rule 124.^[4]

The Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution relied on People v. Omotoy^[5] where the Regional Trial Court found
the accused guilty of arson and sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum,
as minimum, to reclusion perpetua. The
case reached this Court on automatic appeal. In Footnote 16 of the decision, it was observed –

The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for the reason no
doubt that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is involved, albeit joined
to prision mayor in its maximum period in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Actually, the appeal should have gone to the Court
of Appeals since strictly speaking, this Court entertains appeals in criminal
cases only where “the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher” (Sec. 5[2](d), Article VIII, Constitution),
i.e., the penalty is at least
reclusion perpetua (or life
imprisonment, in special offenses). The lapse will be overlooked so as not to
delay the disposition of the case. It is of slight nature, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua having in fact been imposed on the accused, and causes no
prejudice whatsoever to any party.

Petitioner now asks whether the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule
124, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure is applicable to the instant case considering that the penalty
imposed was seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.

Article 27 of The Revised
Penal Code states that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40)
years. While the thirty (30)-year period falls within that range, reclusion perpetua nevertheless is a
single indivisible penalty which cannot be divided into different periods. The
thirty (30)-year period for reclusion
perpetua is only for purposes of successive service of sentence under Art.
70 of The Revised Penal Code.^[6]

More importantly, the crime committed by petitioner is one
penalized under RA 6538 or The
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 which is a special law and not under The Revised Penal Code. Unless otherwise
specified, if the special penal law imposes such penalty, it is error to
designate it with terms provided for in The
Revised Penal Code since those terms apply only to the penalties imposed by
the Penal Code, and not to the
penalty in special penal laws.^[7] This
is because generally, special laws provide their own specific penalties for the
offenses they punish, which penalties are not taken from nor refer to those in The Revised Penal Code.^[8]

The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months under RA
6538 is essentially within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal. However, such
technical term under The Revised Penal
Code is not similarly used or applied to the penalty for carnapping. Also,
the penalty for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstance of violence
against or intimidation of any person or force upon things, i.e., seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, does not correspond to
that in The Revised Penal Code.^[9] But it is different when the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped in the course of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof, since this is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death.^[10]

Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of
“x x x imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as maximum.”^[11] For these reasons the use of the term reclusion temporal in the decretal
portion of its decision is not proper. Besides, we see no basis for the trial
court to set the minimum penalty at twelve (12) years and one (1) day since RA
6538 sets the minimum penalty for carnapping at fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months.

We see no error by the appellate court in relying on a Footnote in Omotoy^[12] to affirm the conviction of the
accused. The substance of the Footnote may
not be the ratio decidendi of the
case, but it still constitutes an important part of the decision since it
enunciates a fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. That this
rule is stated in a Footnote to a
decision is of no consequence as it is merely a matter of style.

It may be argued that Omotoy
is not on all fours with the instant case since the former involves an
appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court while the case at bar
is an appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. As enunciated in Omotoy, the Supreme Court entertains
appeals in criminal cases only where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The basis
for this doctrine is the Constitution itself which empowers this Court to
review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments of lower courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.^[13]

Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty in a
criminal case brought to it on appeal is at least reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment, then it should
impose such penalty, refrain from entering judgment thereon, certify the case
and elevate the entire records to this Court for review.^[14]
This will obviate the unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of
criminal cases between this Court and the Court of Appeals, for by then this
Court will acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very inception and can,
without bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully completed the exercise
of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.^[15]

On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty
less than reclusion perpetua, a
review of the case may be had only by petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45^[16]
where only errors or questions of law may be raised.

Petitioner, in his Reply, also brings to fore the issue of
whether there was indeed a violation of The
Anti-Carnapping Act. This issue is factual, as we shall find hereunder.

In the evening of 26 May 1996 Leonardo Bhagwani parked the
subject Isuzu Trooper in front of his house at No. 7015-B Biac-na-Bato St.,
Makati City, Metro Manila. The vehicle was owned by Augustus Zamora but was
used by Bhagwani as a service vehicle in their joint venture. The following day
the Isuzu Trooper was nowhere to be found prompting Bhagwani to report its
disappearance to the Makati Police Station and the Anti-Carnapping (ANCAR)
Division which immediately issued an Alarm Sheet.^[17]

On 31 May 1996 Bhagwani’s neighbor, fireman Avelino Alvarez,
disclosed that he learned from his daughter, a common-law wife of accused
Michael Cummins, that the accused Rommel Flores, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen
and Michael Cummins himself stole the Isuzu Trooper. Alvarez’s daughter however
refused to issue any statement regarding the incident.^[18]

In the evening of 31 May 1996 SPO3 “Miling” Flores brought to his
house Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen, Rommel Flores, and
complaining witness Bhagwani. In that meeting, Cummins, Vasques, Bertumen and
Flores admitted that they took the vehicle and used it in going to Laguna, La
Union and Baguio.^[19] They
claimed however that it was with the knowledge and consent of Bhagwani. They
alleged that on the night they took the vehicle, they invited Bhagwani to join
them in their outing to Laguna. But when Bhagwani declined, they asked him
instead if they could borrow the Isuzu Trooper. Bhagwani allegedly agreed and
even turned over the keys to them.^[20]

Petitioner Marvin Mercado was absent during that confrontasi in the house of SPO3
“Miling” Flores but his co-accused narrated his participation in the crime.^[21]

The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction but increased the
penalty imposed on the four (4) accused from a prison term of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.^[22]

Petitioner insists that the accused were more motivated by fun
rather than theft in taking the Isuzu Trooper, and that they merely took the
vehicle for a joyride with no intention of stealing it. If they were really
thieves, according to petitioner, they would have sold the vehicle outright
instead of simply abandoning it in Baguio.^[23]

Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this is a petition
for review on certiorari where only questions of law, and not questions of
fact, may be raised. The issue before us being factual, a reevaluation of the
facts and the evidence may not be entertained in this appeal. Besides, findings
of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding
upon the Supreme Court.^[24] This
rule may be disregarded only when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or are not
supported by the evidence on record. But there is no ground to apply this
exception to the instant case. This Court will not assess all over again the
evidence adduced by the parties particularly where as in this case the findings
of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals completely coincide.^[25]

However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals on its imposition
of the penalty. Republic Act No. 6538 imposes the penalty of imprisonment for seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force
upon things. The evidence in this case shows that the accused broke a quarter
window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access to it, thus demonstrating that force
was used upon the vehicle; nonetheless, we believe that this does not merit the
imposition of the full penalty. With the application of The Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed may be
reduced to an indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months to twenty-two (22) years.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
denying the Motion and Manifestation of petitioner Marvin Mercado dated 19
January 2001 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is
reduced to an indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months to twenty-two (22) years. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
Decision penned by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr., RTC-Br. 138, Makati City; Original
Records, pp. 160-172; CA Rollo, pp.
32-45.

^[2]
Sec. 13. Quorum of the court;
certification of appeal of cases to Supreme Court. -x x x Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment should be imposed in
a case, the court, after discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall
render judgment imposing the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment as the circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from
entering the judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire
record thereof to the Supreme Court for review.

^[3]
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. – Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two
of this Act, shall irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be
punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen
years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without
violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years
and four months and not more than
thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof (as amended by RA 7659).

^[4]
Resolution of the Court of Appeals of
7 August 2001 penned by Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., and concurred in by
Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and
Alicia L. Santos, Former Fifth Division; CA Rollo, pp. 342-343; Rollo, pp. 111-112.

^[5]
G.R. No. 112719, 29 January 1997, 267 SCRA 143, 152.

^[6]
People v. Quitorio, G.R. No. 116765,
28 January 1998, 285 SCRA 196, 219.

^[7]
People v. Canoy and Gabucan, 92 Phil
1076 (1953).

^[8]
People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29
July 1994, 234 SCRA 555, 573.

^[9]
Id., p. 576.

^[10]
See Note 3.

^[11]
Original Records, p. 303; CA Rollo,
p. 44.

^[12]
See Note 5.

^[13]
Sec. 5, par. (d), 1987 Constitution.

^[14]
Last paragraph, Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure; see
Note 2.

^[15]
People v. Daniel, No. L-40330, 20
November 1978, 86 SCRA 511, 540, reiterated in People v. Ramos, No. L-49818, 20 February 1979, 86 SCRA 511; People v. Traya, No. L-48065, 30 March 1979, 89 SCRA 274; and People v. Centeno, et al.,
No. L-48744, 30 October 1981, 108 SCRA 710.

^[16]
Id., Sec. 3 (e), Rule 122 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure: “Except as provided in the last paragraph of
section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.”

^[17]
TSN, 22 October 1996, pp. 10-24.

^[18]
Id., pp. 35-43.

^[19]
Id., pp. 47-65.

^[20]
TSN, 10 June 1997, pp. 4-13; 14 July 1997, p. 2; 17 July 1997, pp. 6-8; 29 July
1997, pp. 6-9.

^[21]
Id., pp. 62-63.

^[22]
See Notes 1 and 4.

^[23]
Rollo, pp. 158-159.

^[24]
Gloria Changco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128033, 20 March 2002.

^[25]
Ibid.