AGRIPINA VDA. DE ALBURO, ET AL., PETITIONERS VS. FILOMENA VDA. DE UMBAO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Review of the decision of the Court of Appeals declaring plaintiffs Filomena
Vda. de Umbao, et al., the owners entitled to possession of a parcel of land of
about three hectares located in Sta. Ana, Tubay, Agusan, and ordering defendants
to vacate it and pay plaintiffs the sum of P2,363.50 value of the Tatter’s share
in the products of the land from the time of usurpation thereof by said
defendants.

The appellate court found the lot to be a part of a bigger parcel of over 53
hectares which had been in possession of plaintiffs and their
predecessors-in-interest since the year 1918 at least. Said court further found
that sometime in 1946, defendants surreptitiously took possession of the
3-hectare lot in dispute, and kept it through force. These conclusions were
drawn from the testimony of the witnesses of both sides and the documentary
evidence, especially the survey plan approved March 12, 1918, of the whole
53-hectare land, and the relocation report of the private surveyor, Exh. F.

The main portion of defendants-appellants’ printed brief here attempts to
challenge the findings of the court a quo on the matter. Enough to say
that the question of physical possession is purely factual, and our usual
practice has been not to disturb the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals.
The same thing may be said of appellants’ contention that the value of the
products of the land has not been adequately proven by competent evidence. There
was testimony for, plaintiffs which the Court accepted for purposes of
computation.

In this connection, it should be stated that when this petition for review
was submitted for admission, petitioners expounded the above two questions only.
Under ordinary circumstances, the petition would have been denied, the issues
being factual. However, this Court noticed a point which it thought could be the
subject of further debate: the timeliness of the appeal by plaintiffs to the
Court of Appeals. In the court of first instance, the plaintiffs obtained
judgment for possession of the land; but they got no damages. They, and the
defendants, appealed to the Court of Appeals. There, they again prevailed on the
issue of possession, and also on their claim for compensation. Defendants there
contended that plaintiffs’ appeal was belated, but the Court of Appeals decided
it was not; and in so deciding, it apparently held that in estimating the period
to perfect the appeal, the day of actual receipt of copy of the court’s
order denying their motion for reconsideration, should be the starting point—not
the notice sent by the postmaster—the copy having been sent by
registered mail. (See Rule 27, sec. 8) Now, as at that time (March 1959), there
were litigations^[1] pending before this
Court affecting the application of the very section of the Rules, we gave due
course to this petition. Note specially that if the plaintiffs’ appeal had been
untimely, no damages could have been awarded to them.

In their printed brief, however, defendants-appellants did not discuss the
point here. Perhaps they did so advisedly, because upon careful consideration,
there was really no adequate foundation to their contention that plaintiffs had
appealed out of time. Such contention amounted to this: 21 days after receipt of
copy of the judge’s decision, plaintiffs moved to reconsider; copy of the order
denying their motion was sent to plaintiffs by registered mail on November 8,
1954; in view of “the presumption that letters duly directed and mailed are
received in the regular course of the mail (Rule 123, Sec. 69-V), the order of
denial should have been received by plaintiff within the first five days from
the date of the first notice of the postmaster or on November 16, since mail
service between Butuan City and. Surigao takes only 2 days. The Addressee having
failed to claim said letter, service of notice took effect at the expiration of
such time (Rule 27, sec. 8) and appeal having been filed only on November 27,
1954, 34 days after notification of the decision,-plaintiffs’ appeal was
allegedly filed out of time. * * *.”

We say defendants’ theory has no sufficient foundation, because it rests on a
presumption derived from another presumption. Indeed, they argue:
it is presumed that the registered letter was received at the point of
destination in regular course of the mails—2 days after November 8; it is
also presumed that the postmaster complied with his duty and sent the first
notice on November 10^[2]; therefore,
plaintiffs must be deemed to have received the letter five days after November
10, according to Rule 27, sec. 8. This is tacking one presumption to another,
which is not permitted by orthodox rules of evidence.

“An inference of fact should not be drawn from premises which are uncertain,
but the facts on which an inference may legitimately rest must, it is said, be
established by direct evidence as if they were the very facts in issue. It
follows that one presumption cannot be based on another presumption, and it
has been broadly asserted in many decisions that inferences cannot be founded on
inferences (31 Corpus Juris Secundum, “Evidence”, sec. 116(b) [Italics
ours]).

The result, therefore, is that the five-days-after-the-post-mastur’s-notice
principle could not be applied; defendants’ arguments built thereon collapses
necessarily; and the apel-late court rightfully passed judgment on plaintiffs’
appeal.

As stated, this was the legal question which on a preliminary survey, induced
this Court to entertain the petition for review. It turns out, however, that
petitioners finally elected to discuss only factual questions, which we are not
at liberty to revise.

On the other hand, upon the basis of the facts established according to the
Court of Appeals—which are binding here —there is no doubting the correctness of
its adjudication: plaintiffs are entitled to possession, plus the estimated
damages.

Wherefore, the decision under review should be, and is hereby, affirmed with
costs against appellants.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Decision affirmed.

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^[1] Grospe vs. Court of Appeals, 106
Phil., 1144.

^[2] Admitting there is a presumption
that the postmaster sent the notice, the sending could have been made on
November 11, or 12 or 13.