THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT VS. ARTEMIO PERVEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On December 8, 1958, the appellee Artemio Pervez was charged with attempted
rape before the Justice of the Peace of San Miguel, Iloilo. After conducting the
first and second stages of preliminary investigation, the Justice of the Peace,
on January 30, 1959, dismissed the charge for insufficiency of evidence.
Disagreeing with the findings of the Justice of the Peace, the Provincial
Fiscal, on February 19, 1959, filed an information for attempted rape against
Pervez in the Court of First Instance, certifying that he had conducted a
preliminary investigation in accordance with Republic Act 732, as amended; that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has been
committed, and that the accused is guilty thereof.

On a motion to quash, the court below dismissed the information, sustaining
the contention of the defense that after the dismissal by the Justice of the
Peace, the Provincial Fiscal had no authority to file the information unless
upon a new preliminary investigation, in which (more intimated than directly
averred), the accused had the right to be present and submit his evidence; that
Republic Act 732, as amended by Republic Act 1799, applies only to crime
cognizable by the Court of First Instance and filed directly with said
court, not to those originally filed with the Justice of the Peace. Cited
for the above proposition are Villanueva, et al. vs. Hon. Gonzales, et
al., 99 Phil., 679; 52 Off. Gaz., (12) 5497, and People vs. Magbanua,
et al., C.A.-G. R. No. 19544-R, 54 Off. Gaz., 4500.

From the order quashing the information, the Government appeals, contending
that under Republic Act 732, as amended, the Provincial Fiscal is properly
authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation even without the presence of
the accused who did not request to be present, regardless of whether it was
originally filed with the Justice of the Peace or with said Provincial Fiscal;
that the law itself does not make such distinction; that the Provincial Fiscal
is not bound by the findings of the Justice of the Peace, and way conduct his
own preliminary investigation, to be guided accordingly by the result
thereof.

We find merit in the appeal. It can not seriously be disputed, and needs no
citation of authorities,, that the Provincial Fiscal is not precluded from
conducting his own preliminary investigation of a case previously dismissed by
the Justice of the Peace, since such dismissal creates no bar to another
prosecution. There is need only to determine whether he may do so without the
presence of the accused. In a line of cases (Villanueva, et. al., vs.
Hon. Gonzales, et al., supra.; Lozada vs. Hernandez, 92 Phil.,
1051; Rodriguez vs. Arellano, 96 Phil., 954; People vs.
Napagao, 97 Phil., 785; 51 Off. Gaz., [11] 5634), this Court has repeatedly held
that the legality of a preliminary investigation by the Provincial Fiscal,
pursuant to Republic Act 732, as amended, is not affected by lack of previous
notice to the accused, for said notice is required only after the accused
requested to be present. It is not averred or shown tliat the accused herein had
requested to be present; hence, the Provincial Fiscal was within his authority
in conducting the investigation without the attendance of the accused. That
there had been a previous dismissal by the Justice of the Peace of the same
charge would not alter the above rule. Indeed, we see no substantial distinction
between those cases originally investigated by the Justice of the Peace, and
dismissed by him, and those originally investigated by the Provincial
Fiscal (as in the Villanueva tmd Napagao cases, with respect
to some of the accused), in both of which, before filing an information in
court, the Provincial Fiscal has to rely on the result of his own investigation.
If, in the latter cases, the Provincial Fiscal may conduct the investigation
without the accused who did not request to be present, we see no reason for
changing the rule where a Justice of the Peace, in a preliminary investigation,
had previously dismissed the charge, when, as aforesaid, the findings of the
Justice of the Peace do not bind the Provincial Fiscal. (Of course, where a
Justice of the Peace forwards a case to the Court of First Instance with the
finding that there is a prima facie case, the Fiscal cannot, on his own
authority, dismiss the case, but should file with the court a motion to
dismiss.)

We are cited to our ruling in Villanueva, et al., vs. Hon. Gonzales,
et al., supra, in support of the proposition that Republic Act 732, as
amended, does not apply to those cases originally filed and investigated by the
Justice of the Peace, and, thereafter, forwarded to the Court of First Instance.
This argument springs from a total misapprehension as to the real import of the
Villanueva case. In that case, this Court ruled that:

“Republic Act 732 ‘governs preliminary investigations conducted by provincial
fiscals in cases originally instituted by them in courts of first instance. It
does not apply to cases begun in Justice of the Peace Courts and thereafter
forwarded to the corresponding Court of First Instance . . . !”

Obviously, the ruling refers to those cases where the Justice of the Peace
conducted the second stage of preliminary investigation, and found a prima
facie case, or where the accused waived preliminary investigation therein.
In such cases; the Provincial Fiscal may rely on the evidence presented
in the Justice of the Peace, and is under no obligation to conduct an entirely
new preliminary investigation. But certainly, there is nothing in said decision
to justify the conclusion that after a previous dismissal by the Justice of the
Peace, the Provincial Fiscal may not conduct a separate, independent
investigation of his own, and this, without the presence of the accused, if the
latter did not so request. In fact, the Villanueva case upheld the
legality of the preliminary investigation conducted by the provincial fiscal
with respect to one of the accused who was not among those originally
investigated by the Justice of the Peace, and who was not given notice by the
provincial fiscal in his own investigation.

In resume, we reiterate our previous rulings that if the charge for a crime
cognizable by the Court of First Instance is filed by a competent party or
officer in the Justice of the Peace Court, and the accused waives preliminary
investigation therein, or the Justice of the Peace, after regular preliminary
investigation, finds that a prima facie case exists, and consequently,
elevates the records to the Court of First Instance, the Provincial Fiscal is
not called upon to conduct another investigation, and may forthwith file the
information in the Court of First Instance. Republic Act No. 732 does not apply
in such a case. But if the Justice of the Peace, after due investigation,
dismisses the charge, then the case stands as if no charge had been made, and
the Provincial Fiscal may thereafter conduct his own investigation of the same
charge under the aforesaid Republic Act 732, making it in the presence of the
accused if and when the latter.so requests.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, with costs against the
appellee.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Order reversed.