ONG YET MUA HARDWARE CO., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE VS. MANILA RAILROAD CO., ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Appeal from the judgment, dated February 24, 1959, of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 36764, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

“For the Foregoing Consideration, the Court.hereby renders judgment,
sentencing the defendant to pay’the plaintiff the sum of P1,469.83, with 6%
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint on May 30, 1958,
until fully paid, plus the sum of P200.00 as and for attorney’s fees and
costs.”

Ong Yet Mua Hardware Co., Inc. was the consignee of four (4) cases of planes
and plane blades which were unloaded from the vessel “SS Perseus” at the Port of
Manila in or about June, 1956. Upon its discharge, said cargo was placed under
the custody of the Manila Port Service, an arrastre operator for the Port of
Manila and a subsidiary of the Manila Railroad Company. Of the four (4) cases of
planes and plane blades, only two (2) were delivered by the Manila Port Service
to the consignee. Accordingly, the latter filed a claim against the Manila
Railroad Co. for the recovery of P1.469.83, representing the invoice value of
missing case No. 46 at P384.78 and case No. 47 at P607.97. Defendant admits
liability for the entire invoice value of case No. 46, but claims that its
liability with respect to case No. 47 is limited only to the amount of P500.00,
in accordance with the management contract entered into by and between the
Manila Port Service and the Bureau of Customs, the pertinent provisions of which
read:

“Sec. 15. * * * and the contractor shall be solely responsible as an
independent contractor for, and promptly pay to the steamship company,
consignee, consignor, or other interested party or parties the invoice valae of
each package but which in no case shall be more than five hundred pesos (500.00)
for each package unless the value is either specified or manifested * *
*”.

On the other hand, plaintiff-consignee contends that, not having been a party
to the management contract, it could not’be held subject to the limited
liability clause invoked by the defendant.

It appears, however, that stamped in ink in the delivery permit issued by the
Bureau of Customs and secured at the instance of the consignee were the printed
words, reading as follows: ‘

“This permit is presented subject to all the terms and conditions of the
Management Contract between the Bureau of Customs and the Manila Port Service
and amendments thereto or alterations thereof, particularly but not limited to
Paragraph 15 thereof, limiting: the Company liability to P500.00 per package,
unless the value of the goods is otherwise specified, declared or manifested * *
*.”

Upon presentation of said permit to the Manila Port Service, the latter
issued a gate pass, in which the following relevant statements again appear:

“* * * Issuance of this Gate Pass constitutes delivery to, and receipt by
CONSIGNEE of the goods as described herein. The presentation of the permit to
deliver the shipment consisting wholly or partly of the above goods, is subject
to all terms and conditions contained in the Management Contract between the
Bureau of Customs and Manila Port Service and all amendments thereto or
alteration thereof, particularly but not limited to Paragraph 15 thereof
limiting the Company liability to P500.00 per package, unless the value of the
goods is otherwise specified or manifested * * *.”

Nonetheless, the lower court resolved the issue in favor of the plaintiff, by
adjudging the management contract as not binding on the consignee, even while
its duly authorized broker, the Serrano Brokerage, had signed the gate pass and
delivery permit. Defendant thus interposed this appeal directly to this Court
upon the plea that it would merely raise questions of law.

Appellant has correctly invoked our pronouncement in the case of Tomas
Grocery vs. Delgado Bros., Inc. (105 Phil., 549; 66 Off. Gaz., [27]
4422), wherein, among other things, we said:

“The appellant contends that it is not a party to the management contract
entered into by the Bureau of Customs and the appellee and that for that reason
it could not be bound by such condition. It appears that the 822 cases of milk
Were withdrawn from the appellee by Protaeio Villafuerte, a licensed customs
broker * * *. The notice of the claim for loss filed with the appellee was
signed by him for and in behalf of the appellant * * *. In the permit to
deliver imported goods, dated U February 1955, issued by the Collector of
Customs, the name of the stime customs broker appears * * *. The gate passes
issued by the appellee to bring the cargo out of the pier was in the name of
.the said customs broker * * *. The appellant has not repudiated its privity
with .the broker and has accepted the benefit of delivery of 822 cases of milk
through him. Therefore, it is bound by the notice appearing on the back of the
permit to deliver imported goods * * * and on the gate passes * * * that
claims for losses must De hied with the Contractor within fifteen (15) days from
the date of the arrival of the goods before the appellant could sue the appellee
in court for recovery of the value of the losses. As the trial court aptly
observed, the appellant cannot avail itself of the provisions of the
management contract * * *, when its agent Pratacio Villafuerte, a licensed
customs broker, accepted delivery of the cargo, as shown by the permit to
deliver imported goods * * * and the gate passes * * * and at the sawe time deny
being a party thereto when adverse to its interests. * * *” (Italics
supplied)

This doctrine, repeatedly affirmed in other decisions of this Court (Northern
Motors Co. vs. Prince Line et al., 107 Phil., 253; Bernabe & Co.
Inc. vs. Delgado Bros. Inc., 107 Phil. 287; Delgado Bros. Inc.
vs. Li Yao, & Co 107 Phil., 939; Ysmael & Co. vs. U.
S. Lines, G. R. No. L-14384, April 30, 1960; Domestic Ins. Co. vs.
Manila Port Service, G.R. No. L-15060, August 31, 1960) is conclusive on the
present litigation.

Contrary to appellee’s assertions, no question of fact is involved in this
case, the only evidentiary matter of record being the stipulation of facts
submitted by the parties (see Moran on Rules of Court, Vol. 1, p. 698, 1957 ed.,
citing authorities). Since it does not appear in the stipulation that the
respective invoice values of the missing goods were declared or manifested as to
be exempt from the limited liability clause found in the management contract,
the latter applies with full force and effect.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is set aside, and another one is
entered, sentencing the deferdant-appellant, to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P884.78 only, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until
fully paid. Costs in both instances against plaintiff-appellee.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Judgment set aside.