AGRIPINA VDA. DE ALBURO, ET AL., PETITIONERS VS. FILOMENA VDA. DE UMBAO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Alburo versus Umbao

The Case

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a case of recovery of possession of a parcel of land. The petitioners, Agripina Vda. de Alburo and her co-defendants, are the ones who took and held the land; the respondents, Filomena Vda. de Umbao and her co-plaintiffs, are the ones who claim it as part of a larger holding possessed by them and their predecessors since 1918. The action is essentially one for possession of a three-hectare portion of land in Santa Ana, Tubay, Agusan, together with the value of the products taken from it. The case matters to a reviewee for two reasons: it is a clean illustration of the rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court, and it contains a sharp ruling on evidence — that one presumption cannot be based on another presumption.

Procedural History

The case began in the court of first instance. The plaintiffs obtained judgment for possession of the land, but they were awarded no damages. Both sides appealed to the Court of Appeals: the plaintiffs because they got no damages, and the defendants because they lost on possession. In the Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs again prevailed on possession, and this time they also prevailed on their claim for compensation. The defendants argued before the appellate court that the plaintiffs' appeal had been filed out of time, but the Court of Appeals held that it was timely. The defendants then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review. The Supreme Court initially noticed a legal question — the timeliness of the plaintiffs' appeal — and gave due course to the petition on that account, since if the plaintiffs' appeal had been untimely, no damages could have been awarded to them. In the end, however, the petitioners discussed only factual questions in their brief, and the Court affirmed the decision under review.

Facts

The land in dispute is a parcel of about three hectares located in Santa Ana, Tubay, Agusan. The Court of Appeals found that this lot is part of a bigger parcel of over fifty-three hectares which had been in the possession of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest since the year 1918 at least. This finding rested on the testimony of witnesses for both sides and on the documentary evidence, especially a survey plan of the whole fifty-three-hectare land approved on March 12, 1918, and the relocation report of a private surveyor.

Sometime in 1946, the defendants surreptitiously took possession of the three-hectare lot in dispute and kept it through force. From the time of that usurpation, the plaintiffs were deprived of the latter's share in the products of the land.

On the procedural side, the record shows that twenty-one days after receipt of copy of the judge's decision, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration. Copy of the order denying their motion was sent to the plaintiffs by registered mail on November 8, 1954. The plaintiffs filed their appeal on November 27, 1954. The defendants built an argument that the appeal was late by stacking presumptions about mail delivery, and that argument is the heart of the legal question the Supreme Court examined.

Issues

• Whether or not the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals on the question of physical possession, and on the value of the products of the land, may be disturbed on appeal to the Supreme Court.
• Whether or not the plaintiffs' appeal to the Court of Appeals was filed out of time, such that the award of damages to them could not stand.

Applicable Provisions

Section 8 of Rule 27, as it then stood, provided on service by registered mail:

Service by registered mail is complete upon the expiration of five days after the first notice of the postmaster, unless the addressee appears and gets the mail within that time.

This is the provision on which the defendants relied to say that the plaintiffs were deemed to have received the order denying reconsideration five days after the first notice of the postmaster, and therefore that their appeal was late.

Section 69, paragraph V, of Rule 123, as it then stood, provided on the presumption of receipt of mailed letters:

The presumption that letters duly directed and mailed are received in the regular course of the mail.

This is the presumption the defendants used as the first step in their argument — that the registered letter was received at the point of destination in the regular course of the mails.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the question of physical possession is purely factual, and that the usual practice of the Court is not to disturb the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. The same holds for the contention that the value of the products of the land was not adequately proven by competent evidence; there was testimony for the plaintiffs which the Court accepted for purposes of computation. Since the petitioners finally elected to discuss only factual questions, the Court declined to revise them.

On the second issue, the Court held that there was no adequate foundation for the contention that the plaintiffs had appealed out of time. The defendants' theory rested on a presumption derived from another presumption. They argued that it is presumed the registered letter was received at the point of destination in the regular course of the mails two days after November 8; that it is also presumed the postmaster complied with his duty and sent the first notice; and that therefore the plaintiffs must be deemed to have received the letter five days after that notice under Rule 27, Section 8. The Court rejected this, quoting the rule on evidence:

An inference of fact should not be drawn from premises which are uncertain, but the facts on which an inference may legitimately rest must, it is said, be established by direct evidence as if they were the very facts in issue. It follows that one presumption cannot be based on another presumption, and it has been broadly asserted in many decisions that inferences cannot be founded on inferences.

The Court noted that even admitting a presumption that the postmaster sent the notice, the sending could have been made on November 11, or 12, or 13. The result, therefore, was that the five-days-after-the-postmaster's-notice principle could not be applied, the defendants' argument built on it collapsed, and the appellate court rightfully passed judgment on the plaintiffs' appeal. On the facts established according to the Court of Appeals, which are binding, there was no doubting the correctness of its adjudication: the plaintiffs are entitled to possession, plus the estimated damages.

Doctrine

First, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court and will not be disturbed on appeal, the question of physical possession being purely factual. Second, one presumption cannot be based on another presumption, and inferences cannot be founded on inferences. The presumption that a registered letter was received in the regular course of the mails cannot be combined with a presumption that the postmaster sent the first notice on a particular day, so as to trigger the five-day rule on service by registered mail. Where the premises are uncertain, the fact in issue must be established by direct evidence.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the decision under review, with costs against the appellants; the plaintiffs won possession of the land and the value of the latter's share in its products.

Remember This

Memorize the line that one presumption cannot be based on another presumption, and inferences cannot be founded on inferences. Examiners use this case in remedial law and evidence — on service by registered mail and the timeliness of appeals — and as an example of the Supreme Court's deference to the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.