G.R. Nos. L-29959-60. January 30, 1971
THE POLICE COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, CRISINO M. DE CASTRO AND JOSE G. LUKBAN, JOLLY BUGARIN, AND VICENTE RAVAL, MEMBERS, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE JUDGE ELOY B. …
VILLAMOR, J.:
In this original action of certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, petitioner prays that certain orders of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch I) in its Civil
Cases Nos. 14718 and 14719 be annulled and that respondent Judge Eloy B. Bello be prohibited
permanently from hearing said cases. On December 19, 1968, we issued an
order temporarily restraining respondent Judge from enforcing his order of December 14, 1968, requiring the
members of petitioner to show cause why they should
not be held guilty in contempt, and from further hearing the two aforesaid
cases.
On January 20, 1967,
a sworn complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, serious irregularities in
the performance of duty and/or serious neglect of duty and incompetency
was filed by certain persons with the Board of Investigators of Binmaley, Pangasinan, against
herein respondents Genaro C. Ferrer
and Emerano Bonifacio,
Chief of Police and Corporal, respectively, of the police force of Binmaley. The said
respondents filed a joint answer, after which hearings were conducted. On March 15, 1967, the Board of Investigators
made a report of its investigation containing a finding that “the charges
imputed against respondents were not committed deliberately or intentionally
but, rather, were done through honest mistake,” and recommending to the Police
Commission that “the case be dropped with the admonition that the
respondents x x x should be
more careful in the performance of their official duties.” After reviewing
the records of the investigation in its Administrative Case No. 26, the Police
Commission rendered decision on August
2, 1967, finding the respondents guilty of serious neglect of duty
and ordering their dismissal from the service.
The respondents filed motions for reconsideration, but the same were
denied.
On November 19, 1968,
respondents Ferrer and Bonifacio
filed with the court below two separate petitions for certiorari with
preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Cases Nos.
14718 and 14719). In their petitions
they contended that the Police Commission had no jurisdiction to render a
decision in the administrative case on August 2, 1967, because at that time it
had not yet even published its Police Manual as required by Section 26 of
Republic Act No. 4864 (Police Act of 1966); and that the Police Commission
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing them from the service. On November
21, 1968, respondent Judge issued in each of the two cases an order
requiring the Police Commission to file an answer within ten days, and another
order ex parte directing the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Pursuant to the latter orders, the corresponding writs were issued on November 22, 1968, upon the filing
of a bond by each of herein private respondents.
On November 29, 1968,
the Police Commission filed a motion to dismiss with a prayer for the
dissolution of the writs of preliminary mandatory injunction. On December
9, 1968, respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 14718 and directing herein petitioner to reinstate
respondent Ferrer within twenty-four hours from
receipt of the order. On December 10, 1968, a similar order
was issued in connection with respondent Bonifacio’s
petition in Civil Case No. 14719. On
December 12, 1968, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
December 9 and 10 orders; but the same was returned to petitioner unacted upon on the ground that the motion was not in
accordance with Section 10, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same not
being accompanied by a proof of service.
On December 14, 1968, respondent Judge, on motion of respondents Ferrer and Bonifacio, issued a
joint order in the two cases requiring the members of the Police Commission to
appear in person before him on December 21, 1968, to show cause why they should
not be held guilty of contempt for their failure to reinstate respondents Ferrer and Bonifacio as ordered
in the writs.
On December 19, 1968,
the present petition was filed with this Court.
Sought to be annulled are the orders of respondent Judge dated November
21, 1968, requiring petitioner to file an answer and directing the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in each of the two cases, the
aforesaid writs issued on November 22, 1968, and the December 9 and 10, 1968
orders denying petitioner’s motions to dismiss and ordering petitioner to
reinstate private respondents.
Petitioner, likewise, seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from carrying
out and enforcing his order of December
14, 1968, and from proceeding with the hearing of the cases.
In directing issuance of the writs of preliminary mandatory
injunction ex parte, respondent Judge stated
in his twin orders of November 21, 1968, that there was a prima facie
showing in the petitions that the Police Commission had no jurisdiction to
render a decision in Administrative Case No. 26; that it is alleged in the
petitions that if the petitioners (herein private respondents) are not
immediately reinstated, they will suffer irreparable damage and injury; and
that if the petitioners in the cases eventually win and are found entitled to
reinstatement, it will be difficult for them to secure payment of back
salaries, especially if the Municipality of Binmaley
will not have sufficient funds for the purpose.
We are of the opinion that the writs in question were
improvidently issued, and that, moreover, respondent Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan had no power to issue
such writs against the Police Commission, which holds office in Quezon City.
This Court has already held that it is improper to issue a writ
of preliminary injunction prior to a final hearing except “in cases of
extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of
relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor; where there is a
willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and
remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of the
mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting
continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted
by the defendant, than to establish a new relation.” (Manila
Electric Railroad and Light Company vs. Del Rosario, etc., et al., 22 Phil.,
433.) This doctrine was reiterated in Subido,
etc., et al. vs. Gopengco, etc., et al., L-25618,
March 28, 1969 (27 SCRA 455), citing not only the Manila Electric Railroad
and Light Company case, supra, but also the cases of Lemi vs. Valencia, L-20768, February 28, 1963 (7 SCRA 469);
Bautista vs. Barcelona, 100 Phil., 1078 (1957); Coronado vs. Tan, 96 Phil., 729
(1955); and Villadores vs. Encarnacion,
95 Phil., 913 (1954). In the Subido case, we held:
“As the issuance of a mandatory injunction is the exception
rather than the rule, the party applying for it must show a clear legal right
the violation of which is so recent as to make its vindication an urgent
one.”
Did private respondents have a clear legal right to be reinstated
to their former positions in the municipal police force of Binmaley? We do not think so. The principal ground on which their petitions
in the lower court are predicated is lack of jurisdiction of the Police
Commission to render a decision in Administrative Case No. 26, petitioners
contending that the Police Commission had no such jurisdiction because it had
not yet published a Police Manual when it rendered its decision on August 2, 1967.
The provision of law invoked is Section 26 of Republic Act No.
4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966, to wit:
“SEC. 26. Saving clause. – All pending administrative cases involving
police service and personnel shall be absorbed by the Police Commission one
hundred days after the publication of the Police Manual containing rules and
regulations relative to such matters.”
The Police Manual mentioned in the law,
Section 9, Rule XXIII of which provides:
“Section 9. Saving Clause. – All administrative cases involving members
of the police force pending before the city or municipal boards, or those with
the city or municipal mayors, shall be turned over to the Board of
Investigators concerned, and those with the Civil Service Board of Appeals, to
the Police Commission within one hundred (100) days after the publication of
this Manual,”
was promulgated
only on December 30, 1967,
or sometime after the rendition of the decision by the Police Commission in its
Administrative Case No. 26.
Section 26 of the Police Act of 1966 is, as expressly stated
therein, a mere saving clause, and refers solely to administrative cases
involving police service and personnel which were pending at the time of
the effectivity of the Act. The Police Commission was required to absorb
the said pending cases within one hundred days after it shall have published a
Police Manual. The said Section 26 may
not be interpreted to mean that the Board of Investigators of each city or
municipality and the Police Commission could not legally function to carry
into effect the purposes of the Act until after the lapse of the said one
hundred days, because Section 28 provides that “[t]his Act shall take
effect upon its approval.” Since the Act was approved on September 8, 1966, it became
effective immediately on that date.
Respondents, however, argue that without a Police Manual the
Board of Investigators and the Police Commission would have no rules to guide
them, so that at the very least the procedure that should have been followed in
Administrative Case No. 26 was that provided in Republic Act No. 557, under
which charges are preferred by the municipal mayor against members of the
municipal police force and investigated by the municipal council, whose
decision is appealable to the Commissioner of Civil
Service; and since that procedure was not adopted in the present cases, the
proceedings had before the Police Commission were null and void. The contention is untenable. In the first place, as held by this Court in Galeno vs. Ticao, L-22355,
September 30, 1969 (29 SCRA 464), “the new procedure in the matter of
preferring charges against police officers and the conduct of the investigation
of the charges are now provided in Sections 14 and 15 of the Police Act of
1966,” to wit:
“SEC. 14. Removal and suspension of members of the
Police Force or Agency. – Members of
the local police agency shall not be suspended or removed except upon written
complaint filed under oath with the Board of Investigators herein provided for
misconduct or incompetency, dishonesty, disloyalty
to the Government, serious irregularities in the performance of their duties,
and violation of law.
“SEC. 15. Board of Investigators. – In every local agency be
a Board of Investigators. Charges
against any member of the city and/or municipal police agency shall be
investigated by a Board of Investigators of three members, composed of the city
or municipal treasurer as chairman, a representative of the Provincial
Commander, and a councilor, elected by a majority of the city or municipal
council concerned, as members.
“Copy of the charges shall be furnished the respondent by the
Chairman of the Board of Investigators within five days from the date of filing
of said charges, and the respondent shall answer within five days from receipt
thereof. The Board of Investigators
shall conduct its investigation in public within five days from receipt of
respondent’s answer to the charges or from the expiration of respondent’s
period to answer, whichever is earlier and unless for good cause shown the
investigation shall be finished within thirty days thereafter and the Board
shall submit the records of the investigation, its findings and
recommendations to the Police Commission within thirty days after the
termination of the investigation. The
decision of the Police Commission shall be final and must be rendered within
seventy-five days from the time of receipt of the findings of the Board. Disciplinary jurisdiction of offenses involving
suspension of not more than ten days or forfeiture of not more than fifteen
days’ pay is vested in the chief of the police agency concerned whose decision
shall be final.
“The Board of Investigators shall also conduct investigations
and decide claims relative to benefits as provided under this Act, subject to
appeal to the Police Commission, whose decision shall be final.”
The procedure provided above is
sufficiently detailed so as to allow the Board of Investigators and the Police
Commission to function even without a Police Manual. In the second place, “the procedure
provided for in Section 1 of Republic Act 557 has been repealed by Republic
Act 4864 known as the Police Act of 1966, which was enacted on September 6, 1966.” (Galeno vs. Ticao,
supra.)
In any event, considering that private respondents voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Board of investigators, whose
decisions are subject to review by the Police Commission, they are now barred
under the doctrine of estoppel by lashes from
questioning the jurisdiction of the said Commission. (Cf. Tejam,
et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., L-21450, April 15,
1968 [23 SCRA 29]; Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-29264, August 29,
1969 [29 SCRA 419].)
The principal ground relied upon in their petitions in the court
below, namely, lack of jurisdiction of the Police Commission, being utterly
bereft of legal basis, it can hardly be said that private respondents have
shown a clear legal right warranting the issuance of the writ or preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Moreover, Section 5, Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court
prohibits the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ex parte “unless it shall appear from facts shown by
affidavits, or by the verified complaint that great or irreparable injury would
result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice.” The
verified complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 14718 and 14719 do not show the
required facts to warrant issuance of the writs of preliminary mandatory
injunction before notice and hearing. In Palanan
Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc. vs. Arranz, L-27106, March 20, 1968
(22 SCRA 1186), we said:
“It is not amiss to recall here that time and again this Court
has had occasion to deplore the readiness of some judges to grant and issue
injunction ex parte against acts of public
functionaries, ignoring the presumption of regularity and validity of official
actuations, in disregard of the deference and courtesy due to a co-ordinate branch
of the government, and with no other guide than the far from impartial
assertions in pleadings of interested parties, which a summary hearing would
have shown to be either dubious or unfounded.
The result has been that all too often, the
public interest has been prejudiced through unnecessary delays. It bears repeating here that preliminary
injunctions remain extraordinary remedies that should be dispensed with
circumspection, and that both sides should be first heard whenever
possible.”
There is another reason why the injunctive writs should not have
been issued. The Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan has no jurisdiction to issue writs of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the Police Commission, which holds
office in Quezon City,
outside the territorial boundaries of said court. (Cf. Macailing, et
al. vs. Andrada, et al., L-21607, January 30, 1970
[31 SCRA 126], citing: Castaño vs. Lobingier, 7 Phil.,
91; Acosta vs. Alvendia, L-14598, October 31, 1960; Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs. Arnado,
L-17109, June 30, 1961 [2 SCRA 782]; Hacbang vs. The Leyte Autobus Co., Inc., L-17907, May 30, 1963 [8 SCRA
103]; Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Mfg. Co., Inc. vs. National Administrator of
Regional Office No. 2, L-20491, August 31, 1965 [14 SCRA 1019]; People vs. Mencias, L-19633, November 28, 1966 [18 SCRA 807]; Santos
vs. Moreno, L-15829, December 4, 1967 [21 SCRA 1141]; Cudiamat
vs. Torres, L-24225, February 22, 1968 [22 SCRA 695]; NAWASA vs. Reyes,
L-28597, February 29, 1968 [22 SCRA 905]; Gayacao vs.
Executive Secretary, et al., L-21065 [13 SCRA 753]; Palanan
Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc. vs. Arranz, supra.)
Respondents insist that since the writs prayed for are to be implemented in
Binmaley, Pangasinan, it is
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, rather
than the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, that
has jurisdiction to issue them. In De la
Cruz vs. Gabor, et al., L-30774, October 31, 1969 (30
SCRA 325), this Court sustained the position of the Court of First Instance of Leyte that it had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Secretary of Education, the Director of
Vocational Education and the Commissioner of Civil Service, all of whom hold
office in Manila, because “section 17, paragraph 1, of the Judiciary Act, that
defines the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in concurrence with that of the
courts of first instance, in no way enlarges the power of the latter beyond the
territorial limits set by Section 44(h).” In said case the petitioner had
sought – thru the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction – her immediate
reinstatement to the position of classroom teacher in a public school in Leyte.
As stated earlier, private respondents’ petitions for certiorari
in the lower court are predicated on two grounds, namely, that the Police
Commission had no jurisdiction to render a decision in Administrative Case No.
26, and that it acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing respondent Ferrer, on the flimsy pretext of command responsibility,
and, with respect to both private respondents, in wantonly overruling the
findings and hideously ignoring the recommendations of the Board of Investigators. The first ground is closely interwoven with
the November 21, 1968
orders for the issuance of the writs of preliminary mandatory injunction, and
was squarely raised by the parties to the present cases as an issue and ruled
upon by this Court.
In connection with the second ground, it is uniformly alleged in
the petitions in the court below that without herein private respondents’
presence or knowledge, the Board of Investigators met in session on March 2, 1967, and took ex parte the testimony of Pat. Graciano
Aquino, upon which the Police Commission subsequently
relied in arriving at its conclusions; that “the respondent Police
Commission instead of appreciating the valid acts of the Board enunciated in
its findings and recommendations, said respondent depressed the valid portions
of the proceedings of the Board and then gave bloated significance to the
result of that isolated illegal act of the Board, which is the testimony of
Pat. Graciano Aquino taken
in the absence of, and without due notice to the petitioner;” and that the
Police Commission, “basing its conclusion from loosely connected,
distorted and insufficient facts, with very apparent prejudice and hostility,
ARBITRARILY DISMISSED the petitioner from the service for some highly imagined,
or at most, very minor, administrative offense.”
While findings of fact of administrative bodies are entitled to
great weight and should not generally be disturbed, there is grave abuse of
discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari. Then there is such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos vs. Profince of Tarlac, 67 Phil., 480; Tan vs. People, 88 Phil., 609; Pajo, etc., et al. vs. Ago, et al., 108 Phil., 905), as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive
duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law (Tavera-Luna, Inc. vs. Nable, 67 Phil., 340; Alafriz vs.
Nable, etc., et al., 72 Phil., 278; Liwanag vs. Castillo, 106 Phil., 375; Pajo,
etc., et al. vs. Ago, et al., supra).
Considering the allegations of private respondents, as mentioned above,
in their petitions, and considering, further, that the Board of Investigators
of Binmaley which heard the witnesses had recommended
the dismissal of the case against both respondents, we feel without expressing
an opinion on the merits of the cases in relation to the second ground – that
for this Court to issue a writ of prohibition permanently prohibiting
respondent Judge from proceeding with the cases, as prayed for by petitioner
Police Commission, will be to deprive the private respondents of their day in
court; for then they can no longer be in a position to prove their allegation
that petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing them. While it has been shown that the court below
exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the writs of preliminary mandatory
injunction, it has not likewise been shown in the present petition – nor has it
been alleged therein – that the entire proceedings in the court below are
without or in excess of the lower court’s jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. In passing it must be
mentioned that the doctrine in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction is not
applicable to this aspect of the proceedings, the power of judicial review not
being confined to the court of first instance of the locality where the office
of petitioner is maintained, to the exclusion of the court of first instance in
the locality where private respondents reside.
(Cf. Gayacao vs. Executive
Secretary, et al., supra.)
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the writ of certiorari is
granted, and, accordingly, the orders of respondent Judge in Civil Cases Nos.
14718 and 14719 dated November 21, 1968, insofar as they direct the issuance of
the writs of preliminary mandatory injunction, and the orders issued pursuant
thereto, are declared null and void; the orders of December 9 and 10, 1968, are
likewise declared null and void insofar as they require petitioner to reinstate
private respondents; and respondent Judge is permanently prohibited from
carrying out and enforcing his order of December 14, 1968. The writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby
denied insofar as petitioner seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding
with the cases, and the temporary restraining order issued by this Court in
relation to the hearing of the cases is hereby dissolved. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.