MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO PADUA AND PATERNO PALMARES, PETITIONERS, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied upon by
petitioners, five in number, for their release from imprison­ment.  Meted out life terms for the complex crime of
rebellion with murder and other crimes, they would invoke the People v.
Hernandez^[1]
doctrine, negating the existence of such an offense, a ruling that
unfortunately for them was not handed down until after their convictions had
become final.  Nor is this the first
instance, a proceeding of this character was instituted, as in Pomeroy v.
Director of Prisons,^[2]
likewise a petition for habeas corpus, a similar question was presented.  The answer given was in the negative.  Petitioners plead for a new look on the
matter.  They would premise their stand
on the denial of equal protection if their plea would not be granted.  More­over they did invoke the codal provision that judicial decisions shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines,^[3]
necessarily resulting in the conclusion that the Hernandez decision once
promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit mandate of the
Revised Penal Code as to penal laws having such character even if at the time
of their appli­cation a final sentence has been rendered “and the convict
is serving the same.”^[4]
These arguments carry considerable persuasion. 
Accordingly we find for petitioners, without going so far as to overrule
Pomeroy.

Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after
pleading guilty, was sentenced on May
5, 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua
for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and
kidnapping.  Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses, and were similarly
made to suffer the same penalty in decisions rendered, as to the first two, on March 8, 1954 and, as to the third, on
December 15, 1955.  The last petitioner, Blas
Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses and on January 12, 1954 penalized with reclusion perpetua. 
Each of the petitioners has been since then imprisoned by virtue of the
above convictions.  Each of them has
served more than 13 years.^[5]

Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez,^[6]
as above noted, this Court ruled that the information against the accused in
that case for rebellion complexed with murder, arson
and robbery was not warranted under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
there being no such complex offense.^[7]
In the recently-decided case of People v. Lava,^[8]
we expressly reaffirmed the ruling in the Hernandez case rejecting the plea of
the Solicitor General for the abandonment of such doctrine.  It is the contention of each of the
petitioners that he has served, in the light of the above, more than the
maximum penalty that could have been imposed upon him.  He is thus entitled to freedom, his continued
detention being illegal.^[9]

The fear that the Pomeroy ruling stands as an obstacle to their
release on a habeas corpus proceeding prompted petitioners, as had been
mentioned, to ask that it be appraised anew and, if necessary, discarded.  We can resolve the present petition without
doing so.  The plea there made was
unconvincing, there being a failure to invoke the contentions now pressed
vigorously by their counsel, Attorney Jose W. Diokno,
as to the existence of a denial of a constitutional right that would suffice to
raise a serious jurisdictional question and the retroactive effect to be given
a judicial decision favorable to one already sentenced to a final judgment
under Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code. 
To repeat, these two grounds carry weight.  We have to grant this petition.

1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the
writ of habeas corpus under the circumstances disclosed.  Its latitudinarian scope to assure that
illegality of restraint and detention be avoided is one of the truisms of the
law.  It is not known as the writ of
liberty for nothing.  The writ imposes on
judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is any legal
justification for a deprivation of physical freedom.  Unless there be such a showing, the
confinement must thereby cease.  If there
be a valid sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be extended beyond the period
provided for by law.  Any deviation from
the legal norms call for the termination of the imprisonment.

Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as “the most
important human rights provision” in the fundamental law.^[10]
Nor is such praise unique.  Cooley spoke
of it as “one of the principal safeguards to personal liberty.”^[11]
For Willoughby, it is “the
greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and
illegal imprisonment by whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered.”^[12]
Burdick echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as “one of the most
important bulwarks of liberty.”^[13] Fraenkel made it unanimous, for to him,
“without it much else would be of no avail.”^[14]
Thereby the rule of law is assured.

A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus
in the defense of liberty coupled with its limitations may be detected in the
opinions of former Chief Justices Arellano,^[15] Avanceña,^[16] Abad Santos,^[17] Paras,^[18] Bengzon,^[19]
and the present Chief Justice.^[20]
It fell to Justice Malcolm’s lot, however, to emphasize quite a few times the
breadth of its amplitude and of its reach. 
In Villavicencio
v. Lukban,^[21]
the remedy came in handy to challenge the validity of the order of the then
respondent Mayor of Manila who, for the best of reasons but without legal
justification, ordered the transportation of more than 150 inmates of houses of
ill-repute to Davao.  After referring to the writ of habeas corpus
as having been devised and existing “as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint” the opinion of Justice Malcolm
continued:  “The essential object
and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.  Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient.”^[22]

The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas
corpus petitions even if presented in pleadings on their face devoid of merit
was demonstrated in Ganaway v. Quilen,^[23]
where this Court, again through Justice Malcolm, stated:  “As standing alone the petition for
habeas corpus was fatally defective in its allegations, this court, on its
motion, ordered before it the record of the lower court in the case entitled
Thomas Casey et al. v. George Ganaway.”^[24]
It is to Justice Malcolm likewise in Conde v. Rivera^[25]
to whom is traceable the doctrine, one that broadens the field of the operation
of the writ, that a disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts
the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused if “restrained of his
liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.”^[26]

So it is in the United States.  An 1830 decision^[27]
of Chief Justice Marshall put the matter thus: 
“The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the
common law, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be
imprisoned without sufficient cause.” Then there is this affirmation from
an 1869 decision^[28]
of the then Chief Justice Chase: 
“The great writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries esteemed
the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.” The passing of
the years has only served to confirm its primacy as a weapon in the cause of
liberty.  Only the other year, Justice Fortas spoke for the United States Supreme Court thus:  “The writ of habeas corpus is the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary
and lawless state action. * * * The scope and flexibility of the writ — its
capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention — its ability to cut through
barriers of form and procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and
jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. 
The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative
and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its
reach are surfaced and corrected.”^[29]
Justice Fortas explicitly made reference to
Blackstone, who spoke of it as “the great and efficacious writ, in all
manner of illegal confinement.” Implicit in his just estimate of its
pre-eminent role is his adoption of Holmes’ famous dissent in Frank v. Mangum:^[30]
“But habeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of
the structure.”

2.  Where, however, the
detention complained of finds its origin in what has been judicially ordained,
the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably
narrowed.  For if “the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order,” the writ does not lie.^[31]
That principle dates back to 1902,^[32]
when this Court announced that habeas corpus was unavailing where the person
detained was in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or magistrate.  That is
understandable, as during the time the Philippines
was under American rule, there was necessarily an adherence to authoritative
doctrines of constitutional law there followed.

One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of
jurisdictional defect.  As summarized by
Justice Bradley in Ex parte Siebold,
an 1880 decision:  “The only ground
on which this court, or any court, without some special statute authorizing it,
will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under con­viction and sentence
of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or
the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void.”^[33]

There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever be kept
in mind.  Once a deprivation of a
constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is
deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to
assail the legality of the detention.^[34]

3.  Petitioners precisely
assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal
protection.  According to their
petition:  “In the case at bar, the petitioners
were convicted by Courts of First Instance for the very same rebellion for
which Hernandez, Geronimo, and others were convicted.  The law under which they were convicted is
the very same law under which the latter were convicted.  It had not and has not been changed.  For the same crime, committed under the same
law, how can we, in conscience, allow petitioners to suffer life imprisonment,
while others can suffer only prision mayor?”^[35]

They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal
protection, people similarly situated were not similarly dealt with.  What is required under this constitutional
guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under
similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.  As was noted in a recent decision:  “Favoritism and undue preference cannot
be allowed.  For the principle is that
equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances, which if not identical are analogous.  If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the
rest.”^[36]

The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive
ring.  The continued incarceration after
the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in
accordance with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have
been freed, is fraught with impli­cations at war with equal protection.  That is not to give it life.  On the contrary, it would render it
nugatory.  Otherwise, what would happen
is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of
the conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a
person duly sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer different
penalties.  Moreover, as noted in the
petition before us, after our ruling in People v. Lava, petitioners who were
mere followers would be made to languish in jail for perhaps the rest of their
natural lives when the leaders had been duly considered as having paid their
penalty to society, and freed.  Such a
deplorable result is to be avoided.

4.  Petitioners likewise, as
was made mention at the outset, would rely on Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive effect.  In support of their contention, petitioners
cite U.S. v. Macasaet,^[37]
U.S. v. Parrone,^[38]
U.S. v. Almencion,^[39]
People v. Moran,^[40]
and People v. Parel.^[41]
While reference in the above provision is made not to judicial decisions but to
legislative acts, petitioners entertain the view that it would be merely an
exaltation of the literal to deny its application to a case like the
present.  Such a belief has a firmer
foundation.  As was previously noted, the
Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
Constitution, as well as legislation, form part of our legal system.  Petitioners would even find support in the
well-known dictum of Bishop Hoadley:  “Whoever hath an absolute authority to
interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the law-giver to
all intents and purposes, and not the person who first thought or spoke
them.” It is to be admitted that constitutional law scholars, notably
Frankfurter,^[42]
Powell,^[43]
and Thayer,^[44]
in discussing judicial review as well as the jurist John Chipman
Gray, were much impressed with the truth and the soundness of the above
observations.  We do not have to go that
far though.  Enough for present purposes
that both the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code allow, if they do not call
for, a retroactive application.

It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given
a retroactive effect petitioners had served the full term for which they could
have been legally committed, is habeas corpus the appropriate remedy?  The answer cannot be in doubt.  As far back as 1910 the prevailing doctrine
was announced in Cruz v. Director of Prisons.^[45]
Thus:  “The courts uniformly hold
that where a sentence imposes a punishment in excess of the power of the court
to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold
that the sentence is void in toto; but
the weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void
only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule being
that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas
corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was
valid.”^[46]
There is a reiteration of such a principle in Directo
v. Director of Prisons^[47]
where it was explicitly announced by this Court “that the only means of
giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused * * *
is the writ of habeas corpus.”^[48]
While the above decision speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction over the
case, insofar as the remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic
affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the accused by the
retroactive character of a favorable decision holds true.  Petitioners clearly have thus successfully
sustained the burden of justifying their release.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and
it is ordered that petitioners be forthwith set at liberty.

Dizon
and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., concur in the result.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, and Villamor, JJ concurs with J. Teehankee’s
separate opinion.

Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur in a separate opinion.

Castro and Makasiar, JJ., did not take
part.

^[1]
99 Phil. 515 (1956).

^[2]
107 Phil. 50 (1960).

^[3]
Art. 8 of the Civil Code provides: 
“Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.”

^[4]
According to Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code: 
“Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws shall
have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62
of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.”

^[5]
Petition, par. 1.1 dated January 11, 1969. 
The above allegations are expressly admitted in the answer for the
respondent Director of Prisons filed by the Solicitor General on April 10, 1969.

^[6]
99 Phil. 515 (1956).

^[7]
The petition likewise cited in addition to People v. Hernandez, People v.
Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 (1956); People v. Togonon,
101 Phil. 804 (1957); People v. Romagoza, 103
Phil. 20 (1958) and People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 (1958). Petition,
par. 1, 2.

^[8]
L-4974, May 16, 1969.

^[9]
Petition, par. 1, 3.

^[10] Chafee, The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution,
32 Boston Univ. Law Rev. 143 (1947).

^[11]
2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 709 (1927).

^[12] 3
Willoughby, on the Constitution
1612 (1929).

^[13]
Burdick, the Law of the American Constitution 27 (1922).

^[14] Fraenkel, Our Civil Liberties 6 (1944).

^[15]
Cf. In re Patterson, 1 Phil. 93 (1902).

^[16]
Cf. Ortiz v. del Villar, 57 Phil. 19 (1932).

^[17]
Cf. Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271 (1933).

^[18]
Cf. Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons, 107 Phil. 50-59-62, diss. (1960).

^[19]
Cf. Avelino v. Vera, 77 Phil. 192 (1946).

^[20]
Cf. Saulo v. Cruz, 105 Phil. 315 (1959).

^[21]
39 Phil. 778 (1919).

^[22] Ibid,
p. 790.

^[23]
42 Phil. 805 (1922).

^[24] Ibid,
p. 805.

^[25]
45 Phil. 650 (1924).

^[26] Ibid,
p. 652.

^[27]
Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202.

^[28]
Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall.
85, 95.

^[29]
Harris v. Nelson, 22 L Ed 2d 281, 286 (1969).

^[30]
237 US 309, 346
(1915).

^[31]
Section 4, Rule 102 provides:  “If
it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of
a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the
writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or order. 
Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines,
or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.” 3 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 604, 1970 ed.

^[32]
In re Prautch, 1 Phil. 132.

^[33]
100 US 371, 375.  According to Ex parte Lange: 
“On consideration of the petition, the court was of opinion
that the facts therein recited very fairly raised the question whether the
circuit court, in the sentence which it had pronounced, and under which the
prisoner was held, had not exceeded its powers. 
It therefore directed the writ to issue, accompanied also by a writ of certiorari,
to bring before this court the proceed­ings in the circuit court under which
the petitioner was restrained of his liberty. 
The authority of this court in such case, under the Constitution of the
United States, and the 14th section of the judiciary act of 1789 (1 Stat. at L.
73), to issue this writ, and to examine the proceedings in the inferior court,
so far as may be necessary to ascertain whether that court has exceeded its
authority, is no longer open to question.” (85 US 163, 165-166
[1874]).  Justice Miller, who penned the
opinion, cited the following cases:  U.S.
v. Hamilton, 3 Dall. 17 (1795); Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch 448 (1806); Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75 (1807); Ex parte
Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 7 Pet. 508 (1830); Ex parte
Metzger, 5 How. 176 (1847); Ex parte Kaine, 14 How. 103 (1852); Ex parte
Wells, 18 How. 307 (1856); Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall.
2 (1866); Ex parte Mccardle,
6 Wall. 318 (1868); Ex parte Yerger,
8 Wall. 85 (1869).

^[34]
Cf. Conde v. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650 (1924);
Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741 (1948); Abriol
v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 (1949); Chavez v.
Court of Appeals, L-29169, Aug. 1968, 24 SCRA 663; Celeste v. People,
L-21435, Jan. 30, 1970, 31
SCRA 391.

^[35]
Petition, par. 5, 1, p. 11.

^[36]
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration, L-21064, Feb. 18, 1970,
31 SCRA 413.

^[37]
11 Phil. 447 (1908).

^[38]
24 Phil. 29 (1913).

^[39]
25 Phil. 648 (1913).

^[40]
44 Phil. 387 (1923).

^[41]
44 Phil. 437 (1923).

^[42]
Frankfurter, The Reading of Statutes, reproduced in Of Law and Men, 47, at p.
53 (1956).

^[43]
Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 1 Selected Essays on Constitutional
Law 474, at p. 481 (1938).

^[44]
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, Ibid,
503, at p. 524 (1938).

^[45]
17 Phil. 269.

^[46] Ibid,
pp. 272-273.

^[47]
56 Phil. 692 (1932).

^[48] Ibid,
p. 695.

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