RAYMUNDO BAESA, MARIANO BAESA, JACINTO BAESA, BEATO BAESA, VICTORIO BAESA, AND DOMINGO LOMEDA, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES, VS. THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF CAMARINES SUR, NAGA CITY, RESP…

Appeal by respondent provincial fiscal from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur issuing a writ of mandamus as prayed for by
petitioners,^[1]
(all accused as defendants in Criminal Case No. 7451 of the same court under an
information for frustrated murder citing intervenor
Joker Arroyo as the offended party) and ordering respondent fiscal “to
abstain henceforth from proceeding against the respondents in Criminal Case No.
7451 of this Court” (referring to herein petitioners-appellees).

The appeal, which was first forwarded to the Court of Appeals was
certified to this Court as not being within the appellate court’s juris­diction
and was docketed with this Court on March
26, 1969.

The record of the case below establishes the following factual
background:

Petitioners were originally charged with the crime of frustrated
murder upon complaint of Joker Arroyo for having attacked him on November 10, 1950,
and the information filed by the fiscal was docketed on January 21, 1951 as
Criminal Case No. 2059 of the lower court. 
Arraignment and trial were set for May 5, 1951, but there ensued a total
of thirteen post­ponements thereof – four were made at the instance of the pro­secution,
four were filed by the petitioners, two were made by the court, one upon joint
motion of the parties and two others were made presumably for lack of time, and
it is indicated that in these postponements, if the petitioners-accused were
not the movants, they were either upon mutual
agreement of the parties or upon action of the court motu
proprio and when the prosecution was the movant, the petitioners-accused either expressly or
impliedly acquiesced thereto.^[2]

The reason for these repeated postponements appears to be that
another criminal case for frustrated murder against three of the same
petitioners, namely, Mariano, Raymundo and Victorio all surnamed Baesa and
two others for an earlier attack on July 15, 1950 against the same complainant,
interven­or-appellant Arroyo, and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 1915, was already pending and being tried by the same court,
pre­sided by the same judge, Honorable Jose T. Surtida.  Thus, per order of the lower court issued in
Case No. 2059 on March 5, 1954, “(U)pon joint
petition of the prosecution and defense on the ground that there is an
understanding between them to have this case set for trial after the
termination of (Criminal) Case No. 1915 to which this instant case is
related,” it ordered that “(A)s prayed for, let trial of this case be
held in abeyance pending the termination of Criminal Case No. 1915.”^[3]

The case nevertheless, continued to be set on the court’s calendar
until its last setting on June 5, 1956, on which date intervenor
did not appear as the subpoena issued to him was not served, and the lower
court, upon motion of the defense provisionally dismissed the case without the
petitioners-accused ever having been arraigned therein.^[4]

Five years thereafter on October
4, 1961, at the instance of intervenor-appellant,
respondent fiscal filed another informa­tion, for the same offense subject of
the previous Criminal Case No. 2059, against the same accused, petitioners-appellees here­in. 
This second case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7451 of the same
lower court presided by the same judge. 
Petitioners having been duly arraigned on this second information and
having all entered a plea of not guilty, then filed a motion to quash the information
on the ground of double jeopardy.  The
lower court in its order of October 4,
1963, denied the motion holding that no jeopardy had been incurred
in the previous case, as the accused had not been arraigned therein and
“the dismissal of the previous case was made provisionally and upon the express
re­quest of the counsel for the accused.”^[5]
The case was then set three times for trial on November 8, 1963, January 24,
1964 and June 15, 1964 and each setting was postponed at the instance of the
petitioners-accused, the last setting being cancelled by the court on
petitioners’ manifestation that they had already filed on March 18, 1964, the
present action for mandamus to restrain respondent fiscal from further
prosecuting them in the said cri­minal case.

The present action was submitted by the parties for the lower
court’s decision on the pleadings. 
Petitioners contended that their constitutional right to a speedy trial
had been denied them, citing the period of six years that the first case, No.
2059, had been pending before its provisional dismissal in 1956 and the lapse
of five years after such provisional dismissal before the refiling
of the second case in 1961 (which was almost eleven years from the filing of
the original complaint although concededly well within the prescriptive period
of the offense), and that the second case could not be treated and viewed
independently and separately from the first case.  Respondent contended that petitioners were in
estoppel from invoking the right to speedy trial by
virtue of their agreement to the postponements and defer­ment thereof, that
such delay could not be invoked in the second case, and that any delay in the
trial of the second case was at­tributable solely to petitioners.

Under date of July 30,
1964, the lower court rendered its decision under appeal, holding
that “It is clear that a very long period of time was allowed to elapse
without having the petitioners’ (first) case tried.  It is further clear that the unwarranted
delay was without good cause or justifiable motive.  It is furthermore clear that most of the many
postponements were unjustified.  There
is, therefore, no doubt that the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the
above-cited two cases (Conde vs. Rivera^[6]
and Kalaw vs. Apostol^[7])
apply with equal force and decisiveness to the instant case,” and issued
the writ of mandamus against the prosecution of petitioners-accused in
the second case, likewise pending before it.

Respondent fiscal and intervenor filed
their respective motions for reconsideration on the grounds, inter alia, that the lower court in this case had
erroneously misappreciated the valid causes of the
postponements of record in the first criminal case (granted by the same court
therein), acquiesced in unqua­lifiedly by petitioners, which negated their
claim of denial of their right to a speedy trial, that such right could not be
invoked during the five-year interval between the provisional dismissal of the
first case and the refiling of the second case, since
there was no pending case where the right could be invoked and that the right
to a speedy trial is necessarily relative and is waived, such as when the
accused play an active role in securing sever­al postponements and give their
express conformity thereto and to the deferment and holding in abeyance of
trial until the termination of a related case, in which cases the rights of
public justice should not be precluded.

The lower court nevertheless denied reconsideration per its order
of February 5, 1965, holding that “(E)ven
granting that the number of postponements and their causes given by the
respondent is the correct narration of facts of the case, still, it cannot be
denied that thirteen postponements within a period of six years, without the
accused having been arraigned nor tried once and the filing of the second information
after the lapse of five years and four months from the date of the dismissal of
the first case and almost eleven years from the filing of the original
complaint, constitute an unwarranted delay and a violation of the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial.” Hence, this
appeal.

The Court finds that the writ of mandamus was erron­eously
issued by the lower court on jurisdictional and procedu­ral grounds.  The second criminal case, No. 7451, was
already pending trial before the lower court, and any and all grounds for
dismissal or defenses of the petitioners-accused as to the information against
them, could be raised only in the said case before the court in which it was
pending, which had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter thereof, i.e.
the offense charged in the information. 
Petitioners-accused did file in said criminal case their motion to quash
on the ground of double jeopardy by virtue of the provisional dismissal in 1956
of the first case against them for the same offense, as well as im­pliedly on
the ground of denial of their right to a speedy trial, invoking the cases of Conde and Kalaw.^[8]
As already stated, the lower court in its order of October 4, 1963 in the said
cri­minal case denied their quashal motion, holding
that there was no jeopardy since the accused had not been arraigned in the
first case and its provisional dismissal was “upon the express request of
counsel for the accused”^[9]
and virtually denying petitioners’ claim of having been denied a speedy trial, since
it ruled that they had to stand trial as charged in the case.

It is from such denial order of the lower court in the cri­minal
case that petitioners could have sought recourse from a higher court through
the special actions for a writ of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.  But petitioners could not improperly split,
as it were, their defenses, as they have done here – just as a party cannot
split his cause of action – and file a sepa­rate special civil action of mandamus
on the ground of their being denied the right to a speedy trial.  This would be undue interference with the
proper conduct and governance of the criminal case.

The circumstance that such mandamus case was assigned to the
same lower court presided by the same judge as in the pending criminal case,
Judge Surtida, does not affect the application of the
fundamental rule that to allow co-ordinate courts to interfere with each
other’s judgments or decrees would ob­viously lead to confusion and might
seriously hinder the administration of justice.^[10]
A contrary rule would lead to serious mischievous consequences to the detriment
of the orderly administration of justice. 
For instance, as seen from the case at bar, the same judge of the lower
court would hold in the mandamus case that the ‘unwarranted delay (in
the first case) was without good cause or justifiable motive . . many of the
postponements were unjustified” contrary to his own actuations as
presiding judge in the first criminal case granting the said postponements and
deferment thereof as being for good and justified cause.  The same judge of the lower court would order
in the mandamus case the dismissal of the pending criminal case against
the accused, contrary to his own adverse order in said criminal case denying
the accused’s claim of double jeopardy and virtually
rejecting their claim of denial of the right to speedy trial.

And in this appeal, from the lower court’s decision in the mandamus
case for dismissal of the criminal case, this Court would in effect be
constrained to rule as to which of the lower court’s conflicting actuations in
the two cases was correct, having before it only the record of the appealed mandamus
case – but not the record of the criminal case, which has not been elevated to
this Court since none of the lower court’s act­ions therein, including the
order of denial of petitioners’ quashal motion, has
been questioned or challenged in this Court.

While the lower court apparently relied on Conde
and Kalaw in taking cognizance of the mandamus
case, where it was indicated that the remedy in the event of denial of the
constitutional right to speedy trial is by habeas corpus if the
accused were detained, or by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
for the final dismissal of the case,^[11]
it should be pointed out that such recourse to certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus should be by a challenge of the proceedings themselves in
the pending criminal case by elevating them to a higher court, as was done in
said cases of Conde and Kalaw
which were original actions of mandamus filed with this Court
itself.  A separate special action of mandamus
filed with the court of first instance itself to review and set aside its own
actuations or those of ano­ther court of co-ordinate jurisdiction in a pending
criminal case may not be resorted to, as was done in the case at bar, since a
court may not in effect mandamus itself.

Withal, the lower court appears to have properly denied the quashal motion in the criminal case, judging from the facts
above stated and appearing in the record of the mandamus case, as the
record of said criminal case is not before the Court.  On the authority of People vs. Obsania^[12]
the provisional dismissal of the first case was properly held by the lower
court, in the criminal case now pending, as not terminating the first case on
the merits such as to constitute double jeo­pardy, since the dismissal of the
first case falls under the ruling enunciated in People vs. Jabajab^[13]
that while “(I)t is true that a person accused has a right to a speedy
trial.  x x x the defendant cannot agree to the repeated postponement
of the trial of his cases and then when he finds the Government absent or
unable to go to trial on any of the dates of hearing, take advantage of said
absence and ask for the dismissal of his case.”

The writ of mandamus issued by time lower court against
respondent fiscal to refrain from further proceeding with the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 7451 of said court is set aside, and the trial thereof should
now be held and terminated without further delay.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision and order appealed from are
hereby reversed.  Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., did not take
part.

^[1]
In Sp. Civil Action No. 5766.

^[2]
See Order of February 5, 1965,
Record, p. 98.

^[3]
Per the fiscal’s statement in his motion for
reconsider­ation, Rec., pp. 27, 37, “judgment in Criminal Case No. 1915
was promulgated on April 29, 1954,
but the accused appealed.”

^[4]
Record, p. 53.

^[5] Idem.

^[6]
45 Phil. 650 (1924).

^[7]
64 Phil. 852 (1937).

^[8]
Record, p. 53.

^[9]
Citing People vs. Togle, 105 Phil. 126 (1959);
Gandicela vs. Lutero,
88 Phil. 301 (1951).

^[10]
See De Leon vs.
Salvador, L-30871, Dec. 28, 1970 and cases cited.

^[11]
See Acebedo vs. Sarmiento,
L-28025, Dec. 16, 1970.

^[12]
23 SCRA 1249 (June 29, 1968).

^[13]
100 Phil. 307 (1956).