RESTITUTO BINABAY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE HERMINIO C. MARIANO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH X, RESPONDENTS.

This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition,
with preliminary injunction, to restrain respondent Honorable Herminio C. Mariano, as Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance, Rizal, Branch X, from conducting
further proceed­ings in Criminal Case No. 19503 of said court, entitled
“People of the Philippines
vs. Restituto Binabay.”
Soon after the filing of the petition, We issued the temporary restraining
order prayed for.

As the defendant in said case, petitioner Restituto
Binabay is charged therein with serious illegal
detention, committed, according to the information, dated June 28, 1969, as follows:

“That on or about the 26th day of June, 1969, in Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal,
Philip­pines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a private indi­vidual (without justifiable ground or
reason and by means of force and intimidation) did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and ille­gally
detain one Georgie Malongat,
a child one and a half years of age, (by then and there taking and carrying him
away from his parents against his will and consent,) depriving him of his
liberty for about seven (7) hours.”

The information was amended on July 3, 1969 to allege:

“That on or about the 26th day of June, 1969, in Ft. Bonifacio, Municipality of Makati,
Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, private
individual, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, with
threats to kill, Georgie Malongat,
a minor, for purpose of separating said child from his parents, detaining said
minor for a period of seven (7) hours.”

When the case was called for hearing on August 27, 1969, counsel for the petitioner
stated that he wished “to make representations” to the Court; that he
was “willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense”; and that he
“invoked” or pleaded that a “lighter penalty” than that
prescribed by law for the offense charged be imposed.  The Court then went into a consideration of
the imposable penalty, mentioning, in connection therewith, certain details –
presumably supplied by the parties – having a bearing on the circumstance
surrounding the commission of said offense. 
Defense counsel and the private prosecutor, as well as the father of the
kidnapped child and petitioner herein, like­wise, made some statements.  Thereafter, petitioner’s counsel said:

”At the arraignment of this case, the accused pleaded Not Guilty,
to the crime charged.  After clari­fication
of the facts of this case and admissions made by defense counsel in behalf of
the accused and also admissions of facts relevant to this case made by the
prosecution, it is my duty to enter a plea of Guilty after making the accused
realize and appreciate the consequences of such an act.  We, however, throw the fate of the accused to
the leniency of the Court and request the Court for an appreciation of the miti­gating
circumstances of plea of guilty and the provi­sions of the last paragraph of
Article 268 of the Re­vised Penal Code.”

Thereafter, petitioner was “rearraigned.”
Then, the Branch Clerk of Court stated: 
“Accused enters the plea of guilty to the lesser offense,”
without specifying the same.  This was
followed by further statements of fact made by the Assistant Fiscal, the
private prosecutor and the defense counsel. 
There­upon, respondent Judge orally announced that he had found peti­tioner
herein guilty of “the crime of serious illegal detention described under
Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to the third paragraph of Art.
268” of the same Code and that, considering, inter alia, the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty,
the penalty imposed upon him was an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correcional to seven (7) years and four (4)
months of prision mayor, “to pay a
fine of P500, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.”

When the judgment was being put in writing, immediately
thereafter, respondent Judge noticed that petitioner had been inadvertently
“rearraigned under the original information,
dated June 28, 1969, to
which he pleaded guilty, not under the amended information, dated July 3, 1969.” Hence, respondent
Judge forth­with issued an order, dated August 27, 1969, setting aside the
proceedings held that morning and declaring the same “null and void,”
at the same time setting the case for rearraignment
(presumably under the amended information) on September 8, 1969 at 8:30
a.m.  On the date last mentioned,
petitioner’s counsel filed an “urgent motion” praying that the rearraignment be held at 10:00
a.m. instead of 8:30 a.m.  Petitioner was ac­tually rearraigned,
under the amended information, on Septem­ber
9, 1969.  He then entered a
plea of not guilty, and the case was set for trial on September 29, 1969.

Prior thereto, or on September 24, 1969, petitioner, how­ever,
commenced the present action against the People of the Philippines and
respondent Judge, to restrain the latter from conducting any further
proceedings in said criminal case, al­leging that the same would place him
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, upon the ground that the
judgment orally given on August 27, 1969 had become final and executory, he having allegedly begun to serve his sentence
immediately thereafter.

Petitioner’s claim is devoid of merit.  To begin with, he did not set it up in the
lower court.  Besides, petitioner was a
detention prisoner since June 28, 1969.  From the court room, he was brought back to
the provincial jail in Pasig,
Rizal, on August
27, 1969, as such detention prisoner, not to serve his
sentence.  He did not and could not have
begun to serve the aforementioned sentence, no order of commitment having been
is­sued therefor. 
And no such order could have been issued for no written judgment had
ever been rendered.  Pursuant to Rule
120, section 2, of the Rules of Court, “the judgment must be written
x x x personally and
directly prepared by the Judge and signed by him x x
x.” Indeed, when respondent Judge was about to
comply with this provision, he found out that petitioner had in­advertently
been rearraigned under the original information, des­pite
the fact that, since July 3, 1969,
it had been superseded by the amended information, so that the original
information was, on August 27, 1969,
legally non-existent.  As a consequence,
the rearraignment under such original information and
petitioner’s plea to the charge therein set forth were properly de­clared null
and void, and no valid judgment could have been ren­dered in the case, on August 27, 1969.  Again, the plea of not guilty entered by the
petitioner, on September 9, 1969, upon arraignment under the amended
information, amounted to a waiver of “all objections which are grounds for
a motion to quash,” one of which is that of former jeopardy.^[1]

The present case is, accordingly, dismissed and the re­straining
order issued on September 29, 1969,
hereby dissolved and set aside, with costs against petitioner, Restituto Binabay.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Makalintal and Makasiar, JJ., did not take part.

^[1]
Rule 117, sections 2(h) & 10, Rules of Court.