G.R. No. L-29264. August 29, 1969
BARBARA LOMBOS RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION, COMPOSED OF JUSTICES JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR. AND EDILBERTO SORIANO), AT…
CASTRO, J.:
For a clear understanding of the issues posed by the present
petition for mandamus and certiorari with preliminary injunction, we hereunder
quote the statement of the case and the findings of fact made by the Court of
Appeals in its decision dated October 4, 1967 in CA -G. R. 35084-R, as well as
the dispositive portion of the said decision:
“On December 31, 1958, in Parañaque,
Rizal, by virtue of a document denominated ‘Kasunduan‘, written in the vernacular and ratified before
Notary Public Lazaro C. Ison
of that locality, Nieves Cruz, now deceased, authorized the spouses Atanacio Valenzuela, and Maximina
Victorio and Liberata
Santos to sell a certain parcel of land of about 44,634 square meters belonging
to her and situated in Sitio Matatdo,
barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque,
Rizal, the identity of which is not now in
dispute. Amongst the salient conditions
of this authority were that the price payable to Nieves Cruz for the land would
be P1.60 per square meter and any overprice would pertain to the agents; that
Nieves Cruz would receive from said agents, by way of advance payment on account of the purchase price to be
paid by whomsoever may buy the land, the sum of P10,000.00 upon the execution
of the agreement aforesaid, and another P10,000.00 on January 5, 1959; that the
balance on the total purchase price would be payable to Nieves Cruz upon the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property, the obtention
of which was undertaken by the agents who also were bound to advance the
expenses therefor in the sum of P4,000.00 which would
be deductible from the last amount due on the purchase price; and that should
the agent find no buyer by the time that Torrens title is issued, Nieves Cruz
reserved the right to look for a buyer herself although all sums already
received from the agents would be returned to them without interest.
“As confirmed by Nieves Cruz in a ‘recibo‘,
Exhibit 2, bearing the date ’_____ ng Enero ng 1959′, the stipulated
‘advance payment (paunang bayad)’
of P20,000.00 was duly made to her.
Contrary to the agreement that the balance on the purchase price would
be paid upon the issuance of the Torrens title over the land (September 9,
1960), Nieves Cruz and her children, however, collected from the agents, either
thru Maximina Victorio or
thru Salud G. de Leon, daughter of Liberata Santos, various sums of money during the period
from July 3, 1959 up to September 3, 1961, all of which were duly receipted
for by Nieves Cruz and/or her children and in which receipts it is expressly
stated that said amounts were ‘bilang karagdagan sa ipinagbili
naming lupa sa kanila (additional payments for the land we sold to them)’,
Exhibits 12, 12-a to 12-z-1. These totalled
P27,198.60 which with the P20, 000.00 previously
paid amounted to P47,198. 60.
“Meanwhile, proceedings to place the land under the operation
of the Torrens system were initiated. In due season, the registration court –
finding a registrable title in the name of the
applicants, Emilio Cruz and Nieves Cruz, but that –
“‘x x x the applicant Nieves Cruz
has likewise sold her one-half (1/2) undivided share to the spouses Atanacio Valenzuela and Maxima (Maximina)
Victorio and to Liberata
Santos from whom she had received partial payments thereof in the sum of P
22,000.00; ‘ (Exhibit 4-a),
decreed, on July 15, 1960, the registration of the land in the names of the applicants
aforesaid –
“‘Subject x x x to the rights of the spouses Atanacio
Valenzuela and Maximina Victorio
and to Liberata Santos over the one-half share of
Nieves Cruz of the parcel of land for which the latter was paid P22,000.00 as
partial payment thereof.’ (Exhibit 4).
The judgment aforesaid having become final,
the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. 2488 of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal was, on September 9, 1960, duly
entered and issued to the applicants aforesaid, subject, amongst others, to
the limitation heretofore stated.
“Eventually, pursuant to a partition between Nieves Cruz and
her brother, Emilio Cruz, by virtue of which the entire land was subdivided
into two lots of 48,260 square meters each, Original Transfer of Title No.
2488 was cancelled and superseded by two new transfer certificates respectively
covering the two sub-divided lots, that which pertained to Nieves Cruz, Lot A
(LRC) Psd-13106, being covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80110 issued
on October 3, 1960. Said title carried
over the annotation heretofore mentioned respecting the rights of Atanacio Valenzuela and Maximina Victorio and Liberata Santos
over the portion covered thereby.
(Exhibits 6 and 6-a).
“Then, on September
15, 1961, Nieves Cruz sold the property in question to Barbara Lombos Rodriguez, her balae‘
because the latter’s son was married to her daughter, for the sum of P
77,216.00 (Exhibit J). In consequence,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80110 in the name of Nieves Cruz was cancelled
and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91135 was issued in the
name of Barbara Lombos Rodriguez (Exhibit I) which
likewise carried over the annotation respecting the rights of A tanacio Valenzuela, Maximina Victorio and Liberata Santos
over the property covered thereby.
“Forthwith, on September
16, 1961, Nieves Cruz, through counsel, gave notice to Atanacio Valenzuela, Maximina Victorio and Liberata Santos of
her decision to rescind the original agreement heretofore adverted to,
enclosing with said notice a Bank of America check for P 48, 338. 60, representing
sums advanced by the latter which were tendered to be returned. Atanacio
Valenzuela, Maximina Victorio
and Liberata Santos, through counsel, balked at the
attempt at rescission, denying non-compliance with their undertaking inasmuch
as, per agreement, the balance on the purchase price for the land was not due
until after the 1962 harvest. They,
accordingly, returned Nieves Cruz’ check.
“Thus rebuffed, plaintiff Nieves Cruz hailed defendants Atanacio Valenzuela, Maximina Victorio and Liberrta Santos
before the Rizal Court
in the instant action for rescission of the ‘Kasunduan‘
heretofore adverted to, the cancellation of the annotation on the title to the
land respecting defendants’ rights thereto, and for damages and attorney’s
fees. In their return to the complaint,
defendants traversed the material averments thereof, contending principally
that the agreement sought to be rescinded had since been novated
by a subsequent agreement whereunder they were to buy
the property directly. They also impleaded Barbara Lombos
Rodriguez on account of the sale by the plaintiff to her of the subject
property and interposed a counterclaim against both plaintiff and Rodriguez
for the annulment of the sale of the land to the latter, as well as the
transfer certificate of title issued in her favor consequent thereto, and the reconveyance of the land in their favor, and also for
damages and attorney’s fees.
“Pending the proceedings below, plaintiff Nieves Cruz died and
was, accordingly, substituted as such by her surviving children, to wit: Arsenio, Nelo, Jaime, Andres and
Amanda, all surnamed Nery, and Carmen and Arsenia, both surnamed Mendoza.
“In due season, the trial court – finding for plaintiff Nieves
Cruz and her buyer, Barbara Lombos Rodriguez, and
against defendants – rendered judgment thus –
“‘IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
(1) Ordering the cancellation at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 91135 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, stating
that the land covered thereby was sold to the defendants; (2) Ordering the
defendants to pay to the plaintiff, jointly and severally the sum of P67,564.00 as actual damages and
P5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees; (3) Dismissing the defendant’s
counterclaim; and (4) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of this suit
jointly and severally.’
* * *
“We find no obstacle to appellants’ purchase of the land in
the prohibition against an agent buying the property of his principal
entrusted to him for sale. With the
agreement of Nieves Cruz to sell the land directly to said appellants, her
agents originally, it cannot seriously be contended that the purchase of the
land by appellants was without the express consent of the principal Nieves
Cruz. Accordingly, that purchase is
beyond the coverage of the prohibition.
“By and large, we are satisfied from a meticulous assay of
the evidence at bar that the contract of sale over the land subsequently made
by Nieves Cruz in favor of
appellants was duly and satisfactorily proved.
No showing having been made by appellees to
warrant the rescission of that contract, the attempt at such rescission is
legally untenable and necessarily futile.
The, specific performance of that contract is, under the circumstances,
legally compellable.
“Considering that the rights of appellants, as such purchasers
of the portion corresponding to Nieves
Cruz, is a matter of official record in the latter’s certificate of
title over the land – the annotation of which was authorized by the decision of
the registration court and which annotation was duly carried over in the
subsequent titles issued therefor, including that
issued in the name of appellee Rodriguez – said appellee must be conclusively presumed to have been aware,
as indeed she was, of the prior rights acquired by appellants over the said
portion. Said appellee’s
acquisition of the land from Nieves Cruz remains subject, and must yield, to
the superior rights of appellants. Appellee Rodriguez cannot seek refuge behind the
protection afforded by the Land Registration Act to purchasers in good faith
and for value. Aware as she was of the
existence of the annotated prior rights of appellants, she cannot now be heard
to claim a right better than that of her grantor, Nieves Cruz. Her obligation to reconvey
the land to the appellants is thus indubitable.
* * *
“WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED in
toto, and, in lieu thereof, another is hereby
rendered:
“(1) Setting aside and anulling the deed
of sale, Exhibit J, executed by plaintiff in favor of Barbara Lombos Rodriguez;
“(2) Declaring defendant-appellee Barbara
Lombos Rodriguez divested of title over the property
covered by TCT No. 91135 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
and title thereto vested in defendants-appellants upon payment of the latter to
appellee Rodriguez of the sum of P28,877.40,
representing the balance of the agreed purchase price due on the property minus
P13,000.00 awarded under paragraph (4) within 90 days after this decision
shall have become final, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel T.C. T.
No. 91135 and issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in favor
of appellants, upon payment of corresponding fees;
“(3) Ordering plaintiffs and defendant Barbara Lombos
Rodriguez to deliver to the defendants appellants possession of the property
aforementioned; and
“(4) Ordering appellees jointly and
severally to pay to defendants-appellants the sum of P5,000.00 as temperate
damages, P3,000.00 as moral damages and
P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus costs.
These amounts shall be deducted from the P28,877.40 appellants are
required to pay to Rodriguez under paragraph (2) hereof. ‘
This case is before us for the second time. In G.R. No. L-28462, the heirs of Nieves Cruz
and the present petitioner (Barbara Lombos Rodriguez)
filed a joint petition for certiorari – as an original action under Rule 65
and, simultaneously, as an appeal under Rule 45. As the former, it sought redress against the
refusal of the respondent Court of Appeals to consider a motion for
reconsideration filed beyond the reglementary
period. As the latter, it sought a review
of the respondent Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. On January
3, 1968 we denied the joint petition; the joint petition was
thereafter amended, and this amended petition we likewise denied on January 26, 1968; on February 20, 1968 we denied the’
motion for reconsideration filed solely by Rodriguez.
On July 20, 1968,
Rodriguez alone filed the present petition for mandamus and certiorari. She prays for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the respondents from enforcing the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA -G. R. 35084-R and from entering into any
negotiation or transaction or otherwise exercising acts of ownership over the
parcel of land covered by transfer certificate of title 91135 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal. She also prays that preliminary injunction
issue to restrain the Register of
Deeds of Rizal from registering any documents affecting
the subject parcel of land. No
injunction, however, was issued by us.
The petition in the present case, G.R. No. L-29264, while again
assailing the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the respondent
Court, adds two new grounds. The first
is the allegation that the Land involved in CA -G. R. 35084-R has a value in
excess of P200,000. The petitioner
complains that the Court of Appeals should have certified the appeal to us,
pursuant to section 3 of Rule 50 in relation to section 17(5) of the Judiciary
Act of 1948,[1]
as she had asked the said Court to do in her supplemental motion of June 14, 1968. The second ground is the claim that the Court
of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying her May 14, 1968 motion for new trial, based on
alleged newly discovered evidence.
In their answer, Atanacio Valenzuela, Maxirnina Victorio and Liberata Santos allege that the findings of fact made by
the Court of Appeals in its decision of October 4, 1967 are substantiated by
the record and the conclusions of law are supported by applicable laws and
jurisprudence, and, moreover, that these findings are no longer open to review
inasmuch as the said decision has become final and executory,
the period of appeal provided in Rule 45 having expired. Atanacio Valenzuela
et al. also maintain that the land in litigation had a value of less than P200,
000, according to the records of the case, when their appeal from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in civil case
6901 was perfected; that the petitioner’s motion for new trial in the Court of
Appeals was filed out of time; and that the petitioner is estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in the matter of the
value of the land in controversy. Two
grounds for the defense of estoppel are offered by Atanacio Valenzuela et al.
One is that the petitioner speculated in obtaining a favorable judgment
in the Court of Appeals by submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the said
Court and she cannot now therefore be allowed to attack its jurisdiction when
the judgment turned out to be unfavorable.
The other is that the petitioner’s laches made
possible the sale in good faith by Atanacio
Valenzuela et al. of the land in litigation to Emilio and Isidro Ramos, in
whose names the land is at present registered under transfer certificate of
title 229135 issued on September 25, 1968 by the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
The heirs of Nieves Cruz filed an answer unqualifiedly admitting
the basic allegations of the petition, except as to the value of the land, as
to which they are non-committal.
It is our considered view that the petitioner’s claim of grave
abuse by the respondent Court in denying her motion for new trial is devoid of
merit. It is not disputed that, on the
assumption that the respondent Court had jurisdiction over the appeal, the
petitioner had already lost her right to appeal from the decision of October 4, 1967 when the petition in G.R.
No. L-28462 was filed in January 1968.
It logically follows that the case had passed the stage for new trial on
newly discovered evidence when the petitioner filed her motion for new trial on
May 14, 1968.
Two issues remain, to wit; (1) the value of the land in controversy
and (2) estoppel.
At the time appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, section
17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, provided:
“The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari or writ of
error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts as herein provided, in –
* * *
“(5) All civil
cases in which the value in controversy exceeds two hundred thousand pesos,
exclusive of interests and costs or in which the title or possession of real
estate exceeding in value the sum of two hundred thousand pesos to be ascertained
by the oath of a party to the cause or by other competent evidence, is involved
or brought in question. The Supreme
Court shall likewise have exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals in civil
cases, even though the value in controversy, exclusive of interests and costs,
is two hundred thousand pesos or less, when the evidence involved in said cases
is the same as the evidence submitted in an appealed civil case within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided herein.”
The petitioner would have us believe that, other than a realtor’s
sworn statement dated June 14, 1968, which was filed with the respondent Court
together with her supplemental motion, there is nothing in the records that
would indicate the value of the litigated parcel. We disagree.
The “Kasunduan” (annex A to the
petition) dated December 31, 1958
executed by and between Nieves Cruz and Atanacio
Valenzuela et al. fixed the value of the land (of an area of 44, 634 square
meters) at P1. 60 per square meter. The
decision (annex B) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
dated August 12, 1964
assessed the value of the land at P3.00
per square meter. The decision
(annex D) dated October 4, 1967 of the respondent Court of Appeals pointed out
that the consideration stated in the deed of sale of the land executed by
Nieves Cruz in favor of Rodriguez, the petitioner herein, is P77,216. Moreover, until June 14, 1968, no party to the cause questioned
the valuation of P3.00 per square meter made by the trial court. The records, therefore, overwhelmingly refute
the petitioner’s allegation. They also
prove that the value of the entire parcel of land had been impliedly admitted
by the parties as being below P200,000.
Granting arguendo, however, that
the value of the land in controversy is in excess of P200,000, to set aside at
this stage all proceedings had before the Court of Appeals in CA -G. R. 35084R,
and before this Court in G.R. No. L-28462, would violate all norms of justice
and equity and contravene public policy.
The appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal was pending before the respondent Court during the
period from 1964 until October 4, 1967, when on the latter date it was decided
in favor of the appellants and against the petitioner herein and the heirs of
Nieves Cruz. Yet, the appellees therein did not raise the issue of jurisdiction. The joint petition in G.R. No. L-28462
afforded the petitioner herein the opportunity to question the jurisdiction of
the respondent Court. Again, the value
of the land in controversy was not questioned by the petitioners, not even in
their amended joint petition. It was not
until June 14, 1968 that
the petitioner herein filed with the respondent Court a supplemental motion
wherein she raised for the first time the issue of value and questioned the validity
of the final decision of the respondent Court on the jurisdictional ground that
the real estate involved has a value in excess of P200,000. That the petitioner’s present counsel became
her counsel only in May, 1968 provides no excuse for the petitioner’s failure
to exercise due diligence for over three years to discover that the land has a
value that would oust the respondent Court of jurisdiction. The fact remains that the petitioner had
allowed an unreasonable period of time to lapse before she raised the question
of value and jurisdiction, and only after and because the respondent Court had
decided the case against her. The
doctrine of estoppel by laches
bars her from now questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
The learned disquisition of Mr. Justice Arsenio
P. Dizon, speaking for this Court in Serafin Tijam, et al.
vs. Magdaleno Sibonghanoy,
et al. (G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968), explained, in unequivocal
terms, the reasons why, in a case like the present, a losing party cannot be permitted
to belatedly raise the issue of jurisdiction.
“A party may be estopped or barred
from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel
in pais, of estoppel by
deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
“Laches, in a general sense, is
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
“The doctrine of laches or of ‘stale
demands’ is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace
of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations,
is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
“It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction
of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A. L. R. 79). In the case just cited,
by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether
the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the
parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice
can not be tolerated -obviously for reasons of public policy.
“Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is
too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court
(Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U. S. 273, 61 L.
Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride,
141 U. S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in
Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a
party who has affirmed and involved the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
“Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases
mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) –
to the effect that we frown upon the ‘undesirable practice’ of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse – as well
as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans
et al., G. R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano
et al., vs. Eacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R.
L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations et
al., G.R. L20307, Feb. 26, 1965; and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.”
We do not here rule that where the pleadings or other documents
in the records of a case state a value of a real estate in controversy, a party
to the cause may not show that the true value thereof is more or is less than
that stated in the records. Section
17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 precisely allows a party to submit a sworn
statement of such higher or lower value.
This is not to say, of course, that the court is bound by a party’s
sworn statement, for where more than one party submit materially differing
statements of value, or where a party’s sworn statement conflicts with other
competent evidence, the true value is to be determined by the trial court as an
issue of fact before it.
The time when the issue of the value of a real estate in
controversy is to be resolved is prior to, or simultaneously with, the approval
of the record on appeal and appeal bond, for it is upon the perfection of the
appeal that the appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the case (Rule 41,
section 9). It is at this time that a
party to the cause, be he the intended appellant or the intended appellee, must raise the issue of value before the trial
court, for said court to allow appeal involving a question of fact either to
this Court or to the Court of Appeals, depending on its finding on the value of
the realty. Failure to raise this issue
before the trial court amounts to a submission of the issue solely on the
basis of the pleadings and evidence a quo and is equivalent to a
waiver of the right to present the statement under oath or to adduce the other
competent evidence referred to in section 17(b) of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
A contrary rule would be disastrous. For one thing, to allow a party to present
proof of value before an appellate court would be to convert the said court to
a trial court. For another thing, the
value of real estate may change between the perfection of an appeal and the
receipt of the records or the payment of the appellate court docket fee; hence,
it is best, for stability, to have the value determined at the precise instant
when the trial court must decide to which appellate court the appeal should be
made and not at some uncertain time thereafter.
Worse yet, to permit a party to prove before the Court of A p peals or
before us, after a decision on the merits has been rendered, that a real estate
in controversy exceeds, or does not exceed, P200, 000 in value, would be to
encourage speculation by litigants; for, a losing party can be expected to
raise the issue of value of the realty to show that it is in excess of P200,
000 if the unfavorable judgment is rendered by the Court of Appeals, or to
show that it does not exceed P200, 000 if the unfavorable judgment is rendered
by this Court, in an attempt to litigate the merits of the case all over again.
[2]
In the case at bar, the records – as of the perfection of the appeal
on August 12, 1964 – show that the litigated real estate had a value not in
excess of P200, 000, Conformably with the Judiciary Act of 1948, therefore,
the appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in civil case 6901 was within the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals.
Other issues, both of fact and of law, are raised in the
pleadings. Considering our conclusion
that the respondent Court had jurisdiction over the appeal, it is not necessary
to discuss, much less resolve, any of those other issues. However, because the petitioner and the heirs
of Nieves Cruz have hammered on the twin issues of the existence of an oral
contract of sale and of the efficacy of an oral novatory
contract of sale, a brief discussion of these issues would not be amiss.
The agency agreement of December
31, 1958 is not impugned by any of the parties. Nieves Cruz, however, asserted that the
agency remained in force until she rescinded it on September 16, 1961 by notice to that effect to Atanacio Valenzuela et al., tendering with the said notice
the return, in check, of the sum of P48, 338.60 which she had received from Atanacio Valenzuela et al.
The defendants, upon the other hand, contend that the agency agreement
was novated by a contract of sale in their favor and
that the balance of the purchase price was not due until after the 1962
harvest. Rodriguez, when impleaded by Atanacio Valenzuela
et al., denied that she was a buyer in bad faith from Nieves Cruz.
The parties and the lower courts are agreed that Nieves Cruz had
received P20, 000 from Atanacio Valenzuela et al. by January 5, 1959 and that the payment
of this total sum was in accordance with the agency agreement. The parties and the lower courts, however,
are at variance on the basis or reason for the subsequent payments. The petitioner herein, the heirs of Nieves
Cruz and the Court of First Instance of Rizal take
the position that the payments after January 5, 1959 were received by Nieves
Cruz as partial or instalment payments of the
purchase price on the representations of Atanacio
Valenzuela et al, that they had a buyer for the property from whom these
payments came, all pursuant to the agency agreement. The respondents Atanacio
Valenzuela et al., on the other hand, assert that those amounts were paid by
them, as disclosed buyers, to Nieves Cruz and her children, pursuant to a novatory verbal contract of sale entered into with Nieves
Cruz subsequent to the agency agreement and prior to the issuance of the decree
of registration of July 15, 1960.
It is thus clear that the decisive issues are (a) whether or not
Nieves Cruz did agree to sell to Atanacio Valenzuela
et al. the litigated parcel of land sometime after January 5, 1959, and (b) whether or not the said agreement
is enforceable or can be proved under the law.
The fact that Atanacio Valenzuela et al. were
agents of Nieves Cruz under the agency agreement of December 31, 1958 is not
material, for if it is true that Nieves Cruz did agree to sell to her agents
the real estate subject of the agency, her consent took the transaction out of
the prohibition contained in article 1491(2) of the Civil Code. Neither are articles 1874 and 1878(5) and
(12) of the Civil Code relevant, for they refer to sales made by an agent for a
principal and not to sales made by the owner personally to another, whether
that other be acting personally or through a representative.
Was there a novatory oral contract to
sell entered into by Nieves Cruz in favor of Atanacio
Valenzuela et al.? In resolving this
question, the respondent Court pointed to significant facts and circumstances
sustaining an affirmative answer.
Cited by the Court of Appeals is the testimony of Andres Nery, a successor-in-interest of Nieves Cruz and a
substitute plaintiff upon Nieves Cruz’ death, to the effect that after they had
gone to the defendants several times, they were told that the buyer was Salud de Leon. This
witness also said, according to the transcript cited by the respondent Court, that
they were paid little by little and had been paid a grand total of P48,
000. The respondent Court likewise
adverted to the receipts (exhibits L-I2 to L-22, exhibit L-24, exhibit L-26,
and exhibits 12, 12-a to 12-z-1) signed by Nieves Cruz and/or her children and
concluded that on the faces of these receipts it is clear that the amounts
therein stated were in payment by Atanacio Valenzuela
et al. of the land which the recipients had sold to them (“ipinagbile naming lupa sa kanila“). Of incalculable significance is the notation
in the original certificate of title and in the transfer certificate of title
in the name of Nieves Cruz which, in unambiguous language, recorded Nieves
Cruz’ sale of her interest in the land to Atanacio
Valenzuela et al. If that notation were inaccurate or false, Nieves Cruz would
not have remained unprotesting for over a year after
the entry of the decree of registration in July, 1960, nor would she and her
children have received 13 installment payments totaling P19, 963 during the period
from September 9, 1960 to September 3, 1961.
Salud de Leon, it should be borne in
mind, is the husband of Rogaciano F. de Leon and the
daughter of the defendant Liberata Santos. It should likewise be remembered that, as
remarked by the trial court, Salud de Leon testified
that it was she who had the oral agreement with Nieves Cruz for the purchase by
Atanacio Valenzuela et al. of the litigated property
and, as found by the respondent Court, Salud de Leon
was the representative of Atanacio Valenzuela et al.,
not of Nieves Cruz.
We conclude, therefore, that there is substantial evidence in the
record sustaining the finding of the respondent Court that the parties to the
agency agreement subsequently entered into a new and different contract by
which the landowner, Nieves Cruz, verbally agreed to sell her interest in the
litigated real estate to Atanacio Valenzuela et al.
A legion of receipts there are of payments of the purchase price
signed by Nieves Cruz. True, these
receipts do not state all the basic elements of a contract of sale, for they do
not expressly identify the object nor fix a price or the manner of fixing the
price. The parties, however, are agreed
– at least the plaintiff has not questioned the defendants’ claim to this effect
– that the object of the sale referred to in the receipts is Nieves Cruz’ share
in the land she co-owned with her brother Emilio and that the price therefor is P1.60 per square meter. At all events, by failing to object to the
presentation of oral evidence to prove the sale and by accepting from the
defendants a total of P27,198.60 after January 5, 1959, the plaintiff thereby
ratified the oral contract, conformably with article 1405 of the Civil Code,
and removed the partly executed agreement from the operation of the Statute of
Frauds. And, finally, the sale was
established and recognized in the land registration proceedings wherein the
land court, in its decision, categorically stated:
“[T]he applicant Nieves Cruz has
likewise sold her one-half (1/2) undivided share to the spouses Atanacio Valenzuela and Maximina
Victorio and Liberata
Santos from whom she had received partial payment thereof in the sum of P 22,
000.00.”
The pertinent certificates of title bear
the annotation of the aforesaid right of Atanacio
Valenzuela et al. The final decision of
the land court – to the effect that Nieves Cruz had sold her undivided share to
Atanacio Valenzuela et al. and had received a partial
payment of P22, 000 – is now beyond judicial review, and, because a land
registration case is a proceeding in rem,
binds even Rodriguez.
Rodriguez nevertheless insists that despite the rescission by the
Court of Appeals of her purchase from Nieves Cruz, the said respondent Court
did not order Nieves Cruz to return the P77, 216 which she had received from
her. While mutual restitution follows
rescission of a contract (article 1385, Civil Code), the respondent Court
should not be blamed for omitting to order Nieves Cruz to restore what she had
received from the petitioner on account of the rescinded contract of sale. In the first place, in the pleadings filed
before the trial court, Rodriguez made no claim for restitution against Nieves
Cruz or her heirs. In the second place,
Nieves Cruz died in the course of the proceedings below and was substituted by
her heirs who, necessarily, can be held individually liable for restitution
only to the extent that they inherited from her.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as rescission of the contract between
Nieves Cruz and the petitioner herein was decreed by the respondent Court, the
latter should be entitled to restitution as a matter of law. It is of no moment that herein petitioner did
not file any cross-claim for restitution against the plaintiff, for her answer
was directed to the defendants’ claim which was in the nature of a third-party
complaint. She was neither a
co-defendant nor a co-third-party defendant with Nieves Cruz; nor were Nieves
Cruz and the herein petitioner opposing parties a quo, for they
joined in maintaining the validity of their contract. Section 4 of Rule 9, therefore, has no
application to the petitioner’s right to restitution.
We declare, consequently, that the estate of Nieves Cruz is
liable to Barbara Lombos Rodriguez for the return to
the latter of the sum of P77,216, less
the amount which Atanacio Valenzuela et al.
had deposited with the trial court in accordance with the decision of
respondent Court. We cannot order the
heirs of Nieves Cruz to make the refund.
As we observed above, these heirs are liable for restitution only to the
extent of their individual inheritance from Nieves Cruz. Other actions or proceedings have to be
commenced to determine the liability accruing to each of the heirs of Nieves
Cruz.
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition for mandamus and certiorari is
denied, at petitioner’s cost.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur
Fernando, J., did not take
part.
Reyes, J., is on official leave.
[1]
The entire discussion on the issue of value in this decision has as its frame
of reference section 17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, infra, before
its total elimination by Republic Act 5440 which went into effect on September 9, 1968. As the law stands today,
all appeals from decisions in civil cases involving property or money claims,
regardless of the value or
amount in controversy, must now be taken to the Court of Appeals, provided that
such appeals do not pose only errors or questions of law. Whatever pronouncements
are made in this decision in reference to the said section 17(5) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 must be taken as applicable only to appeals (similar to
the case at bar) which were perfected prior to the date of effectivity
of Republic Act 5440
[2]
It may be asked: what happens if, contrary to the express or implied finding
of a trial court, the Court of Appeals or this Court finds that the value of
real estate in controversy in an appeal from a trial court on matters of fact
and law or fact alone, exceeds the value of P200, 000 or does not exceed such
value, as the case may be? The answer is not difficult. If the appeal is made
to the Court of Appeals, but on the basis of the records a quo,
including any sworn statement by a party to the cause or other evidence submitted
before perfection of the appeal, the realty should appear to have a value in
excess of P200, 000, the Court of Appeals shall certify the appeal to the
Supreme Court pursuant to section 3 of Rule 50 – and we may or may not accede
to the certification depending on our finding on the value. However, a party
litigant may raise the issue of value in a preliminary motion or in his brief
on the basis solely of the records a quo, again including
whatever sworn statement or other competent evidence of value may have been
submitted before the perfection of the appeal; and if he does that but the
Court of Appeals rules that it has jurisdiction over the controversy because
of its finding that the realty has a value not in excess of P200, 000, the
finding of value is reviewable by us on an original
action for mandamus or certiorari, for this factual matter is indispensably
involved in the issue of jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, the appeal is
made to us but, on the same basis as above, the realty should appear to have a
value not in excess of P200, 000, we will remand the appeal to the Court of
Appeals, and our finding on value, though one of fact, will be binding upon the
Court of Appeals.
In resume, the value of real estate
the title or possession of which is involved or brought in question should,
for purposes of determining which appellate court has jurisdiction over the
appeal, be based solely on the pleadings, sworn statement or other competent
evidence already in the records of the case at the time the appeal is
perfected.