BENJAMIN H. AVES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF PEñARANDA, NUEVA ECIJA, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. HON. EDUARDO L. JOSON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF NUEVA ECIJA, AND …

In this petition for certiorari filed on July 9, 1968 with the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, the Municipal Mayor of Peñaranda, Nueva
Ecija, Benjamin H. Ayes, prayed for a declaration of nullity of the order of
preventive suspension of sixty days effective July 5, 1968 issued by the
Provincial Governor of Nueva Ecija, respondent Eduardo L. Joson.^[1]
The petition for certiorari failed, the lower court in its decision of August
31, 1968 dismissing the same, respondent Provincial Governor being upheld.  Hence, this appeal to us.  We reverse the lower court on the authority
of Sarcos v. Castillo,^[2]
a decision promulgated by us on January 31, 1969, where it was categorically
held that, under the Decentralization Act of 1967,^[3]
the power of preventive suspension of a municipal mayor “has been withheld
from the provincial governor and may no longer be exercised by him.”

The facts as found by the
lower court follow: “(1) That petitioner Benjamin H. Ayes is duly elected
Mayor of Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija, and has been holding and exercising the duties
and functions of said offices since January 1, 1968; (2) That on July 3, 1968
respondent Governor Joson filed an administrative complaint with the Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija * * * charging the peti­tioner with alleged
‘Official Misconduct’ and ‘Illegal Employment of Municipal Policemen’; (3) That
on the basis of the said charges, respondent Governor Joson on July 3, 1968
issued an order suspending the petitioner from office effective July 5, 1968
for a period of sixty (60) days * * *; (4) That upon instructions of respondent
Governor Joson, respondent Vice-Mayor Lacuna took his Oath as Acting Mayor of Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija, on July 5, 1968 * * * and
forthwith assumed such office and exercised the duties and functions thereof on
the same date.  This fact has been
expressly admitted by the petitioner thru counsel orally in open [court] and in
writing * * *. “^[4]

The crucial issue then
was the validity of the preventive suspension of petitioner ordered by
respondent Provincial Governor.  The
answer cannot be in doubt.  As was made
clear by us in the Sarcos decision, such an authority he does not possess under
the Decentralization Act of 1967.  That
much is clear in the light of the explicit statutory language employed.  To quote from the Sarcos opinion: “1.  Under the former law then in force which
stands repealed by virtue of the Decentralization Act, the provincial governor,
if the charge against a municipal official was one affect­ing his official
integrity, could order his preventive suspension.  At present, the law is anything but
that.  A reading of the pertinent
paragraph above-quoted makes manifest that it is the provincial board to which
such a power has been granted under conditions there­in specified.  The statutory provision is worded
differently.  The principle, that the
deliberate selection of language other than that used in an earlier act is indicative
that a change in the law was intended, calls for application.”^[5] As was therein Stated further: “Here,
clearly, no such authority is vested in the provincial governor.  Instead, the statutory scheme, complete on
its face, would locate such power in the provincial board.  There would be no support for the view, then,
that the action taken by the provincial governor in issuing the order of
preventive suspension in this case was in accordance with law.”^[6]

This being another instance where a suspension of a municipal
official belonging to a party other than that to which the provincial governor
is affiliated, it may not be amiss to stress anew one of the basic purposes
implicit in the Decentralization Act of 1967, namely, to minimize, if not to do
away entirely with, the evils of partisanship. 
In terms of a desirable end to be achieved, that would constitute a further justification of the view that
the provincial governor is bereft of the previously granted authority to order
a preventive suspension.  Our observation
in the Sarcos case bears repeating: “Such a restraining influence is
indeed needed for the undeniable facts of the contemporary political scene bear
witness to efforts, at times disguised, at other times quite blatant, on the
part of local officials to make use of their positions to gain partisan
advantage.  Harrassment of those
belonging to opposing factions or groups is not unknown.  Unfortunately, no stigma seems to attach to
what really amounts to a misuse of official power.  The truism that a public office is a public trust, implicit in which is the
recognition that public advantage and not private benefit should be the test of
one’s conduct, seems to have been ignored all too often.  The con­struction of any statute therefore,
even assuming that it is tainted by ambiguity, which would reduce the
opportunity of any public official to make use of his position for partisan
ends, has much to recommend it.”^[7]

This being a certiorari proceeding, the ultimate question being
the absence of authority or the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
provincial governor, it suffices to declare null and void his order of
preventive suspension, there being no need to pass upon the other questions
raised in the petition.  That our
decision should be limited to the disposition of this crucial issue is further
reinforced by the fact that the preventive suspension ordered was only for a
period of sixty days dating from July 5, 1968, and there is nothing in the
record, nor in petitioner’s brief filed on February 11, 1969 as well as
in his motion for an early decision submitted August 16, 1969 to show that
petitioner had not as yet been reinstated to his position.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 31,
1968 dismissing the petition is reversed and another entered granting this
petition for certiorari, declaring null and void the order of preventive
suspension of July 3, 1968 issued by the provincial governor.  Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J., is on official
leave.

^[1]
The other respondent named is the Vice-Mayor of Peñaranda, Demetrio R. Lacuna.

^[2]
26 SCRA 853 (1969).

^[3]
Republic Act No. 5185.

^[4]
Appendix, Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, pp. 33-34.

^[5]
Sarcos v. Castillo, 26 SCRA 858-859 (1969).

^[6]  Ibid, p. 859.

^[7]  Ibid, pp. 864-865.