BARBARA LOMBOS RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SEC­OND DIVISION, COMPOSED OF JUSTI­CES JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, HERMO­GENES CONCEPCION, JR. AND EDILBERTO SORIANO), AT…

Rodriguez versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is the case of Rodriguez versus the Court of Appeals, a petition for mandamus and certiorari with preliminary injunction brought by Barbara Lombos Rodriguez against the Court of Appeals and against Atanacio Valenzuela, Maximina Victorio and Liberata Santos. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to undo a decision of the Court of Appeals that annulled her purchase of a parcel of land in Parañaque and ordered her to reconvey it to the defendants, who had been the agents of the seller. The case matters because it fixes two enduring lessons for the Bar: first, that a party who invokes a court's jurisdiction, submits her cause for decision, and loses may not afterwards repudiate that same jurisdiction; and second, that a registered owner who buys land with an annotation on the title of prior rights in favor of others cannot shelter herself behind the protection given to purchasers in good faith and for value.

Procedural History

The action began in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, where Nieves Cruz sued Atanacio Valenzuela, Maximina Victorio and Liberata Santos for rescission of their agreement, cancellation of the annotation on her title, and damages. The defendants impleaded Barbara Lombos Rodriguez, the buyer to whom Nieves Cruz had sold the land, and counterclaimed for annulment of that sale, reconveyance, and damages. The trial court found for Nieves Cruz and Rodriguez and against the defendants, ordering the cancellation of the annotation, the payment of actual damages and attorney's fees, and the dismissal of the counterclaim.

The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which in a decision dated October 4, 1967 reversed the trial court in toto. It set aside the sale to Rodriguez, declared her divested of title, vested title in the defendants upon their payment of the balance of the purchase price, ordered delivery of possession, and awarded damages and attorney's fees.

The heirs of Nieves Cruz and Rodriguez then filed a joint petition in the Supreme Court, both as an original action for certiorari and as an appeal, which the Court denied in January 1968; an amended petition was likewise denied, and a motion for reconsideration filed solely by Rodriguez was denied in February 1968. In July 1968 Rodriguez alone filed the present petition for mandamus and certiorari, adding two new grounds: that the land was worth more than 200,000 pesos and should have been certified to the Supreme Court, and that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying her motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. No injunction was issued.

Facts

On December 31, 1958, in Parañaque, Rizal, Nieves Cruz executed a document called a Kasunduan, ratified before a notary public, authorizing the spouses Atanacio Valenzuela and Maximina Victorio, together with Liberata Santos, to sell a parcel of land of about 44,634 square meters belonging to her. The price payable to Nieves Cruz was 1.60 pesos per square meter, and any overprice would pertain to the agents. Nieves Cruz was to receive 10,000 pesos upon execution and another 10,000 pesos on January 5, 1959, as advance payment, with the balance payable upon issuance of the Torrens title, which the agents undertook to obtain and to fund in the sum of 4,000 pesos, deductible from the last amount due.

The stipulated advance payment of 20,000 pesos was duly made. Contrary to the agreement that the balance would be paid upon issuance of the Torrens title, Nieves Cruz and her children nevertheless collected from the agents various sums from July 1959 up to September 1961, all receipted for and expressly stated to be additional payments for the land sold, totalling 27,198.60 pesos, which with the 20,000 pesos came to 47,198.60 pesos. The registration court decreed registration in the names of Emilio Cruz and Nieves Cruz, subject to the rights of the spouses Valenzuela and Victorio and of Liberata Santos over the one-half share of Nieves Cruz, for which she had been paid 22,000 pesos as partial payment. The title issued on September 9, 1960 carried that annotation, and it was carried over into the transfer certificate issued to Nieves Cruz after the partition.

On September 15, 1961, Nieves Cruz sold the property to Barbara Lombos Rodriguez, her balae, for 77,216 pesos, and a new title was issued in Rodriguez's name, likewise carrying over the annotation of the defendants' rights. The next day Nieves Cruz gave notice of rescission and tendered a check for 48,338.60 pesos, which the defendants refused, denying any non-compliance since the balance was not due until after the 1962 harvest. Nieves Cruz then sued for rescission. Pending the proceedings she died and was substituted by her surviving children.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for new trial based on alleged newly discovered evidence.
• Whether or not the value of the land in controversy exceeded 200,000 pesos, so as to place the appeal within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
• Whether or not the petitioner is estopped by laches from belatedly questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the appeal.

Applicable Provisions

Section 17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, provided:

The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in - (5) All civil cases in which the value in controversy exceeds two hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs or in which the title or possession of real estate exceeding in value the sum of two hundred thousand pesos to be ascertained by the oath of a party to the cause or by other competent evidence, is involved or brought in question. The Supreme Court shall likewise have exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals in civil cases, even though the value in controversy, exclusive of interests and costs, is two hundred thousand pesos or less, when the evidence involved in said cases is the same as the evidence submitted in an appealed civil case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided herein.

This provision supplies the jurisdictional threshold that the petitioner invokes, and it also authorizes a party to submit a sworn statement of the value of the real estate in controversy.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the claim of grave abuse was devoid of merit. On the assumption that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal, the petitioner had already lost her right to appeal from the decision of October 1967 when the joint petition was filed in January 1968. It followed that the case had passed the stage for new trial on newly discovered evidence when she filed her motion in May 1968.

On the second issue, the Court held that the records overwhelmingly refuted the allegation that the land was worth more than 200,000 pesos. The Kasunduan fixed the value at 1.60 pesos per square meter for an area of 44,634 square meters; the trial court assessed it at 3.00 pesos per square meter; and the deed of sale in favor of Rodriguez stated a consideration of 77,216 pesos. Until June 1968 no party had questioned the trial court's valuation, and the value of the entire parcel had been impliedly admitted by the parties as being below 200,000 pesos.

On the third issue, the Court held that even granting that the value exceeded 200,000 pesos, to set aside at that stage all the proceedings before the Court of Appeals and before the Supreme Court would violate all norms of justice and equity and contravene public policy. The appeal had been pending before the Court of Appeals from 1964 until October 1967, yet the appellees did not raise the issue of jurisdiction; the joint petition afforded the petitioner the opportunity to question it, and she did not; it was not until June 1968 that she raised the issue of value for the first time, and only after and because the Court of Appeals had decided against her. The Court applied the doctrine of estoppel by laches, quoting its earlier ruling:

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

The Court clarified, however, that it was not ruling that where the records state a value, a party may not show that the true value is more or less, for the Judiciary Act precisely allows a sworn statement of such higher or lower value, though the court is not bound by it where the statements differ or conflict with other competent evidence.

Doctrine

First, a party who invokes the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, submits the cause for decision, and then obtains or fails to obtain that relief, may not afterwards repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. This is estoppel by laches, grounded not on the validity of the judgment but on public policy, which frowns upon the undesirable practice of accepting a judgment only if favorable and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

Second, laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by due diligence could or should have been done earlier; unlike the statute of limitations, it is principally a question of the inequity of permitting a stale claim to be enforced.

Third, under Section 17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the value of the real estate in controversy may be ascertained by the oath of a party or by other competent evidence, but the court is not bound by a party's sworn statement where it conflicts with other competent evidence.

Fourth, a purchaser of registered land who takes with notice of an annotated prior right in favor of another cannot claim the protection afforded to purchasers in good faith and for value, and cannot acquire a right better than that of her grantor.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition, and Rodriguez lost; the decision of the Court of Appeals was left standing.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a party who invokes a court's jurisdiction and submits her case for decision cannot, after losing, repudiate that same jurisdiction, for estoppel by laches bars her. Examiners use this case to test the doctrine of estoppel by laches against belated jurisdictional objections, and to test the rule that a buyer of registered land takes subject to annotated prior rights and cannot invoke the protection of an innocent purchaser for value.