ALEXANDER R. NG, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), SELIVIC PAWNSHOP CORPORATION (FORMERLY TAMBUNTING PAWNSHOP) AND TERESITA T. LIBORO, RESPON…
ABDULWAHID, J.:
The instant petition stemmed from a Complaint[3] for actual illegal dismissal, underpayment of salary/wages, non-payment of salary/wages, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, separation pay and ECOLA, filed with the Labor Arbiter on November 29, 2011 by petitioner Alexander Ng against private respondents Selivic Pawnshop Corporation (formerly Tambunting Pawnshop) and Teresita T. Liboro. The complaint was docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. NCR-11-17826-11.
In his Position Paper,[4] petitioner alleged that he has been employed as an appraiser of Tambunting Pawnshop (now Selivic Pawnshop Corporation) in one of its Pasig City branches since November 23, 1999. He was required to work for six (6) days a week from 8:30 in the morning until 5:30 in the afternoon and on some occasions, on rest days. He received a daily wage of Four Hundred Four Pesos (Php404.00) though he never received the monetary value of his unused service incentive leave as well as his 13th month pay and ECOLA. Petitioner also claimed that on March 2, 2011, Tambunting Pawnshop formally closed its Pasig branch and transferred him to its Caloocan City branch. He was able to work there only for two (2) days from March 9 to March 10, 2011. At around this time, petitioner received a memorandum from Tambunting Pawnshop, alleging that he has violated company policies, among which, is the over-appraising of pawned items on certain instances covering the entire period of his employment with Tambunting Pawnshop or for a period of almost twelve (12) years. He was suspended for a month pursuant to the said memorandum. According to petitioner, he never heard again from respondents until a termination letter was handed to him, signed by the Auditor and the Operations Manager. He claimed that he was not afforded an opportunity to present his defense on the charges leveled against him, but was instead unceremoniously dismissed without due process and without payment of separation pay.
On the other hand, private respondents did not file their position paper. The records show that during the mandatory hearing scheduled on December 20, 2011 and January 5, 2012, private respondents failed to appear despite due notices sent to the address of private respondent Teresita T. Liboro at No. 12, Mahogany Street, Forbes Park, Makati City. The said notices were returned bearing the notations, “RTS, REFUSED TO RECEIVE BY MR. LIBORO ALBANO, dated December 12, 2011.” Another set of notices were sent for the January 27, 2012 hearing to the same address, directing private respondents to file their verified position paper. Again, the notices were returned with the notations, “RTS, REFUSED TO RECEIVE dated January 17, 2012.” The filing of their position paper was rescheduled to February 20, 2012, with a warning that if private respondents fail to appear and file the required position paper, the hearing will proceed ex-parte. However, the said notices were returned, bearing the notations, “RTS, REFUSED TO RECEIVE dated February 6, 2012.” To further afford respondents another chance, petitioner furnished the office of the Labor Arbiter another address at 7-A EDSA Ave., corner Evangelista Street, Bangkal, Makati City. Notice was sent to the given address and was received by a certain Jualyn Ajoc, but private respondents failed to appear despite notice. Another notice was sent to the same address and was received by a certain Elvis Montenegro. Still, private respondents failed to appear. Thus, on July 31, 2012, Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria rendered a Decision,[5] finding that petitioner was illegally dismissed by private respondents, entitling him to the mandatory remedy of reinstatement and payment of backwages, and granting his claim for payment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads, as follows:[6]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding respondents guilty of illegal dismissal. Accordingly, respondents are ordered jointly and severally liable:
1) 2) 3) Other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
There being no appeal from the decision interposed by private respondents, petitioner filed on November 19, 2012 a Motion to Issue Writ of Execution,[7] praying that a writ be issued for the execution and satisfaction of the July 31, 2012 Decision. A pre-execution conference was scheduled on December 17, 2012 and notices were sent to both parties. During the said conference, a representative of petitioner appeared, while private respondents failed to attend.
Finding that private respondents were sufficiently notified by registered mail, the Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution[8] and thereafter, a Notice of Garnishment[9] dated April 2, 2013 addressed to Banco de Oro (BDO).
Upon learning from BDO that a Notice of Garnishment was issued against their account, private respondents filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion to Quash Writ of Execution[10] dated April 10, 2013 wherein they alleged that the notice sent to them by BDO regarding the garnishment of their bank accounts pursuant to a Writ of Execution in connection with the instant labor case was the first notice they received regarding the said case. Private respondents contended that the office of the Labor Arbiter did not validly acquire jurisdiction over them by reason of improper service of summons upon them. They contended that the claimed employer of complainant is Selivic Corporation, with respondent Teresita T. Liboro being named as a party-respondent only on account of her position and/or association with the corporation. Thus, the summons issued in relation to this case should have been served at 742 Rizal Avenue Extension, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, which is the principal office address of private respondent company, and not at No. 12, Mahogany Street, Forbes Park, Makati City, which is the residence of respondent Teresita T. Liboro. Based on the foregoing premise, private respondents prayed that: (1) the Writ of Execution be quashed for having been issued without the requisite jurisdiction over the respondents; (2) the Decision rendered in the instant case be recalled and set aside for having been issued without the requisite jurisdiction over the respondents; and (3) consistent with due process, an order be issued directing respondents to file their position paper.
On July 10, 2013, petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition[11] to private respondent’s Motion to Quash Writ of Execution, praying that the same be noted and the Writ of Execution issued pursuant to the Decision dated July 31, 2012 rendered by the Labor Arbiter be maintained.
On December 11, 2012, Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria issued an Order,[12] denying private respondents’ Motion to Quash, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:[13]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents’ Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, let the execution proceedings proceed.
SO ORDERED.
On January 13, 2014, private respondents filed a Petition[14] with urgent prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, where they essentially questioned the validity of the summons issued to them in the present case and claimed that the Labor Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over them, thus, depriving them of their right to due process. Private respondents alleged that their legal demurral began when they received a notice from BDO informing them that their bank accounts were being garnished. They alleged that it was only then that they were informed of the existing labor case between them and petitioner.
According to private respondents, the claimed employer of complainant is Selivic Corporation, with respondent Teresita T. Liboro being named as a party-respondent only on account of her position and/or association with the corporation. Thus, private respondents contended that summons should have been served at the principal place of business of private respondent company, at 742 Rizal Avenue Extension, Caloocan City, Metro Manila. Private respondents alleged that summons in the labor case was not sent to private respondent company’s principal place of business, but at the residence of private respondent Teresita T. Liboro, which notice was received by a certain Liboro Albano at No. 12, Mahogany St., Forbes Park, Makati City. This notwithstanding, the Labor Arbiter proceeded with the hearing and the submission of the parties’ position papers. This time, the Labor Arbiter sent a notice of hearing allegedly received by a certain Jualyn Ayoc at 7-A EDSA Ave., corner Evangelista St., Bangkal, Makati City, which is still not the principal place of business of private respondent company. Private respondents asserted that, by reason of the improper service of summons, they were not the one at fault in failing to attend the hearings before the Labor Arbiter.
On April 21, 2014, the NLRC rendered a Decision,[15] finding the service of summons over private respondents to be invalid and not binding, and consequently reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:[16]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings upon service of valid summons to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17] dated May 5, 2014, but the same was denied in the assailed Resolution[18] dated July 14, 2014.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition, praying that the April 21, 2014 Decision and the July 14, 2014 Resolution of public respondent NLRC be annulled and set aside on the ground that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Petitioner contends that in quasi-judicial proceedings, procedural rules governing service of summons are not strictly construed, and substantial compliance therewith is sufficient. They claimed that service to private respondent Liboro was tantamount to service to private respondent company, as Liboro was, at the time the complaint was filed, was the company’s appointed treasurer, and currently, corporate secretary of the said company.
We find no merit in the instant petition.
Service of summons in cases filed with the Labor Arbiter is governed by Section 4, Rule V of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, to wit:
SECTION 4. SERVICE OF SUMMONS. – Summons shall be served personally upon the parties by the bailiff or a duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from his/her receipt thereof, or by registered mail, or by private courier authorized by the Commission; Provided that in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.
The bailiff or officer serving the summons shall submit his/her return within two (2) days from date of service thereof, stating legibly in his/her return his/her name, the names of the persons served and the date of receipt, which return shall be immediately attached to the records and shall be part thereof. If no service was effected, the reason thereof shall be stated in the return.
In case of service by registered mail or by private courier, the names of the addressees and the dates of receipt of the summons shall be written in the return card or in the proof of service issued by the private courier. If no service was effected, the reason thereof shall be so stated.
In relation thereto, Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity.-When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel.
Under the aforecited rules, service of summons is effected by handing the copy of the summons personally upon the parties. In case of domestic private juridical entities, the same should be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel as they are deemed so integrated with the corporation that they know their responsibilities and immediately discern what to do with any legal papers served on them.[19] The records of this case reveal that summons was not personally served upon private respondents but instead on a certain Liboro Albano at No. 12, Mahogany St., Forbes Park, Makati City, and thereafter, on Jualyn Ajoc at 7-A EDSA Ave., corner Evangelista St., Bangkal, Makati City and finally, on a certain Elvis Montenegro at 7-A EDSA Ave., corner Evangelista St., Bangkal, Makati City. Hence, summons were not personally served upon private respondents.
Neither was there a valid substituted service in this case. Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected by (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
Contrary to the requirement set forth in the above provisions, the records of the case reveal that summons were never served at the principal place of business of private respondent company as set forth in the Articles of Incorporation. In addition, petitioner failed to show the pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons showing the impossibility of serving the summons personally that warrants substituted service. Hence, the said summons cannot be binding on private respondents.
Considering the foregoing disquisition, we sustain the finding of the NLRC, which reads, as follows:[20]
xxx While substituted service allows service at the residence of the officers mentioned in the Rules, or in the corporation’s office or regular place of business, nevertheless, substituted service may only be resorted to after attempt by way of personal service to the corporation failed, which clearly does not appear in the instant case.
xxx xxx xxx
Let it be emphasized upon that in order to validly acquire jurisdiction over the person of a juridical person, service must be made to the officer who is named in the statute, as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Paramount Insurance Corp. vs. A.C. Ordonez Corporation, et. al., the Supreme Court held that:
“xxx (s)ervice of summons to someone other than the corporation’s president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer and in-house counsel, is not valid.
The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to receive summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is limited and more clearly specified in the new rule. The phrase ‘agent, or any of its directors’ has been conspicuously deleted. Moreover, the argument of substantial compliance is no longer compelling. We have ruled that the new rule, as opposed to Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court, is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have been done so in clear and concise language. Absent manifest intent to liberalize the rule, strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is required.”
Thus, consistent with the Decision of the Supreme Court in the Paramount Insurance case, the commission holds that the service of summons to petitioners in this case does not constitute substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service.
It is a basic rule that the Labor Arbiter cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the latter being served with summons.[21] The mandatory character of Section 4, Rule V of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure is evident from the use of the word “shall.” Even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are not strictly bound by procedural requirements, they are still bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental requirements of due process.[22] As similarly held by the Supreme Court in the case of Kanlaon, supra:[23]
Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases before labor arbiters and respondent Commission, they “shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.” The rule that respondent Commission and the Labor Arbiters are not bound by technical rules of evidence and procedure should not be interpreted so as to dispense with the fundamental and essential right of due process. And this right is satisfied, at the very least when the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers.
We disagree with petitioner’s claim that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed decision. As held in Purefoods Corporation vs. Nagkakaisang Samahang Manggagawa ng Purefoods Rank-and-File:[24]
The Court reiterates that the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed with the CA will prosper only if there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC. It was incumbent, then, for petitioner to prove before the appellate court that the labor commission capriciously and whimsically exercised its judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, or that it exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and that its abuse of discretion is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In this case, the NLRC is presumed to have considered the underlying facts of this case and all arguments of both parties in rendering its decision. Therefore, we find that petitioner failed to present evidence to overthrow this presumption. Thus, we see no compelling reason to reverse or set aside the assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
*Inting, S.B., and [
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]Sadang, M.Q.C., JJ., concur.
* Acting Senior Member, vice J. P.J. Baltazar-Padilla, per Office Order No. 135-15-ABR dated April 17, 2015.
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] Acting Junior Member, per Office Order No. 135-15-ABR dated April 17, 2015.
[1] Rollo, pp. 330-339.
[2] Id. at 352-359.
[3] Id. at 23.
[4] Id. at 189-194.
[5] Id. at 39-45.
[6] Id. at 44-45
[7] Id. at 48-50.
[8] Id. at 53-56.
[9] Id. at 58.
[10] Id. at 59-66.
[11] Id. at 134-136.
[12] Id. at 142-154.
[13] Id. at 153.
[14] Id. At 164-182.
[15] Id. at 330-339.
[16] Id. at 338-339.
[17] Id. at 340-345.
[18] See Note 2.
[19] See Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, 279 SCRA 337, 346 (1997).
[20] See Note 2 at 357-358.
[21] See Larkins vs. NLRC, 311 PHIL 687.
[22] National Power Corporation vs. NLRC, 272 SCRA 704, 723 (1997).
[23] See Note 19 at 350-351.
[24] 563 SCRA 471, 479-480 (2008).