CARMELITA BECIERA AND MACARIO S. SEPADA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JOSE G. PANEDA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 220, QUEZON CITY AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, …
LIBREA-LEAGOGO, J.:
Per JRD verification,[4] no comment was filed as per CMIS entry. Thus, the third paragraph of the Resolution[5] dated 23 May 2014 is reiterated, and the Petition is submitted for decision.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
A Complaint[6] dated 20 June 2006 was filed by plaintiff Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), against defendants Kiotoy Multi-Purpose Cooperative (“KMPC,” for brevity), Macario S. Sepada (“Sepada,” for brevity), Gerardo A. Valmoria+ (“Valmoria,” for brevity), and Carmelita Beciera (“Beciera,” for brevity) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-06-58494.
Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that: DAR, through its lending conduit DBP, and defendants entered into a Loan Agreement whereby the former extended a loan of Php750,000.00 at 12% interest per annum, payable in five years with one year grace period; on 09 November 1992, defendants executed in favor of DBP, a promissory note in the amount of Php750,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum; defendants agreed that in case of non-payment of the note on demand or at maturity or upon the happening of any of the events of default, they agreed to pay, by way of liquidated damages, an additional amount equivalent to the basic interest rate on the principal sum, but in no case less than Php1,000.00 until fully paid, and attorney’s fees of 10% of the total amount due, exclusive of costs and other judicial or extrajudicial expenses; defendants defaulted in their amortizations since 29 December 1997, thereby rendering the entire obligation due and demandable; as of 31 March 2006, defendants’ total outstanding obligation amounted to Php4,394,975.00, representing the unpaid principal of Php750,000.00, interests of Php1,167,000.00, and penalty charges of Php2,477,975.00; despite repeated demands, defendants failed to pay; DAR was compelled to institute the present action and engage the services of counsel; and DBP executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of DAR.
Defendants failed to file an Answer.[7]
A Decision dated 03 June 2010 was rendered by the trial court,[8] the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the defendants Macario S. Sepada, Gerardo A. Valmoria and Carmelita Beciera are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P750,000.00 plus interest of 12% per annum and penalty charges of 12% per annum from November 6, 1994 until the entire amount is paid.”[9]
A Writ of Execution[10] dated 09 May 2012 was issued.
Individual defendants filed an Omnibus Motion: A) To Secure a Copy of the Decision B) To Suspend the Implementation of the Writ of Execution insofar as Defendants Macario S. Sepada, Gerardo A. Valmoria and Carmelita Beciera are Concerned[11] (“Omnibus Motion,” for brevity) dated 07 August 2012, to which plaintiff filed an Opposition[12] dated 05 November 2012.
The trial court issued the first assailed Order[13] dated 14 June 2013 denying the Omnibus Motion, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants’ Omnibus Motion A). To Secure a Copy of the Decision (and) B).To Suspend the Implementation of the Writ of Execution is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.“[14]
Individual defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] dated 08 August 2013, which was denied in the second assailed Order[16] dated 15 November 2013.
Hence, this Petition.
RULING
Petitioners raise the following grounds for allowance of their Petition, viz:
“1) PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS COMMITTED A (sic) GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONERS ARE CONSIDERED TO HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF HIS DECISION OR WHEN HE DENIED THE RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS TO GET OR RECEIVE A COPY OF THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-06-58494 DATED JUNE 3, 2010(,) THUS EFFECTIVELY BARRING THEM FROM FILING AN APPEAL.
2) PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS COMMITTED A (sic) GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE ORDERED THE PETITIONERS TO PAY THE FINANCIAL OBLIGATION OF KIOTOY MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM WHEN THEY SIGNED THE LOAN AGREEMENT AND PROMISSORY NOTE IN THEIR CAPACITY AS OFFICERS OF THE COOPERATIVE.”[17]
Petitioners contend, inter alia, that: public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when he considered petitioners to have received a copy of the Decision and/or denied their right to obtain a copy of the same, thus, effectively barring them from filing an appeal within the reglementary period; while they might have failed to file an answer, the right to appeal the Decision within the reglementary period is not forbidden; they have yet to see a copy of the Decision and they want to know why they were made liable to pay for the financial obligation of the cooperative; they signed the loan agreement and promissory note in their capacity as officers of the cooperative at that time; they could not remember signing any document that would make them liable for the financial obligation of the cooperative; the Decision was mailed to their addresses as indicated in the Complaint and summons; how could the decision be possibly delivered or served upon petitioner Beciera at her alleged address in Tagum City when the said place has a total land area of 19,580 hectares; the probable reason why respondent used Tagum as the address of petitioner Beciera is because in the acknowledgment of the Loan Agreement, she used a residence certificate issued by Tagum but it does not mean that she is a resident of that place since during that time it was easy to secure the same from Tagum; petitioner Sepada could not have possibly received the Decision since the office of KMPC was already closed when the said Decision was rendered; KMPC had already stopped its business operations and other economic activities since 1997, as shown by the barangay certification issued by the barangay captain; on 23 February 1997, petitioners Sepada, Beciera and Valmoria were no longer officers of KMPC, as they were replaced by another set of officers as shown in the Minutes; petitioners automatically stopped holding office when their successors were elected and duly qualified; Sec. 9 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court says that judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail; when the Decision was rendered, KMPC was already closed and nobody would receive any communication addressed to it, and the sheriff asked the assistance of the barangay to enable him to meet petitioners; petitioners would be deprived of their property without due process of law if they would not be given a copy of the Decision; a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice; and public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when petitioners were made liable to pay for the debt obtained by KMPC.
Stripped of verbiage, the issue in this special civil action for certiorari is whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders.
We find in the negative.
(T)here is grave abuse of discretion when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[18] Such capricious, whimsical and arbitrary acts must be apparent on the face of the assailed (O)rder(s). The burden of proof is on the petitioner(s) to show that the (public respondent) issued the Order(s) with grave abuse of discretion.[19] This petitioner failed to do.
In denying petitioners’ Omnibus Motion, public respondent aptly found, inter alia, viz:
“A careful scrutiny of the records revealed that defendants chose not to participate in the proceedings before this Court as they failed to file a responsive pleading despite having been duly served the (s)ummons together with a copy of the Complaint. In fact, it is true that they even filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer before this Court on February 6, 2008(,) however, no pleading was filed. Thus, upon motion of the plaintiff, defendants were declared in default and subsequently, evidence was presented ex parte, until this case was finally decided. The Decision of the Court was mailed in (sic) the addresses of defendants as indicated in the Complaint and (s)ummons.
From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that defendants were not deprived of due process(,) however, what is clearly apparent is that they chose to sleep on their rights (sic) to controvert the claims of plaintiff. Apart from not participating in the proceedings of this case, they failed to inform this Court of their supposed new addresses. It is not the Court’s duty to verify or update on (sic) parties’ change of circumstances. The failure of defendants to inform the Court that after a few years, new sets of officers were elected or that Kiotoy Multi-Purpose (C)ooperative had already closed, are clear indicia of their negligence in the protection of their causes.“[20] (Emphasis supplied)
The Complaint against petitioners was filed in June 2006. Petitioners received copies of the summons and Complaint,[21] and even filed their Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer[22] dated 30 January 2008. However, they failed to file their responsive pleading. Petitioners were at fault in not informing the trial court of any change in their respective addresses. As stated in the first assailed Order, the trial court’s Decision was mailed to petitioners at the addresses indicated in the Complaint and summons. They cannot pass the blame to the court, which is not tasked to monitor the changes in the circumstances of the parties xxx.[23] Since they knew that a case was filed against them, they should have been diligent in monitoring and keeping abreast with the status of said case. Moreover, they could have participated in the proceedings, but chose not to. They cannot close their eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim (they) acted in good faith. Certainly, (W)e cannot ascribe good faith to those who have not shown diligence in protecting their rights.[24]
Furthermore, the Decision dated 03 June 2010 has already become final and executory, as keenly pointed out by public respondent, viz:
“Thus, when defendants filed the aforementioned Omnibus Motion on August 16, 2012, it was almost two (2) years after this Court decided the case, thus, the Decision of this Court, dated June 3, 2010, had already become final and executory, considering that no appeal has been filed thereto within the reglementary period as provided for by law.”[25]
It is well-settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. This principle, commonly known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Verily, it fosters the judicious perception that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of public policy which must be faithfully complied.[26]
The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. So when appeal, or a petition for review is available, certiorari cannot be resorted to; certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal. xxx Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.[27]
Considering the foregoing, We find no necessity to resolve the other matters raised by petitioners which go into the merits of the final and executory Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Diamante, and Sadang, JJ., concur.
+ In the instant Petition, it was stated that Gerardo A. Valmoria died on 26 November 2013, as shown by a photocopy of his Certificate of Death dated 27 November 2013; rollo, pp. 13, 75
[1] Rollo, pp. 07-22
[2] Id. at 23-26
[3] Id. at 27-30
[4] Id. at 99 (dorsal side)
[5] Id. at 77
[6] Id. at 44-50
[7] Id. at 11
[8] Id. at 23
[9] Id. at 53
[10] Id. at 53-54
[11] Id. at 56-59
[12] Id. at 63-67
[13] Id. at 23-26
[14] Id. at 26
[15] Id. at 68-74
[16] Id. at 27-30
[17] Id. at 13-14
[18] Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, etc., et al., G.R. No. 170701, 22 January 2014, SC E-Library
[19] Novateknika Land Corporation v. Philippine National Bank, et al., G.R. No. 194104, 13 March 2013
[20] Rollo, p. 25
[21] Id. at 15
[22] Id. at 51-52
[23] Cf. Salvador O. Mojar, et al. v. Agro Commercial Security Service Agency, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 187188, 27 June 2012
[24] Cf. Heirs of the Late Felix M. Bucton, etc., et al. v. Spouses Gonzalo and Trinidad Go, G.R. No. 188395, 20 November 2013
[25] Rollo, p. 25
[26] Cf. National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 173802, 07 April 2014
[27] Cf. Silverina E. Consigna v. People of the Philippines, et al., G.R. Nos. 175750-51, 02 April 2014