LORENZO LLAMOSO, PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE FERRER AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

In consequence of the elections held November 11, 1947, the
municipal board of canvassers of Lumban, Laguna, proclaimed Vicente Ferrer as
mayor-elect, with a plurality of 363 votes over the next candidate Lorenzo
Llamoso.

Llamoso filed quo warranto proceedings alleging that
Ferrer was disqualified for lack of legal residence. After hearing, the court of
first instance of Laguna declared the position vacant, stating that Ferrer had
not the legal requisites necessary to be validly elected.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which in due
course, confirmed the ineligibility of Ferrer, but declined to transfer “the
palm of victory” to Llamoso who “had not received the popular verdict”. It
affirmed the decision of the court of first instance.

These two petitions for certiorari to review the judgment of
the Court of Appeals refer to the same controversy. On the one hand, Ferrer
maintains he was not disqualified; on the other, Llamoso argues that he should
be declared elected upon the disqualification of Ferrer.

On the first point, the decision of the Court of Appeals finds
that:

“On October 24, 1947, the petitioner Lorenzo Llamoso filed with
the Justice of the Peace Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, a petition for the
exclusion of the respondent Vicente Ferrer from the registry list of voters of
Precinct No. 6 of the Municipality of Lumban, for alleged lack of six months’
residence in the said municipality, as required by section 98 of Republic Act
No. 180 (Revised Election Code). The Justice of the Peace denied the petition,
and petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the
appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 3984, entitled ‘Lorenzo Llamoso vs. Board
of Inspectors of Lumban, etc.’ After hearing, the court rendered on November 4,
1947, a decision reversing the judgment of the justice of the peace and ordering
the exclusion of the respondent Vicente Ferrer from the registry list of voters
of said Precinct No. 6. The Respondent brought the case to the Supreme Court on
certiorari (G. R. No. L-1784), but the high court was able to dispose of the
petition only on November 13, 1947, or two days after the election. In its
resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari, the high court said that the
petition had no merit and the question therein involved had already become
moot.”

The Court of Appeals held that the judgments above mentioned
are conclusive on the lack of qualifications of Ferrer. Invoking our ruling in
Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645, Ferrer says the appellate court committed error.
Supposing that the case fits the situation now, and that the judgments were not
conclusive, inasmuch as the record does not show the contrary (that in fact he
had the required residence), we must confirm the finding that he is and was
ineligible. (Sec. 2174, Adm. Code, in connection with sec. 96 of Republic Act
No. 180.)

The petition of Llamoso raises this question: When the winning
candidate turns out to be disqualified, is the candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes entitled to the office?

The parties have failed to call our attention to a previous
decision of this Court squarely on the matter. Ferrer’s counsel calls attention
to Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil., 238, wherein it is said:

“Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not
entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the election is
quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such
an office. * * * In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the
word, because opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that
the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a
plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real
victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case,
there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots”. (Topacio vs. Paredes, supra, 254, 255.)

Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 establishing the procedure
when a person who is not eligible is elected to a provincial or municipal office
says that any registered candidate may contest his right to the position by
quo warranto proceedings. It does not provide that if the contestee is
declared ineligible the contestant will be proclaimed. Indeed it may be gathered
that the law contemplates no such result, because it permits the filing of the
contest by any registered candidate irrespective of whether the latter
occupied the next highest place or the lowest in the election returns.

As a matter of fact the American precedents on Elections hold
that:

“It is a fundamental idea in all republican form government
that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried,
unless he or it receives a majority or a plurality of the legal votes cast in
the election. Accordingly, the general rule is that the fact that a plurality or
a majority of the votes are east for an ineligible candidate at a popular
election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. In such case the electors have failed to make a
choice and the election is a nullity”. (29 Corpus Juris Secundum, 353.)

“* * * although the candidate voted for by a majority cannot be
declared elected because of his ineligibility and the majority vote is thereby
rendered ineffective for such purpose, such majority vote is effective to forbid
the election of the candidate having the next highest number of votes. The
effect is to render the purported election nugatory and to leave a vacancy in
the office thus attempted to be filled”. (18 American Jurisprudence,
353.)

Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. No
costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Padilla, Tuason,
Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.