BUCRA CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HIGINO B. MACADAEG, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, AND ELIGIO GIRON, RESPONDENTS.

This is a special civil action of certiorari filed with this
Court by the petitioner against the respondent Judge Higino Macadaeg of the
Court of First Instance of Manila and Eligio Giron, to set aside the order of
the respondent Judge requiring the petitioner to deposit in court the sum of
P25,000, which the petitioner, as a garnishee in a civil action filed by the
respondent Eligio Giron against Antonio C. Salcedo, claims to have in its
possession to cover the obligation existing prior to the garnishment of the
defendant Salcedo to the petitioner.

Section 10, Rule 59, which provides that the court may, after
the examination of a debtor of the defendant, “order personal property capable
of manual delivery belonging to the defendant, in the possession of the person
so required to attend before the court, to be delivered to tlia cleric of the
court, sheriff, or other officer on such terms as may be just,” is applicable
only in oases where indebtedness is admitted by the garnishee, or a personal
property capable of manual delivery belonging to the defendant is in the
possession of the person so required to attend before the court. But if the
garnishee does not admit the indebtedness or makes a legal or equitable claim to
the property or amount in his hands as in the present case, the controversy must
be determined by action, as provided in section 41, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. To compel the garnishee in the present case to deposit in oourt the
amount of P25,000 in his possession notwithstanding its claim thereto, would be
to deprive the petitioner of a property without due process of law.

The proceedings provided for in “sections 476, 481, 482 and 486
of the Code of Civil Procedure (from which sections 35, 37, 38, and 41 of Rule
39 were taken) are identical in principle with the proceeding for the citation
of debtors explained in the chapter on attachment” (Tayabas Land Go. vs.
Sharruf, 41 Phil., 382, 388), and therefore applicable to the present case,
specially the provision of section 486 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, now
section 41, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 544 of the California Code of Civil Procedure is identical
with section 432 of the old Philippine Code of Civil Procedure which, like most
of the provision of our old Code touching attachment proceedings, was borrowed
literally from the California Code, and the provisions of section 8, Rule 59, or
our Rules of Court on effect of attachment of debts and credits were literally
copied from said section 432 of our old Code of Civil Procedure. Under the
provision of said section 8 of Rule 59 all persons having any personal property
belonging to the defendant, or owing any debt to the defendant, at the time of
the service of the order of garnishment, shall be, unless such property be
delivered or transferred, or such debt be paid by him, to the clerk, sheriff or
other officer of the court, liable to the plaintiff for the amount of such
credit, property or debts, until the attachment be discharged.

And this Court in the case of Tee Bi & Co. vs. Chartered
Bank of India, Australia and Cnina, 41 Phil., 819, 822, quoted with approval the
following syllabus in the case of Carter vs. Los Angeles National Bank, 116
Cal., 370-1;

“ATTACHMENT; GARNISHMENT; ACTION BY JUDGMENT CREDITOR AGAINST
GARNISHEE.—After execution unsatisfied against the judgment debtor, the judgment
creditor may bring an aeii on at law against a garnishee upon whom notice was
served under an attachment issued in the action before judgment; and it is not
necessary before bringing such action that the garnishee should be required to
appear and answer, or that an order should be obtained authorizing the action
against the garnishee; and no ecuitable circumstance need be shown to justify
the suit, which is upon direct liability of the garnishee to the plaintiff in
that suit provided for in section 544 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.”

In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the respondent judge
acted in excess of the jurisdicition of the court in issuing the order of March
16, 1949, requiring the petitioner to deposit the sum of P25, 000 in court, and
that therefore said order, being null and void, is set aside with costs against
the respondent Eligio Giron. (See Resolution of September 19, 1949.) So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,
Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.