ESTRELLA LEDESMA, PETITIONER, VS. EDUARDO ENRIQUEZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, RESPONDENT.

This is a case of prohibition instituted by Estrella Ledesma,
administratrix in testate proceedings No. 1362 in the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros, against Judge Eduardo D. Enriquez, presiding over the third
branch of said court. The facts which may be gathered from the petition and from
the answer and annexes attached thereto of the respondent, may be briefly stated
as follows:

This case No. 1362 aforementioned refers to the testate estate
of the deceased Marcelo Ledesma and involves properties presumably situated in
the province of Occidental Negros. The petitioner Estrella appears to be one of
the heirs of the deceased Marcelo Ledesma. She is now residing in the City of
Manila but it is not known when she first took up such residence in the City. In
February, 1948, Jose Cosgayon y Ledesma, another heir, filed in said case No.
1362 a petition alleging that the administratrix Estrella is a permanent
resident of Manila; that the properties included in the testate estate are
abandoned; that the produce, rentals, and income of the estate are in the hands
of the tenants, and the supposed lessees of the properties; that unless a
co-administrator is appointed, the estate and all its assets including its
Income are liable to be lost to the detriment of the heirs and other interested
parties, and asking that he be appointed co-administrator to protect his rights
and those of the other heirs, specially his brothers and sisters; and that an
order be issued requiring petitioner Estrella to render an accounting of her
administration.

Acting upon this petition Judge Francisco Arellano, presiding
over the first branch of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
issued an order dated February 16, 1948, denying the petition for appointment of
a co-administrator on the ground that as long as the administration of the
properties of a deceased person is in the hands of an administrator duly
qualified and acting as such, it is improper to appoint another administrator.
The order however, states that since it is alleged that the administratrix
Estrella Ledesma had not filed any inventory or annual report of her
administration since she was appointed 25 years ago, and since she resides
permanently in Manila and that all these were prejudicial to the heirs, he cited
Estrella Ledesma to appear before the court on March 6, 1948, at 8:30 a.m., and
show cause, if any, why she should not be punished for contempt of court in view
of the alleged abandonment of her administration and in not having made the
corresponding inventory of the properties under her administration, including
her annual reports.

On March 4, 1948, Estrella sent the following telegram from
Manila to the Court of Negros Occidental:

“RE ORDER NO. 1362 ORDER JUST RECEIVED PLEASE POSTPONE HEARING
FOR 30 DAYS INDISPOSED WILL FILE WRITTEN REPLY.”

On the basis of this telegram Judge Francisco Arellano of said
Court granted the same and he set the hearing of the incident (la vista de este
incidente) for April 3, 1948, at 8:30 a.m., warning the administratrix that she
must appear personally on that date. On April 1, 1948, Estrella again sent the
following telegram to the same court:

“PLEASE GIVE ANOTHER EXTENSION STILL INDISPOSED AND FINANCIALLY
DISABLED.”

Acting upon this telegram, Judge Eduardo D. Enriquez, the
respondent herein, presiding over the third branch of said Court, issued an
order dated April 3, 1948 which reads as follows:

“No encontrado justificada la peticion de la administradora
formulada mediante telegrama de fecha 1. de Abril de 1948, pidiendo extension de
plazo para su comparecencia;

“Por el presente, se ordena su arresto.”

The corresponding warrant of arrest was issued and was served
on the petitioner Estrella in Manila on April 20, 1948. On April 22, 1948, the
petltiqner-administratrix through her counsel filed in this Court the present
petition for prohibition alleging that the warrant of arrest issued against her
was illegal and unjust and constituted a grave abuse of discretion and that as a
result thereof, she was arrested and confined for an indefinite period of time;
that her confinement was causing her great prejudice, annoyance and degradation,
and that the had no other adequate remedy nor could she appeal from the order
ordering her arrest. She now asks this Court to set aside the said warrant of
arrest; that pending consideration of her petition “an order be issued to the
respondent Judge to refrain him from further execution of said order of arrest
and that herein petitioner be released from confinement.”

On April 24, 1948, petitioner’s counsel filed a petition to
permit the herein petitioner to file a bond in an amount to be fixed by this
Court in order that herein petitioner “will have more facilities to comply with
all what the Hon. Court is requiring her to submit,” and within a period of 30
days, the herein petitioner is willing to appear before the said Court and
submit her account.

On April 30, 1948, this Court by resolution gave due course to
the petition for prohibition and required the respondent to answer the same
within 5 days from receipt of a copy of the resolution, at the same time
ordering the provisional release of the petitioner upon her filing a bond in the
sum of P200. Petitioner’s counsel as well as the respondent were notified by
telegram on the same date of that part of the resolution regarding the
provisional release of the petitioner. On May 3, 1948, the petitioner filed the
corresponding bail bond and she was forthwith released.

On May 22, 1948, the answer of the respondent was received. In
said answer Judge Eduardo D. Enriquez claims among other things, that the
petitioner never complied with her promise to file a reply, contained in her
telegram of March 4, 1948; that her petition for another extension contained in
her second telegram of April 1, 1948, was not supported either by an oath or a
medical certificate; that he (respondent) regarded the alleged indisposition of
the petitioner stated in her two telegrams as ground for the postponement of her
appearance as a mere subterfuge to frustrate the orders of the court and to
place obstacles in the orderly administration of justice, seeking thereby to
convert said orders into mere scraps of paper to the detriment of thes dignity
of the courts of justice, and that the issuance by the respondent of the order
of arrest was done in a regular manner and in the ordinary exercise of the
inherent powers of courts of justice to enforce their.orders and legal
processes.

After a careful consideration of this case, we are satisfied
that the respondent was warranted in issuing his order of April 3, 1948,
ordering the arrest of the petitioner herein. Said order was issued not to
harrass the petitioner but merely to enforce the order of the court requiring
her appearance in court to show cause why she should not be punished for
contempt of court for her failure to comply with her duties as administratrix in
the testate proceedings. Said court was perfectly justified in issuing that
order for her appearance if as made to appear before us, since her appointment
as administratrix about 25 years ago, to the prejudice of the heirs and to the
detriment of the properties under administration, she had really abandoned her
administration, had come to live permanently in Manila and had not filed any
annual report, not even an inventory of the properties she was supposed to be
administering. And, this requirement for hereto appear and render an accounting
of her administration was not done by the court on its own initiative although
it could have done so but upon a petition of one of the heirs said to be
prejudiced by petitioner’s abandonment of her administration.

No one may be compelled to act as administrator in any
proceedings. The petitioner herein was under no obligation to be administratrix
in said proceedings No. 1362, If she found her permanent residence in Manila
incompatible with her duties to administer properties situated in Negros
Occidental, she was perfectly justified in refusing the administration. But as
long as she accepted the appointment of administratrix, qualified as such, and
led the court and the heirs to believe that she would perform her duties as such
and protect and serve the interests of said heirs and other interested parties,
she was bound to comply with her duties. If later on she found it difficult or
impossible to continue with her administration, at least she should have filed an
inventory of the properties she had administered and render an accounting of her
administration, particularly of the produce, fruits and income of the properties
under administration, and then ask the court that she be relieved of her duties.
This, she apparently had not done. For this reason as already stated, the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental was justified in requiring her to
appear.

Her first request for postponement which was not supported by
medical certificate was granted; but when another request by telegram equally
unsupported either by oath or medical certificate was sent by her, specially
since the promise to reply contained in her first telegram had not been complied
with, the respondent herein who presided the court before which she was required
to appear believing that the petitioner was purposely and want only disobeying
orders of the court had the right to issue the warrant of arrest in order to
enforce compliance with its order. Without this remedy, courts would be helpless
to enforce their orders and judicial processes. When a person or party is
legally and validly required by a court to appear before it for a certain
purpose, when that requirement is disobeyed, the only remedy left for the court
is to use force to bring such person or party before it. It may be that this
power may be abused. In the present case however, we are satisfied that there
was no abuse of discretion committed by the respondent. If the Supreme Court
allowed the provisional release of the party, as it did, it was not because it
considered the warrant of arrest as having been issued illegally and without
cause, but it was merely to relieve the petitioner of the discomfort and
embarrassment incident to confinement in jail and to accord her better
facilities to pursue the remedy she sought, while we studied and passed upon the
merits of her petition.

In view of the foregoing, the present petition is hereby
denied, without any pronouncement as to costs. The petitioner is ordered within
ten days after notification of this decision, to appear, before the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental as she was originally required to do to be
dealt with by that court. Should she fail to do so, that court is authorized to
confiscate the bail bond filed by her under authority of this Court, and take
such other measures it may deem just and proper.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla,
Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.