THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. DIOSDADO DE ATRAS ALIAS “DADING”, PAT. ARROSTRE CALLANGA ALIAS “OESTE”, PAT. MACARIO GOROSPE ALIAS “MAC”, PAT. FAUS­TINO VALEROSO …

Original petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction filed by the People of the Philippines
against the Honorable Jorge R. Coquia, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro (Mamburao) and the other
respondents Diosdado de Atras,
Arrostre Callanga, Macario Go­rospe, Faustino Valeroso, Jose Encarnacion,
Rodolfo Bernar­do, and three others of unknown
identity, praying that, after proper proceedings, the respondent judge be
ordered to dis­charge Rodolfo Bernardo, one of several defendants in Cri­minal
Case No. R-837, for murder, of the abovenamed court,
so that he may testify therein as a state witness.

It appears that on June
1, 1966 an information for murder was
filed in the abovementioned court against Atras, Callanga, Gorospe, Valeroso, Encarnacion and Rodolfo
Ber­nardo (Criminal Case No. 837).  On
June 14 of the same year, the State opposed the motion for bail filed by the
defendants and presented in support of its opposition the testimony of several
witnesses, amongst them Judge Leandro Reyes of the
Municipal Court of San Jose, Occiden­tal Mindoro, Dr.
Ricardo Pascasio, Luciano Omus, Antonio Collantes and
Salvador Tambagahan. 
It was understood in this connection that such evidence was to be
considered as already presented for the purpose of the trial on the merits.

On September 12, 1966
the prosecution filed a motion for the discharge of defendant Rodolfo Bernardo
so that he may be used as a state witness, alleging as reason therefor that his testimony was absolutely necessary to
prove con­spiracy and that said defendant had expressed his willing­ness to
be a state witness if so discharged.

On November 14, 1966,
before the resumption of the trial on the merits, the respondent judge issued
an order holding “in abeyance its ruling (upon the motion to dis­charge
Bernardo) until it is satisfied with the conditions set forth by the law as
seen from the evidence of the prosecution”.  Thereafter and after prosecution witness Sal­vador
Tambagahan had been cross-examined, the prosecution
presented its last witness in the person of Mrs. Guillerma
Ortiz Vda. de Cruz whose
testimony is, as alleged at pp. 3 and 4 of the petition under consideration,
substantially as follows:

“That she was sleeping in her little house inside the Iglesia Ni Cristo compound on December 19, 1966 with her husband
and children.  Their house has only a sala where the family slept together under a big mosquito
net; that at about 1 to 1:30 in the morning of December 20, 1963 she was awakened when a person
woke her husband who was sleeping beside her. 
And then the person who woke her husband fired a gun hitting her husband
who later died in a hospital.  She iden­tified
the triggerman as Diosdado de Atras,
one of the accused in this case, and also identified two persons, namely, Arrostre Callanga and Macario Gorospe, who were
standing beside the trigger-man holding short guns at the time of the shoot­ing.  These two persons are also accused in this
case (p. 4, 5-58, T.S.N. Dec. 16, 1966;”

Before Mrs. Cruz could be examined, petitioner re­quested the
court to make a final ruling on its motion to discharge defendant
Bernardo.  As a result, on December 19, 1966, the respondent
judge issued the resolution complained of denying the motion aforesaid, stating
therein, among other things, the following:

“This morning, counsel for the prosecution requested for a
ruling on the said motion to dis­charge and upon manifesting to the Court that
their last witness to be presented for the pro­secution is Mrs. Guillerma Ortiz Vda. de Cruz, who is still on the witness stand under
cross-examination and the other witness to be present­ed is Rodolfo Bernardo in
case he is discharged from the information this Court hereby resolves the said
motion to discharge.

“After going over the records, this Court finds that the said
motion is without merit under Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.  It has been ruled in this connection that the
discharge of a defendant to be utilized as a witness for the prosecution,
should be availed of only if there is absolute necessity for the testimony of
the accused whose discharge is re­quested or the accused is the only one who
has knowledge of the crime and not when his testi­mony would simply corroborate
or otherwise strengthen the evidence in the hands of the prosecution.  (People vs. Ibanez, 92 Phil
933; People vs. Borja, G. R. No. L-14327,
January 30, 1960) Furthermore, one of the requirements for the discharge of the
defendant under Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is that there is no
other direct evidence of the prosecution for the offense committed except the
testimony of the defendant.  Such is not
the situation in the case at bar.”

x x x                      x
x x                       x x x                            x x x

“The records show that there were three witnesses so far
presented by the prosecution who allegedly saw the shooting incident and
identified the accused.  These witnesses
are Luciano Omus, Salvador Tambagahan and Guiller­ma Vda. de Cruz, the last being the
widow.  Furthermore, the purpose of
utilizing said Rodolfo Bernardo is to prove conspiracy of the accused.

“It is the rule that all the conditions set forth in the
aforesaid rule (Sec. 9, Rule 119) must be complied with.  For the law seeks to regulate the manner of
enforcement of the regulations in the sound discretion of the court.  (U. S. vs. Abanzado, 37 Phil. 658; Guiao vs.
Figueroa, 94 Phil. 1018).  The dis­charge
of an accused that he may turn state witness is expressly left to the
discretion of the court.  The court has
the exclusive responsibility to see that conditions pre­scribed by the rule
exist.  (People vs. Iba­ñez, supra).  The grant of discretion in cases of this kind
under this provision was not a grant of arbitrary discretion to be exercised
with due regard to the correct ad­ministration of justice.  (U. S. vs. Abanza­do,
37 Phil: 658).”

It appearing that at the time the motion
to discharge Bernardo was filed three prosecution witnesses, namely, Luciano Omus, Salvador Tambagahan and Guillerma Vda. de Cruz, had already
testified to the effect, inter alia, that they saw
the shooting incident and had actually identified the defendants, it seems
obvious that there is no absolute necessity for the testimony of Bernardo in
order to prove the commission of the offense by the de­fendants nor even to
prove conspiracy amongst them.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is denied and the petition
under consideration is hereby dismissed, without costs.

Reyes, J.B.L. (Acting C.J.), Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.