VICENTE CARBAJAL AND ARCADIO QUEMADA, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. PONCIANA DIOLOLA, MIGUEL AMOYAN, SILVESTRE AMOYAN AND BENITO ABELLA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First In­stance of Samar in favor of plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 956.

On February 25, 1958, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that
defendants entered a portion of their land situated at San Policarpio,
Samar, made copra out of the coconuts gathered from
the land, and that, claiming to be owners thereof, the defendants refused to
vacate the land in spite of plaintiffs’ demands.  Plaintiffs prayed, among others, that they be
declared the lawful owners of the land; that defendants be
ordered to vacate the pre­mises occupied by them and to pay plaintiffs P50.00
as monthly rental value for the use and occupation of the portion occupied by
the defendants.  Defendants’ answer
denied the material allegations of the complaint, and,
as affirmative defense, alleged that they were the law­ful co-owners of the
land mentioned in the complaint, of which the portion occupied by them was
part.  They prayed, among others, that
the complaint be dismissed and that plain­tiffs be ordered to respect their
ownership of the land.

After plaintiffs had rested their case, defendants filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of plaintiffs’ evidence.  The court denied the motion.  Plaintiffs then moved that defendants be
denied the right to present evidence on the ground that their motion to dismiss
did not contain a reservation of their right to present evidence in event their
motion would be denied.  After the
parties had filed their res­pective memoranda, the court, in an order dated
July 15, 1959, denied plaintiffs’ motion. 
However, before defendants could present their evidence, the court, on
July 28, 1959, revoked its order of July 15, 1959, and granted plaintiffs’
motion not to allow defendants to present evidence.

On July 30, 19591 judgment was rendered by the court on
plaintiffs’ evidence declaring one of the plaintiffs the ab­solute owner of the
land described in the complaint, and or­dering defendants to vacate the portion
of land occupied by them and to pay P30.00 as monthly rental value from July 1,
1951, until said portion was vacated by them, P300.00 as at­torney’s fees, and
the costs.  Defendants appealed to the
Court of Appeals.  Said court, however,
certified the case to this Court on the ground that it involves only questions
of law.

Defendants-appellants contend that the lower court erred in not
allowing them to present their evidence. 
The conten­tion is meritorious.  In Director of Lands vs. Ceniza, etc., et
al., G.R. No. L-18527, June 29, 1963 (cited with approval in the recent
case of Siayngco, et al. vs. Costibolo,
et al., G.R. No. L-22506, February 28, 1969), in
setting aside the or­der of March 23, 1961 disallowing the oppositor
to submit his evidence after his motion to dismiss on the ground of insuffi­ciency
of petitioner’s evidence had been denied, Mr. Justice Paredes,
speaking for the Court, said:

“At the time the present controversy was be­ing ventilated,
the rule governing the subject-mat­ter, which was a clarification of the
doctrines on earlier cases (Arroyo vs. Azur, 76
Phil., 495, Ap­ril 13, 1946; Guido vs. Castelo,
L-1613, May 24, 1948, 81 Phil., 81; Ocum et al. vs. Nuñez, et al., L-8018, Oct. 26, 1955; Montelibano,
et al, vs. Ba­colod Murcia, etc., L-15092, Sept. 29,
1962), was –

‘After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant without waiving his right to offer evidence in the
event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.  However, if the motion is granted and the
order of dismissal is re­versed on appeal, the movant
loses his right to present evidence in his behalf.’

This rule is now embodied in the Revised
Rules of Court, section 1, Rule 35, captioned Judgment and Demurrer to
Evidence, which will take effect on January 1, 1964.  It is, therefore, evident that the respondent
court, in the case at bar, after denying the motion to dismiss, for
insufficiency of evidence, (demurrer to the evidence), should have permitted
the petitioner-defendant to pre­sent his own evidence, notwithstanding its
failure or omission to make a reservation to that effect; more so, as in this
particular case, when the petitioner-defendant had asked to be given a day in
court, in order to defend the government’s title to a 78 hectare parcel of
land.”

Rule 35, Revised Rules of Court, provides:

“Section 1.  Effect of judgment on
demurrer to evidence.  – After
the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant
with­out waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not
granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to re­lief. 
However, if the motion is granted and the order of dismissal is reversed
on appeal, the mov­ant loses his right to present
evidence in his be­half.”

Under this rule, what extinguishes
defendant’s right to pre­sent evidence is the waiver or renunciation
thereof.  Re­servation by the defendant
of the right to present evidence is not necessary because the rule itself
reserves such right to the defendant.

In the instant case, the defendant moved to dismiss on the ground
of insufficient evidence but did not waive his right to present evidence in
event his motion would be de­nied.  He
therefore had the right to present his evidence after his motion to dismiss had
been denied, because the rule itself reserved his right to do so.  It was not ne­cessary for him to make the
reservation.

The rationale of Rule 35, Revised Rules of Court, is given in Siayngco, et al. vs. Costibolo,
et al., supra, where this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Teehankee, said:

“2.  The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is
simple and logical.  The defendant is
permitted, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his
motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal (i.e. demur to the plaintiff’s
evidence) on the ground that upon the facts as thus estab­lished and the
applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.  If the trial court de­nies the
dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plain­tiff’s evidence is sufficient for an
award of judg­ment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains
before the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive the defendant’s
evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be
properly placed before it for adjudication as well as before the appel­late
courts, in case of appeal.  Nothing is
lost.  This doctrine is but in line with
the established procedural precepts in the conduct of trials that the trial
court liberally receive all proferred evidence at the
trial to enable it to render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in
the record, thus assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal have all the
material before them ne­cessary to make a correct judgment, and avoiding the
need of remanding the case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded
evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still another appeal, with all the
concommitant delays. 
The rule, however, im­poses the condition by the same token that if his
demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed
on appeal, the mov­ant loses his right to present
evidence in his be­half and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand
on the insufficiency of plaintiff’s case and evidence.  In such event, the appellate court which
reverses the order of dismissal shall pro­ceed to render judgment on the merits
of plain­tiff’s evidence.

“Simply restated, a defendant who presents a demurrer to
plaintiff’s evidence retains the right to present his own evidence, if the
trial court disagrees with him; but if the trial court agrees with
him, and on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and
reverses the dismis­sal order, he has lost the right to present his own
evidence.”

The contrary ruling in De los
Santos vs. Court of Ap­peals, et al., G.R. No. L-18682, June 30, 1965, was based upon
procedural jurisprudence up to 1953, while the ruling in Di­rector of Lands vs.
Ceniza, etc., et al., supra, followed in Siayngco, et al. vs. Costibolo,
et al., supra, and in the in­stant case, was based upon procedural
jurisprudence as clari­fied in later decisions up to 1962.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from
is set aside and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings.  Costs
against the plaintiffs-appellees.

Reyes, J.B.L. (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando, and Teehankee,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.

Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are
on official leave.