REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE JESUS S. RODRIGUEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, 11TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH VI,…

Petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo to approve the record on appeal filed by the petitioner in
Civil Case No. 6738 of the said court and to transmit the same to this Supreme
Court.

The case originated in a petition filed on 12 March 1965 in the
Court of First Instance aforesaid by the Republic of the Philippines against
Rosario T. Jalandoni (represented by her administratrix, Luz Jalandoni Vda. de Serra) to restrain her
from taking possession of Lots 3748 and 3860 of the Iloilo Cadastre and covered
by Original Certificates of Title Nos. 15139 and 15188, which lots are, and
have been since 1919, occu­pied by the Iloilo Normal School under the Bureau of
Public Schools, De­partment of Education; to constitute a board of appraisers
to determine and fix the fair and reasonable value of said cadastral lots; to
authorize payment of, and direct defendant to accept, the value of the lots as
deter­mined at the time the Government took possession thereof, with interest;
and to order the cancellation of the Original Certificates of Title and the
issuance of Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of the petitioner
(Petition, Annex “A”).

On 16 March 1965, the court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain defendant “from enforcing the writ of possession
awarded to her in G. R. No. 19920-R,^[1]
pending the termination of this litigation and/or unless a contrary order is
issued by this court”.

Subsequently, upon defendant’s motion, and despite petitioner’s
objection, the court below, by order of 31
August 1965, dismissed the petition for failure to state a cause of
action and dissolved the preliminary injunction (Annex “F”).

Its petition for reconsideration having been denied, the Republic
filed notice of appeal to this Court and a record on appeal only, being exempt
from the requirement of an appeal bond. 
But the Court, upon ob­jection of the defendant, denied approval of the
notice and record on appeal (Annex “R”) on the ground that –

“. . .  the purpose for which
the petition has been instituted became moot and academic in view of the fact
that the property sought to be expropriated or retained has already been
purchased by the plaintiff in a negotiated contract of sale duly approved by
this Court in Special Proceedings No. 1634, entitled In The Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Rosario T. Jalandoni,
Luz Jalandoni Vda. de Serra, peti­tioner, the duly appointed administratrix.

“The objective then for which the petition was filed has been
already obtained and the appeal as an incident of the petition must perforce be
dis­missed.”

Wherefore, the petitioner-appellant resorted to this Supreme
Court in quest of a writ of mandamus, as described in the first part of this
decision.

We are not called here to pass upon the merits of the petition
filed in the court below.  The issue now
is whether the court below has neglected to perform an act specifically
enjoined by law, and unlawfully excluded the petitioner from the right to
prosecute an appeal duly per­fected in Civil Case No. 6738.

We are of the opinion that the writ of mandamus should issue.

For in refusing to allow the appeal to proceed on the ground that
the case has become moot and academic, notwithstanding that on 18 February 1966
it was informed by counsel for petitioner that implementation of the sale of
the lots to the Government had been suspended, and the legality of the sale was
being inquired into, the court below, in fact, proceeded to determine the
merits of the petitioner’s appeal, trenching upon the jurisdiction of the
appellate courts.

Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court
clearly establish that, unless the appeal is abandoned, the only ground for
dismissing an appeal in the trial court is the failure of the appellant to file
on time the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or record on appeal.

“SEC. 13.  Effect of
failure to file notice, bond, or record on appeal.  – Where the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record
on appeal is not filed within the period of time herein provided, the appeal
shall be dismissed.”

“SEC. 14.  Motion to
dismiss appeal.  – A motion to
dismiss an appeal on any of the grounds mentioned in the preceding section, may
be filed in the Court of First Instance prior to the trans­mittal of the record
to the appellate court.”

There is only one instance under the Rules of Court wherein a
trial court may refuse to allow an appeal to proceed, notwithstanding
compliance by the appellant with the procedural requirements of Rule 41, and
that is in the case of paupers’ appeals (Rule 41, section 16).

“SEC. 16.  Appeal by
pauper.  – Where a party desiring to
appeal shall establish to the satisfaction of the trial court that he is a
pauper and unable to pay the expenses of prosecuting the appeal, and that the
case is of such impor­tance, by reason of the amount involved, or the nature of
the questions raised, that it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court, the
trial judge may enter an order entitling the party to appeal as pauper.  The clerk shall transmit to the appellate
court the entire record of the case, including the evidence taken on trial and
the record on appeal, and the case shall be heard in the appellate court upon
the original record so transmitted without printing the same.

“A petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be
entertained by the appellate court.”

Even in this case, the power is only given by implication, and it
is unnecessary to stress the need of proceeding with caution so that a party
may not be deprived of its right to appeal except for weighty reasons.

It is true that, under section 9 of Revised Rule 41, “the
appeal is deemed perfected upon the approval of the record on appeal and
of the bond other than a cash bond”, but the provision is not meant to
confer upon the trial court unbounded discretion to disapprove records on
appeal for reasons other than the non-compliance by the appellant with the re­quirements
of Rule 41.^[2]
Otherwise, the way would be opened for courts of first instance to forestall
review or reversal of their decisions by higher courts, no matter how erroneous
or improper such decisions should be.

Moreover, since the Government has refused implementation of the
private sale of the cadastral lots in question, because it is of the opinion
that it is of doubtful legality, to say the least, and because the validity
thereof has actually been put in issue in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, in Case No. 66225 of said court entitled Luz Jalandoni
vs. Hon. Rafael Salas, et al. (Annexes “1” and “2” of the
petitioner’s memorandum in this Court, Record, page 131 et. seq.), the
pronouncement that the expropriation proceedings have become moot and academic
is at present premature.  The validity or
invalidity of the deed of sale was not for the respondent court to resolve.

The governing rule is found in our decision in Dosalla vs. Caluag, L-18765, 31 July 1963, 8 SCRA, 644, 647, where
we said:

“We find merit in the petition.  To begin with, the grounds on which the
appeal was dismissed are not among those for which an appeal may be dismissed
as enumerated in Rule 52, of the Rules of Court.  These grounds, even if they exist, can
only be entertained by an appellate court, not by the court a quo, for, as
already stated, an appeal is perfected if the steps prescribed in Section 3,
Rule 41 had been taken, and once taken it becomes the duty of the court a
quo to give due course to the appeal. 
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – “(Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the writ of mandamus is granted, and the
respondent court is ordered to approve and transmit to this Court the
petitioner’s record on appeal in Civil Case No. 6738 of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo.  Costs against the
private respondent.

Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., both
on official leave, did not take part.

^[1]
Of the Court of Appeals.

^[2] A
trial court may not dismiss an appeal as frivolous, such step de­volving upon
the appellate courts:  Republic vs.
Gomez, 31 May 1962, 5 SCRA
368; Icasiano vs. Icasiano,
27 October 1961, 3 SCRA
302.