G.R. Nos. L-20662 & L-20663. March 19, 1968
PHILIPPINE MARINE OFFICERS’ GUILD, PETITIONER, VS. COMPAÑIA MARITIMA, PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., MADRIGAL SHIPPING CO., CIR ASSOCIATE JUDGES ARSENIO MARTINEZ, BALTAZAR VIL…
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision dated December 23,
1961 and the resolution en banc dated May 18, 1962 of the Court
of Industrial Relations in Cases Nos. 6-IPA and 617-ULP.
The respondents Compañia Maritima Philippine Steamship Navigation Company and
Madrigal Shipping Company [hereinafter referred to as MARITIMA, PHILSTEAM, and
MADRIGAL, respectively, and as COMPANIES jointly] are domestic corporations
engaged in the operation of motor ships and vessels in the different ports of
the Philippines, while the petitioner, Philippine Marine Officers Guild
thereinafter referred to as PMOG), is a labor organization composed of marine
officers and engineers.
On different dates in June 1954 PMOG sent separate letters to
several shipping firms, including MARITIMA, PHILSTEAM, and MADRIGAL,
each letter containing a set of demands, informing the addressees that
PMOG represented the deck officers and engineers respectively employed by them,
and requesting a conference concerning said demands. A dispute thereafter arose between PMOG and
each of the COMPANIES, and on July 17,
1954 PMOG filed with the Conciliation Service of the Department of
Labor notices of its intention to strike against MARITIMA and PHILSTEAM, alleging
refusal to bargain and other unspecified unfair labor practices. The Conciliation Service called a conference
of the parties, but no agreement was reached by them. Another conference was set for August 17, 1954, at which MADRIGAL
was also requested to be present in view of the fact that PMOG had also filed a
strike notice against it.
On August 16, 1954,
a day before the date set for the second conference MARITIM concluded with
another labor union, the Marine Officers Association of the Philippines (MOAP)
a collective bargaining agreement covering the Maritima
officers and engineers. The second
conference was held as scheduled, but the parties were unable to come to any
settlement of their disputes. On August 24, 1954 PHILSTEAM likewise
entered into an agreement with another labor union, the Cebu
Seamen’s Association, Inc. (CSA). PMOG
thereupon declared a strike against the three COMPANIES and pickets were placed
at Piers 4 and 8, North Harbor,
Manila, where PHILSTEAM and
MARITIMA vessels regularly docked, respectively, as well as in front of the Madrigal
Building on the Escolta. The picketing at Pier 4 did not last long,
but that at Pier 8 and on the Escolta was carried on
for weeks and months. On January 14,
1955, while the strike and the picketing in these two places were still in
progress, the President of the Philippines, pursuant to Section 10 of Republic
Act 875, certified the dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations, where it
was docketed as Case No. 6-IPA. On January 18, 1955 the CIR issued a
resolution ordering the “strikers to return to work immediately upon
receipt of this order, and the respondent companies to readmit thee. The following day, PMOG filed a manifestation
expressing its willingness to abide by said resolution and requesting that
“three bailiffs accompany the three groups of members to their respective
companies and that the groups of the petitioner x x
in the provinces x x be given ten (10) days from date to report to duty
to their respective commies.”
However, by virtue of the injunction issued by this Court[1]
the return-to-work order was not enforced.
Subsequently, the following formal
complaints involving unfair labor practices were docketed with the CIR, to
wit:
(1) Case No. 617-ULP filed on February 25, 1955 by PMOG against
MARITIMA and MOAP;
(2) Case No. 618-ULP filed on February 25, 1955 by PMOG against
PHILSTRAM and CSA;
(3) Case No. 646-ULP filed on March 29, 1955 by PMOG against
MADRIGAL;
(4) Case No. 672-ULP filed on April 30, 1955 by MOAP against PMOG;
(5) Case No. 1002-ULP filed on July 6, 1956 by PHILSTEAM against
PMOG.
All the aforementioned cases were heard separately, but because
the issue in Case No. 6-IPA, which is whether or not the PMOG strike was legal,
was intertwined with the questions raised in the unfair labor practice cases,
the CIR rendered a single decision, with the following findings:
(1) Case No. 617-ULP
“Considering the respective acts and conducts of Maritima and PMOG from the time the latter first sought to
have a bargaining conference with the former up to the date of the second and
last conference, the Court is convinced, and so holds that Maritime had not
refused to bargain collectively with PMOG.
“One of the charges herein states that Maritime had refused to
reinstate the strikers when they offered to return to work
unconditionally. As will be seen from
our discussion in Case No. 6-IPA of the issue as to whether the company had
discriminatorily denied reinstatement to the strikers after the termination of
the PMOG strike, this charge has neither factual nor legal basis. As regards the other charges herein, the
Court finds, upon the entire record of the case, that none of them has been
substantiated, either, and that Maritime had not engaged in any kind of unfair
labor practices.”
(2) Case No. 618-ULP:
“We find that by initiating and conducting the above
interrogation and investigation to determine whether its employees had
authorized PMOG to act as their bargaining agent, Philsteam
had interfered with, restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization.”
x x x
x
x x x x x
“We find that by their acts and omission, Philsteam
had tried to discourage Feliciano from remaining as member of the PMOG and to
encourage him to affiliate with CSA and had, thereby, restrained, coerced and
interfered with employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.
x x x
x
x x x x x
“We find, and so hold, that this employer had not refused to
bargain collectively with a representative of its employees within the
meaning of Section 4(a) (6) of the Act.
x x x
x
x x x x x
“Upon the entire record of the case, we find that,
notwithstanding the fact that Philsteam had committed
certain unfair labor practices herein-before mentioned, the charge that CSA is a company
union or employer-dominated has not been established by substantial
evidence”.
(3) Case No. 646-ULP:
“And since, as indicated by the evidence, no deck officer or engineer
had volunteered to inform his employer that he was or was not a member of any
labor organization, we are convinced, and so find, that after being requested
to bargain collectively with PMOG, Madrigal, one way or another, and by the use
of the letters for “union members” and “non-union members”,
bad unwittingly interrogated its employees, especially the above PMOG witnesses, to ascertain
whether they were members of PMOG or had authorized it to represent them. In a way, it could be claimed and the Court
so finds that Madrigal interfered with the right of its employees to
self-organization guaranteed by the Act.
x x x
x
x x x x x
“But when, as in this case, the contracts were individually initiated and
executed not through the union and while PMOG is still claiming to be the
bargaining representative of its employees, we find that this act of Madrigal
and/or its agent has left open for doubts, as the Court does, that it had
further interfered with its employees right to self-organization.”
x x x
x
x x x x x
“Upon the record of this case, we find that Madrigal had not
refused to bargain collectively with PMOG in contemplation of law.
(4) Case No. 672-ULP:
“Upon the entire record of this case, the Court finds that the
charge against PMOG has not been proved by substantial evidence.”
(5) Case No. 1002-ULP:
“Upon the entire record of this case the Court finds that the
charge against PAM has not been proved by substantial evidence.”
(6) Case No. 6-IPA:
Strike
against Madrigal:
“It appearing that the Madrigal deck officers and engineers
who struck on August 24, 1954, had justifiable reason for their action, and
considering that there is no evidence of record showing that Madrigal’s
interests has been injured or prejudiced by any of the unlawful acts imputed to
PMOG men, the Court is of the opinion and concludes that the strike on the
whole against this employer was proper and legal.”
Strike
Against Philsteam:
“Upon the entire record of the case, the Court finds and so
holds, that the strike against Philsteam was not only
justified but properly and lawfully carried out.”
Strike
Against Maritima:
“It having been declared against Maritime for no cause or
purpose and unlawful means having been resorted to by some strikers and
picketers in the course of the prosecution thereof at Pier 8 for which the
striking labor organization has been found responsible, and considering further
that Maritime can not be held liable for the death of the late Modesto
Rodriguez, the Court finds, and so holds, that the PMOG strike against this
employer was illegal from its inception.”
In view thereof, the CIR in the dispositive
portion of the decision ordered:
“1. Madrigal Shipping Company, its agents,
successors and assigns, to cease and desist from investigating their employees
to ascertain whether they are members of the Philippine Marine Officers Guild
or any other labor organization or have authorized it or any other labor
organization to represent them for the purpose of collective bargaining and, in
any manner, interfering with restraining, or coercing such employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 3 of the Act; and offer all of
their striking employees immediate and full reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions, without back salaries and without prejudice
to their seniority or other rights and privileges unless they have found
substantially equivalent employment elsewhere during the pendency
of this case;
“2. Philippine Steamship Navigation Company, its
agent successors and assigns, to cease and desist from interrogating and
investigating their employees to determine whether they have authorized
Philippine Marine Officers Guild or any other labor organization to represent
them for the purpose of collective bargaining, discouraging or trying to discourage
any of such employees from remaining as a member of Philippine Marine Officers
Guild or any other labor organization, and encouraging or trying to encourage
any of such employees to join Cebu Seamen’s
Association or any other labor organization, and in any manner, interfering
with, restraining, or coercing their employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization and other rights guaranteed in Section 3 of this Act; and
offer all of their striking employees immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, without back salaries rights and
privileges, unless they have found substantially equivalent employment
elsewhere during the pendency of this case;
“3. Compañia Maritima, its agents, successors and assigns, to reinstate
immediately upon their application, all of their striking employees, except
those with pending and/or decided criminal cases connected with or related to
the strike or picket whether the decision is stayed or on appeal, to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, without back salaries, unless
they have found substantial equivalent employment elsewhere during the pendency of this case.
To facilitate the return and avoid confusion in the Companies, the
strikers concerned are given sixty (60) days to present themselves for
work.”
All the parties except intervenor Cebu Seamen’s Association
moved to reconsider the decision of the trial court. The resolution penned by Judge Arsenio Martinez on May 18, 1962, ruled thus:
“All motions denied.”
But insofar as the case of MARITIMA was concerned three Judges
(Villanueva, Tabigne and Bugayong)
filed separate opinions, each concurring in the findings of fact made in the
decision but dissenting from the dispositive portion
thereof which ordered reinstatement of the strikers. Thereafter PMOG filed the instant petition
for review by certiorari.
In this connection, it is
to be noted that PHILSTEAM also appealed from the decision and resolution en
banc in Case No. 6-IPA, as well as in Case No. 618-ULP and Case No.
1002-ULP, but this Court affirmed the decision and resolution appealed from
without, however, passing upon the question of 2 back wages inasmuch as the
same was not at issue in the appeal.[2]
PMOG advances the
following propositions in its petition, stating that the first two (2) apply to
all the COMPANIES and the last three (3) to MARITIMA only, to wit:
1. Terms and Conditions of Work
In cases certified by the President of the Philippines
as labor disputes in industries indispensable to the national interest, it is
the duty of the Court of Industrial Relations to fix the terms and conditions
of work through compulsory arbitration and not leave the same to the parties
through free collective bargaining.
2. Back Wages
It is a dangerous
precedent to disallow back wages to workers who were refused reinstatement
when they unconditionally offered to return to work after they had abandoned their
legal strike.
3. Unfair Labor Practices
a. An employer
asking a union, which desires to bargain collectively, to prove its majority
when said employer would not and could not bargain is an unfair labor practice.
b. The killing of the head of the picketers by the Chief of the
company’s security guard is the worst form of interference.
c. Refusal to reinstate and employ the employees
who have abandoned their strike and who have offered to return to work
unconditionally is an unfair labor practice.
4. Legality of Means in a strike
In this jurisdiction, should the Supreme Court adopt the viewpoint
that labor violence is a special category
of unlawfulness, to be suffered (except in extreme cases), and to be
overlooked in favor of efforts
at settling the underlying controversy giving rise to violence?
5. Reinstatement of Strikers
Illegality of a strike does not ipso facto deprive a
striker of reinstatement if he is not personally guilty of any legal act.
As regards the first issue, the petitioner, in its brief
maintains in effect that the CIR tried to solve the labor dispute by mediation during the preliminary
conferences, and that when it failed to find a solution to the dispute the said
Court decided to proceed with it as a compulsory arbitration case. The following statement of the Court is
cited:
“THE COURT:
All right, there being no possibility
of settling the case amicably, let us go to the merits of the case.
Now, according to the pleading the question of the legality or
illegality of the strike should be given preference. The Court is of the opinion that the said
question of the legality or illegality of the strike should be heard
first.” (p. 7, t.s.n., hearing of March 28, 1955, before Judge Modesto
Castillo).
The petitioner contends that it was error for the CIR not to fix
the terms and conditions of employment after having found no solution to the
dispute, citing Section 10 of Republic Act 875, which reads:
“SEC. 10. Labor Disputes in Industries Indispensable to the
National Interest.- When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines
there exists a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the national
interest and when such labor dispute is certified by the President to the Court
of Industrial Relations, said Court nay cause to be issued a restraining order
forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout the employees,
pending an investigation by the Court, and if no other solution to the dispute
is found, the Court may issue an
order fixing the terms and conditions of employment.”
The contention of the petitioner that the CIR failed to find a
solution to the dispute is not true. The
fact is that after ascertaining
that the question of majority representation had been the cause of
misunderstanding between PMOG and the COMPANIES and after correctly analyzing
the absurdity of the whole set-up if it should fix the terms and conditions of
employment before resolving the question of majority representation, the CIR
enjoined the parties to consider holding a certification election. The proposed solution thus found by the CIR
cannot be questioned.
“When a case is certified to the CIR by the President of the Philippines
pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act 875, the CIR is granted authority to find a solution to the industrial
dispute; and the solution which the CIR has found under the authority of
presidential certification and conformable thereto cannot be
questioned.” (Radio Operators’
Association of the Philippines
vs. Philippine Marine Radio Officers Association,
et al. G.R. No. L-10112, Nov.
29, 1957, 54 0.G. 3218; Feati University
vs. Bautista, G.R. Nos. L-21278, 21462, 21500, Dec. 27, 1966).
Regarding the second issue, the petitioner contends that it was
an abuse of discretion to disallow back wages to workers who abandoned their
legal strike but were refused reinstatement in spite of their unconditional
offer to return to work. This contention
has for its premises: (1) that the strike was legal; (2) that there was an
unconditional offer to return to work, and (3) that the strikers were refused reinstatement.
Indeed, if all these circumstances concurred, the strikers would
be entitled to backwages.
“Now, it is clear from the statement of the rule that those
who strike voluntarily – even if in protest of unfair labor practice – are entitled
to backpay only
“When the strikers abandon the strike and apply for
reinstatement despite the unfair labor practice and the employer either refuses
to reinstate them or imposes upon their reinstatement new conditions that
constitute unfair labor practices.”
(Cromwell Commercial Employees &
Laborers Union (PTUC), vs. Court of Industrial Relations and Crowell Commercial
Co., Inc., G. R. No. L-19778, Feb. 26,
1965).
However, the CIR found that “the companies are not to blame
for their failure to rehire the strikers after the issuance of the Court’s back-to-work
order.” Said the Court:”
“ x x x it will be recalled that the disputes in the case at bar
reached the Court through presidential certification on January 14, 1955. The record shows that three days later, or on January 17, 1955, to be exact, the
strikers met and after some discussion among themselves unanimously agreed and
resolved to terminate the strike “within two weeks whether or not an order
to return is issued by the Court.”
On the following day, the Court “without prejudice to the hearing
and disposition in the usual manner of the demands and of whatever issues that
might arise,” issued a
resolution, ordering the “strikers to return to work immediately upon
receipt of this order, and the respondent companies to readmit them”. On January 19, 1955, PMOG filed a
manifestation, expressing its willingness “to abide by said
resolution” and requesting that “three bailiffs accompany the three
groups of members to their respective companies” and that the members of
the petitioner x x x in the
provinces x x be given ten (10) days from date to
report to duty to their respective companies.” On the same day, the Court issued a
supplementary resolution granting PMOG’s requests and
directing the bailiffs “to be at the premises of the respondents until the
strikers shall have reported not later than January 28, 1955, at four
o’clock in the afternoon.”
In the presence of the bailiffs, all the available strikers reported
back to the Companies and the latter directed them to proceed to their
respective vessels. In some instances,
the replacements who were hired during the strike refused to relinquish their
posts in favor of the returning strikers.
In others, the ship masters did not accept the strikers because the
strikers had no embarkation orders.
Because of these difficulties PMOG twice moved for enforcement of the
resolutions through the assistance of law-enforcing agencies and other
government authorities, including customs officials and the Philippine
Constabulary. Those motions were granted
by the Court in two orders issued on February 16 and 19, 1955. On February 23, 1955 Maritima
and Philsteam filed a joint manifestation, advising
the Court that although the strikers who reported back to work had been
readmitted and were already ‘on board the vessels for the last few days x x same cannot depart because the old officers and
engineers, who remained in their posts when the strike was declared would not
sail with the strikers so that the said vessels are now tied up,’ and praying
that ‘if there is anything more that they can possibly and legally do in
compliance with the said order, x x they be duly
advised for their guidance’. On February 24, 1955, CSA and MOAP, in
separate petition filed with the Supreme Court, sought an injunction to
restrain the enforcement of the above back-to-work resolution and supplementary
resolutions and order. On the same day,
the high tribunal issued a writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. On March
25, 1955, the Supreme Court, after hearing all the parties
concerned, including the Companies and PMOG, declared this injunction permanent
x x x .”
Accordingly, the CIR concluded that “none of the companies
had discriminatorily rejected their application for reemployment”. Such findings being upon a question of fact,
the same cannot be reversed herein because they are supported by substantial
evidence. On this score alone, the claim for back wages has to be denied;
hence, the ClR did not commit any abuse of
discretion in this regard.
With the resolution of the first two issues raised by petitioner
MADRIGAL’S motion to dismiss the appeal need no longer be considered.
The third issue raised by the petitioner pertains to three (3) alleged
unfair labor practices committed by MARITIMA, which will be discussed hereunder
in the order they are listed in the petition.
a. An employer asking a union, which desires to bargain
collectively, to prove its majority when said employer would not and could not
bargain is an unfair labor practice.
Petitioner maintains that it was an unfair labor practice for
MARITIMA, after having concluded an agreement with MAP on August 16, 1954, just one day before the
scheduled second conciliation conference, to ask PMOG to prove its majority
representation notwithstanding the fact that MARITIMA could no longer validly
enter into a collective bargaining contract with it.
The contention of petitioner has no factual basis. The testimony of Atty. Dinglasan,
which is quoted by petitioner in its brief, does not show that MARITIMA asked
PMOG to prove its majority representation during the conference on August17,
1954. The testimony is as follows:
“THE COURT
continuing
Q. You
were present in that conference had on August 17?
THE WITNESS
I think, I was.
THE COURT
Do you know the subject matter taken up
in that last conference?
THE WITNESS
We have the transcript of stenographic
notes of that conference.
THE COURT
Were the demands of the Philippine Marine
Officers’ Guild ever taken up in that conference?
THE WITNESS
I think we did not take up the discussion
of the demands because we were threshing out the legal points of majority
representation.
THE COURT
So, in that last conference of August 17,
the principal subject-matter taken up was the majority representation, was it?
THE WITNESS
I think the August 17 conference was a
continuation of the July 30th conference”
(pp. 90-91, t.s.n.
Jan. 10, 1956, Dinglasan testifying.)
Indeed there is no finding in the decision that MARITIMA asked
PMOG to prove its majority representation during that conference. The decision merely states the following:
“But the best evidence of PMOG’s
true position is to be found in what Tan stated in the second conference. When asked by the conciliator whether the
PMOG was willing to submit to a certification election, Tan answered: “No comment”. It should be added that Tan also manifested
that PMOG would institute a
certification case with this Court. But
the record shows that no such case was ever filed by this union.” (pp.
86-87 of the Decision of the Trial Court)
In view thereof the contention of petitioner on this point cannot
be sustained.
b. The killing of the head of the picketers by the
chief of the company’s security guard is the worst form of interference.
Again, the allegation of the petitioner is devoid of factual and
legal basis. The reference is to the
fatal stabbing of Modesto Rodriguez, a MARITIMA employee-striker, allegedly by
Andres Alarcon, MARITIMA
chief security guard. Alarcon was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila and was found guilty of the crime of homicide. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals he
was acquitted. The appellate court
found:
“That the slaying of Modesto Rodriguez was manifestly
committed without the concurrence of the will of Alarcon
as it has not been proved that he participated or agreed with the criminal
design of the actual killer. As has been
heretofore stated, the presence of Alarcon in the
scene of the commotion was for the purpose of performing his duty as security
guard of the Compañia Maritima,
and not to kill or harm
anybody. (People vs. Alarcon,
61 O.G. No. 10, p. 1380.)
Accordingly, it cannot be said that in this particular connection MARITIMA interfered with
the freedom of the strikers to pursue union activities.
Refusal to reinstate and employ the employees who have abandoned
their strike and who have offered to return to work unconditionally is an
unfair labor practice.
This proposition has no factual basis either. As heretofore discussed, the COMPANIES, which
include MARITIMA, were not to blame for their failure to reemploy the strikers
in view of the injunction issued
by this Court, restraining the CIR from enforcing its return-to-work order upon
which the offer to return to work of the strikers was predicated. Furthermore, there is no showing that the
strikers renewed their offer to work after the issuance of said injunction. It cannot be alleged, therefore, that
MARITIMA refused to reinstate and employ the strikers who have abandoned their
strike.
Under the fourth issue, petitioner poses the following question: ?
In this jurisdiction, should the Supreme Court adopt the viewpoint that labor violence is a
special category of unlawfulness, to be suffered (except in extreme cases), and
to be overlooked in favor of efforts at settling the underlying controversy
giving rise to violence?
In raising this question the petitioner would like the Court to
overlook the following acts of
violence in determining the legality or illegality of the strike, to wit:
a. Physical injuries and malicious mischief
committed by Capt. Yenko (pp. 131-132, Decision of Trial Court)
b. Assault by Villaflor,
who was sentenced to suffer 4 months and one day of arresto
mayor (pp. 132-133, Decision of Trial Court)
c. Breaking of truck side and windows by Labrador
and Yenko, who were, as a consequence, charged with coercion before the Municipal
Court. (pp. 133134, Decision of Trial Court)
d. Picketers threw empty bottles at Ramirez, a
truck driver, and inflicted injuries on his right arm. Consequently, Ricardo Antonio was charged
with slight physical injuries before the Municipal Court of Manila. (p. 134, Decision of Trial Court)
e. Free-for-all fight in the pier during which Lizardo, a picketer, drew his pistol and filed shots in the
air (pp.134-135, Decision of Trial Court)
The question has obvious reference to the following citation from
Ludwig Teller of the New York Bar:
“But the viewpoint is gaining more ground, both in legislation
and in law enforcement, that labor violence is a special category in
unlawfulness, to be suffered except in extreme cases, and to be overlooked in
favor of efforts at settling the underlying controversy giving rise to the
violence. The Supreme Court of the
United States has held, for example, that an employer subject to the Railway
Act may not secure an injunction restraining violence where he refuses to
submit the labor controversy to arbitration.
The National Labor Relations Board has often disregarded unlawful
activity committed by employees and labor unions, and has protected their
rights under the Wagner Act despite such unlawful activity. Local police authorities are found to be increasingly reluctant to
intervene in cases of labor unruliness.”
(Teller Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, April 1947, Commulative Supplement, p. 101)
In this jurisdiction, however, acts of violence in carrying on a
strike are not so easily overlooked in the determination of its legality or
illegality. To overlook them
“would encourage abuses and terrorism and would subvert the very purpose
of the law which provides for arbitration and peaceful settlement of
disputes.” (Liberal Labor Union vs.
Phil. Can Co., 91 Phil. 78). This Court
has repeatedly frowned upon the use of unlawful means in carrying out a strike.
“In cases not falling within the prohibition against strikes,
the legality or illegality of a strike depends first upon the purpose for which
it is maintained, and, second,
upon the means employed in carrying it on.
Thus, if the purpose which the laborers intends to accomplish by means of a strike is trivial, unreasonable,
or unjust (as in the case of National Labor Union vs. Philippine Match Co., 70
Phil. 300), or if in carrying on the strike the strikers should commit violence
or cause injuries to persons or damage to property (as in the case of National
Labor Union, Inc., vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 68 Phil. 732),
the strike, although not prohibited by injunction may be declared by the court
illegal with the adverse consequences to the strikers.” (Luzon Marine Dept. Union vs. Roldan, 86 Phil. 507).
“Here we find that the majority opinion predicated the
illegality of the strike not merely on the infringement of said agreement by
the union but on the proven fact that, in carrying out the strike, coercion,
force, intimidation, violation (sic) with physical injuries, sabotage and the use of unnecessary and obscene
language or epithets were committed by top officials and members of the union
in an attempt to prevent arbitration and peaceful settlement of labor
disputes. As aptly said in one case: ‘A
labor philosophy based upon the theory that might is right, in disregard of law
and order, is an unfortunate philosophy of regression whose sole consequences
can be disorder, class hatred and intolerance.’ (Grater City Masters Plumbers
Association vs. Kahme (1939 y N.Y.S. (2nd 589)”
(Liberal Labor Union Vs. Phil. Can Co., supra)
The above view was reiterated by this Court in United Seamen’s
Union of the Philippines vs. Davao Ship-owners
Association (G. R. No. L-18778-79, August 31, 1967).
The CIR, in finding the PMOG responsible for the aforementioned
acts of violence, said:
“As some of the above offenses were perpetrated by the
picketers not only in Yenko’s presence but in direct
cooperation with him and under his leadership PMOG can not seriously pretend
innocence and avoid complicity in or liability for their acts and conduct and
the consequent effects thereof upon Maritima’s
property. True, Section 9(c) of the Act
has discarded the principle of “vicarious liability” under which a
striking labor organization is necessarily held responsible for the acts of
even a single striker. That the law, as
it is now, requires in order to hold an association or organization liable for
the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, ‘proof of actual
participation in, or actual authorization of such acts or of ratifying of such
acts after actual knowledge thereof.’ It is not essential that two or three of
these elements should concur. One
suffices. In the case at bar, the
unlawful acts, as already pointed out, were done in the presence of Yenko as well as with his cooperation and under his direction
and, hence, conclusive of the actual participation and ratification thereof of
PMOG Moreover, there is nothing in the record to show that this union disauthorized or objected to Yenko’s
acts and those of the other picketers despite the fact that such acts had
undoubtedly come to its knowledge or that of its officers and
members.” (pp. 137-138 of the
Decision of Trial Court)
Under the circumstances, the CIR correctly held that the PMOG
strike against MARITIMA was
illegal.
The last proposition raised by the petitioner is that the
illegality of a strike does not ipso facto deprive a striker of the
right to reinstatement if he is not personally
guilty of any illegal act.
It bears repeating here that according to the CIR the strike
against MARITIMA was “for no cause or purpose” and hence was
unjustified, and unlawful means was resorted to by some strikers and picketers
in the prosecution of the strike. On the
first point the court categorically found that MARITIMA “had not refused
to bargain collectively with PMOG” and “had not engaged in any kind
of unfair labor practice.” On the second point the specific acts of
illegality have been mentioned in the earlier part of this decision. In view of such findings three Judges of the
CIR (Villanueva, Tabigne and Bugayong),
as hereinbefore
stated, upon motion for reconsideration voted for the reversal of the decision
penned by Judge Martinez insofar as it ordered MARITIMA to reinstate the
strikers.
Judge Martinez himself in the decision found that PMOG, through
its leaders, not only had knowledge of the acts of violence committed by some
of the strikers but either participated in such commission or ratified the
same. This Court has held in a number of
cases that if a strike is unjustified, as when it is declared for trivial,
unjust or unreasonable purpose, the employer may not be compelled to reinstate
the strikers to their employment. (Almeda et al. vs. CIR et al., 97 Phil. 306, citing National
Labor Union vs. Phil. Match Factory Co., 70 Phil. 300; and Luzon Marine
Department Union vs. Arsenio Roldan,
et al., 47 0.G. Supp. No. 12, p. 136).
This is not of course an inflexible rule, and its application must
depend to a considerable degree upon the circumstances. In United Seamen’s Union
vs. Davao
Shipowners Association G.R. Nos. L-18778 and 18779,
August 31, 1967) we affirmed the decision of the Industrial Court dismissing the
employees who were active participants in a strike which was held to be illegal
and unjustified. In the present case,
where the strike against MARITIMA was not only unjustified but also carried on
illegally we find no justifiable ground to disagree with the majority in the
court below who voted against the reinstatement of the strikers.
With the foregoing modification, the decision of the lower Court
of December 23, 1961 is affirmed. Costs
against petitioner.
Reyes, Acting C.J., Dizon, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., in the result.
[1]
Resolutions of February 24, 1955
and March 25, 1955 in Cebu Seamen’s Association vs. Castillo,
et al., G.R. No. L-8802; Marine Officers Association of the Philippines
vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-8808; Compañia Maritime vs. PMOG, G.R. No. L-8712.
[2]
Philippine Steam Navigation
Co., vs. Phil. Marine Officers Guild and Hon. Court of Industrial
Relations, G.R. No. L-20667, Oct. 29, 1965.