PHILIPPINE MARINE OFFICERS’ GUILD, PETITIONER, VS. COMPAÑIA MARITIMA, PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., MADRIGAL SHIPPING CO., CIR ASSOCIATE JUDGES ARSENIO MARTINEZ, BALTAZAR VIL…

Philippine Marine Officers Guild versus Compañia Maritima

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by the Philippine Marine Officers Guild, a labor organization of deck officers and engineers, against three domestic shipping corporations — Compañia Maritima, the Philippine Steam Navigation Company, and Madrigal Shipping Company — to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial Relations. The dispute began as a bargaining deadlock and ripened into a strike, then into a cluster of unfair labor practice cases and a presidential certification. The case matters because it fixes the boundaries of compulsory arbitration under the Industrial Peace Act: what the Court of Industrial Relations may do when the President certifies a dispute, when strikers are entitled to back wages, and how the legality of a strike is measured company by company.

Procedural History

In June 1954 the Philippine Marine Officers Guild sent separate demand letters to several shipping firms, including the three companies. Disputes arose, strike notices were filed with the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor, and conferences were held without settlement. The Guild struck, and picketing at Pier 8 and along the Escolta continued for weeks and months. On January 14, 1955 the President certified the dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations under Section 10 of Republic Act 875, where it was docketed as Case No. 6-IPA. The Court of Industrial Relations issued a return-to-work resolution, but it was not enforced because of an injunction issued by the Supreme Court.

Several unfair labor practice complaints were then docketed, filed by the Guild against the companies and their rival unions, and by those unions and one company against the Guild. Because the question of the legality of the strike was intertwined with the unfair labor practice charges, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a single decision. All parties except one intervenor union moved for reconsideration, and the resolution en banc denied all motions, with three judges dissenting on the reinstatement of the Maritima strikers. The Guild then filed this petition for review by certiorari. A separate appeal by the Philippine Steam Navigation Company was affirmed by the Supreme Court without passing on the question of back wages, which was not at issue there.

Facts

The Guild represented deck officers and engineers employed by the three companies. After its demand letters and the failed conferences, Compañia Maritima concluded a collective bargaining agreement with another union, the Marine Officers Association of the Philippines, on August 16, 1954 — one day before the second scheduled conference. On August 24, 1954 the Philippine Steam Navigation Company likewise entered into an agreement with the Cebu Seamen's Association. The Guild thereupon declared a strike against all three companies and set up pickets at Piers 4 and 8 of the North Harbor in Manila and in front of the Madrigal Building on the Escolta. The picketing at Pier 4 did not last long, but that at Pier 8 and on the Escolta was carried on for weeks and months.

While the strike and picketing continued, the President certified the dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations. The Court ordered the strikers to return to work immediately and the companies to readmit them. The Guild manifested its willingness to abide by the resolution and asked that bailiffs accompany the returning groups and that members in the provinces be given ten days to report. In the presence of the bailiffs the available strikers reported, but in some instances replacements hired during the strike refused to relinquish their posts, and in others the ship masters did not accept the strikers for lack of embarkation orders. The companies reported that vessels could not depart because the old officers and engineers who had stayed at their posts would not sail with the returning strikers. Rival unions then sought and obtained from the Supreme Court a writ of preliminary injunction, later declared permanent, restraining enforcement of the return-to-work orders.

The Court of Industrial Relations heard the certification case and the unfair labor practice cases, and found that Maritima had not refused to bargain and had committed no unfair labor practice; that the Philippine Steam Navigation Company had interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees by interrogating them on their union authorization and by discouraging one employee from remaining with the Guild, though it had not refused to bargain and the rival union was not shown to be company-dominated; that Madrigal had unwittingly interrogated its employees through letters for union and non-union members and had individually executed contracts while the Guild claimed representation, but had not refused to bargain; and that the charges against the Guild in the two remaining cases were not proved by substantial evidence. On the strike, the Court held the strike against Madrigal proper and legal, the strike against the Philippine Steam Navigation Company justified and lawfully carried out, and the strike against Maritima illegal from its inception, having been declared for no cause and prosecuted with unlawful means at Pier 8, for which the striking organization was held responsible.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations, in a dispute certified by the President as affecting an industry indispensable to the national interest, is duty-bound to fix the terms and conditions of work through compulsory arbitration instead of leaving them to free collective bargaining.
• Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations abused its discretion in disallowing back wages to strikers who abandoned a legal strike and were allegedly refused reinstatement despite an unconditional offer to return to work.
• Whether or not the companies committed the unfair labor practices charged, including demanding proof of majority from a union the employer would not bargain with, the killing of the head of the picketers by the company's security chief, and refusal to reinstate strikers who offered to return unconditionally.
• Whether or not labor violence in the course of a strike is to be treated as a special category of unlawfulness that may be overlooked in favor of settling the underlying controversy.
• Whether or not the illegality of a strike ipso facto deprives a striker of reinstatement when he is not personally guilty of any unlawful act.

Applicable Provisions

Section 10 of Republic Act 875, the Industrial Peace Act, on labor disputes in industries indispensable to the national interest, provides:

Section 10. Labor Disputes in Industries Indispensable to the National Interest. When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines there exists a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the national interest and when such labor dispute is certified by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations, said Court may cause to be issued a restraining order forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout the employees, pending an investigation by the Court, and if no other solution to the dispute is found, the Court may issue an order fixing the terms and conditions of employment.

This is the provision the Guild invokes to compel the fixing of terms and conditions of employment, and its permissive wording — the Court may issue an order — is the textual hinge of the ruling.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Guild's premise was false: the Court of Industrial Relations did find a solution. After ascertaining that the question of majority representation was the cause of the misunderstanding between the Guild and the companies, and after analyzing the absurdity of fixing terms and conditions of employment before resolving who the majority representative was, the Court enjoined the parties to consider holding a certification election. That solution, found under the authority of the presidential certification and conformable to it, cannot be questioned. The text of Section 10 confirms this: the duty to fix terms arises only if no other solution is found, and the Court may then issue the order.

On the second issue, the Court held that back wages would be due only if three premises concurred: that the strike was legal, that there was an unconditional offer to return to work, and that the strikers were refused reinstatement. The Court quoted the rule thus:

When the strikers abandon the strike and apply for reinstatement despite the unfair labor practice and the employer either refuses to reinstate them or imposes upon their reinstatement new conditions that constitute unfair labor practices.

But the Court of Industrial Relations found that the companies were not to blame for the failure to rehire the strikers after the return-to-work order, since the difficulties arose from replacements refusing to relinquish posts, from missing embarkation orders, and ultimately from the injunction that restrained enforcement. That finding is one of fact, supported by substantial evidence, and cannot be reversed; on this score alone the claim for back wages must be denied, and no abuse of discretion was committed.

On the unfair labor practice charges, the Court sustained the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations: Maritima did not refuse to bargain and committed no unfair labor practice; the Philippine Steam Navigation Company did interfere with, restrain, and coerce its employees by interrogating them on their authorization of the Guild and by discouraging an employee from remaining with it, but did not refuse to bargain; Madrigal interfered with the right to self-organization through its letters for union and non-union members and its individual contracts, but did not refuse to bargain; and the charges against the Guild were not proved by substantial evidence. On the remaining questions of labor violence and reinstatement, the Court resolved them through the disposition of the appeal, leaving undisturbed the findings on the legality of each strike.

Doctrine

First, under Section 10 of Republic Act 875, presidential certification does not automatically convert the dispute into compulsory arbitration on the merits. The Court of Industrial Relations is granted authority to find a solution to the industrial dispute, and only if no other solution is found may it fix the terms and conditions of employment. A certification election ordered to resolve majority representation is such a solution and cannot be questioned.

Second, back wages for strikers require the concurrence of three premises: a legal strike, an unconditional offer to return to work, and a refusal to reinstate or the imposition of new conditions constituting unfair labor practices. Where the refusal to rehire is attributable to circumstances for which the employer is not to blame, and the finding is supported by substantial evidence, the claim for back wages fails.

Third, the legality of a strike is determined company by company, on the cause and the means employed. A strike declared for no cause and prosecuted with unlawful means is illegal from its inception as to that employer, and the striking organization may be held responsible for the unlawful acts of its picketers.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the decision and resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial Relations were affirmed.

Remember This

Memorize the rule that presidential certification empowers the Court of Industrial Relations to find a solution, and that fixing terms and conditions of employment is only the fallback when no other solution exists. Examiners use this case to test the scope of compulsory arbitration under Section 10 of Republic Act 875 and the three-premise test for back wages of strikers.