G.R. No. L-26331. March 15, 1968
BALBINO PAMINTUAN AND ILUMINADA STA. ANA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. EMANUEL M. MUÑOZ, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF BULACAN AND OLIMP…
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioners spouses and private respondent Olimpio
Mendoza were plaintiffs and defendant, respectively, in a civil case before the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan for quieting of
title to certain properties consisting of logs, lumber, a sawmill and its
accessories. In the course of the
litigation, the parties entered into an amicable settlement wherein respondent
recognized petitioners’ ownership of the sawmill,
while the latter recognized the former’s right over
all the sawed logs and lumber subject of the action. The amicable settlement also provided, in
par. 4 thereof[1] –
“4. That as a further condition of this agreement,
plaintiffs have agreed, as they hereby agree, to pay to the defendant
the sum of THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, in
consideration of the mutual quit-claim, which amount the herein defendant
assigns to Mr. Demetrio Fajardo,
as represented In this agreement by Mr. Bonifacio Dimalanta, his representatives” (Underscoring
supplied)
Upon its submission, the lower court on October 9, 1964 rendered a decision
approving the amicable settlement and enjoining the parties to comply with the
terms and conditions thereof.
On November 11, 1964;
respondent filed a motion be fore the lower court for a writ of execution to
enforce payment to him of P3,000.00 by petitioners
pursuant to par. 4 of the amicable settlement.
It was alleged by respondent that while the judgment based on said
settlement had already become executory, petitioners
still have not yet paid the said P3,000.00 and that Demetrio
Fajardo had, on this same date, filed a written
waiver of his right to the assignment of said sum.
The court, on November
20, 1964, granted respondent’s Motion and ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution which was issued on the very same day. On November
23, 1964, petitioners filed a motion to reconsider the order of November 20, 1964, and also an
opposition to the waiver of the assignment executed and filed by Fajardo, The lower court denied both motion and opposition.
On December 7, 1964,
the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan levied upon two
(2) lots and a house built thereon owned by petitioners. Notice of levy was filed and registered with
the local Register of Deeds.
Subsequently, the sheriff issued the “Notice of Sale” setting
the sale on January 29, 1965
and on December 28, 1964
served a copy of said notice to petitioners by registered mail. At the sale, the levied properties were
acquired by respondent for P3,269.00. The certificate of sale was then delivered
to respondent’s counsel and registered with the Register of Deeds on February 15, 1965.[2]
On April 21, 1966,
respondent filed an ex-parte motion for an alias
writ of possession to place him in actual possession of the properties in
question. The court granted the motion and the alias writ was issued. On June
14, 1966, petitioners filed an urgent motion to quash said alias
writ of possession. This was denied and petitioners filed an amended motion to
quash.
On July 18, 1966,
the lower court denied petitioner’s amended motion to quash and issued,
instead, a second alias writ of possession as prayed for in respondent’s ex-parte motion of July
11, 1966. Thereupon,
petitioners instituted the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction. We gave due course thereto
and is sued preliminary injunction.
Three questions are presented for determination:
(1)
Are petitioners entitled to prior notice and
hearing before the trial court can order execution of a final and executory judgment?
(2)
Was the writ of execution issued, substantially
at variance with the judgment of the lower court rendered on October 9, 1964?
(3)
Was the manner of levy by the provincial sheriff
attended with irregularity?
Regarding the first point, it is by now axiomatic that a judgment
on a compromise – like the one in the case at bar – is at once final and
immediately executory. Also of the same stature is the rule that
once a judgment becomes final and executory, the
prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right and the
granting of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. Otherwise stated, once sought by the prevailing
party, execution of a final judgment will just follow as a matter of course. Hence, the judgment debtor need not be given
advance notice of the application for execution nor be afforded prior hearing.[3]
This renders of little significance then the fact alleged by petitioners that
they received copy of respondent’s motion for execution only on the afternoon
of the day set for its hearing.
On the second point, petitioners’ claim that variance obtains
because under par. 4 of the amicable settlement their obligation to pay the P3,000.00 is in favor of Demetrio Fajardo and not to respondent is without merit. The cited paragraph very clearly states that
“as a further condition x x x
plaintiffs [herein petitioners] have agreed, as they hereby
agree, to pay to the defendant [herein respondent] the sum of P3,000 x x x.”
The matter of the assignment of this amount Fajardo
is purely between him and respondent.
But it is an uncontroverted fact that
petitioners have not made any payment: to anyone and that Fajardo
had already waived all his rights under the assignment back to respondent. The lower court therefore neither abused its
discretion nor acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in ordering execution
of the judgment for P3,000.00 in respondent’s favor.
Petitioners finally argue that they had not been served a notice
of the levy nor a notice of the sale as required by
the Rules. The sheriff’s return,
however, shows that the notice of levy had been registered with the Register of
Deeds pursuant to Rule 57, Sec. 7 in Connection with Rule 39, Sec. 15 of the
Rules, and that the notice of sale had been sent by registered mail on December 28, 1964, to
petitioners. Even assuming then that
petitioners were not served a copy of the notice of levy, yet We have already ruled in Philippine Bank of Commerce V. Macadaeg, G.R. No. L-14174, October 31, 1960, that this defect is cured by service of notice of sale upon the
judgment debtors prior to the sale, which was cone here. The levy was validly effected
then.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby
dismissed and writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued revoked and set
aside. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., on leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 11-12
[2] See Sheriff’s return, Rollo, p.
22.
[3] Rule 39, Sec. 1, Rules of Court; Luther v. Clay, 100 Ga. 236, 28 S.E.
46.