G.R. No. L-25403. March 15, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LUIS CATALINO Y ARNISTO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
ANGELES, J.:
A review of Criminal Case No. 1542 of the Court of First Instance
of Aklan, entitled “The People of the
Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Luis Catalino Y Arnisto, accused”, wherein the trial court, in its decision
dated October 15, 1965, found the accused guilty of the crime of murder for the
killing of his brother-in-law, Raymundo Gregorio y Severino, and imposed upon him the supreme penalty of
Death.
The accused, Luis Catalino, was
prosecuted in the lower court for the killing of Raymundo
Gregorio on June 2, 1961,
under an information for murder, committed with the
qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, and attended
by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling and relationship. He stood trial under a plea of “not
guilty”.
To prove the People’s case, the prosecution presented at the
trial five witnesses: Dr. Federico Lose, the rural health officer of Altavas, Aklan, who conducted the
autopsy of the body of the victim; Maria Catalino,
the widow of the deceased and sister of the accused; Jose Maravilla,
the victim’s landlord into whose house the latter was first brought in a dying
condition immediately after the incident; Consolacion
Gregorio, common-law wife of the accused and sister of the victim; and Andres Pador, Chief of Police of Altavas,
Aklan, who conducted the investigation of the
crime. The background facts of the case
culled from their testimonies are the following:
The rain had just stopped at about 7:00
o’clock on the night of June
2, 1961, in barrio Tibiao, Altavas, Aklan. In their house situated on top of a hill, Raymundo Gregorio and his wife, Maria Gregorio, were
squatting side by side on the kitchen floor under the light of a kerosene lamp
on the “banggerahan” facing them. They were drinking “tuba” and
munching on roasted corn as their “sumsuman”
while their children were preparing for bed in another portion of the
house. The floor of the kitchen was made
of bamboo slats, one inch in width, nailed about one centimeter apart. Suddenly,
Raymundo jerked his body, saying “Ne, I was thrust by somebody.” Raymundo
stood, his trousers, loosened or slashed by the thrust, dropped to the floor;
and Maria saw her husband clutching a wound in his abdomen from which his
intestines were coming out.
Instinctively, Maria took hold of the kerosene lamp on the “banggerahan“, opened the bamboo slats door of the
kitchen, and looked downstairs. From
where she stood, Maria saw a man about two brazas
away from her, moving quickly away from the house with his back towards
her. With the aid of the light coming
from the kerosene lamp she was carrying, Maria recognized the man as her
brother, the accused Luis Catalino, at whom she
shouted “Manong Luis, you come up and kill all
of us”, before he finally disappeared in the dark. The wounded husband had moved to the sale
when the wife returned to him. She
wrapped his body with a blanket, and at Raymundo’s
bidding, Maria started beating a hallow bamboo gong to summon help. A few neighbors soon answered the call for
aid, and the wounded husband was carried to the house of his land?lord
about 300 meters away, in a hammock. Raymundo Gregorio pleaded to his landlord to give him aid,
but the latter, seeing the seriousness of his condition, advised the wife to
take her husband to town. Raymundo did not reach town, however, for on the way, at
the house of one Procopio Macario,
he expired that same evening. Maria
Gregorio then instructed her son and the barrio lieutenant of the place to
report the matter to the authorities in town, and to inform their relatives of
her husband’s death. Still later, the body of the victim was taken to the town
where it was autopsied by Dr. Federico Loza, the
rural health officer of Altavas, Aklan.
The medical officer found on the body of the victim an incised
wound about two (2) inches in length in the infra-umbilical region, one inch below
the umbilicus, from which wound portions of the small intestines were coming,
presenting multiple incisions including the mesentery. Vertically aligned with, and about an inch
below this wound was a second one which was superficial. In the necropsy report,
the doctor described the first wound as fatal, in consequence of which death
resulted from internal hemorrhage; and in his testimony before the court, he
opined that the wound could have been caused by a bladed or double bladed
instrument like a bolo or talibong, for the edges of
the wound were all clean-cut. Judging
from the vertically aligned positions of the two wounds, he ventured further to
say that the two wounds could have been caused by a single thrust.
That morning following the night of the incident, people from
the place came to view the remains of Raymundo
Gregorio at the house of Procopio Macario
where the cadaver lay in state. Among the first relatives to arrive was the
father of the widow. The accused
arrived a little later, then left shortly
thereafter. It was then that the widow
told the police officers present that it was her brother Luis Catalino, who killed her husband. At about noon
time that very same day, Luis Catalino was arrested
and brought to town for investigation.
Five days after the commission of the crime, the Chief of Police
of Altavas conducted a re-enactment of the crime
with the consent of Luis Catalino who denied being
the author of the crime. The chief of
police and the accused, along with two other policemen, two PC soldiers, and
the widow of the deceased were all present at the scene of the incident for
purposes of said re-enactment. Upon
examination of the ground under the house of the victim, the chief of police
found three (3) footprints, left and right, which were apparently made by one
without shoes. He asked the accused to
fit his feet in said footprints which the accused did after some reluctance;
and the chief of police found that they tallied,
heels and toes. Thereafter, at about the
same time that the incident took place on the night of the killing, the chief
of police ordered the widow to go up the house with the PC soldiers. After closing the door of the kitchen, he
asked one of his policemen to change clothes with that of the accused and
ordered them to go under the house. At a
given signal, the PC soldiers asked the widow to open the door of the kitchen
and look out. At that precise time, the policeman and the accused were also required
to walk out at a distance of about six meters, and the widow correctly pointed
to the accused as the man he saw there on the night of the killing. Thus, the chief of police filed the
corresponding complaint against Luis Catalino.
The evidence for the prosecution further shows that there had
been a long standing feud between the accused on the one hand, and the deceased
and his widow on the other hand. The
controversy related to a disagreement between the widow and the accused in
respect of the shares of the property of their parents who were both still
living which had been previously assigned to each of them; the portion assigned
to the widow and worked upon by the deceased during his lifetime had been
planted to coconuts, while the portion assigned to the accused remained barren
or cogonal.
The accused expressed a desire that a part of the produce of the widow’s
land should be given to him which the deceased never did. The disagreement between the accused and his
sister was recently further aggravated by the fact that the common law wife of
the accused (sister of the deceased) had abandoned him since April, 1961, and
the accused believed that it was the deceased who had given her money and
prompted her to leave their home. And although
the last serious quarrel between the accused and the deceased occurred more
than ten(10) years before the killing of the
deceased, on June 2, 1961,
they had another altercation barely three days before the night of the killing.
The accused drew his bolo on that occasion, but the deceased ran to town. On the latter part of that same day the
accused chanced to meet his own common-law wife and the wife of the deceased
together in the house of a certain Ciocoro where Luis
Catalino warned his sister (wife of the deceased) to
be careful because something may happen in a few days.
For his defense, Luis Catalino
presented evidence tending to show that on June 2, 1961, he was in his son-in-law’s caingin weeding the plants from morning until the
afternoon. Returning to his son-in-law’s
house late in the afternoon, he prepared their food for that evening because
his grandson was sick and his daughter had to attend to him. Still later, he pounded about ten gantas of palay which he later
placed in a buri bag.
They ate supper at about 8:00
that evening. He slept in the house of
his son-in-law where he has been staying since his common-law wife left him in
the the month of April. He was still asleep when in the following morning, he was awakened by his son-in-law who informed him
that his brother-in-law has been killed the night before. And upon learning that the deceased lay in
state in the house of Procopio Macario,
he lost no time in going there to see the remains of the deceased.
The defense also presented evidence to show that some other
persons and not the accused have committed the crime imputed to Luis Catalino. The
extra-judicial confessions of Rodrigo Tulio and
Federico Layson taken by a PC investigator and sworn
to before the Deputy Clerk of Court were produced in court to show that they
have voluntarily owned the killing of Raymundo
Gregorio. Much to the surprise of the
defense, however, when these alleged killers were placed on the witness stand,
they repudicated their alleged confessions and
declared that they were detained in the provincial jail on a complaint for
cattle rustling, and that they knew nothing about the killing of Raymundo Gregorio.
They admitted having signed the affidavits containing their admissions
of the killing, but claimed that they only signed the same because they were
manhandled by detention prisoners, and the accused in
the provincial jail and, out of fear, were forced to admit the killing of which
they were totally ignorant. They
expressly denied before the court the truth of the statements they had
previously signed.
Upon these facts, the trial court found the accused guilty as
charged, and as aforestated, sentenced the accused
to the penalty of death, and to indemnify the heirs of the decd the sum of P6,000.00.
We find two main issues which must be resolved before We may sustain the conviction of herein appellants in the
lower court:
(1)
Whether or not the identification made by the
widow of the accused as the man she saw running away from their house on the
night of the killing of her husband, is worthy of belief; and
(2)
Whether or not the trial court was right in
disregarding the extra-judicial confessions of the two detention prisoners
presented by the accused to prove his innocence.
We shall, therefore, consider the various points discussed by
herein appellant in his brief with those issues foremost in our mind.
Appellant vigorously assails the credence and weight placed by
the trial judge upon the testimony of the widow of the deceased, on which the
lower court apparently gave full reliance in rendering the judgment of conviction
under appeal. He brands as incredible
and improbable the story told by the said widow before the court: Thus, that
after the deceased had jerked his body, telling her –“Ne,
I was thrust by somebody”, and she saw him clutching at his wounded abdomen
out of which his intestines were billowing out, said widow would immediately
grab the kerosene lamp from their “banggerahan“,
open the door of the kitchen and look out into the darkness and survey the
scene outside the house; that she not only saw a man two brazas
away moving quickly from the house, but also recognized that man whose back was
turned against her to be the herein appellant; that she shouted at him “Manong Luis, you come up here and kill all of us”; and
that only after he disappeared completely into the darkness did she finally
turn back to her wounded husband to give him succor. In a word, appellant disputes the
credibility of the said witness.
We find no substantial merit to herein appellant’s claim that
the above testimony is incredible. Time
after time, this Court has declared that the matter of assigning values to
declarations at the witness stand is best and most competently performed or
carried out by the trial judge because the latter, unlike appellate
magistrates, can weight such testimony in the light of the declarant’s
demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial.[1]
And as far as credibility and veracity of witnesses are concerned, the
conclusions of lower courts command great weight and respect,[2]
for their proximate contact with those who take to the
witness stand, places them in a more competent position to discriminate
between the true and the false.[3]
Of course, these rules admit of exceptions, as when patent inconsistencies in
the statements of witnesses are ignored by the lower court, or when the
conclusion arrived at is clearly unsupported by evidence; but the existence of
any of such exceptions had not been shown in this case. We find no cogent reason, therefore, to
disturb the reliance place by the trial court upon the testimony referred to by
herein appellant.
Appellant contends, that the way the widow had reacted to the
tenseness of the situation she found herself in on that fateful night of the
killing of her husband, is opposed to ordinary human experience – too unnatural
to be believable – for the more natural thing for her to do immediately after
seeing the gaping wound in the abdomen of her husband, his intestines coming
out of said wound, would be to rush to his side, to think of her husband’s
safety above all else, or to immediately shout for help and seek the aid of her
neighbors. Appellant, therefore, imputes
bad motive on the part of the widow and suggests, that her identification of
the accused as the man the saw that evening was born out of her consuming
hatred for him. The suggestion should be
denied. The widow, perhaps, had not
acted the way We would normally expect a woman to do
under the circumstances, but considering the nervous condition she must have
found herself under the situation that evening, it is equally probable that she
acted under stress without knowing what to do best under the
circumstances. It is not difficult to
demonstrate the fact that different people will react in various ways when
placed under stress, and the circumstance that the widow had acted in another
way that to others might appear unnatural is no argument to the proposition
that what she did was impossible. What
is clear from the testimony of the said widow is the fact that she recognized
the man she saw that evening to be her brother, appellant herein, that is why
she shouted at him to “come up here and kill all of us.” The widow
acted at the time under a nervous excitement, without time to reflect; and We cannot subscribe to the suggestion that she could had
been influenced by any evil motive against herein appellant.
But appellant would insist that for the widow to have seen and
recognized a man in the dark outside their house after staying for sometime in
the kitchen facing a lamp, is opposed to common knowledge of human experience
to be worthy of reasonable belief. Thus,
be frames his argument in the following wise:
“This woman must be possessed of an uncanny eyesight. After staying for sometime in the kitchen,
facing a lamp, and suddenly looking out into the darkness, she not only
recognized a man running away but was also able to positvely
identify that man. This, We believe, is incredible in itself because it is contrary
to ordinary human experience. How many
times have We experienced stepping out of the street
into the darkness of a moviehouse and bump into
chairs and persons, for we fail to see them? Much less could We
recognize persons, altho within an arms length, in
such cases. That is the ordinary human
experience. Maria Gregorio’s experience
does not fall within this realm; it is, thus, not deserving
belief.” We are not impressed with this argument either. Obviously,
appellant herein overlooks the fact, also supported by ordinary human
experience, that one may easily find his way through in a dark moviehouse, may recognize persons not too far away from
him, with the aid of a dimly lighted flashlight of an usher or the light of a
match stick. There can be no parity,
therefore, between the situation of the widow when she looked out in the dark
that fateful evening and the blinding darkness inside a moviehouse
described by herein appellant, for the simple reason that the widow looked
outside the door of the kitchen that night with the aid of the light from her
lamp. Maria Gregorio testified that the
wick of the kerosene lamp she carried is as big as her pointer finger, and its
flame was about four (4) inches in length.[4]
Although she first stated that the wind blew inside the house when she opened
the door of the kitchen,[5]
she later qualified her statement by explaining that there was no wind that evening, that it was calm because the rain had just
stopped.[6]
She described the floor of the house where she stood to be less than five (5)
feet above the ground,[7]
and from there she saw the man downstairs, about two brazas
away from her, moving quickly away from the house;[8]
and although he was not facing her,[9]
she recognized him to be her brother (Manong Luis),
the herein appellant.[10]
She testified further, that upon seeing him there, she told him, “Manong Luis, you come up and kill all of us.”[11]
We are convinced that with the size of the flame of the lamp she was holding at
the time, and within the distance she saw the man downstairs, it was really
possible for the widow to have recognized her own brother as the man she saw
that evening; otherwise, she would not have told him “to come up and kill
all of us”, if she was not sure, having no time to reflect, that he was
her own brother.
Appellant next argues that the lower court erred in finding that
he had sufficient motive for killing his brother-in-law, the deceased Raymundo Gregorio.
He points out the fact that while his sister, the widow of the deceased,
had testified about a quarrel they had over the inheritance of their parents
some ten years ago, she also admitted that said quarrel had long been settled
between them by their own parents who were both still living. He contends further that neither would the
alleged separation between him and his common-law wife, sister of the deceased,
be a sufficient motive for him to commit the crime because they have in fact
been separated no less than three (3) times during the more than
twenty-five(25) years that they have been living together, and although she
has recently abandoned him and left for Iloilo, she returned to Altavas, nevertheless, on May 28, about a week before the
commission of the crime on June 2, 1961.
This argument should be rejected.
We believe the trial court did not err in finding sufficient motive on
the part of herein appellant to commit the murder of which he stands
convicted. There is abundant evidence
on record that barely three (3) days before the killing, the quarrel between
herein appellant and the deceased had been renewed where the former drew his
bolo and chased the latter; and later on that very same day, a Tuesday before
the Friday when the killing occurred, herein appellant, upon meeting by chance
the wife of the deceased and his own common-law wife together in the house of
a certain Ciocoro warned his sister “to be
careful, because in a few days something will happen.[12]
It has likewise been shown that herein appellant had suspected that his
common-law wife received money from her elder brother, the deceased, who
induced her to separate from him and leave him for good. This suspicion,
according to the common-law wife, drove him mad; he called her a traitor, and
would want to kill her and her brother, the deceased;[13]
that is why she had left and finally decided to leave him. It is clear, therefore, that whether it be
the quarrel over the inheritance of their parents or the suspicion of herein
appellant that the deceased was the cause of his separation from his common-law
wife which led to the commission of the crime, the indubitable fact that stands
out in the record is the existence of bad blood between herein appellant and
the deceased before the demise of the latter; and We are convinced that either
of the above-mentioned causes could be a sufficient motive on the part of
herein appellant for the killing of his brother-in-law.
Neither do We find incredible the
testimony of the Chief of Police of Altavas, Aklan, that the footprints he found under the house of the
deceased were similar in size to those of herein appellant. While it is true that the said footprints
were discovered five days after the killing and were then no longer fresh, he
explained that the ground where the footprints were found was wet because it
is the place where water from the kitchen spreads or settles. It would hence be safe to surmise that said
part of the ground under the house will be soft and footprints thereon will be
well-defined. The circumstance that it
had been raining then in Altavas for the last five
days as pointed to by herein appellant could not have affected the footprints
because, as testified to by the chief of police, that part of the ground under
the house was not exposed to rainfall; and neither was said part of the ground
affected by the flow of water from the kitchen, for the house had been vacated
by the family of the deceased after the killing on June 2, 1961.[14]
The footprints aforesaid, were therefore preserved, which enabled the chief of
police to ascertain the similarity in size of the footprints and the feet of
herein appellant after asking the latter to insert or superimpose his feet
into said footprints.[15]
The evidence alone, of course, is not conclusive of the fact that the said
footprints were those of herein appellant, but it tends to show in some
reasonable degree that someone whose feet are of said sizes had been there; and
since herein appellant had been positively identified by the widow to be the
person she saw running away from the scene of the crime on the night of the
killing, the circumstances point strongly to herein appellant as the one who
left said footprints.
Finally, We are convinced that the
defenses of alibi and projection offered by herein appellant do not
merit any serious consideration. It has
been clearly established by the evidence, both for the prosecution and for the
appellant, that the houses of the deceased and that of Dioscoro
Macario where herein appellant lives since he was
abandoned by his common-law wife, are only about two (2) or two and a half
(2-1/2) kilometers apart,[16]
and there is a trail connecting the two houses.[17]
It was then not really impossible for herein appellant to be at the scene of
the crime at about 7:00 o’clock on the night of the killing, inspite of the claim that he was at Dioscorots
house preparing food for supper and pounding palay at
the time,[18]
and did not leave the house after his arrival at about 5:00 o’clock that
afternoon from the “kaingin” of his son-in?law.[19]
Moreover, the defense of alibi here will not prosper on account of the
positive identification of herein appellant by an eyewitness that he was seen
at the scene of the crime.[20]
Coming to the defense of projection, appellant vigorously
maintains that it was error on the part of the trial court to have concluded
that the extra-judicial confessions of Rodrigo Tulio
and Felipe Leyson owning the killing of Raymundo Gregorio were not made freely and
voluntarily. He relies heavily upon the
testimony in court of the Deputy Clerk of Court before whom the above-named
detention prisoners in the provincial jail of Aklan
subscribed to their confessions to the effect, that be first read the questions
and answers in their respective affidavits and translated them to Rodrigo Tulio and Felipe Leyson in their
native dialect which they understood,[21]
after which Rodrigo Tulio willingly signed his name,[22]
while Felipe Leyson voluntarily affixed his thumb
mark also;[23]
that no complaint whatsoever was made at the time by either Rodrigo Tulio,[24]
or Felipe Leyson,[25]
before they signed and affixed their names and thumb marks on their respective
confessions. It is also pointed out that
a PC officer had testified that he personally conducted and recorded the
confessions of the above-named detention prisoners;[26]
that there were other PC soldiers present when be conducted the said investigation;[27]
and that no force, threat, intimidation or promise of any reward was made upon
them at the time.[28]
The voluntariness of the confessions, according to
herein appellant is further sustained by the testimony of the provincial warden
to the effect that he was not aware of any manhandling of said prisoners while
they were under his custody;[29]
that he had brought along Rodrigo Tulio and Felipe Leyson to the PC headquarters at Tuliols
own behest, because he confided to him that they had a hand in the killing of Raymundo Gregorio;[30]
and that as he was present during the investigation, he knew for a fact that
said detention prisoners were not manhandled by the PC during the
investigation.[31]
The bone of appellant’s contention, therefore, is that the said confessions
were made freely and voluntarily, and should have been admitted by the trial
court in exculpation of herein appellant.
The argument merits no serious consideration.
There are clear signs in the record showing that the alleged
confessions were not made freely and voluntarily. Both Rodrigo Tulio
and Federico Leyson were presented in court for the
defense of herein appellant, but they turned hostile to his cause. Leyson testified
that he had never committed the crime; that he only admitted the crime because
he was badly beaten in jail by other prisoners and was then out of his mind.[32]
Rodrigo Tulio, on the other hand, complained that on
the very day of his arrest at Jamindan, Aklan, for reasons unknown to him, the PC soldier who
arrested him, hit him at the back three (3) times with the butt of his gun.[33]
He was first delivered to the municipal jail of Jamindan,
then transferred to the PC headquarters at Loctungan where he received further torture.[34]
From there, he was taken to the municipal jail of Altavas,
and still later to the provincial jail of Aklan,
where herein appellant, also a detention prisoner there at the time, beat him
several times, warning him that if he will not admit the killing of Raymundo Gregorio at the investigation at the PC
headquarters, he will kill him upon his return to the provincial jail.[35]
He testified further that his right eyebrow had been shed as a matter of fact
due to such manhandling before he was taken to the PC headquarters at Buswang where the confession took place.[36]
There is a showing that such manhandling really took place, for even the Deputy
Clerk of Court who testified for the defense, admitted that when the prepared
statement of Rodrigo Tulio was taken to him for
ratification, Tulio “was weak, that even in
signing the papers, it took him time in signing and even the voice when I asked
him, he just nod his head, sometimes he said yes”; that “he noticed
in his face, a slight contusion and he was weak,”[37]
while Felipe Leyson “was also weak and had a
black eye at the time.”[38]
The PC sergeant who conducted the investigation and took the statements of said
detention prisoners also admitted that when he fetched Tulio
from the provincial jail “he had bruises on his right face which was
somewhat swollen.”[39] And
so with the provincial warden who testified that when Felipe Leyson was first brought to the provincial jail, he
already “had sore eyes.”[40]
There is also a glaring discrepancy between the testimony of the provincial
warden and the PC sergeant who took the testimony of said detention
prisoners. While the sergeant claimed
that he conducted the investigation of said detention prisoners at the behest
of the Chief of Police of Altavas before whom one Presentacion Tulio had lodged a
complaint for theft of large cattle, and he had taken said prisoners from the
provincial jail to investigate them in connection therewith; and that he only
happened to inquire from them about the killing of Raymundo
Gregorio because the Chief of Police of Altavas also
made mention to him regarding the said killing, the provincial warden, on the
other hand, claimed that without being asked, Rodrigo Tulio
made a statement to him of his desire to confess about his involvement in the
killing of Raymundo Gregorio, that is why he suggested
that they go to the PC headquarters where he may make his confession.[41]
And the Court sees no reason why the Chief of Police had to indorse the complaint
of Presentacion Tulio
against said prisoners to the PC headquarters for further investigation of the
alleged theft of large cattle, when it is admitted, by the PC sergeant himself
who conducted the investigation that at the time he took the statements of said
prisoners, the corresponding complaint had been filed by the Chief of Police in
the Municipal Court of Altavas, which remitted the
case to the Court of First Instance.[42]
Such facts and circumstances altogether convince the Court that the trial court
was right in holding that the extra-judicial confessions of Rodrigo Tulio and Felipe Leyson relied
upon by herein appellant were not made by them freely and voluntarily.
But even if We were to assume that the
said confessions were made freely and voluntarily, which is not a fact, as
earlier shown, We still have to reckon the question of admissibility of such
Confessions as substantive evidence. The
Rules provide that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him,[43]
but this would seem to exclude the confession of a third person for or against
him. The said Rules provide further that a declaration of a person against his
interest may be used against third persons,[44]
but such provision would not be applicable to this case either, even if We
were to consider the confessions under consideration as a declaration against
interest and the State as a third person, because it is a further requirement
that before a declaration against interest may be admissible, it must be shown
that the declarant is either deceased, outside of the
Philippines, or unable to testify, which is not true here. Thus, the rule that as long
as the declarant of available as a witness, his
extra-judicial statement should not be heard. This is in accord with the weight of
authority in American jurisprudence which holds that a confession on the part
of a third person tending to exculpate an accused, is not admissible in
evidence where the confession does not constitute a part of the res gestae, the
reason given by the courts for excluding such evidence is that it is hearsay.[45]
We recall that this question of admissibility of such kind of confession was
once raised in issue here where this Tribunal did not reach any accord on the
matter,[46]
but even if We were to follow the opinion of the three (3) members of the Court
there that such kind of evidence is admissible, We would still find the
conclusion reached by the trial court legally sustainable. For ultimately, its value
would depend upon the weight given or assigned to it by the trial court.
Here, the lower court did not believe the statement in the alleged confessions
of Rodrigo Tulio and Felipe Leyson
that they used a spear made of bamboo in killing Raymundo
Gregorio due to the improbability of causing, with such kind of weapon, the
incised clean-cut wound found by the medical officer on the body of the
deceased, and We find no reasonable basis upon the evidence of record to disturb
that conclusion.
The finding of the lower court that the crime was committed with
treachery may not be seriously disputed.
By suddenly attacking the victim from under the house, the assailant
had employed a means in the execution of the crime which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
The aggravating circumstance of nighttime, however, may no longer be
separately considered, the same being included in the qualifying circumstance
of treachery.[47]
The reason for this rule is that nighttime forms part of the peculiar
treacherous means and manner adopted to insure the execution of the crime.[48]
But the lower court was right in considering the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling which is applicable even if it be shown that the perpetrator of the
crime never entered the house where the victim was at the time of the attack.[49]
There being no mitigating circumstance to off-set the aggravating circumstance
of dwelling, the penalty imposed by law should be imposed in its maximum
period.
WHEREFORE, the writer of this opinion believes that the
lower court was right in sentencing the herein appellant to the supreme penalty
of death; but for lack of the necessary number of votes among the members of
the court to sustain the death sentence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby imposed. Decision appealed from is affirmed in all
other respects, with costs against herein appellant.
Reyes, Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., on leave.
[1] People v. Refuerzo, 82 Phil. 576;
People v. Federico, G.R. No. L-1512, May 12, 1949; People v. Aguipo, G.R. No.
L-12128, July 31, 1958; People v.
Romawak, G.R. No. L-19644, October 31, 1964; People v. Secapuri, et al., G.R.
No. L17518-19, February 28,
1966.
[2] People v. Evaristo, G.R. No.
L-14520, Feb. 26, 1965; People v.
Lumayog, G.R. No. L-19142, March 31, 1965; People v. Castro, G.R. No. L-21449, June 30, 1967.
[3] People v. Constante, G.R. No.
L-14639, Dec. 28, 1964; People v.
Berdida, et al., G.R. No. L-20183
June 30, 1966; People v. Estrada, G.R. No. L-26103, January 17, 1968.
[4] Tsn, Gonzales, p. 47.
[5] Id.
[6] Tsn, Gonzales, p. 56.
[7] “
“ p. 30.
[8] “
“ p. 49.
[9] “
“ p. 49-50.
[10] “
“ p. 20-21.
[11] “
“ p. 25.
[12] Tsn, Gonzales, pp. 27, 79-80, 91.
[13] Tsn, Gonzales, pp. 79, 93.
[14] Tsn, Fadullon, pp. 12-13.
[15]
“ “ pp. 13-14.
[16]
“ Gonzales, p. 115; Isberto, p. 27.
[17]
“ Policarpio,
p. 9.
[18]
“ Gonzales, p. 104.
[19] Tsn, Gonzales, p. 104.
[20] U.S.
v. Oxiles, 29 Phil. 587; U.S.
v. Pascua, 1 Phil. 631; People v. Secapuri, et al., supra; See also People v.
Estrada, supra, and cases cited therein.
[21] Tsn, Fadullon, pp. 27-28, 35-36.
[22] “
“ p. 31.
[23] “
“ p. 35.
[24] “
“ p. 31.
[25] “
“ p. 39.
[26] “
Isberto, p. 2-3.
[27] “
“ p. 4-5.
[28] “
“ p. 8.
[29] “
Gonzales, p.
154.
[30] Tsn, Gonzales, pp. 155, 160.
[31]
“ “ p. 156.
[32]
“ “ p. 148.
[33]
“ Isberto,
p. 33-34.
[34]
“ “ p. 35.
[35] “ “ p. 44-45, 50.
[36]
“ “ p. 51.
[37] Tsn, Fadullon, p. 30.
[38]
“ “ p. 40.
[39]
“ Isberto,
p. 13.
[40]
“ Gonzales, p. 157.
[41]
See, Tsn, Isberto, pp. 1-5;
12-13; 18-19; Tsn, Gonzales, pp. 154-155.
[42] Tsn, Isberto, pp. 23-24.
[43]
Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
[44]
Sec. 32, Rule 130, “ “
[45]
See, Francisco, Rules of Court (Evidence) p. 324.
[46] See, People v. Toledo & Holgado,
51 Phil. 825.
[47] People v. Sespeñe, et al., 102
Phil. 199.
[48] People v. Pardo, 79 Phil. 568;
People v. Corpus, et al., G.R. No. L-12718, February 24, 1960.
[49] People v. Bautista, 79 Phil. 652; See, also People v.
Ambis, 68 Phil. 635.