AMELITO R. MUTUC, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate
for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil action for
prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on
Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes, was not in
vain.  Nor could it be, considering the
conceded absence of any express power granted to respondent by the
Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication
arising from any provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle
that a statute is to be construed consistently with the fundamental law, which
accords the utmost priority to freedom of expression, much more so when
utilized for electoral purposes.  On November 3, 1970, the very same day
the case was orally argued, five days after its filing, with the election
barely a week away, we issued a minute resolution granting the writ of
prohibition prayed for.  This opinion is
intended to explain more fully our decision.

In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29,
1970, petitioner, after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his
candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him five
days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due
course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with
sound systems and loudspeakers, an order which, according to him, is “violative of [his] constitutional right * * * to freedom of
speech.”^[1]
There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he
would seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary
injunction.  On the very next day, this
Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file
an answer not later than November 2, 1970,
at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday, November 3, 1970.  No preliminary injunction was issued.  There was no denial in the answer filed by
respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the
petition, but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision
of the Constitutional Convention Act,^[2]
which made it unlawful for candidates “to purchase, produce, request or
distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens,
lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of
domestic or foreign origin.”^[3]
It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the
recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda
material, under the above statute subject to confiscation.  It prayed that the petition be denied for
lack of merit.  The case was argued, on November 3, 1970, with petitioner
appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmeña arguing in behalf of respondent.

This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for
urgency, the election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the
same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth
the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a
ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the
construction placed on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would
raise serious doubts about its validity, considering the infringement of the
right of free speech of petitioner.  Its
concluding portion was worded thus: 
“Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is
permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or
demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political
jingles by candidates.  This resolution
is immediately executory.”^[4]

1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was one
of power.  Respondent Commission on
Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on
petitioner.  To repeat, no such authority
was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act.  It did contend, however, that one of its
provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral
propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches and
cigarettes, and concluding with the words “and the like.”^[5]
For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an
order.  We view the matter
differently.  What was done cannot merit
our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem
generis, the general words following any
enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those
specifically referred to.^[6]
It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution
of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent
Commission was its failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of
construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in
consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription.^[7]
Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given a “construction
which should be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law.”^[8]
The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional
infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended itself.  The judiciary may even strain the ordinary
meaning of words to avert any collision between what a statute provides and
what the Constitution requires.  The
objective is to reach an interpretation rendering it free from constitutional
defects.  To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the conclusion reached must
avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that
score.^[9]

2. Petitioner’s submission of his side of the controversy, then,
has in its favor obeisance to such a cardinal precept.  The view advanced by him that if the above
provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lend itself to the view
that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then the challenge of
unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. 
For, in unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment
of free speech or a free press.  It has
been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for
the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.  What respondent Commission did, in effect,
was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this
constitutional right is directed.  Nor
could respondent Commission justify its action by the assertion that
petitioner, if he would not resort to a taped jingle, would be free, either by
himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers.  Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is
not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not
perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical
contrivances.  If this Court were to
sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable
from a previous restraint.  That cannot
be validly done.  It would negate
indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures.^[10]

3. Nor is this all.  The
concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion
for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official
or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government.  That is to manifest fealty to the rule of
law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the
legal hierarchy.  The three departments
of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have
no choice but to yield obedience to its commands.  Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.  Congress in the enactment of
statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether
substantive or formal, be transcended. 
The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or dis­regard
what it ordains.  In its task of applying
the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon
to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law.  Even its power of judicial review to pass
upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of
adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the
Constitution is paramount.  It overrides
any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates.  Thereby there is a recognition of its being
the supreme law.

To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent
Commission was aptly summed up by the present Chief Justice thus:  “Lastly, as the branch of the executive
department – although independent of the President — to which the Constitution
has given the ‘exclusive charge’ of the ‘enforcement and administration
of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, ‘ the power of decision of
the Commission is limited to purely ‘administrative questions.’”^[11]
It has been the constant holding of this Court, as it could not have been
otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict
with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution.^[12]
Our decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by the
thought that only thus may its responsibility under the Constitution to insure
free, orderly and honest elections be adequately fulfilled.^[13]
There could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or
order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to
nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech.  Petitioner’s case, as was obvious from the
time of its filing, stood on solid footing.

WHEREFORE, as set forth in our Resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent
Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or
implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use
of political taped jingles.  Without
pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

Dizon and
Makasiar, JJ., on
official leave.

^[1]
Petition, paragraphs 1 to 5.

^[2]
Republic Act No. 6132 (1970).

^[3]
Section 12 (E), Ibid.

^[4]
Resolution of Nov. 3, 1970.

^[5]
Section 12 (E), Constitutional Convention Act.

^[6]
Cf. United States v. Santo Niño, 13 Phil. 141
(1909); Go Tiaoco y Hermanos
v. Union Insu­rance Society of Canton, 40 Phil. 40 (1919); People v.
Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352 (1923); Cornejo
v. Naval, 54 Phil. 809 (1930); Ollada v.
Court of Tax Appeals, 99 Phil. 605 (1956); Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v.
Social Security Commission, L-15045, Jan. 20, 1961, 1 SCRA 10.

^[7]
Cf. Herras Teehankee v.
Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); Manila Electric Co. v.
Public Utilities Employees Association, 79 Phil. 409 (1947); Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84
Phil. 368 (1949); Guido v. Rural Progress Adminis­tration, 84 Phil. 847
(1949); City of Manila v. Arellano Law Colleges, 85 Phil. 663 (1950); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86
Phil. 50 (1950); Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429 (1950); Sanchez v. Harry Lyons
Construction, Inc., 87 Phil, 532 (1950); American Bible Society v. City
of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957); Gonzales v. Hechanova,
L-21897, Oct. 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230; Automotive Parts and Equipment Co., Inc. v.
Lingad, L-26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 248; J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,
L-21064, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.

^[8] Radiowealth v. Agregado,
86 Phil. 429 (1950).

^[9]
Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Ross, 289 US
373 (1933).

^[10]
Cf. Saia v. People of the State of New
York, 334 US 558 (1948).

^[11] Abcede v. Hon. Imperial, 103 Phil. 136 (1958). The
portion of the opinion from which the above excerpt is taken reads in
full:  “Lastly, as the branch of the
executive department – although independent of the President – to which
the Consti­tution has given the ‘exclusive charge’ of the ‘enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,’
the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely ‘administrative
questions.’ (Article X, Sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines)
It has no authority to decide matters ‘involving the right to vote. ‘It may not
even pass upon the legality of a given vote (Nacionalista
Party v. Commission on Elections, 47 Off. Gaz.,
[6], 2851). We do not see, therefore, how it could assert the greater and
more far-reaching authority to determine who – among those possessing the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, who have complied with the
procedural requirements, relative to the filing of certificates of candidacy –
should be allowed to enjoy the full benefits intended by law
therefore.  The question whether in order
to enjoy those benefits – a candidate must be capable of ‘understanding the
full meaning of his acts and the true significance of election,’ and must have
– over a month prior to the elections (when the resolution complained of
was issued) ‘the tiniest chance to obtain the favorable indorsement
of a substantial portion of the electorate,’ is a matter of policy, not
of administration and enforcement of the law, which policy must
be determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative
functions.  Apart from the absence of
specific statutory grant of such general, broad power as the Commission claims
to have, it is dubious whether, if so granted – in the vague, abstract,
indeterminate and undefined manner necessary in order that it could pass upon
the factors relied upon in said resolution (and such grant must not be deemed
made, in the absence of clear and positive provision to such effect, which is
absent in the case at bar) – the legislative enactment would not amount to
undue delegation of legislative power. (Schechter vs.
U.S., 295 US
495, 79 L. ed. 1570.)” pp. 141-142.

^[12]
Cf. Cortez v. Commission on Elections, 79 Phil. 352 (1947); Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 85
Phil. 149 (1949); Guevara v. Commission on Elections, 104 Phil. 268
(1958); Masangcay v. Commission on Elections,
L-13827, Sept. 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 27; Lawsin v. Escalona, L-22540, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 643; Ututalum v. Commission on Elections, L-25349, Dec.
3, 1965, 15 SCRA 465; Janairo v. Commission on
Elections, L-28315, Dec. 8, 1967, 21 SCRA 1173; Abes v.
Commission on Elections, L-28348, Dec. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 1252; Ibuna v. Commission on Elections, L-28328, Dec. 29,
1967, 21 SCRA 1457; Binging Ho v. Mun. Board
of Canvassers, L-29051, July 28, 1969,
28 SCRA 829.

^[13]
Cf. Cauton v. Commission on Elections,
L-25467, April 27, 1967, 19
SCRA 911. The other cases are Espino v. Zaldivar, L-22325, Dec. 11, 1967, 21 SCRA 1204; Ong v. Commission on Elections, L-28415, Jan. 29,
1968, 22 SCRA 241; Mutuc v. Commission on
Elections, L-28517, Feb. 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 662; Pedido
v. Commission on Elections, L-28539, March 30, 1968, 22 SCRA 1403; Aguam v. Commission on Elections, L-28955, May 28,
1968, 23 SCRA 883; Pelayo, Jr. v. Commission
on Elections, L-28869, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1374; Pacis
v. Commission on Elections, L-29026, Sept. 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 377; Ligot v. Commission on Elections, L-31380, Jan. 21,
1970, 31 SCRA 45; Abrigo v. Commission on
Elections, L-31374, Jan. 21, 1970, 31 SCRA 27; Moore v. Commission on
Elections, L-31394, Jan. 23, 1970, 31 SCRA 60; Ilarde
v. Commission on Elections, L-31446, Jan. 23, 1970, 31 SCRA 72; Sinsuat v. Pendatun,
L-31501, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 630.

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