G.R. No. L-30798. November 26, 1970
KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA LA CAMPANA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH V, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, QUEZON CITY BRANCH A…
CASTRO, J.:
This is an original petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with preliminary injunction to oust the Court of First Instance of Quezon City of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide civil
case Q-12580, which is an action for annulment of sale with preliminary
injunction filed by the respondent La Campana Food
Products, Inc.
The present litigation evolved out of a labor dispute that arose
way back in 1951 between the petitioner Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa La Campana (hereinafter referred to as the Kaisahan),
on the one hand, and the La Campana Coffee Factory,
Inc. and a certain Tan Tong, who was then doing business under the name of La Campana Gaugau Packing, on the
other. In that dispute, the jurisdiction
of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) to take cognizance of the case
against the coffee corporation was posed in issue before us on the ground that
the 30-complainants rule prescribed by Commonwealth Act 103 was not complied
with, there being then only 14 persons employed in the coffee factory, only 5
of whom were members of the Kaisahan and that, moreover,
the permit of the union was suspended by the Secretary of the Department of
Labor.[1]
Holding that the CIR had jurisdiction to entertain the case, we
said, with reference to the first point raised, that
“… This contention loses force when it is noted that, as found by
the industrial court – and this finding is conclusive upon us – La Campana Gaugau Packing [which
was the business name and style used by Tan Tong as proprietor of this
particular investment] and La Campana Coffee Factory,
Inc., are operating under one single management, that is, as one business
though with two trade names. True, the
coffee factory is a corporation and, by legal fiction, an entity existing
separate and apart from the persons composing it, that is, Tan Tong and his
family. But it is settled that this
fiction of law, which has been introduced as a matter of convenience and to subserve the ends of justice cannot be invoked to further
an end subversive of that purpose.”
We then remanded the case for trial by
the CIR, where subsequently other allied cases involving the same litigants
arose and were jointly heard.[2]
On May 16, 1956,
however, while those cases were pending adjudication, Ramon Tantongco (or Tan Tong) died, for which reason, the Kaisahan moved for the inclusion of Ricardo Tantongco, who was appointed administrator of the estate of
the deceased, as party defendant. After
the CIR granted this motion, Ricardo Tantongco asked
the said court to dismiss the cases then pending against the La Campana Gaugau Packing and the La
Campana Coffee Factory, Inc., on the ground that
they were mere money claims that should be filed with the probate court having
jurisdiction over the estate of Ramon Tantongco.
Meanwhile, on November
12, 1956, the CIR rendered a partial decision in the main case
between the parties, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the management of
the respondent La Campana Starch & Coffee
Factory [the name by which the Kaisahan chose to
refer to the coffee corporation and the gaugau
packing factory] guilty of unfair labor practice under Section 5 of Commonwealth
Act No. 312, and for having dismissed the said workers and admitted new ones,
without first securing authority from this Court. …”
This decision was followed, on February 18, 1957, by another
order, relative to the other allied cases, directing the management of the La Campana Gaugau Packing and the La
Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. (or, as referred to by
the Kaisahan, the La Campana
Starch and Coffee Factory) as well as the administrator of Ramon Tantongco’s estate to reinstate the laborers therein
mentioned, with back wages.
This order of February 18, 1957 and the previous order of the CIR
impleading Ricardo Tantongco
(as administrator of the estate of Ramon Tantongco)
as party-defendant, were appealed to this Court by certiorari in G. R.
L-12355, but this appeal was summarily dismissed by minute resolution of June
12, 1957.
On August 10, 1957, due to the termination of the intestate
proceedings re the estate of Ramon Tantongco, Ricardo
Tantongco, acting as representative of the legal
heirs of the deceased, wrote a letter to the employees of the La Campana Starch Packing with address at 74-76 Luskot Street, Quezon City,
notifying them that the “LA CAMPANA STARCH PACKING, which is the business
name used in connection with all the business of the deceased Don Ramon Tantongco, is now to be closed on Saturday, September 14,
1957, on the ground that the Intestate Estate Proceedings of the deceased Don
Ramon Tantongco, under Special Proceedings No. Q-1879
of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City is
already closed.”[3]
On August 13, 1957,
the Kaisahan petitioned the CIR for the execution of
its decision of February 18, 1957. Ricardo Tantongco,
however, refused to comply with the writ subsequently issued which directed him
and/or the management of the coffee corporation and the starch packing factory
to reinstate the workers affected in the case and deposit with the CIR the
latter’s backwages which then amounted to P65,534.01,
contending that he was no longer the administrator of the estate of Ramon Tantongco. For this
refusal, the Kaisahan sought to have Ricardo Tantongco declared in contempt of court. The latter thereupon filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with this Court for the purpose of enjoining the CIR
from proceeding with the hearing of the contempt proceedings against him. We, however, denied his petition on September 22, 1959, in the following
terms:
“In conclusion, we find and hold that the La Campana Starch and Food Products Company which stands for
the La Campana Starch and Coffee Factory are entities
distinct from the personality of Ramon Tantongco;
that after the death of Ramon these two entities continued to exist and to
operate under the management of petitioner [referring to Ricardo Tantongco] and that consequently he is the proper person
and official to which the orders of the CIR are addressed and who is
duty bound to comply with the same.
…”[4]
Then, on February 11,
1960, the Kaisahan filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
as prayed for in its motion of August
13, 1957. In this motion,
the Kaisahan also sought to have the name of “La
Campana Food Products, Inc.” included in the
writ, alleging that “the name of the respondent company [obviously
referring to the La Campana Starch and Coffee
Factory] has been changed to La Campana Food
Products, Inc.” Ricardo Tantongco and the La Campana Food Products, Inc. came to know of this motion of
the Kaisahan, however, and accordingly filed a joint
opposition thereto, the former reiterating that he was no longer the
administrator of the estate of Ramon Tantongco, and
the latter, on the ground that it is a “corporation duly organized under
and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines sometime on January 31, 1953 and
had acquired a juridical personality distinct and separate from other entities,
particularly the La Campana Starch and Coffee
Factory.”
Acting on the motion of the Kaisahan,
the Acting Clerk of the CIR issued, on March
8, 1960, the writ of execution prayed for. Pursuant thereto, the Sheriff of Quezon City, on March
10, 1960, levied upon eleven trucks which were claimed by La Campana Food Products, Inc. as its properties. Before the Sheriff could effectuate the
execution of the judgment, however, Ricardo Tantongco
and the La Campana Food Products, Inc., filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the CFI of Quezon City to enjoin the said execution, on the basis of
which, on March 11, 1960,
the CFI issued a temporary restraining order.
On Decemberber 13, 1960, by virtue of this
restraining order, the Sheriff of Quezon City returned
the writ unsatisfied.
In the meantime, on November
10, 1960, the Kaisahan filed with this
Court a petition to declare the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City without jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction and
prohibition against the CIR. On July 20, 1961, we held in this case
that as the CIR is equal in rank to the CFI, the latter cannot issue this kind
of writs against the former.[5]
Before our decision in the above-mentioned case was rendered,
however, the Kaisahan filed another motion for an alias
writ of execution with the CIR for the enforcement of its orders of February 18, 1957 and September 30, 1957, which motion was
granted on May 13, 1961. Pursuant thereto, the Sheriff of Quezon City, on July
28, 1961, levied upon six motor vehicles which were, again,
claimed by the La Campana Food Products, Inc. to be
its properties. The Sheriff scheduled
the sale of these vehicles on August 5,
1961, ignoring the protest of the La Campana
Food Products, Inc.
On August 1, 1961, Ricardo Tantongco
and the La Campana Food Products, Inc., to forestall
the sale, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with this
Court to declare the writ of execution issued on March 8, 1960 by the Acting
Clerk of the CIR and the alias writ of execution issued on July 5, 1961
by the CIR null and void.[6]
Ricardo Tantongco argued that as under our decision
in L-13119, promulgated September 22,
1959, supra, the deceased Ramon Tantongco
was declared not a party respondent to the cases pending before the CIR filed
by the Kaisahan, therefore, the aforesaid writs
should not be directed against him. On
the other hand, the La Campana Food Products, Inc.
contended that it was never a party respondent in any of those cases and hence
should not also be made to respond to the CIR’s
decisions in said cases.
On August 3, 1961,
we resolved this petition as follows:
“After a study of the allegations of the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction filed in case L-18671 (La Campana Food Products, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. S. Bautista,
etc., et al.), with prayer for preliminary injunction, IT IS FOUND that the
petition should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of merit.”
Meanwhile, on the same date that the above decision was rendered,
the Development Bank of the Philippines
filed a third-party claim to the assets of the La Campana
Food Products, Inc., on the basis of a mortgage loan to the said entity. On May 31, 1963 the CIR en banc,
reversing an order of its Presiding Judge, ruled that the lien of the DBP, as a
third-party claimant, should be respected, and that the complainants (referring
to the members of the Kaisahan) should post a bond
in order to effect the sale of the panel trucks which were registered in the
name of the La Campana Food Products, Inc. to protect
the rights of the DBP.
On October 27, 1965,
the CIR, upon motion of the Kaisahan, issued an order
allowing the issuance of a writ of execution against the La Campana
Starch and Coffee Factory and Ricardo Tantongco, as
administrator of the estate of the deceased Ramon Tantongco,
Pursuant thereto, a writ of execution was issued on January 25, 1966.
The Kaisahan, however, later moved for the
amendment of the writ, specifically praying for the “enclosure of La Campana Starch and Coffee Factory, La Campana
Gaugau Packing Co., La Campana
Coffee Factory, Inc., La Campana Food Products, Inc.
and/or Ricardo Tantongco as the parties against whom
the reliefs and remedies delineated in the writ
should be directed and implemented.” This motion was granted by the CIR on
July 3, 1967, and, pursuant
thereto, the Clerk of Court on August
1, 1967, issued an amended writ of execution the pertinent portion
of which reads as follows:
“NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to go to the
premises of the respondents LA CAMPANA STARCH AND COFFEE FACTORY, LA CAMPANA
GAWGAW PACKING COMPANY, LA CAMPANA COFFEE FACTORY, INC., LA CAMPANA FOOD
PRODUCTS AND/OR RICARDO TANTONGCO at 74-76 Luskot, Quezon City and 1326 E. de los
Santos Avenue, Quezon City and reinstate the petitioners
NATIVIDAD MANAHAN, ELIODORA WAYAN, NATIVIDAD WAYAN, TEOFILA MALINAO, ANASTACIO
CARINGAL, TRINIDAD JUNTILA, TRINIDAD ESTRADA, REMEDIOS REFUGIA, ZACARIAS
MALINAO, LORETA BERNABE, BONIFACIO CALDERON,
MARCELO ESTRADA, EXEQUIEL RAPIZ, GERONIMO GALLARDES, ELISEO ABARDALOSA,
RAMONA UY, SALVADOR RICO, HERMOGENA GERONIMO, GENARO LIGUATAN, ANITA RUBELLOS
and TIMOTEO FORONDA to their former jobs or equivalent positions. You are hereby further commanded to collect
from said respondents the amount of P65,534.01 awarded in Case No. 584-V(1),
the amount of P61,770.77 plus P65,006.50 representing the back wages of the
workers in Case No. 584-V from June 16, 1951 to February 28, 1963, and the
amount of P63,588.00 representing back wages of the workers involved in Cases
Nos. 584 V(1), 584-V(3), 584-V(5) and 584V(6) from August 1, 1957 to August
31, 1962, and to turn over the said amounts to this Court for its further
disposition. You must, likewise, require
respondents to sign a statement showing that the above-named petitioners in
these cases have in fact been reinstated.
“Furthermore, you are hereby directed to return this Writ
within fifteen (15) days from compliance therewith, together with your
corresponding report.”
In compliance with the above writ, the Sheriff of Quezon City levied upon several parcels of land (claimed by
La Campana Food Products, Inc. to be exclusively
registered in its name) and scheduled their sale at public auction on November 10, 1967.
On November 9, 1967, one day before the scheduled sale, the La Campana Food Products, Inc. filed with the CIR an urgent
motion for reconsideration of its order of July 3, 1967 on the ground that it
was issued without due process of law as it was made to apply to the La Campana Food Products, Inc. which was never a party in any
of the cases mentioned in the said writ.
It also asked that the projected sale be restrained.
Pending study of the merits of the motion of the La Campana Food Products, Inc., the CIR stayed the prospective
sale. Thereafter, on January 10, 1968, the CIR en banc
denied the said motion for reconsideration, holding that the La Campana Food Products, Inc. “has been, in
contemplation of law as well as by judicial pronouncement particularly in the light
of the Supreme Court’s resolution in G.R. No. L-18671 dated August 3, 1961 dismissing for lack of
merit La Campana’s petition to enjoin the sale of its
assets under the writs of March 8, 1960
and July 5, 1961, a
respondent in the cases at bar whose assets can legally be subjected to
execution.” The CIR likewise ordered the Sheriff to proceed with the sale
of the levied properties.
On June 15, 1968,
the company asked this Court to review this decision of the CIR in L-29031, but
the petition was denied by this Court in a resolution promulgated on June 25, 1968. The company moved for a reconsideration of
this resolution, but subsequently withdrew the same on November 4, 1968, mainly on the ground that
“an evidence newly-discovered came into focus and which is believed and
hoped to alter or change the final outcome of the instant case.”
In the meantime, the La Campana Food
Products, Inc., on October 29, 1968,
received a Second Notice of Sheriff’s Sale
dated October 22, 1968
which informed the company that the real properties priorly
levied upon in 1967 were to be sold at public auction on November 5, 1968.
On October 30, 1968
the company wrote the Sheriff of Quezon City a letter
requesting that the sale be suspended as it had not yet received this Court’s
decision on its motion for reconsideration in L-29031.
On November 4, 1968,
the same day that it withdrew its motion for reconsideration in L-29031, the La
Campana Food Products, Inc. filed a motion with the
CIR praying for a reopening or new trial of the cases previously
adjudicated. A letter concerning this
action of the company was delivered to the Sheriff the following day, with the
request that the sale be held in abeyance until it received the decision of the
CIR on its motion. The Sheriff, however,
went through with the sale just the same on the scheduled date. At the auction, the Kaisahan
appeared as the only bidder, and bought the parcels of land for P255,258.88.
Consequently, the La Campana Food
Products, Inc. filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated November
9, 1968 for annulment of sale with damages with preliminary
injunction against the Kaisahan, the Sheriff of Quezon City and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. On
April 19, 1969, pending adjudication on the merits of this complaint, the
herein respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City issued an order restraining the Sheriff from issuing a certificate of
sale to the Kaisahan and the Register of Deeds from
accepting and/or registering any document in connection with the said sale.
The Kaisahan then filed the petition at
bar, assailing the jurisdiction of the CFI of Quezon
City to take cognizance of the complaint of the La Campana
Food Products, Inc., mainly on the ground that a civil court cannot pass upon,
alter, correct and/ or modify a writ or decree emanating from the Court of
Industrial Relations and that the proper forum in which to quash a writ of
execution is the very court which issued the writ.
The La Campana Food Products, Inc., one
of the respondents herein, contends, on the other hand, that there is nothing
specified in its complaint that it seeks to be reviewed and/or reversed by the
Court of First Instance, much less any order, decision, mandate or any
actuation of the CIR, as it is only the official actuations of the Sheriff in
connection with the sale which are questioned in the said CFI.
The La Campana Food Products, Inc.
maintains that the questioned sale is null and void, for the following reasons:
(a) The properties sold were worth P10 million but were sold for
the unconscionable price of only P255,258.88.
(b) The writ did not authorize the sale as the mandate there is
merely to reinstate the dismissed employees and collect their backwages and to return the same within 15 days from
compliance.
(c) Even if the sale were authorized by the writ, the Sheriff
violated the procedure laid down in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in that –
1) the sale on November 5,
1968 was beyond the 60-day period effectivity
of the writ as provided in Section 11 of Rule 39;
2) the sale made was in violation of Section 18, Rule 39 as the
requirement of posting of notices for 20 days in three public places was not
complied with, because while the Second Notice of Sheriff’s Sale is dated
October 22, 1968, the sale actually took place on November 5, 1968, a
lapse-period of only 14 days, and the notice, moreover, was posted only at one
place;
3) the required newspaper publication was not made because the
first and only newspaper publication for the sale was on October 19 and 26 and
November 2, 1967 for the sale scheduled on November 10, 1967; no such
publication was made for the questioned sale of November 5, 1968; and
4) the Sheriff did not comply with Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, that is, he did not attach a certified copy of the judgment to the
writ.
(d) Lastly, there was no valid levy since the lis
pendens entered in the titles of its
properties is not allowable under the Torrens System and should be stricken out
inasmuch as the basis of the same is an amended writ of execution enforcing a
judgment for reinstatement of employees and back wages, and not against the
titled real properties concerned nor involving the said property (citing
Section 79, Act 496; Section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court; and Biglang-awa vs. Constantino,
L-9965, August 20, 1960).
In the course of the consideration of the instant petition, this
Court received a motion to dismiss from the Kaisahan
dated October 2, 1969, ostensibly in representation and on behalf of the
aggrieved individual members thereof, on the ground that the parties, that is,
the Kaisahan and the La Campana
Food Products, had entered into a compromise agreement settling all existing
disputes between them. In this
agreement, the Kaisahan admits and concedes that (1)
the La Campana Food Products, Inc. has a distinct
legal personality from the La Campana Starch and
Coffee Factory; (2) the award to the Kaisahan by the
CIR has no legal validity against the said foods corporation; (3) the said
foods corporation was never a party to the proceedings before the CIR in the
aforementioned cases; (4) the writ did not authorize the sale of the real
properties of the corporation and, as it has already expired, should be
declared null and void; (5) the notice of levy of execution (which the
respondent corporation prefers to call “lis pendens“) annotated on the certificates of title of
the properties registered in the name of the La Campana
Food Products, Inc. is unlawful and should be cancelled; (6) the CFI of Quezon City has jurisdiction over the annulment case; and
(7) the Kaisahan was in default in the court
below. The Kaisahan
therefore agreed to withdraw the jurisdiction issue now pending before this
Court; the respondent company, on the other hand, waives all claims for damages
against the union.
On October 22, 1969,the Kaisahan
informed this Court through a written manifestation of its incumbent officers
that it had terminated the services of Atty. Antonio B. Abad,
its counsel of record, and that in view of the compromise agreement between
the petitioning union and the respondent company, the Kaisahan
is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case.
On November 15, 1969
some of the laborers directly affected by the adjudications made by the CIR in
the aforementioned cases filed a written manifestation with this Court through
Atty. Antonio B. Abad whereby they declared that they
never authorized the said incumbent officers of the Kaisahan
to intervene or represent them in connection with the said decided labor
cases. They, therefore, prayed that the
motion to dismiss filed by the union be denied.
On February 23, 1970,
for failure of the respondents to submit a reply memorandum as required by us,
we considered the present petition submitted for decision.
1. The first material question that confronts us is whether or
not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over an action predicated upon
certain irregularities in procedure allegedly committed by the Sheriff in the
sale of certain properties where such sale was made pursuant to a writ of
execution issued by the Court of Industrial Relations.
The powers vested by law in the Court of Industrial Relations
include those powers that generally pertain to the courts of justice,[7]
and one of these, as stated more concretely by the Industrial Peace Act,[8]
is the power “To control, in the furtherance of justice, the conduct of
its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with
a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto.” Within the
framework of the facts heretofore mentioned, the Sheriff of Quezon
City was undoubtedly acting solely in his capacity as a ministerial officer of
the CIR. If, therefore, he commits any
error in the procedure or mode of executing his ministerial duties, the power
of control of the CIR over him requires that any question regarding his
actuations in executing the court’s order resulting in prejudice to a party
litigant should be ventilated with the same court. Were we to sanction the taking by the CFI of
jurisdiction over the complaint of the respondent company, we will in effect be
curtailing the effective exercise by the CIR of part of its powers vested by
law. Such a situation undoubtedly cannot be brought about unilaterally by this
Court without express grant of authority by Congress. The proper step, therefore, that the La Campana Food Products, Inc. should have taken, being the
party directly liable to respond to the adjudications of the CIR of November
12, 1956 and February 18, 1957 – its liability thereunder
having been finally determined in the decision of the said court dated January
10, 1968 and affirmed by us in G. R. L-29031, promulgated on June 25, 1968 –
was to file with the CIR either a motion or a separate action to set aside the
said execution sale.[9]
2. We now come to the
motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner union with this Court on October 2, 1969 in relation to its
written manifestation of October 22,
1969.
In our view, the compromise agreement submitted by the petitioner
union as basis for the motion to dismiss is not a proper ground for the
dismissal of the present petition, nor does it bar the prevailing individual
members of the Kaisahan from asking for the
enforcement of the above-mentioned adjudications of the CIR. The admissions made by the Kaisahan through its incumbent officers are pure matters
of law which only the courts can determine with conclusive effect. Indeed, some of the admissions contained
therein have already been finally adjudicated in the previous related
controversies between the parties. Thus,
the admission by the Kaisahan that the La Campana Food Products, Inc. has a distinct legal
personality from the La Campana Starch and Coffee
Factory can no longer be compromised since as determined by us in La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. vs. Kaisahan
Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa La Campana (93 Phil. 161), the gaugau
or starch factory which is known as the La Campana Gaugau Packing and managed by Tan Tong as sole proprietor
is, for purposes of the claim of the Kaisahan, not a
business entity separate and distinct from the La Campana
Coffee Factory, Inc.; and as decided by the CIR in its resolution dated January
10, 1968 and affirmed by us in Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa La Campana vs. La Campana Starch
and Coffee Factory, Inc., et al. (L-29031, June 25, 1968), the assets of
the La Campana Food Products, Inc. can legally be
subjected to execution under the CIR’s adjudications
of November 12, 1956 and February 18, 1957.
Indeed, our own examination of the records of L-29031 shows that the
name “La Campana Food Products, Inc.” came
about only by virtue of an amendment of the articles of incorporation of the
La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on March 23, 1953, by virtue of which the
name of the La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. was
changed to La Campana Food Products, Inc.
The other admission made by the Kaisahan
in the said agreement, to wit, that the notice of levy of execution was unlawful
and that the CFI of Quezon City has jurisdiction over
the annulment case filed by the corporation, are matters which the union
cannot determine for itself since whether or not the said levy of execution was
unlawful depends on what the courts applying the law will have to say about
that issue; and, on the other hand, as to the jurisdiction of the CFI over the
annulment case, the same cannot plainly be conferred by the Kaisahan
upon the said court since only Congress can determine, apart from what the
Constitution provides, which court has what jurisdiction over what matters and
subjects. Moreover, as we have stated
earlier, the CFI of Quezon City has no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the said annulment case.
The said compromise agreement, therefore, cannot be considered
binding against the Kaisahan. For the same reason, the corporation cannot
also be considered bound by its pledge to waive its claim for damages, if there
be any due from the union arising out of the sale of the corporation’s
properties.
Regarding the union’s manifestation that it is no longer
interested in the prosecution of the case against the La Campana
Food Products, Inc., suffice it to say that, as held by us in a case decided
recently,[10]
this is not a sufficient reason for dismissing the claim of the union against
the employer. “The labor union as a
body in reality has not so great a material interest in the controversy as
would prejudice it in the event of dismissal.” It is, indeed, the prevailing
union members for whose benefit the unfair labor practice case was prosecuted
to a successful conclusion who stand to suffer tremendous losses.
The recognition of the right of working men to join, or assist in
the formation of, an association for the purpose of demanding reasonable
concessions from their employer, and of their legitimate aspiration to work and
live decently, did not come by an Aladdin’s lamp. No greater perfidy can be conceived than that
after a union has emerged victor in a bitterly-fought struggle, its officers,
by the simple expedient of a stroke of the pen, become particeps
criminis in the betrayal of the union’s
aggrieved members.
3. As to the termination of
the services of Atty. Antonio B. Abad to represent
the Kaisahan in the present case and in any
subsequent case in which the Kaisahan may be involved
against the La Campana Food Products, Inc., it must
be emphasized that the laborers in whose favor the decisions of the CIR were
rendered and which are now final and executory, manifested
to this Court that they never authorized the incumbent officers of the Kaisahan to intervene or represent them in connection with
the said decided labor disputes. In view
of the lack of interest of the Kaisahan which is
acting as a representative party for and in behalf of its members, to face the
La Campana Food Products, Inc. in court for the final
settlement of the said decided labor cases, the proper procedure to follow in
any related cases that may arise as a result of the said decisions, is for the
affected laborers to be made parties thereto in accordance with Section 3,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Court of First Instance of Quezon City, being without jurisdiction to try, hear and decide
civil case Q-12580, is hereby directed forthwith to dismiss the said case; and
the compromise agreement between the Kaisahan and
the La Campana Food Products, Inc. is hereby declared
null and void. Costs against the La Campana Food Products, Inc.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Dizon and
Makasiar, JJ., on
official leave.
[1]
La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. vs. Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa La Campana, L-5677, May
25, 1953, 93 Phil. 161, 165.
[2]
Ricardo Tantongco vs. Kaisahan
Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa La Campana, L-13119, Sept.
22, 1959, 106 Phil. 199, 202.
[3]
Annex B of “Additional Arguments to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of July 3, 1967, etc., Filed by the Third Party Claimant, Dated
November 8, 1967” dated November 20, 1967, filed by the La Campana Food Products, Inc. and forming part of the
records in L-29031, June 25, 1968. A similar notice (Annex E. Ibid.)
was also sent to the City Treasurer of Quezon City.
This letter captioned “La Campana Starch
Packing” with address at 74-76 Luskot St., Espana Extension, Quezon City
reads in part as follows: “This is
to inform you that the business conducted under the business name and style of
LA CAMPANA STARCH PACKING with factory and business address at 74-76 Luskot, St., Q.C. and owned and operated by the deceased,
Ramon Tantongco which was inherited by all his legal
heirs, will close its business on or about September 14, 1957.”
[4]
Ricardo Tantongco vs. Kaisahan
Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa La Campana, et al., L-13119, Sept. 22, 1959, 106 Phil. 199, 206.
[5] Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa La Campana (KKM) vs.
Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, et
al., L-17692, July 20, 1961,
2 SCRA 806.
[6]
La Campana Food Products, Inc., et al. vs.
Hon. Jose S. Bautista, et al., L-18671, August
3, 1961.
[7]
See Section 20, C.A.
103.
[8]
See Section 5(e), R.A. 875 in relation to Section 5, Rule 135 of the
Rules of Court.
[9]
See Jalandoni vs. Ledesma,
et al., 64 Phil. 1058 (1936); Hamoy vs. Batingalo, L-18119, August
30, 1962.
[10]
La Campana Food Products, Inc. vs. CIR,
L-27907, May 22, 1969, 28
SCRA 314, 323.