VICTORIA AGUINALDO AND SIMEONA AGUINALDO, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. SEGUNDO AGUINALDO (DECEASED), PRIMO AGUINALDO AND RUFINA AGUINALDO, DEFENDANTS. CECILIO AGUINALDO, ANASTACIA …

Any effort on the part of a litigant to delay, if not to defeat,
the enforcement of a final judgment, executory in
character, by raising an objection that at best hardly rises to the level of a
technicality is not likely to elicit the sympathy of this Court or of any court
for that matter.  Yet, in effect, that is
what the move taken by defendants in this case amounted to.  The lower court as was but proper did not
lend its approval.  Still undeterred,
they would appeal.  They ought to have
known better.  There is no reason to
refuse affirmance to the order of the lower court com­plained
of, appointing appellants as legal representatives of the deceased defendant
and substituted in his place pursuant to the Rules of Court in order that the
execution that ought to have taken place long since could at long last be
effected.

There is no dispute as to the antecedents.  On January 14, 1965, the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch II through its clerk
issued a writ of execution reciting that as far back as March 31, 1958, it
rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs,^[1]
now appellees, requiring one of the defendants
therein, Segundo Aguinaldo, to reconvey
one-fourth (1/4) pro-indiviso of the property in
litigation to appellees, and to pay the latter the
amount of P300.00 yearly beginning with the year 1955.  There was an appeal.  The decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals on May 23, 1965.  It was further set forth therein that on January 5, 1965, a motion for its
execution was granted.  Hence the writ of
execution.  On February 13 of the same
year, one Cecilio Aguinaldo
filed an urgent ex parte manifestation and motion to
quash such writ of execution based primarily on the allegation that defendant
Segundo Aguinaldo died on August 7, 1959 during the pendency
of such appeal.  There was an opposition
to such motion on February 25, 1965, inviting attention to Sec. 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court to the effect that in the event of the death of a party to a
pending case, it is the duty of his attorney to give the name and residence of
his executor, administrator, guardian, or their legal representative and
alleging that there was a failure on the part of counsel to comply with the
above provision.  The prayer was for the
denial of the motion of Cecilio Aguinaldo
and for an order requiring counsel for the defendants to furnish the court the
names as well as the residences of the heirs or legal representatives of the
deceased in order that they could be substituted in his stead so as not to
render nugatory a decision, final and executory in
character.  On March 4, 1965, the lower court, then presided by
the Hon. Ricardo C. Puno, gave counsel of record up
to March 22, 1965 within
which to submit the name and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian
or other legal representative of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo.  The aforesaid counsel in turn merely
manifested on March 23, 1965 that he had ceased to be such as of May 31, 1956,
and that such a pleading be considered sufficient compliance with the aforesaid
order.  Considering the turn of events,
plaintiffs, in order that such a decision in their favor be not rendered
nugatory by the above technicality, had no choice but to ask the court in a
motion of April 7, 1965 to have the heirs of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo, defendants Cecilio, Anastacia, Simplicio and Domingo,
all bearing the surname of Aguinaldo being the
legitimate children, and one Felicitas Bagawisan, a granddaughter, substituted as defendants.  On October 5, 1965, the lower court, this
time presided by Judge Andres Sta. Maria, granted the aforesaid motion and
substituted defendants in place of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo.

Hence this appeal to the Court of Appeals, which in turn by
resolution of February 17, 1969
certified the matter to this Court, the question involved being one of
law.  As noted at the outset, we find for
appellees.

1.  It would be the height
of unreason to impute error to the lower court precisely for embodying in the
order complained of what is set forth in the Rules of Court.  Thus: 
“Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or
incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly
of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to
give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other
legal representative.”^[2]
Had the defendant, thereafter deceased, seen to it that a new counsel was
appointed, then upon his death there could be compliance with the above
provision.  To cause plaintiffs to suffer
for such neglect of duty is to cast an undeserved reflection on the law.  It is equally vital to remember that the
judgment had become final and the stage of execution reached.  Defendants cannot be heard to allege that it
is much too late now to apply the above rule. 
That would be to set at naught the principle consistently adhered to by
this Court.

It was succinctly put in Amor v. Jugo^[3]
in these words:  “And with more
compelling reason the respondent court cannot refuse to issue such writ, or
quash it or order its stay, when the judgment had been reviewed and affirmed by
an appellate court, for it cannot review or interfere with any matter decided
on appeal, or give other or further relief, or assume supervisory jurisdiction
to interpret or reverse the judgment of the higher court.”^[4]
What was said by us in Li Kim Tho v. Sanchez^[5]
is worth recalling:  “Litigation
must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of
the fruits of the verdict.  Courts must
therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result.  Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.”^[6]
An excerpt from Villaflor v. Reyes^[7]
is equally relevant:  “There should
be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary,
much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by
efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the
clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite
obvious and indisputable.”^[8]

2. This appeal, moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an
insubstantial objection bereft of any persuasive force.  Defendants had to display ingenuity to
conjure a technicality.  From Alonso v. Villamor,^[9] a
1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to our disapproval of such a
practice.  The aim of a lawsuit is to
render justice to the parties according to law. 
Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective.  Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to
pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation.  We have done so before.  We do so again.

WHEREFORE, the order of October 5, 1965 is affirmed.  This decision is immediately executory.  Treble
costs against defendants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Teehankee, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Dizon and
Makasiar, JJ., on
official leave.

^[1]
Plaintiffs are Victoria Aguinaldo and Simeona Aguinaldo.

^[2]
Sec. 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court.

^[3]
77 Phil. 703 (1946). Cf. Shioji v. Harvey, 43
Phil. 333 (1922); Cabigao v. Del Rosario, 44
Phil. 182 (1922); Philippine Trust Co. v. Santamaria,
53 Phil. 463 (1929).

^[4] Ibid,
p. 707.

^[5]
82 Phil. 776 (1949).

^[6] Ibid,
p. 778.

^[7]
L-23702, January 30, 1968, 22 SCRA 385.

^[8] Ibid,
p. 394.

^[9]
16 Phil. 315. Cf. Blanco v. Bernabe, 63 Phil.
124 (1936); Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 (1949); Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156
(1958); McEntee v. Manotok,
L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272; Urbayan v.
Caltex (Phil.), L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016; Udan v. Amon, L-24288, May
28, 1968, 23 SCRA 837; Palma v. Oreta, L-27807, Aug.
31, 1970.