G.R. No. L-23272. November 26, 1970
JOSE F. ZAMORA (GOLDEN TAXICAB), PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENTS.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal taken by petitioner Jose F. Zamora from a decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals upholding an assessment made against him by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue – hereinafter referred to as Respondent – in
the sum of P23,103.85, as deficiency compensating tax, and ordering him to pay
the same, as well as from a resolution of said Court denying Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision.
It appears that, in February 1958, Petitioner, who owns and
operates a fleet of taxicabs known as Golden Taxicab, imported fifteen (15)
units of Ford Consul Sedan, in completely knocked down (CKD) parts, for the use
of his company. The importation was
released from customs’ custody upon payment by Petitioner of 7% of the gross
selling price or value of the imported parts, as compensating tax thereon, and
the filing of a bond to guarantee the payment of deficiency tax, in the event
the shipment is subject to a 50% compensating tax. Sometime later, Respondent notified the
Petitioner that the rate imposable upon his importation is 50% and requested
settlement of the deficiency tax on the shipment in question, in such amount
as may be computed by the Bureau of Customs.
A reconsideration of the action thus taken by Respondent having been denied,
Petitioner appealed, on January 7, 1960,
to the Court of Tax Appeals. During the pendency of such appeal, or on February 15, 1961, Respondent assessed and
demanded from Petitioner the payment of P23,103.85, as deficiency compensating
tax on the aforementioned shipment, computed at the rate of 50% of its
aforementioned value. In due course,
thereafter, said Court rendered its decision upholding the contested assessment
and ordering Petitioner to pay the sum of P23,103.85, as deficiency compensating
tax. His motion for reconsideration of
said decision having been denied, Petitioner filed the present petition for
review.
The only question for our determination is whether the rate of
compensating tax applicable to the importation in question is 50 per centum
of the gross money value thereof, as prescribed in Section 184(a) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, or 7 per centum of said value, as
provided in Section 186 of the same Code.
At the time material to the case at bar, the pertinent parts of these
sections read as follows:
“SEC. 184. Percentage tax on sales of jewelry, automobiles,
toilet preparations and others.- There shall be levied, assessed, and
collected once only on every original sale, barter, exchange, or similar
transaction for nominal or valuable considerations intended to transfer
ownership of, or title to, the articles herein below enumerated a tax equivalent
to 50% of the gross value in money of the articles so sold, bartered,
exchanged, or transferred, such tax to be paid by the manufacturer or
producer: x x x.
“a) Automobile chassis and bodies, the selling price of which
does not exceed seven thousand pesos; Provided, That where the selling
price of an automobile exceeds seven thousand pesos but does not exceed ten
thousand pesos the same shall be taxed at the rate of seventy-five per centum
of such selling price: And provided,
further, That where the selling price of an automobile exceeds ten
thousand pesos the same shall be taxed at the rate of one hundred per centum
of such selling price. A sale of automobile shall, for the purpose
of this section, be considered to be a sale of the chassis and of the body
together with parts and accessories with which the same are usually equipped: Provided, however, That parts and
accessories of automobiles imported as replacements or as completely knocked
down parts as well as locally manufactured parts and accessories for the
assembly of automobiles shall be subject to tax under section one hundred and
eighty-six: And provided,
further, That the total cost of such materials or parts on which tax has
already been paid under section one hundred and eighty-six, as duly
established, shall be deductible from the gross selling price or gross value in
money of the assembled or manufactured articles: x x x.”
“SEC. 186. Percentage tax on sales of other articles. –
There shall be levied, assessed and collected once only on every original sale,
barter, exchange, and similar transaction either for nominal or valuable
considerations, intended to transfer ownership of, or title to, the articles
not enumerated in sections one hundred and eighty-four and one hundred and
eighty-five, a tax equivalent to seven per centum of the gross
selling price or gross value in money of the articles so sold, bartered,
exchanged, or transferred, such tax to be paid by the manufacturer or
producer: Provided, That where
the articles subject to tax under this section are manufactured out of
materials likewise subject to tax under this section and section one hundred
and eighty-nine, the total cost of such materials, as duly established, shall
be deductible from the gross selling price or gross value in money of such
manufactured articles. x x x.”
It is urged that the theory of Respondent, adopted by the Court
of Tax Appeals – to the effect that, insofar as automobile parts and
accessories are concerned, the rate of 7 per centum prescribed in
Section 186 applies only to importers engaged in the manufacture or assembly of
automobiles – is untenable, because importations similar to those involved in
the present case, made by the Petitioner in the past, had uniformly been
subjected to said rate, and because, in making the importation in dispute, he
had relied on General Circular No. V-208 of the then Bureau of Internal Revenue,
dated May 24, 1956, which is of the following tenor:
“GENERAL CIRCULAR NO.
V-208
“To all internal revenue officers
and others concerned:
“For the information and guidance of all internal revenue
officers and others concerned, there is quoted hereunder an opinion of the
Secretary of Finance contained in his letter to this Office dated May 24, 1956,
regarding the advance sales tax collectible on importations of automobile,
whether already assembled or chassis and bodies ready for mounting under sections
184 and 186 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as follows:
‘With reference to my letter to you dated February 24, 1956,
regarding the advanced sales taxes which are applicable to imported
automobiles, I wish to clarify and reiterate my view that importations of
assembled automobiles for resale as well as importations of chassis and bodies
ready for mounting, are subject to the advanced sales taxes prescribed under
sections 184 and 185 of the Tax Code.
‘It should be carefully noted that this refers to importations of
automobiles already assembled and chassis and bodies ready for mounting. This does not refer to importations of parts
and accessories for replacement or maintenance of automobiles or CKD component
parts for the manufacture of automobiles.
Such parts and accessories of automobiles are imported as raw materials
and not as automobiles, and are consequently subject only to 7% sales tax
under section 186 of the Tax Code. The
importation of automobile chassis and/or bodies ready for mounting, however,
is to be considered as importation of automobiles and not of parts and
accessories as may be inferred from section 184(a) of the Tax Code.
‘For the purposes of this letter, chassis and bodies may be defined
as follows:
‘(1) Chassis as applied to a motor car means: ‘The rectangular metal framework, as
distinguished from its body and seats, but including its accessories for
propulsion, as the tanks, motor, etc., and general running gear.’ (Kansas City
Automobile School Co. vs. Holcker Elberg
Mfg. Co., No., 182 S.W. 759,761).
‘(2) Body as applied to a motor car means: “The metal shell, interior trim, seats,
cowl, hood, fenders, grille, doors, windows and windshield, etc. ‘
‘When a car is manufactured out of imported materials (parts and
accessories), it shall be subject to the quarterly sales tax prescribed under
either section 184 or section 185 of the Tax Code, after proper deductions have
been allowed for the total cost of the parts and accessories on which sales tax
had already been paid.
‘Importations of automobiles, whether already assembled or chassis
and bodies ready for mounting, come under sections 184 and 185. Importations of automobile parts and
accessories and CKD component parts come under section 186.
‘Please be guided accordingly in the implementation of my letter
referred to above.’
“In view of the aforequoted opinion
of the Secretary of Finance, imported automobiles, whether already assembled
or chassis and bodies ready for mounting, shall be subject to the advance sales
tax prescribed by sections 184 and 185 of the National Internal Revenue Code
based on the landed cost thereof, plus the corresponding mark up established by
section 183 (B) of the same Code.
However, importations of automobile parts and accessories for replacement or maintenance of automobiles of
CKD component parts for the manufacture of automobiles shall be subject to the
advance sales tax prescribed by section 186 of the National Internal Revenue
Code based on the landed cost thereof, plus the 25% mark-up established by
section 183 (B) of the same Code. When a
car is manufactured out of imported materials (parts and accessories), the
gross selling price of the manufactured car, after proper deductions shall
have been allowed for the total cost of the parts and accessories on which the
advance sales tax has already been paid, shall be subject to the rate of the
tax prescribed by sections 184 and 185 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
“x x
x x x x x x x.”
This circular does not, however, bear out Petitioner’s
pretense. Indeed, as explicitly stated
in the circular:
“xxx I wish to clarify and reiterate my view that importations
of assembled automobiles for resale as well as importations of chassis and
bodies ready for mounting, are subject to the advanced sales taxes prescribed
under sections 184 and 185 of the Tax Code.
“It should be carefully noted that this refers to importations
of automobiles already assembled and chassis and bodies ready for mounting. This does not refer to importations of
parts and accessories or CKD component parts for the manufacture of
automobiles. x x
x.”
“x x x (I)mportations of automobile parts and accessories for
replacement or maintenance of automobiles of CKD component parts for the
manufacture of automobiles shall be subject to the advance sales tax
prescribed by section 186 of the National Internal Revenue Code based on
the landed cost thereof, plus the 25% mark-up established by section 183(B)
of the same Code.”[1]
It is not contended by Petitioner that the shipment in question
has been imported “for the manufacture of automobiles.” Accordingly,
he was not justified in relying upon the circular in support of his
contention.
Upon the other hand, in his opinion No. 44, Series of 1963, the
Secretary of Justice expressed the following view:
“The Bureau of Internal Revenue holds the view that the
reduced 7% sales tax rate may be availed of only by car assemblers and
manufacturers who import parts and accessories for the purpose of
assembling cars and that where the said parts and accessories are imported
by one who is not an assembler or manufacturer the tax that should be
paid is the usual rate of 50%, but where the importer is also the
end-user, as in the instant case, the tax due is the compensating and not
the advance sales tax. On the other
hand, the Munoz (Hi) Motors, Inc., asserts that the importation in question
should be entitled to the reduced tax rate of 7% on the ground that it comes
within the purview of the underscored proviso of section 184(a) there being an
importation of completely knocked-down parts intended for the assembly of
automobiles.
“After an examination of the above-quoted provisions, we have
come to the conclusion that the view of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is the correct
one. According to the first
paragraph of section 184 ‘such tax to [shall] be paid by the manufacturer
or producer’. Hence, the reduced tax
payable pursuant to the proviso under consideration of paragraph (a) of the
same section should be deemed to have been provided for the benefit of the
said ‘manufacturer or producer‘.
“This view finds ample support in the conference report,
quoted below, of the committee which prepared House Bill No. 5809 (now Republic
Act No. 1612):
‘Report consolidates into one paragraph all provisions covering tax
on automobile chassis and bodies, so as to avoid confusion in the manner and
rate of taxing locally-assembled cars.
With that, Mr. President, there has been confusion in the manner of imposing
tax on assembled cars here. The spare
parts were made to pay taxes, and when the assembled cars were sold, a luxury
tax is imposed on the assembled cars, so that in effect, the industry is
paying two kinds of taxes. With this
conference report, we consolidated all these provisions, so that the tax
paid on spare parts are deductible when these parts are assembled into finished
cars. Otherwise, the assembling industry
here would be paying two kinds of taxes, which is contrary to the basic
philosophy of our taxation system; and second, with that kind of double taxation,
these cars would have to be sold at exorbitant prices. x x
x ‘ (Senate Congressional Record, July 11, 1956, p.
305; Underscoring supplied.)’
“It is quite evident that it was the legislative purpose to do
away with the practice then prevalent in taxing twice locally assembled
cars. A tax was collected initially on
the spare parts and accessories, and another on the assembled car when it was
sold. Pursuant to the amendment, the tax
paid on the spare parts and accessories would be ‘deductible when these parts
are assembled into finished cars’. End-users
who are not car assemblers or manufacturers do not fall within the purview of
this amendment since they would be required to pay only the tax assessable on
the CKD parts and accessories.
“Besides, the interpretation urged by the Munoz (Hi) Motors,
Inc., would result in gross inequality in the taxation of the same
article. A car locally manufactured from
spare parts and accessories imported by one who is not an assembler or manufacturer,
would be subject only to the 7% tax and no more. On the other hand, if the spare parts were
imported by an assembler or manufacturer, besides being subject to the 7% tax,
the difference in value between the spare parts and the finished product would
still be subject to the regular rate of tax, 50% or more, as the case may
be. This is a situation which could not
have been within the legislative contemplation.
Furthermore, this would indirectly open the door to circumvention of
the law by the simple expedient of making it appear that the end-user, and not the assembler or manufacturer, is
the importer of the spare parts and accessories.
“It is stated that
during the era of import and exchange controls the Central Bank limited the importation
of CKD units to car assemblers and
did not allow their importation by ordinary importers and end-users. (See letter of Munoz (Hi) Motors, Inc. to the
BIR, dated July 18, 1962.) This bolsters the conclusion that the reduced tax
rate of 7% may be availed of only by importers who are car assemblers or
manufacturers. Republic Act No. 1612
was passed during this time of controls and statutes should be construed in the
light of contemporary events existing at the time of their passage and not in
the light of subsequent events. (See 82
CJS 739-743; 50 Am. Jur. 276-277.)”[2]
It is argued that section 190 of the National Internal Revenue
Code “does not make a distinction between an importer who is a
manufacturer or car assembler and an importer who is not a manufacturer or
assembler. ” However, “parts
and accessories of automobiles” are subject to the 7% rate, under section
186, by virtue only of the first proviso in subdivision (a) of section 184,
which limits the application of said section 186 to “parts and accessories
of automobiles imported as replacements or as completely knocked down parts for
the assembly of automobiles x x x . ” Indeed, this qualification is in consonance with
the spirit and letter of section 186, which provides that the rate therein
fixed shall be “paid by the manufacturer or producer.” In
other words, it is not intended for the end-user or consumer. There would have been no reason to insert the
aforementioned qualification, and the same would not have been made, had the
purpose of the proviso been to apply section 186 to the importation of parts
and accessories of automobiles as completely knocked down parts, regardless of
whether or not the importer was an automobile manufacturer or assembler. The view taken in the appealed decision is
further bolstered up by the subsequent proviso, in section 184(a), to the
effect that “the total cost of such materials or parts on which tax has
already been paid under section one hundred and eighty-six x x x shall be deductible from the gross
selling price or gross value in money of the assembled or manufactured
articles x x x.”
Then, too, it is not difficult to understand why the application
of the 7 per centum rate was limited only to importations made by
those engaged in the manufacture and assembly of automobiles – the Government
wanted to encourage the establishment of factories or plants for the
manufacture or assembly of automobiles in the Philippines, to increase job
opportunities for local laborers and mechanics and reduce the drain on our
dollar reserve resulting from the purchase of foreign-made automobiles.
Needless to say, the 7% compensating tax applied to previous
similar importations of the
Petitioner is not and cannot be controlling in the case at bar. Well-settled is the rule that errors
committed by public officers can not be set up as estoppel
against the Government or bar its future action in accordance with law.[3]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with
costs against Petitioner herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Dizon and
Makasiar, JJ., on
leave.
[1]
Underscoring ours.
[2]
Underscoring ours.
[3]
Government v. Monte de Piedad,
35 Phil. 728; Pineda v. Court of First Instance, 52 Phil. 803; Estate of
de la Viña v. Government, 65 Phil. 262; Cu Unjieng v. Board of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 1; Hilado v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 100 Phil.
288, 295; Canlubang v. Standard Alcohol Co.,
L-10887, April 16, 1958; Genato v. Court of
Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615, 621; Philippine American Drug Co. v.
Collector of Internal Revenue, 106 Phil. 161, 167-168; Lewin
v. Galang, 60 O.G. 7366; Visayan
Cebu Terminal Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, L-19530 & L-19444, Feb. 27, 1965.