MARTIN LANTACO, SR., ESTEBAN DEL BARRIO, ROSALITO ALAMAG AND BORROMEO VITALIANO, COMPLAINANTS, VS. CITY JUDGE  FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, RESPONDENT.

This is a verified letter-complaint dated August 7, 1975 addressed
to the President of the Philippines (by 1st Indorsement,
dated August 25, 1975, this case was referred by the Office of the President to
this Court, pursuant to Section 7, Article X of the Constitution), by jeepney drivers Martin Lantaco,
Sr., Esteban del Barrio, Rosalito Alamag
and Borromeo Vitaliano, all
residents of Pasay City, against City Judge Francisco
R. Llamas of the Pasay City Court for
“Backsliding and Grave Abuse of Discretion.”

On January 8, 1975,
an investigating special counsel of the City Fiscal’s
Office of Pasay City, filed
Criminal Cases Nos. 95647, 95648, 95649 and 95650, all for estafa
against Ricardo Paredes, an officer of the PASCAMASCON, an association of jeep­ney
operators, for “nonremittance of SSS contribution premiums.” These cases were assigned
to respondent.  After the prosecution had
rested its case, the defense moved to dismiss all the criminal cases on the
ground that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to convict
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.  The
prosecution opposed the motion. 
According to the complainants, the respondent set the promulgation of
his decision on July 22, 1975, postponed to July 30, 1975 and again to July 31,
1975, when at about 9:45 in the morning, upon respondent’s instruc­tion, his
clerk of court read the dispositive portion thereof
acquitting the accused of all four estafa cases on
the ground of reasonable doubt.

According to the herein complainants:

“After the reading of (the) Decision a recess was made by
Judge Llamas and we requested Judge Llamas to furnish us a copy of said
Decision.  Judge Llamas told us that
there are no more copy and we told Judge Llamas if there is no more copy we
would like to xerox the original and Judge Llamas
told us that xerox copy are not permitted and Judge
Llamas in­structed one of the employees in his office – a steno- typist to type
another copy for us and that the typist told us to come back on Monday, August
4, which we did, but, the steno-typist failed to furnish us the copy as agreed
by us and told us again to come back next day, August 5.  The next morning we went back to the office
of Judge Llamas, same we failed
to get copy of the Decision.

“On August 6, 1975
at 11:00 A.M. one of the
complainants, Esteban del Barrio and Ceferino F. Ginete, the President of our labor union went to Judge
Llamas to secure copy of said decision to (sic) the same person – the
steno-typist.  The steno-typist went
inside the room of Judge Llamas and a few minutes the typist went back to us
and informed us that he could not type the Decision because the folder is at
the house of Judge Llamas and when Mr. Ginete inquire
why the said folder of the complainants are at the house of Judge Llamas, the
typist reply the Judge making ‘CORRECTION.’ Mr. Ginete
wonder why a correction is being made when the
decision has already been rendered and why the delay in fur­nishing us copy,
WHY?”

This Court required the respondent to comment on the complaint by
2nd Indorsement dated September 16, 1975. 
This Court also sent by registered mails a follow-up letter dated October 23, 1975 and a tracer letter
dated November 25, 1975.  The Bureau of Posts in a certification dated November 26, 1975 certified that
these follow-up letters were delivered to and received by the office of the
respondent.

Finally, on March 8, 1976
this Court received respondent’s comment dated December 3, 1975. 
His brief comment:

“The four related criminal accusa­tions against Mr. Ricardo Paredes,
were validly and properly decided by this Court.  The motion to dismiss after the prosecution’s
case was rested, was resolved and said resolution of
acquittal is the very decision in this case which was validly promulgated in
the presence of the accused, the prosecuting fiscal and Mr. Severino
Ginete and all the complaining parties.  The records of the decision
show that the accused assisted by counsel signed the same on said date and
copies thereafter furnished counsel for the accused and the prosecuting
fiscal.”

Respondent also averred:

“It is respectfully submitted that on the details of the
proceedings and the evidence presented, no better answer could be made by the
undersigned except by submitting a copy of said decision pormulgated
July 31, 1975 and marked as Annex ‘A’ of this comment.  In the same breath, the matter of the
advisa­bility as suggested that this finding by this Court be reviewed by the
Military may best be answered by a thorough read­ing of the decision.”

After a careful examination of the records before this Court, We
found that respondent committed grave abuse of authority in refusing to give
the complainants a copy of his decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 95647­-95650.  The complainants were understandably
interested in securing a copy of the decision as they were the complaining
witnesses in these four criminal cases. 
The request was made during office hours.  It was relayed personally to the
respondent.  The decision in question was
already promulgated.  Copies were already
furnished the counsel for the prosecution and the defense.  It was already part of the public record
which the citizen has a right to scrutinize. 
And if there was “no more copy,” the complainants were
amenable to have a xerox copy of the original on
file, copies of which, as part of court records, are allowed to be given to
interested parties upon request, duly certified as a true copy of the original
on file.  What aggravates the situation,
as seen from the sequence of events narrated by the complainants which were never denied or rebutted by the respondent, is
that respondent, without just cause, denied complainants access to public
records and gave the complainants the run-around, which is oppressive as it is
arbitrary.  In Baldoza
vs. Honor­able Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano (A.M. No.
112-MJ, May 5, 1976), WE emphasized the importance of access to public records,
predicated as it is on the right of the people to acquire information on
matters of public concern in which the public has a legitimate interest.  While the public officers in custody or
control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which
such records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such
discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit such access,
inspection, examination or copying.

Continuing, said this Court:

“The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people
are entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly
granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law (Article
IV, Section 6, New Constitution).  The incorporation of this right in the
Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role
of free exchange of information in a democracy.  There can be no realistic perception by the
public of the nation’s problems, nor a meaningful
democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general
interest.  Information is needed to
enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times.  As has been aptly observed:  ‘Maintaining the flow of such information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemina­tion since, if
either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.’ (87 Harvard Law Review 1505)” [Baldoza vs.
Hon. Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, A.M. No. 112-MJ, May 5, 1976].

The herein complainants
prayed that respondent’s decision be reviewed “to obviate any miscarriage
of justice considering the adverse effects to the thousands of jeepney drivers and to prevent the other jeepney operators in using (sic) the Decision x x x for their own benefits.”
The respondent commented that “no better answer could be made x x except by submitting a copy of the decision” and the
complaint “may best be answered by a thorough reading of the
decision.”

OUR “review” in
administrative cases of this nature as defined in Vda.
de Zabala vs. Pamaran (A.C. No. 200-J, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 430, 433), is
limited to the text of the decision and respondent’s articulations on the law
and the evidence submitted.  WE do not
review the decision to reverse it or to set it aside as if it were brought to
this Court on regular appeal; for this is beyond the objective of an
administrative proceedings to protect the public service, to secure the
faithful and efficient performance of official functions, and to rid the public
service of incompetent, corrupt and unworthy public servants.

WE have carefully read, examined and analyzed the decision
submitted by the respondent.  WE found
that in sustaining the motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence after the prosecution rested its case, respondent committed several
errors bordering on gross ignorance of the law.

I.   Respondent erred in
concluding that the prose­cution failed to prove that the accused, despite
repeated demands, refused and still refuses to remit the alleged collected
premium contributions and that “if no demand was ever made x x, then a criminal prosecution for estafa
x x x could not
prosper.”

The uniform allegation in all the four informa­tions
for estafa that “the accused, despite repeated
demands, refused and still refuses to remit x x x,” need not anymore be proved by the prosecution;
because the Social Security Act of 1954 (R.A. No.
1161, as amended by R.A. No. 1792, No. 2658 and No.
3839, and further amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 24, 65 and 177), makes
it the duty of the employer to remit the contributions without need of any
demand therefor by the employee.  Section 22(a), (b), (c) and (d) of said Act,
governing “Remittance of Contributions” requires as a legal
obligation of every employer to remit within the first seven (7) days of the
month the contributions of the employee and the employer to the Social Security
System, failing which invites the imposition of a penalty of three percent
(3%).  With this mandate of the law,
demand on the part of the employee before the employer remits these contri­butions
to the SSS is not a condition precedent for such
remittance.  The Social Security System
can collect such contributions in the same manner as taxes are made collectible
under the National Internal Revenue Code (Sec. 22 [b], Social Security
Act).  Thus:

“SEC. 22.  Remittance of
contributions. – (a) The contributions imposed in the pro­ceeding
sections shall be remitted to the SSS within the first seven days of each calendar
month following the month for which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may
prescribe.  Every employer required to
deduct and to remit such contributions shall be liable for their payment,
and if any contribution is not paid to the SSS, as
herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution a penalty thereon
of three per cent per month from the date the contribution falls due until
paid.  If deemed expedient and
advisable by the Commission, the collection and remittance of contribu­tions
shall be made quarterly or semi­annually in advance, the contributions payable by the employees to be advanced by their respective employers: 
Provided, That upon separation of an employee,
any contributions so paid in advance but not due shall be credited or refunded
to his employer.

“(b)  The contributions payable under this
Act in cases where an employer refuses or neglects to pay the same shall be collected by the System in the
same manner as taxes are made collectible under the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended.  Failure or refusal of the employer to pay
or remit the contribu­tions herein prescribed shall not prejudice the right of
the covered employee to the benefits of the coverage.

xx                     xx                     xx                     xx

“(e)  For purposes of this section, any employer who
is delinquent or has not remitted all the monthly contributions due and payable
may within six (6) months from approval of this amendatory act remit said
contributions to the SSS and submit the corresponding
collection lists therefor without incurring the
prescribed three per cent penalty.  In
case the employer fails to remit to the SSS the said
contributions within the six months
grace period, the penalty of
three per cent shall be imposed from the time the contributions first became
due as provided in paragraph
(a) of this section:  Provided, however,
That the Administrator, may in meritorious cases, allow employers who have submitted a payment plan, on or before
April 19, 1973, to pay their contributions due and payable up to December 31,
1973 without incurring the prescribed three per cent penalty.” (As amended
by Rep. Act No. 2658, and by Pres. Decrees Nos. 24 and
177).

To prove remittance, the employer can submit his records thereon
or a certification from the SSS as to the fact of
remittance of the contributions.

II.  Respondent likewise
erred in concluding that, in connection with the daily deductions of P0.50 as SSS
premium contributions, “this Court is not convinced and could not
reasonably believe that there was a forced daily deductions or exaction of P0.50.”

Section 18 of the Social Security Act governing employees’
contribution, provides that “x x the employer
shall deduct and withhold from such employee’s monthly salary, wage,
compensation or earnings the employee’s contribution in an amount
corresponding to his salary, wage, compensation or earnings during the month in
accordance with the following schedule effective on January 1, 1973 x x.” With this legal obligation placed on the
employer’s shoulder, respondent’s reasonable belief that “there was or could be no forced daily deductions
or exaction of P0.50” would have no legal basis and support.

III.  Respondent again erred
in finding “that from the existing relationship between the accused as
owner of the utility jeepneys and all the
complainants, there is categorically demonstrated no employer-employee
relationship in contemplation of the Social Security Act of 1954, as amended by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 24, 65 and 177. 
In other words, if by law there exists
no such relationship, then the herein accused truly is not even
obligated to collect such amounts; neither is he under obligation to make remittance payments.”

For, as early as March 23, 1956, in National Labor Union vs. Benedicto Dinglasan (L-7945),
this Court already ruled that there is
employer-employee relation between jeepney
owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the
boundary system arrangement, and enunciated:

“The main question to determine is whether there exists a
relationship of employer-employee between the drivers of the jeeps and the
owner thereof.  The findings contained in
the first order are not disputed by both parties except the last to which the
respondent took exception.  But in the
resolution setting aside the order of 16
February 1954 the Court of Industrial Relations in banc
did not state that such finding is not supported by evidence.  It merely ‘declares that there is no employer-employee
relation between respondent, Benedicto Dinglasan, and the driver-complainants in this case.’ If
the findings to which the respondent took exception is
unsupported by the evidence, a pronouncement to that effect would have been
made by the Court in banc. 
In the absence of such pronouncement we are not at liberty to ignore or
disregard said finding.  The findings of
the Court of Industrial Relations with respect to question of fact, if
supported by substantial evidence on the record shall be conclusive.  Taking into consideration the findings of
fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations we find it difficult to uphold
the conclusion of the Court set forth in its resolution of 23 June
1954.  The drivers did not invest a single centavo
in the business and the respondent is the exclusive owner of the jeeps.  The management of the business is in the
respondent’s hands.  For even if the
drivers of the jeeps take material possession of the jeeps, still the
respondent as owner thereof and holder of a certificate of public
convenience is entitled to exercise, as he does and under the law he must,
supervision over the drivers by seeing to it that they follow the route
prescribed by the Public Service Commission and the rules and regulations
promulgated by it as regards their operation. 
And when they pass by the gasoline station of the respondent checking by
his employees on the water tank, oil and tire pressure is done.  The only features that would make the
relationship of lessor and lessee between the
respondent and the drivers, members of the union, as con­tended by the
respondent, are the fact that he does not pay them any fixed wage but their
compensation is the excess of the total amount of P7.50 which they agreed to
pay to the re­spondent, the owner of the jeeps, and the fact that the gasoline
burned by the jeeps is for the account of the drivers.  These two features are not, however,
sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer-employee,
because the estimated earnings for fares must be over and above the amount they
agreed to pay to the respondent for a ten-hour shift or ten-hour a day
operation of the jeeps.  Not having any
interest in the business because they did not invest anything in the
acquisition of the jeeps and did not participate in the management thereof,
their service as drivers of the jeeps being their only contribution to the
business, the relationship of lessor and lessee
cannot be sustained [In the matter of the Park Floral Company, etc., 19 NLRB
403; Radley et al. vs. Commonwealth, 161 SW (2d) 417;
Jones vs. Goodson et al., 121 Fed. Rep. (2d) 176; Mitchel vs. Gibbson et al., 172
Fed. Rep. (2d) 970].  In the lease of chattels the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased
although the lessee cannot make bad use thereof, for he would be responsible for damages to the lessor
should he do so.  In this case there is a supervision and a sort of control that the owner of the
jeeps exercises over the drivers.  It is
an attempt by ingenious scheme to withdraw the relationship between the owner
of the jeeps and the drivers thereof from the operation of the labor laws
enacted to promote industrial peace.” (98 Phil. 650,
651-53).

On April
30, 1963, this Court
reiterated this doctrine in Magboo, et al. vs.
Bernardo (L-16790, 7 SCRA 952) and stated:

“Appellant assails said decision, assigning three errors which
boil down to the question of whether or not an employer-employee relationship
exists between a jeepney-owner and a driver under a
‘boundary system’ arrangement.  Appellant
contends that the relation­ship is essentially that of lessor
and lessee.

“A similar contention has been rejected by this Court in
several cases.  In National Labor Union
v. Dinglasan, 52 O.B., No.
4, 1933, it was held that the features which characterize the ‘boundary system’
-­ namely, the fact that the driver does not receive a fixed wage but gets only
the excess of the receipt of fares collected by him over the amount he pays to
the jeep-owner and that the gasoline consumed by the jeep is for the account of
the driver — are not sufficient to withdraw the relation­ship between them
from that of employer and employee.  The
ruling was subsequently cited and applied in Doce v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-9417, December 22, 1958, which involved the liability of a bus owner
for injury compensation to a conductor working under the ‘boundary system.’ ” (7 SCRA 953-54).

Indeed, considering that
about nineteen (19) years before July 31, 1975, when respondent rendered his
decision in the four estafa cases, it was a settled
doctrine that an employer-employee relationship exists between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney
drivers under the boundary system arrange­ment, of which rule respondent was
obviously ignorant (Section 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court, and in line with
Municipal Board of Manila vs. Agustin, 65 Phil. 144).

Respondent mistakenly relied on the cases of Social Security
System vs. Court of Appeals and Shriro (37 SCRA 579) and Social Security System vs. Court of Appeals
and Manila Jockey Club (30 SCRA 210), which have no
bearing on or relevance to the issue posed in the estafa
cases filed by the complainants and heard by him.  The Shriro and the Manila
jockey Club cases did not involve or resolve the
relationship between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers in any manner whatsoever.  The Shriro case
concerned the relationship of “commission sales agents” and Shriro (Philippines)
Inc., the exclusive distributor of “Regal” sewing machine.  The Manila Jockey Club, Inc. case concerned
jockeys who are connected with the
Manila Jockey Club, Inc. and the Philippine Racing Club, Inc.

Since an employer-employee relationship subsists between the jeepney owners/operators and jeepney
drivers under the boundary system arrangement, SSS coverage
“shall be compulsory” (Sec. 9, Social Security Act), the SSS’s deduction would follow as a matter of law (Sec. 18, supra), and the accused in the four estafa cases, without previous demand by the jeepney drivers, is under legal obligation to remit the
driver’s contri­bution to the SSS.

Decisions of the Supreme Court need not be proved as they are
matters of judicial notice (Sec. 1, Rule 129, Rev. Rules of Court; V Moran, Rules of Court,
1970 ed., pp. 38-39).  Ignorance of the
law excuses no one (Art. 3, New Civil Code) and judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the law or the Constitution are
part of the legal system (Art. 8, New Civil Code).

In the light of the above
discussion, respond­ent gravely erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss the estafa cases by conveniently relying on the accepted axiom
that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense to gain
conviction, for conviction can only rest upon the strength of the prosecution
evidence (Duran vs. Court of Appeals, L-39758, May 7, 1976, citing People vs.
Barrera, 82 Phil. 391), and, as a
consequence, material and moral
damages had been inflicted on the numerous complaining drivers whose rights to refile the criminal cases for estafa
against the accused are now foreclosed by the rule on double jeopardy.

In recapitulation, We
find that respondent exhibited gross ignorance of the Social Security Act of 1954, as amended, particularly the
sections governing SSS compulsory coverage,
employer-employee contributions, deduction of SSS’s
contributions, and remittance of SSS contributions;
and of the settled jurisprudence that the relationship between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney
drivers under the boundary system arrangement is that of employer and employee.  Or,
if respondent was aware of them, he deliberately refrained from
applying them, which can never be excused (Quizon, et
al. vs. Judge Jose G. Baltazar, Jr., A.C. No. 532-MJ, July 25, 1975) and “is hardly to be
condoned” (Fernando, J., concurring opinion, Quizon,
et al. vs. Judge Baltazar, Jr., supra).

WE, moreover, find that
respondent repeatedly ignored this Court’s directive to file his comment on the
instant complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of our 2nd Indorsement of September 16, 1975, necessita­ting the sending of two tracer
letters dated October 23, 1975 and November 25, 1975.  His comment came only on March 8, 1976.  His failure to submit the required comment within the period fixed is disrespect to the Court as well as aggravated the delay in the speedy and
orderly dispo­sition of this administrative complaint (cf. Medina, etc., et al.
vs. Hon. Valdellon, etc., et al., L-38810, March 25,
1975; Atienza vs. Perez, etc., A.M. No. P-216, July 9,
1974).

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS IS HEREBY
DISMISSED AS CITY JUDGE OF PASAY CITY WITH FORFEITURE
OF ALL RETIREMENT PRIVILEGES AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY
POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR -CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS, AGENCIES OR INSTRUMENTALITIES.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee,
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Fernandez, Guerrero, and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Barredo, and De Castro, JJ., concurs in the opinion of Madame Justice Melencio-Herrera.

Melencio-Herrera, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.