FORTUNATO AISPORNA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, AVELINO DE LA CRUZ AND BENIGNO DE LA CRUZ, RESPONDENT.

In CAR Case No. 420-Gpn-NE’ 70, entitled “Fortunato Aisporna vs. Avelino De la Cruz”, an action for reinstatement with
damages, instituted before the Court of Agrarian Relations at Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
where the complaint was later amended to include respondent Benigno
de la Cruz, herein petitioner Fortunato Aisporna obtained judgment for reinstatement to the
possession of a farm land as leasehold tenant by virtue of Section 36-1 of R.A. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform
Code of 1963.  On appeal by respondents,
the aforesaid judgment was set aside by the Court of Appeals^[1]
fundamentally on the ground that the remedy for the reinstatement of an ejected
tenant secured under the above provision had been abolished or repealed by R.A. 6389 which amended R.A.
3844.  Hence, this peti­tion for review
on certiorari of the latter judgment.

The factual antecedents of this case are not dis­puted.  The property involved is a farm land
measuring approximately 23,756 square meters situated in Sto.
Cristo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, planted to palay.  Private
respondent Avelino de la Cruz acquired the land some­time
in 1966.  In a verbal contract of
leasehold tenancy, he transferred possession of the land to petitioner Fortunato Aisporna as tenant.

Shortly thereafter, in 1967, private respondent Avelino de la Cruz filed a complaint (CAR Case No. 4318)
with the Court of Agrarian Relations for the ejectment
of petitioner tenant on the ground that he (de la Cruz) will personally
cultivate the farm.  The agrarian court
on July 7, 1967 rendered a
decision which authorized the owner Avelino de la
Cruz to dispossess his tenant.  The
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals On October 1, 1968, and after
said judgment became final and executory, Fortunato Aisporna was ejected
from the landholding and the owner, Avelino de la
Cruz, assumed actual physical possession of the farmland on May 13, 1969.

Subsequently, on April
11, 1970, Fortunato Aisporna
filed CAR Case No. 420-Gpn-NE’70 for reinstatement with damages on the ground
that the owner had failed to personally cultivate the landholding.  He claimed that after his ejectment,
the owner instituted co-respondent Benigno de la Cruz
as tenant to work and cultivate the farm during the two successive crop years
from 1969 to 1971, and that respondent owner allegedly had not performed any
phase of farmwork but visited the landholding only
during harvesting or threshing seasons. 
On the other hand, owner Avelino de la Cruz
answered and asser­ted that he personally cultivated the farm, sometimes with
the use of farm machinery, including the prepara­tion of seedbed, broadcasting
the seeds, plowing, harrowing and transplanting the seedlings.  Trial was held on the issue of personal cultivation and upon the conflicting
assertions, appearing in the testimonial evidence of the parties, the agrarian
court found for the tenant Aisporna and rendered the
following judg­ment on August 12, 1976,
thus:

“FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of Fortunato Aisporna
and against Avelino de la Cruz, in the tenor and
disposition herein below provided to wit:

1.    Declaring that defendant Avelino
de la Cruz has not personally and by him­self undertaken the work and cultivate
the landholding in question with an area of 23,756 square meters, situated at Sto. Cristo, Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, since he has
disposed plaintiff Fortunato Aisporna
therefrom on May
12, 1969;

2.    Ordering defendant Avelino
de la Cruz to reinstate plaintiff immediately to the aforesaid landholding;

3.    Denying plaintiff’s claim for payment of
actual or compensatory damages, as well as exemplary or moral damages for in­sufficiency
of evidence;

4.    Ordering said defendant Avelino
de la Cruz to pay plaintiff the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) in the
form of litigation expenses; and

5.    Dismissing the complaint with respect to
defendant Benigno de la Cruz.”

Defendant Avelino de la Cruz appealed
to the Court of Appeals.  In reversing
the decision of the agrarian court, the Court of Appeals relied on the
amendment to the first paragraph of section 36 introduced by Repub­lic Act No.
6389 during the pendency of the action for
reinstatement, the amendment abolishing personal cul­tivation as ground for
ejecting an agricultural lessee.  The
appealed decision held that with the abolition of personal cultivation, with it
was eliminated the coro­llary proviso on reinstatement of the ejected
tenant.  It further ruled that since the
amending law is silent as regards those cases for ejectment
and/or reinstate­ment authorized and filed in court under paragraph 1 of
section 36, R.A. No. 3844, which are pending at the
time of the amendment, the cause of action for reins­tatement and the right to
bring an action and pursue the remedy, albeit already started, are abated
pursuant to the general rule that the repeal of a law defeats all actions and
proceedings under the repealed statute at the time of its repeal, including
those which are pending appeal. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the appealed
case.

From the above reversal, petitioner comes before Us and submits
the following issues:

I

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 36 OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 3844 IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE REPEAL OF SECTION 36 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3844 BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6389, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
LOST HIS RIGHT OF ACTION FOR REINSTATEMENT.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE TENANCY RIGHT OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE OVER THE LANDHOLDING IN QUESTION
IS ANCHORED ON SECTION 36 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3844.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WOULD IN
EFFECT NULLIFY SECTION 7 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6389 ELIMINATING TOTALLY PERSONAL
CULTIVATION AS A GROUND FOR DISPOSSESSION OF AN AGRICULTURAL TENANT.

V

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS CONTRAVENES THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 27 AND RUNS COUNTER TO THE POLICY OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND THE
EMANCIPATION OF TENANT-FARMERS.

In amplification of the issues, petitioner main­tains the view of
the trial court that to sustain the right of the lessor-owner
to eject his tenant on ground of personal cultivation, the former’s
desire or inten­tion must be honest, sincere, and must have been moti­vated by
good faith, and bad faith is presumed if he does not cultivate the land himself
within the period of three (3) years from the dispossession of the tenant, in
which case, the latter shall have the right to be reinstated and recover
damages.  In line with the dissenting
opinion in the appealed decision, petitioner further argues that his right to
remain as tenant is not based on paragraph 1 of Section 36 of Republic Act No.
3844, nor that his right to reinstatement was created by the same, such that
with the repeal of the said provision, the ejected tenant may no longer be
reverted to the possession of the leasehold from which he was ejected.  Petitioner contends that what the law
actually repealed was the right of the landlord to eject his tenant on ground
of personal cultivation; and that where there is bad faith on the part of the
landowner consis­ting of a false representation on the said ground, Congress in
repealing the paragraph did not intend to include the deprivation of the
tenant’s right to be reinstated. 
Finally, petitioner sees the reversal as contrary to the spirit and
intent of the current agra­rian reform policy to emancipate the tenant farmers
from the bondage of the soil.

Respondent landowner, on the other hand, asserts that in view of
the amendment of Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 by R.A. 6389 and since Congress has not provided for any
saving clause in R.A. No. 6389 with respect to cases
pending in the courts for the ejectment of
agricultural lessees on the ground that the agricultural lessor
or a member of his immediate family will per­sonally cultivate the landholding
involved as authorized under Section 36, paragraph (1) of R.A.
3844, the repeal defeats all actions or proceedings pending under the repealed
statute at the time of its repeal including those which are pending appeal,
citing the case of Arambulo vs. Canicon,
CA-G.R. No. 46727-R, January 26, 1972, which was
elevated to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-34816 but
said petition was denied for lack of merit, in effect sustaining the Court of
Appeals’ ruling that R.A. 6389 abated pending
appeals, according to private respondent’s theory.  And he concludes, thus:  “Simply stated, the rights of the
landowner and the tenant being reciprocal under Sec. 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844, it follows of necessity that the repeal of
said law by R.A. No. 6389 erases not only the rights
of the landholder but also the rights of the tenant for re­instatement.  Consequently, we cannot now disturb the
vested right of Avelino de la Cruz.”

Finally, respondent claims that the action for reinstatement,
assuming the remedy is still available, was filed prematurely on May 5, 1970 or before the lapse of
three (3) years when no presumption of bad faith on the part of the landowner
has yet arisen.

The central issue posed in these contentions is whether or not
petitioner’s action for reinstatement to enforce his right to demand possession
of the lease­hold pursuant to paragraph (1) of Section 36 of Republic Act No.
3844 is deemed abated by the repeal or abolition during the pendency
thereof, of the aforesaid provision.

Undoubtedly, the governing law then in force when petitioner
filed his action for reinstatement to the land in question is paragraph (1) of
Section 36 of R.A. 3844.  This provision states:

“Sec. 36.  Possession of
Landholding; Exceptions. – Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1)     The agricultural lessor-owner
or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding
or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential,
factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes; Provided,
That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights
under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and
leased by the agricultural lessor is not more than
five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may
be entitled to advance notice of at lease one agricultural year before ejectment proceed­ings are filed against him:  Provided further, That should the landholder
not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to substantially carry
out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it
shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the
right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss
incurred by him because of said dispossession;”

The amendatory act is Republic Act No. 6389 entitled “An act
amending Republic Act numbered Thirty Eight Hundred and Forty-Four as amended,
otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, and for other
purposes,” approved September 10, 1971, otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the
Philippines.  Section 7 thereof provides
as follows:

“Sec. 7.  Section 36(1)
of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

(1)     The landholding is declared by the
department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes:  Provided, That the
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to
five times the average of the gross har­vests on his landholding during the
last five preceding calendar years.”

A cursory reading of Republic Act 6389, Sec. 7 quoted above clearly
eliminated personal cultivation by the landowner as grounds for the ejectment of an agricultural tenant.

The assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, in
dismissing the appeal, based its action in the following rationale:

“When this case was still pending in the court below, the Land
Reform Code, otherwise known as Republic Act 6389, was passed by Congress which
took effect on September 10, 1971.  Its
repealing clause, Sec. 38, paragraph 2, RA 6389, expressly repealed and/ or
modified ‘all laws or parts of any law inconsistent with the provisions
thereof’.  Among the provisions thus
repealed or amended was the aforequoted provision of
Sec. 36, paragraph 1, of Republic Act 3844. 
Personal cultivation by the landowner as a ground for ejectment of the agricultural lessee was therein eliminated
and with it, was likewise eliminated the corollary proviso on reins­tatement of
the ejected lessee.

Our main task now is to determine the effect of the repeal of the
provision under which this case was instituted, not any more the issue of
whether or not defendant-appellant personally cultivated the land­holding to
determine the plaintiff’s right to a reinstatement.  Let it be noted that the repealing law
Republic Act 6389 is silent as regards those cases for ejectment
and/or reinstatement authorized and filed in court under Sec. 36, paragraph 1
of Republic Act 3844, and which are pending at the time of the repeal thereof.

That being the case, we believe that the dismissal of the present
case is in order.  For this Court, and
any court for that matter, is already powerless to grant the remedy sought by
the plaintiff-appellee in view of the repeal of the
law upon which his right was predicated. 
No valid judgment can be rendered in the pending case after the repeal
of the act under which it was brought. 
(Re McCardle, 7 Wall. 506.)

That a cause of action for reinstate­ment accrued under the old law
in favor of the plaintiff-appellee, on the assumption
that defendant-appellant really did not personally cultivate his landholding,
is not disputed.  But the right to bring
an action and pursue the remedy albeit already started, is already precluded by
the repeal of paragraph 1, Sec. 36, of Republic Act 3844 from which the said right
was deprived, the repealing law, not having provided any saving clause with
respect thereto.

‘The repealing clause is such an express enactment as necessarily
divests all inchoate rights which have arisen under the statute which it
destroys.  These rights are but incident
of the statute and fall with it, unless saved by express words in the repealing
clause.’ (Dufus & Howard Purnace
Co., 40 N.Y.S. 925, 930, 8 App. Div. 567.) In
analogous cases, it had been held that:

‘The powers derived wholly from a statute are extinguished by its
repeal and no proceedings can be pursued under the repealed statute though
begun before the repeal, unless such proceedings be autho­rized under a special
clause in the repealing act.  (Filanigan vs. Sierra Country, 196 U.S.
553; 25 Supreme Court Rep. 314.) A suit pending to enforce a right or remedy
conferred solely by a sta­tute, is abated by the uncondi­tional repeal of the
said statute (Globe Pub. Co. vs. State Bank, 27 L.R.A. 854.)

This Court ordered the dismissal of an ejectment
case, pending appeal herein when Republic Act 6489 took effect, ad­vocating the
principle that ‘the repeal of a law defeats all actions and proceedings under
the repealed statute at the time of its repeal, including those which are
pending appeal.’ (Canicon vs. Arambulo,
CA-G.R. No. 46727-R, January 26, 1972.) Thus this
Court, speaking through Honorable Justice Jesus Y. Perez, said:

‘Since Congress has not pro­vided for any saving clause in Republic
Act No. 6389 with respect to cases pending in Court for the ejectment
of agricultural lessee on the ground that the agricultural lessor-owner
or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding
involved as authorized under Section 36, par. 1, Rep. Act 3844, then the
instant case should be dismissed for it is settled that the repeal de­feats all
actions and proceedings pending under the repealed statute at the time of its
repeal including those which are pending appeal.

‘As a general rule the repeal of a statute without reservation
takes away all remedies given by the re­pealed statute and defeats all actions
and proceedings pending under it at the time of its repeal.  (Gates vs. Osborne, 19 L. Ed. 768; Louisville
& N.R. Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 268
F.4 (cert den 41 S. Ct. 147, 254 U.S. 650, 65 L.Ed.
457.) The rule is espe­cially applicable to the repeal of statutes creating a
cause of action (Callet v. Alioto,
290 p. 438; Western Union Tel. Co. vs. Lumpkin, 26 S.E. 73), providing a remedy
not known to the common law or confer­ring jurisdiction where it did not exist
before, and abates proceedings pending even after judgment but before the entry
thereof or pending appeal.  A suit the
continuance of which is dependent upon the statute repealed stops where the
repeal finds it (South Carolina
v. Caellard, 101 U.S.
433)’ (59 C.J. 1189-1190)

If upon the effectivity of Republic Act
6389 on September 10, 1971, a plaintiff landowner who has a pending case for eject­ment of his tenant, has lost his right to do so, as
above cited, then We see no reason why, under similar prevailing circumstances,
We should reinstate the herein plaintiff-appellee to
the landholding from where he had been ejected pursuant to a final and executory judgment of the same Agrarian Court in its CAR
Case No. 4318.”

We do not agree with respondent appellate court.

What Republic Act 6389 abolished, eliminated or repealed is the
right of the landowner to eject his tenant on the grounds that said landowner
would person­ally cultivate the land. 
This amendatory Act did not abolish the right of the tenant to continue
in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding.  In fact, such right of the tenant to remain
in the enjoyment and possession of the landholding was not created by para­graph
(1) of Sec. 36, Rep. Act 3844 because the main proviso of Sec. 36 actually
recognizes the tenant’s right to continue in the enjoyment and possession of
his land­holding in these terms: 
“Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender
of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding x x x.” Such right to
enjoy and possess is not only a contractual right but also arises from a status of tenancy or
relationship duly recognized and protected by agrarian reform legislation.

Hence, Rep. Act 6389 in its Section 7 specifically amending Sec.
36 (1) of Rep. Act 3844 cannot be consi­dered to have repealed the tenant’s
right to enjoy and possess the landholding because such right is preserved and
maintained in the main proviso of Sec. 36 which is not altered, amended or
otherwise repealed.  In other words, Sec.
36 of R.A. 3844 as amended by Sec. 7 of R.A. 6389 will read as follows:

“Sec. 36.  Possession of
Landholding; Exceptions. – Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing, it is shown that:

(1)     The landholding is declared by the
department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes:  Provided, That the agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times
the average of the gross har­vests on his landholding during the last five
preceding calendar years.”

That it was the intention of the legislature in amending paragraph
(1), Sec. 36 of R.A. 3844 to deprive the landowner of
the right to eject his tenant on the ground that the former would personally
cultivate the land and also to abate cases brought by the landowner to eject
the tenant on the same ground which were still pending at the time of the
passage of the amendatory Act,
is clear and evident from the deliberations and debate of Congress when
Republic Act 6389 was being deliberated, as published in the Senate Journal,
thus:

“SENATOR DIOKNO:  Now I am very much inte­rested in one other
aspect of the existing law which has been the source of many problems, and that
is, the termination of the tenancy relation­ship because the landowner would
want to cultivate the land himself.

“SENATOR LAUREL:  We have eliminated that option on the part of
the landowners.  On p. 7, Your Honor you
will notice that we have deleted from line 3 to line 21.  This is the basis of the owner’s alibi in
refusing to sell to the tenants, that he will convert it into a subdivision, a
hospital site or a school site.  We are
deleting that portion of the Code.

“SENATOR DIOKNO:  Now, what happens to those cases which are
now pending in court where this has been the excuse given?  In other words the landowner, under the
existing law, has notified his tenants or lessees, ‘You must vacate because I
will personally cultivate the land.’ That is under the existing law which gives
him that right.  But if these cases are
not yet decided and then this bill is enacted into law, what would happen to
those cases?

“SENATOR LAUREL:  It will not affect whatever contracts were
entered into.

“SENATOR DIOKNO:  There is no contract.  No existing contract.

“SENATOR LAUREL:  Yes.

“SENATOR
DIOKNO:  It is
just an old, old relationship between fathers and grandfathers, etc. of both
parties, until they finally come down to the present parties.  So the right of the agricul­tural lessor-owner is based upon a legal provision.  And this legal pro­vision in force now
authorizes him, with of course, certain provision that this matter can be
brought to court and so forth, to eject these tenants.  Now, can he continue to exercise that right
or can we say that he can no longer do so because the right so to speak has not
become final and it has now disappeared?

“SENATOR
LAUREL:  In answer to Your Honor’s question, the owner will lose the right to
eject after the enactment of this measure even on cases as those cited by Your
Honor, because in those particular cases, the owner has not really succeeded
yet in ejecting the tenants.

“SENATOR
DIOKNO:  In
other words, where the ejectment is already a final
case, or ‘yari na‘ then it
is alright.

“SENATOR
LAUREL:  Yes.

“SENATOR
DIOKNO:  Well,
I am glad Your Honor has the same view because that is the same view that I
would have advocated on p. 8, Your Honor refers.” (Senate Journal, Nos. 43
& 44, March 30 & 31, 1971, 2nd Regular Session – 7th Congress)

Moreover, R.A. 6389 must be considered a remedial legislation enacted
with the principal aim and purpose of curtailing and suppressing the pernicious
practice of many landowners who resort to the filing of cases of ejectment against their tenants based on personal
cultivation in retaliation to harrass tenants who
were determined to enforce the rights granted them by law.  Such justification is clearly expressed in
the original Senate Bill No. 478, as quoted in The Code of Agrarian Reforms
Annotated by Justice Guillermo S. Santos, 1973 Revised Edition, p. 157, to wit:

“Personal cultivation by the landowner of his land x x x as a basis for dispos­session
is being abused.  This provision is being
availed of by landowners in driving their lessees out of their landholding on
the pretext of personal cultivation x x x which often causes tension and explodes as an agrarian
unrest.

“SENATOR LAUREL: Well, Your Honor, just for the record, the
Committee would like to state its reason for proposing the deletion of Section
36. First, based on statistics, 80 to 85 percent of the farm lands here in this
country have also below 10 hectares. 
Second, the idea of personal cultivation has been abused; it has become
an alibi.  It is the reason given always
by landowners to prevent the conversion from tenancy into leasehold.  And third, when it comes to the weighing of
who needs it more, we felt that the tenants on the land, need it more to
survive than the owner who decides late in life to cultivate it himself or with
his sons.  In other words, he who needs
the help more should receive it.  Or ‘those who (have) less in life should have
more in law’ — ­borrowing from President Magsaysay.  That is the entire reason or philosophy for
our proposal to eliminate Section 36.” (Congressional Record, Senate, Vol.
II, No. 48, April 13, 1971, p.
1844)

In the light of this clear intention of the law, We hold that the
Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal of the petitioner-tenant
whereby he seeks reinstatement and the exercise of his right to the enjoy­ment
and possession of the landholding from which he had been previously ousted by
the landowner-respondent on the latter’s false representation and bad faith,
which right of enjoyment and possession has not been repealed or abolished by
the amendatory Act.

The Court of Appeals’ holding that the repeal of a statute
defeats all actions and proceedings pending under the repealed statute at the
time of its repeal, including those cases which are still pending appeal is, of
course, correct as the general rule in statutory construction.  And for this reason, the dismissal of pending
cases in­cluding those on appeal where the landowner seeks the pri­vilege or
authority to oust his tenant on the ground of personal cultivation, is
justified and warranted because the repeal had eliminated personal cultivation
as a ground for eviction.

But given the facts of the case at bar, where it is the tenant
who, having been previously ousted by the landowner by false representation and
bad faith, now comes on appeal as petitioner to enforce his right of security
of tenure, We hold that the general rule stated above does not apply but the
exceptions thereto which state that “a repealing statute must not
interfere with vested rights or impair the obligation of contracts; that if any
other construction is possible, the act should not be construed so as to affect
rights which have vested under the old
law, or as requiring the abatement of actions instituted for the
enforcement of such rights.” (Statu­tory Construction by V.J. Francisco, p. 335; 23 Crawford, Statutory
Construction, Sec. 296, pp. 599-600).

The right of the petitioner-tenant to the enjoyment and possession
of the landholding is a right granted, con­ferred and vested by law, in fact by
and through the va­rious legislations that have been passed by the legisla­ture
to improve the lot of the tillers of the soil and by progressive land reforms
to emancipate them from bondage and poverty, even as the 1935 Philippine
Constitution mandated that “The State shall afford protection to labor,
especially to working women and minors, and shall regulate the relations
between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and
agriculture.” (Art. XIV, Sec. 6, Constitution of the Philippines).  Thus, We find the right of security of tenure
of the tenant recognized under Act No. 4054 otherwise known as “The
Philippine Rice Share Tenancy Act,” approved on February 27, 1933, under Section 19 thereof which
provides as follows:

Sec. 19.  Landlord cannot
dismiss his tenant except for good causes. 
The landlord shall not dismiss his tenant without just and reasonable
cause, otherwise the former shall be liable to the latter for losses and
damages to the extent of his share in the product of the farm entrusted to the
dismissed tenant.

Commonwealth Act No. 461 entitled “An Act to regulate the
relations between landowner and tenant and to provide for compulsory
arbitration of any controversy arising bet­ween them,” approved June 9, 1939
further protected the security of tenure of the tenant under Section 1 thereof
which states:

“Any agreement or provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, in all cases where land is held under any system of tenancy
the tenant shall not be dispossessed of the land cultivated by him except for
any of the causes mentioned in section nineteen of Act Numbered Four thousand
fifty-four or for any just cause, and without the approval of a representative
of the Department of Justice duly authorized for the purpose.  Should the landowner or the tenant feel
aggrieved by the action taken by this official, or in the event of any dispute
between arising out of their relationship as landowner and tenant, either party
may sub­mit the matter to the Court of Industrial Relations which is given
jurisdiction to de­termine the controversy in accordance with law.”

Under Republic Act No. 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, enacted August
30, 1954, the tenancy relationship between a landowner and a tenant is clearly
defined and under such relationship, the tenant acquires the right to continue
working on and cultivating the land, until and unless he is dispossessed of his
hold­ings for any of the just causes enumerated in Section 50 or the
relationship is terminated in accordance with Sec­tion 9.  Specifically, Sections 6 and 7 of Republic
Act No. 1199 provide:

“Sec. 6.  Tenancy
Relationship; Its Definition. – Tenancy relationship is a juri­dical tie which
arises between a landholder and tenant once they agree, expressly or im­pliedly
to undertake jointly the cultivation of land belonging to the former, either
under the share tenancy or leasehold tenancy system, as a result of which relationship
the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land,
until and unless he is dispossessed of his holdings for any of the just causes
enumerated in Section fifty or the relationship is ter­minated in accordance with Section nine.

“Sec. 7.  Tenancy Relationship; How Established;
Security of Tenure. – Tenancy relationship may be established either
verbally or in writing, expressly or impliedly. 
Once such relationship is established, the tenant shall be entitled to
security of tenure as hereinafter provided.” (underscoring supplied).

It is interesting to note that under Republic Act 1199, Part IV
on Security of Tenure, the ejection of the tenant is provided under Section 49
and the causes for the dispossession of a tenant are enumerated (which are
similar to Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844) and these provisions read:

“Sec. 49.  Ejectment of Tenant. – Not­withstanding any agreement or
provision of law as to the period, in all cases where land devoted to any
agricultural purpose is held under any system of tenancy, the tenant shall not
be dispossessed of his holdings except for any of the causes hereinafter
enumerated and only after the same has been proved before, and the dis­possession
is authorized by the court.

“Sec. 50.  Causes for
the Dispossession of a Tenant. – Any of the following shall be a sufficient
cause for the dispossession of a
tenant from his holdings:

(a)     The bona fide intention of the landholder
to cultivate the land himself personally or through the employment of farm
machinery and implements:  Provided,
however, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself or should
fail to employ mechanical farm implements for a period of one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith
and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and
damages for any loss incurred by him be­cause of said dispossession; Provided,
further, That the landholder shall, at least one year but not more than two
years prior to the date of his petition to dispossess the tenant under this
sub-section, file notice with the court and shall inform the tenant in writing
in a language or dialect known to the latter of his intention to cultivate the
land himself, either personally or through the employment of mechanical
implements, together with a certification of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources that the land is suited for mecha­nization:  Provided, further, That the dispossessed
tenant and the members of his immediate household shall be preferred in the
employment of necessary laborers under the new set-up.

(b) x x x.”

Republic Act 2263, approved June 19, 1959, amended Section 49 of
Republic Act 1199, the latter to read as follows:

“Sec. 49.  Ejectment of Tenant. – Notwithstanding any agreement or
provision of law as to the period or future surrender of the land, in all cases
where land devoted to any agricultural purpose is held under any system of
tenancy, the tenant shall not be dispos­sessed of his landholdings by the
landholder except for any of the causes hereinafter enumerated and only after
the same has been proved before and the dispossession is authorized by the
court.

x x x.”

Section 50 of Rep. Act 1199 was likewise amended to include among
the causes for the dispossession of the tenant the bonafide
intention of not only the land­holder-owner but also his relative within the
first degree of consanguinity to cultivate the land himself personally or
through the employment of farm machinery and implements.

The Agricultural Land Reform Code, which is Republic Act No. 3844
approved August 8, 1963,
contains provisions establishing agricultural Leasehold relation (Sec. 5) and
conferring and protecting the security of tenure of the agricultural lessee
(Sec. 7).  Thus –

“Sec. 5.  Establishment
of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. – The agricultural lease­hold relation
shall be established by ope­ration of law in accordance with Section four of
this Code and, in other cases, either orally or in writing, expressly or
impliedly.”

“Sec. 7.  Tenure of
Agricultural Lease­hold Relation. – The agricultural leasehold relation once
established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue
working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished.  The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom
unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.”

The different laws cited and enumerated above clearly show that
the right of the tenant to the enjoy­ment and possession of the farmholding had been created and conferred, protected and
guaranteed therein previous to the enactment of R.A.
3844 and that par. (1) of Sec. 36 of said R.A. 3844
did not create such right.  The security
of tenure of the tenant had been enjoyed by him long before the passage of R.A. 3844.  Hence, it
is not correct for the Court of Appeals to assume that the right of the tenant
to the security of his tenure was abo­lished by R.A.
6389 when the latter repealed by subs­titution paragraph (1) of Sec. 36, R.A. 3844.

And more than that, the Supreme Court has upheld the tenant’s
security of tenure on the police power of the State in compliance with the
mandate of the Consti­tution expressed in Article II, Sec. 5, 1935 Constitution
of the Philippines, as against alleged impairment of the obligations of
contract, a limitation to the freedom of contract and a denial of the equal
protection of the laws, in Primero vs.
Court of Agrarian Relations and Sinforoso Quion, L-10594, May 29, 1957, 101 Phil. 675.  The Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice Endencia, said:

“The provisions of law assailed as unconstitutional do not
impair the right of the landowner to dispose or alienate his property nor
prohibit him to make such trans­fer or alienation; they only provide that in
case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy
relationship between the landowner and his tenant should be preserved in order
to insure the well-being of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly
dispossessed by the trans­feree or purchaser of the land; in other words, the
purpose of the law in question is to maintain the tenants in the peace­ful
possession and cultivation of the land or afford them protection against
unjusti­fied dismissal from their holdings. 
Repub­lic Act 1199 is unquestionably a remedial legislation promulgated
pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the exercise
of the police power of the State to promote the common weal.  It is a statute relating to public subjects
within the domain of the general legisla­tive powers of the State and involving
the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by
it.  Republic Act 1199, like the precious
tenancy laws enacted by our lawmaking body, was passed by Congress in compliance
with the constitutional mandates that ‘the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the
concern of the State’ (Art. II, sec. 5) and that ‘the State shall regu­late the
relations between landlord and tenant * * * in agriculture * * *.’ (Art. XIV,
sec. 6).”

The constitutional guarantee afforded the tenant’s right to
security of tenure was further emphasized and strengthened in the case of Pineda
vs. De Guzman and Feliciano, L-23773-74, December 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1450, wherein the Supreme Court held –

“Section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, Republic Act
1199, as amended, enunciates the principle of security of tenure of the tenant,
such that it prescribes that the re­lationship of landholder and tenant can
only be terminated for causes provided by law. 
The principle is epitomized by the axiom in land tenure that – once a
tenant, always a tenant.  Attacks on the
constitutionality of this guarantee have centered on the contention that it is
a limitation on freedom of contract, a denial of the equal protec­tion of the
law, and an impairment of or a limitation on property rights.  The assault is without reason.  The law simply provides that the tenancy
relationship between the landholder and his tenant should be preserved in order
to insure the well-being of the tenant and protect him from being unjustly
dispossessed of the land.  Its
termination can take place only for causes and reasons provided in the
law.  It was established pursuant to the
social justice precept of the Constitution and in the exercise of the police
power of the State to promote the common weal. 
(Primero v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-10594, May
29, 1957.)”

Indeed, We find no clear and cogent reason, no logical and legal
ground to hold, as the Court of Appeals held, that Republic Act 6389 abolished
the right of the tenant to be reinstated to the enjoyment and possession of the
farmholding in question.

There is one final point We cannot ignore, and that is, the
undisputed finding of the agrarian court and not disturbed by the appellate
court that the private respon­dent-landowner had foisted false representations
and com­mitted bad faith in successfully evicting the petitioner-tenant from
the landholding.  We are bound by such
finding of fact.  The authority given to
said landowner to oust the tenant-petitioner was, therefore, vitiated with
dishonesty and malice.  We cannot and
should not reward such malice and bad faith. 
On both justiciable and equitable grounds, the
petitioner herein is entitled to reinstatement and possession such that it must
be deemed that his possession has been continuous and uninterrupted.  To dismiss the present appeal of the tenant
is simply a backward step from the social justice and agrarian progress of the
nation, and this Court will not allow nor sanction the same.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations is hereby ordered reinstated. 
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Special Division of Five; Batacan, J., ponente; Pascual, Jimenez
and Gancayco, JJ.,
concurring; Vasquez, J., dissenting.