G.R. No. L-50563. October 30, 1981
GABRIEL ABAD, PIO AGANON, MARIO ALARCIO, JOSE AQUINO, CESAR ATANACIO, LEONARDO AURELIO, SOTERO BERNARDO, AURELIO CABRAL, JESUS CARREON, ABELARDO CARRILLO, GERARDO COLOMA, ARMAN…
ABAD SANTOS,
J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the orders of the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXXVII), dated February 16, 1979 and
May 2, 1979, which respectively dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the
complaint in Civil Case No.117708 and denied for lack of merit the motion for
reconsideration filed by the
plaintiffs therein—herein petitioners Gabriel Abad, et
al.
On August 28, 1978, plaintiffs-petitioners filed with the respondent
Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint alleging, among other things,
that until their respective dates of retirement, retrenchment or resignation
between 1967 and 1978, plaintiffs were
permanent and regular employees of the defendant — the herein private respondent
Philippine American General Insurance Company, Inc. (hereinafter referred to
as PHILAMGEN); that one of the rights and privileges
to which plaintiffs were entitled during their employment with the company was
sick leave with pay as provided in their collective bargaining agreements; that
at the time of their retirement, retrenchment, resignation or separation, their
accumulated sick leaves with pay were unilateraly
and arbitrarily declared forfeited by the defendant; that as a condition
precedent to the payment of their respective retirement, retrenchment or
resignation benefits, they were required by the defendant to sign
mimeographed documents purporting to completely release and discharge the
defendant from all obligations, contractual and legal, to each of them; that
such releases or waivers are null and void ab initio for having been obtained under circumstances
indicative of undue influence, if not of outright compulsion; that all data
necessary for the determination of plaintiffs’ sick leaves and of the money
values thereof can be found only in records within the exclusive possession of
defendant; that defendant’s refusal to give due compensation for their earned
and accumulated sick leaves have caused anxieties and inflicted upon them serious
deprivation and unnecessary suffering, mental and physical, for which they
should be allowed moral and exemplary damages within the sound discretion of
the court; and that they should likewise be allowed attorney’s fees in the sum
of not less than P50,000.00. On the
basis of the foregoing allegations, plaintiffs prayed –
“a. that upon the authority of Rule 27 of the
Rules of Court an order be issued forthwith directing defendant upon service of
summons upon it to prepare and submit from pertinent records in its possession
and control (1) a list containing the names and addresses of all of defendant’s
employees who have been retired, retrenched, resigned or separated; (2) the
inclusive dates of service of each retired, retrenched, resigned or separated
employee; (3) the latest position held or designation given to such employee;
(4) the latest basic salary given to such employee plus all allowances and
additions all of which, make up the gross salary; (5) the number of days of
accumulated sick leave with pay of each employee; and (6) the money value of
such accumulated sick leave with pay based on the latest gross salary of each
employee, furnishing a copy of such list to plaintiffs’ counsel;
“b. that after trial judgment be rendered
sentencing defendant and all persons claiming under it or acting in its behalf,
jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs and all other retired, retrenched, resigned employees of defendant company —
(i)
the money value of the respective accumulated
sick leave with pay of all said employees;
(ii)
moral and exemplary damages in amounts to be
determined by the Honorable Court within its sound discretion;
(iii)
attorney’s fees in the sum of not less than
P50,000.00 plus expenses of litigation; and
(iv)
interest at the legal rate of the sums due
plaintiffs in the concept of accumulated sick leave with pay from the
respective dates of the employees’ retirement, retrenchment, resignation or
separation and on the awards for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees from the date of filing of this complaint; and
“c. that plaintiffs be granted
general relief.” (Complaint, pp. 8-9.)
Instead of filing an answer to the complaint, PHILAMGEN
filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated November
6, 1978, seeking the dismissal of the complaint on the following
grounds: (1) that the court has no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit under Art. 216 (now Art.
217) of the New Labor Code (P. D. No. 442, as amended); (2) that the claims set
forth in the complaint have been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished; and (3) that the cause of action alleged in the complaint is
barred by Art. 281 (now Art. 292) of the New Labor Code.
After the
plaintiffs-petitioners had filed their Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, the
Court of First Instance of Manila issued its order of dismissal dated February
16, 1979, which
reads as follows:
“ORDER
“Considering the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant and
the Opposition thereto filed by the plaintiffs, and finding that under the rulings
of the Supreme Court in the case of Jacqueline Industries versus National Labor
Relations Commission, 66 SCRA 403, Ruby International
Corporation versus Court of First Instance of Manila, et al., G.R. No. L-28893, August 31, 1977, and Firestone Filipinas
Employees Association versus Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the
Philippines, 61 SCRA 346, and Articles 216 and 281 of
the New Labor Code (PD 442, as amended), that cases of the nature filed by the
plaintiffs against the defendant in this case, fall within the jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Commission,
and not the Court of First Instance, and that the allegations of the plaintiffs
that their action being for enforcement
of stipulations of the collective bargaining agreement and therefore is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance is too general in scope and do not preclude the
vesting of jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission over said
money claims arising from the employer-employee relationship under said
collective bargaining agreement, the court grants the motion to dismiss for the
above-stated reasons.
“WHEREFORE, without prejudice to the proper remedy, if any,
the court is constrained to DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses the complaint,
without pronouncement as to costs.
“SO ORDERED. “
Plaintiffs-petitioners sought reconsideration of said order of
dismissal which, however, was denied in an order dated May 2, 1979.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari,
on a pure question of law, of the said orders of the lower court.
The only issue presented to Us for
resolution is whether or not the respondent court erred in dismissing the
complaint on the ground that, being in the nature of money claims arising from
an employer-employee relationship, the case falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission pursuant to Art. 216 (now Art. 217) of the New Labor Code and the
rulings of this Court in the cases of Jacqueline Industries vs. N. L. R. C., G.R. No. L-37034, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 403; Ruby
International Corp. vs. C.F.I. of Manila, et al., G. R. No. L-28893, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 499; and
Firestone Filipinas Employees Association vs. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. of
the Philippines, G.R.
No. L-37952,
December 10, 1974, 61 SCRA
346.
The legal provision
relied upon by the respondent court in holding that the case falls under the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission is the former Art. 216, now Art. 217, of the New Labor Code (P. D. No. 442, as
amended), which reads as follows:
“ART. 216. JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS AND THE COMMISSION.
– (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:
x x
x x
x x x x x
(3) All money claims of workers involving nonpayment
or underpayment of wages, overtime or premium compensation, maternity or
service incentive leave, separation pay and other money claims arising from employer-employee relations, except claims for employee’s
compensation, social security and medicare benefits
and as otherwise provided in Article 127 of this Code;
x x x x x x x x x
(5) All other cases arising from
employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by this Code.
x x x x x x x x x
(Underscoring supplied.)
Holding that the complaint is in the
nature of money claims arising from employer-employee relations, the lower
court ruled that the same falls under
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission and must therefore
be dismissed.
We cannot agree.
The petitioner has not raised this point but both private and
public respondents relied on Art. 216 of the New Labor Code as above quoted and
the Jacqueline Industries, Ruby International Corp. and Firestone Filipinas
Employees Association cases, supra, which applied said provision without
realizing that on May 1, 1978,
long before the complaint in Civil Case No. 117708 was filed, Art. 216 had been
further amended by P. D. No. 1367 so that as re-numbered into Art. 217 it now
reads as follows:
“ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
– (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:
(1) Unfair labor practice cases;
(2) Unresolved issues in collective bargaining,
including those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment; and
(3) All other cases arising from employer-employee
relations duly endorsed by the Regional Directors in accordance with the
provisions of this Code; Provided, that the Regional
Directors shall not endorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for
moral or other forms of damages.
“(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters, compulsory arbitrators,
and voluntary arbitrators in appropriate cases provided in Article 262 of this
Code.”
The foregoing amendatory provision of P. D. No. 1367 removed
from the enumeration of cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission “money claims
arising from employer-employee relations”.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of said Labor Arbiters over cases arising from employer-employee
relations was expressly limited to those which are “duly indorsed by the
Regional Directors in accordance with the provisions of (the) Code” which,
in no case, shall include “claims for moral and other forms of damages”.
Applying the aforequoted provision of
P. D. No. 1367 (which took effect on May 1, 1978) to the subject complaint
(which was filed on August 28, 1978), and considering the reliefs
prayed for therein-which consist mainly of the payment of the money values of
sick leaves, which defendant company allegedly refused to pay despite
obligation to do so, and of moral and exemplary damages to which plaintiffs are
allegedly entitled by virtue of said nonpayment—We find respondent court’s
dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction to be without support in
law.
It must be noted, furthermore, that said amendatory provision of
P. D. No. 1367 was even given retroactive application, for being curative in
nature, in the case of Garcia vs. Martinez
(G. R. No. L-47629, May 28, 1979, 90 SCRA 331) where
We ruled that the Court of First Instance of Davao
City had jurisdiction over the complaint for actual, moral and exemplary
damages, allegedly arising from the plaintiff’s dismissal as a manager of a
radio station, which was filed on August 2, 1976. This ruling was reiterated in
the more recent case of Calderon, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals (G. R. No. L-52235,
October 28, 1980, 100 SCRA 459) where We held that
the Court of First Instance of Rizal had jurisdiction
over the complaint for recovery of unpaid salaries, allowances, other reimbursable
expenses, and damages, which was filed on March 3, 1978.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent court, dated February 16, 1979 and May 2, 1979, are hereby set aside; the
dismissed complaint is reinstated; and said court is directed to conduct
further proceedings for the disposition of Civil Case No. 117708. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concur.