REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MOVANT-APPELLANT, VS. FRANCISCO COKENG, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

DISSENTS IN A SEPARATE OPINION

ANGELES, J.:

It is my considered opinion that the amended petition stating
that the applicant Francisco Cokeng owned a residential building situated at 12th
Street, No. 28, Broadway, Quezon City, purportedly valued at P20,000.00, having
been published in the issue of the Official Gazette of June, 1955, and three times in
the Daily Record, a newspaper then having general circulation, to all intents
and purposes, it was a sufficient notice to give the public and the
investigating agencies of the Government an opportunity to gather information
and to express objection relative to the petition, which fact negates any idea
of an attempt to conceal a relevant matter to the application, and it appearing
that until now the State has not come forward with any adverse or derogatory
evidence against him from persons who live adjoining or close to the said house
in Quezon City, for this reason alone, I vote to grant appellee’s motion for
reconsideration.

SEPARATE OPINION

 CASTRO, J.:

Francisco Cokeng, on December
29, 1958, became a Filipino citizen through the procedure
prescribed by law for naturalization; on this day he took the oath of
allegiance and was issued his certificate of naturalization.

More than two years later, or more precisely on March 7, 1961,
the Solicitor General instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
court that granted Cokeng Fi­lipino citizenship, a proceeding for the denaturalization
of the latter, on the ground that he had obtained his certificate of
naturalization fraudulently and/or illegally. 
More particularly it was averred (1) that he made it ap­pear in the
naturalization proceeding that he was a resident of Manila when in fact he was
residing at no. 28, 12th Street, Broadway, Quezon City, and (2) that he had
habitually concealed his taxable income and evaded payment of taxes due from
him to the Government.  The court denied
the Solicitor General’s motion on December
11, 1961.

On appeal by the State, this Court on July 30, 1966 re­versed, and ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of citizenship upon the two grounds raised by
the Solicitor Gen­eral.  On September 20, 1966 Cokeng filed the
present motion for reconsideration.

In the resolution penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the two
conclusions reached by him are (1) that the denatu­ralization of Cokeng cannot
be predicated upon the charge of underdeclaration of his income; and (2) that
his denaturalization should nevertheless be ordered on the ground that his
omission to state in his original application for naturalization his residence
in Quezon City is fatal.  With respect to
the latter, Mr. Justice Reyes has this to say: 
“The good faith of the applicant in omitting one or more of his
‘present and past places of residence’ in his application, becomes and is
irrelevant for the purposes of the law. 
Whether the omission be in good or bad faith,
the fact is that full inquiry as to the irreproachability of applicant’s
behaviour is well thereby prevented, and the law’s intent frustrated.  Hence this Court in a long line of decisions
has invariably held that such omission is fatal to the application for
naturalization * * * the act of the appellee Cokeng is not disclosing his
residence in Quezon City * * *
rendered the decree of naturalization improvident and improper, being contrary
to the requirements and policy of the law. 
While the decree had become final, the State is not thereby deprived of
corrective action through denaturalization proceedings for the cancellation of
the naturalization certificate.  For
under section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, ‘a competent judge may cancel the
naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the civil registry
whenever it is shown that . . . . said naturalization
certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally.’  These terms were reproduced from the American
law that allowed cancellation of naturalizations ‘fraudulently or illegally
procured,’ and it has been the constant interpretation of the Federal and
Supreme Courts of the United States that the term ‘illegally procured’ is not
limited to irregularity, but also denoted a determination by the court contrary
to law of the matter submitted to it.”

With all due respect for the opinion of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
we are constrained to disagree with his con­clusion that the certificate of
naturalization issued to Cokeng should be cancelled, for the reasons that will
hereunder be stated.

More specifically, we hold the view (1) that the resi­dential
building, situated at no. 28, 12th Street, Broadway, Quezon City, and owned by
Cokeng, was not a “residence” within the meaning of the word as used
in the Naturalization Law; and (2) that measured by the injunction that in a denaturalization
proceeding the proof of fraudulent or illegal procurement of the certificate of
naturalization must be “clear, un­equivocal and convincing,” the
evidence in the present case does not meet this stringent requirement.

1.       Although the word
“residence” may have varying connotations in different statutes and
situations, it is nonetheless the consensus of legal lexicographers that
“residence” is the place where a person has established a home, with
intention to remain thereat permanently or for an indefinite time, and implies
something of permanence or continuity at least for an indefinite period, to the
exclusion of other contemporaneous residence (see Words and Phrases,
Permanent Edition, vol. 37, pp. 317-323). 
Quoting from Van Dyne’s Na­turalization, Velayo, in his book Philippine
Citizenship and Naturalization, p. 73, states that in its
broad sense, residence “means a place of abode, selected with the inten­tion
of remaining permanently or for an indefinite period.” Also from Van Dyne,
Velayo (p. 74) makes this explicit quotation of what the court said in the case
of In Re Hawley, 1 Daly 531:  “There are few questions that come up
for the consideration of judicial tribunals which are more difficult to define
than what will constitute a residence.  The
best definition that I have ever been able to find, or which my own experience
could suggest — and I have had a great deal — is that to be deduced from the
Roman Law — that a man’s residence is the place where his family dwells or
which he makes the chief seat of his affairs and interests.” In Pe­tition
of Oganesoff, 20 F (2d) 980, the court had this to say:  “While the words ‘domicile’ and
‘residence’ may be dis­tinguished for certain purposes, I think they are
synonymous for the purpose of naturalization. 
It has often been held that they are synonymous, and I think the
authorities bear out the conclusion here expressed.  Statutes using these two terms have
frequently been construed to this effect. * * * The presumption is that a
married man’s residence is where his family resides, when the family resides in
a permanent home, and no separation has taken place. * * * When a residence or
domicile is once acquired, it continues until a new one takes its place.  It is not lost merely by temporary absence,
or temporary residence elsewhere, though that may be continued for a period of
years.”

Reverting now to the case at bar, the record, to our mind, shows
that the house in Quezon City owned
by Cokeng was not a residence within the meaning given to the term “resi­dence”
by the cases we have above quoted.  True
that the house is owned by him, but the lot on which it stands is owned by some
other person.  He bought the house for
his ailing father who was afflicted with tuberculosis.  Although he and his wife had a room in that house
reserved for their use on their occasional visits to his father, nevertheless
he, his wife and children actually lived for all purposes in Sto. Cristo, Manila.  That the house in Sto. Cristo, Manila
was the actual residence of Cokeng and his family, is
proved by the mention of that place as his residence in no less than
twenty-three important documents executed by him, eight of which were presented
in evidence by the Office of the Solicitor General itself.

The eight documents referred to by the Solicitor General as
showing that he had a second residence, indicate at best that the house he owns
in Quezon City was mentioned in the said documents in the concept of a mere second
address.  Exhibit A is a petition
for the appointment of a special administrator of the estate of Cokeng’s
deceased father.  Attorney Federico
Amacio who prepared the petition explained that he did not consider Cokeng’s
address material, and because he remembered the address of Cokeng’s father in Quezon
City, he instructed his stenographer to place it in
the pe­tition.  Exhibits B and C are the
birth certificates of the two sons of Cokeng. 
It was obviously someone else who gave the information that was placed
in the birth certificates; otherwise if it was he who did give the information,
he would not have committed the errors that appear in the said certificates as
to his own age as well as that of his wife. 
Exhibit AA is a tax declaration of the house in Quezon
City, which document was prepared by the Quezon
City assessor. 
For the purposes of the said tax assessment, all that
is important is an address of the taxpayer. 
Exhibits Y-5, Y-6 and Y-1 are articles of incorporation.  The mention of the actual residences of the
stockholders or incorporators is not material, because all that matters with
respect to the validity of the said articles of incorporation is a statement of
the addresses of said incorporators or stockholders, which addresses can
even be their respective offices or places of business.  Exhibit SSS is an income tax return
accomplished for the year 1957.  Income
tax returns can be filed in any place in the Philippines
and the taxes paid in such place.  All
that is necessary as far as the Bureau of Internal Revenue is concerned is an
address of the taxpayer to which the assessments made by it can be sent.

All these go to show that Cokeng did not consider the house in Quezon
City as a residence. 
And even if the said house could be considered a residence, two facts
stand out, which must be construed in favor of Cokeng, namely, (1) that his
ownership of a house in Quezon City was mentioned in his amended petition for
naturalization which was published in the issue of the Official Gazette
of June, 1955 and three times in the Daily Record; and (2) that
until now the State has not come forward with any adverse or derogatory
evidence against him from persons who live adjoining or close to the said house
in Quezon City.

It may be noted, in passing, that four of the above-described
documents, namely, exhs. A, Y-5, Y-6 and Y-1, were executed after the
filing of the amended petition for naturalization, and are therefore irrelevant
and incompetent evi­dence.

The entire picture, as we see it, demonstrates a sincere
conviction on the part of Cokeng that his house in Quezon
City was not a residence of his at the time of the
filing of his original petition for naturalization.

2.       We cannot in words
emphasize our reasoned adherence to the view that the remedy afforded the
Government in a denaturalization proceeding is “a narrower one than
that of direct appeal from the granting of a petition. * * * To set aside such
a grant the evidence must be ‘clear, unequivocal and convincing’ — it can not
be done upon a bare preponderance of evidence which leaves the issue in doubt.
* * * This is so be­cause rights once conferred should not be lightly
revoked.  And more especially is this
true when the rights are precious and when they are conferred by solemn
adjudication as is the si­tuation when citizenship is granted. * * * Were the
law otherwise, valuable rights would rest upon a slender reed, and the security
of the status of our naturalized citizens might depend in considerable degree
upon the political temper of majority thought and the stresses of the
times” (Justice Frank Murphy in Schneiderman vs. U.S.,
320 U.S. 125, 158-159).

In the phrase of Justice Rutledge (Schneiderman vs.
U.S.,
320 U.S.
165-169) —

“Immediately we are concerned with only one man, William
Schneiderman.  Actually, though indirectly,
the decision affects millions.  If, seventeen
years after a federal court adjudged him entitled to be a citizen, that
judgment can be nullified and he can be stripped of the most precious right, by
nothing more than re-examination upon the merits of the very facts the judgment
established, no naturalized person’s citizenship is or can be secure.  If this can be done after that length of
time, it can be done after thirty or fifty years.  If it can be done for Schneiderman, it can be
done for thousands or tens of thousands of others.

“For all that would be needed would be to produce some
evidence from which any one of the federal district judges could draw a
conclusion, concerning one of the ultimate facts in issue, opposite from that
drawn by the judge decreeing admission. 
The statute does not in terms prescribe ‘jurisdictional’ facts.  But all of the important ones are
‘jurisdictional,’ or have that effect, if by merely drawing a contrary conclusion
from the same, at any later time a court can overturn the judgment.  An applicant might be admitted today upon
evidence satisfying the court he had complied with all requirements.  That judgment might be affirmed on appeal and
again on certiorari here.  Yet the day after,
or ten years later, any district judge could overthrow it, on the same evidence,
if it was conflicting or gave room for contrary inferences, or on different
evidence all of which might have been presented to the first court.

“If this is the law and the right the naturalized citizen
acquires, his admission creates nothing more than citizenship in attenuated, if
not suspended, animation.  He acquires
but prima facie status, if that.  Until
the Government moves to cancel his certificate and he knows the outcome, he
cannot know whether he is in or out.  And
when that is done, nothing forbids repeating the harrowing process again and
again, unless the weariness of the courts should lead them to speak res
judicata.

“It may be doubted that the framers of the Constitution
intended to create two classes of citizens, one free and independent, one haltered
with a lifetime string tied to the status. 
However that may be, and conceding that the power to revoke exists and
rightly should exist to some extent, the question remains whether the power to
admit can be delegated to the courts in such a way that their determination,
once made, determines and concludes nothing with finality.

“If every fact in issue, going to the right to be a citizen,
can be re-examined, upon the same or different proof, years or decades later;
and if this can be done de novo, as if no judgment had been
entered, whether with respect to the burden of proof required to reach a
different decision or otherwise, what does the judgment determine? What does it
settle with finality? If review is had and the admission is affirmed, what fact
is adjudicated, if next day any or all involved can be redecided to the
contrary? Can Congress, when it has empowered a court to determine and others
to review and confirm, at the same time or later authorize any trial court to
overturn their decrees, for causes other than such as have been held sufficient
to overturn other decrees?

“I do not undertake now to decide these questions.  Nor does the Court.  But they have a hearing on the one which is
decided.  It is a judgment which
is being attacked. Accordingly, it will not do to say the issue is identical
with what is presented in a naturalization proceeding, is merely one of fact,
upon which therefore the finding of the trial court concludes, and consequently
we have no business to speak or our speaking is appellate intermeddling.  That ignores the vital fact that it is a judgment,
rendered in the exercise of the judicial power created by Article 3 which it is
sought to overthrow, not merely a grant like a patent to land or for
invention.  Congress has plenary power
over naturalization.  That no one
disputes.  Nor that this power, for its
application, can be delegated to the courts. 
But this is not to say, when Congress has so placed it, that body can
decree in the same breath that the judgment rendered shall have no conclusive
effect.  Limits it may place, But that is
another matter from making an adju­dication under Article 3 merely an advisory
opinion or prima facie evidence of the fact or all the facts determined.  Congress has, with limited exceptions,
plenary power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  But to confer the jurisdiction and at the
same time nullify entirely the effects of its exercise are not matters heretofore
thought, when squarely faced, within its authority.  To say therefore that the trial court’s
function in this case is the same as was that of the admitting court is to
ignore the vast difference between overturning a judgment, with its adjudicated
facts, and deciding initially upon facts which have not been adjudged.”

United States vs. Anastacio, 226 F.2d 916
and Baumgartner vs. U.S., 322 U.S. 665, 670 are authority
for the rule that “there must be a * * * solidity of proof which leaves no
troubling doubt in deciding a question of such gravity as is implied in an
attempt to reduce a person to the status of alias [or stateless person] from
that of citizen.” (see also 3 Am. Jur. 2d. p. 1046) Such being the case, citizenship
once granted should not be taken away upon the slightest pretext of some
alleged fraud or irregularity. 
Citizenship obtained through naturalization is not a se­cond-class
citizenship.  Unlike, therefore, in
naturalization proceedings where the facts and the law may be interpreted and
construed strictly against the applicant, in a denaturalization case,
the reverse is true.  “A strict
burden of proof is placed on the government. 
If there is any doubt on the facts, the interest of the government, and
not that of the individual, must give way. 
When fraud is charged, the power of denaturalization will apparently be
exercised only to denaturalize the most perfidious applicants” (Torre, Aliens:  Denaturalization for Fraud, 35 Calif.
L.R, 449, 453). “The courts must be less concerned with what one
undesirable citizen can do if he is permitted to retain his citizenship and
residence in this country than with what one bad precedent-making decision can
do” (U.S. v. Anastacio, supra, p. 919).  “In its consequences, it
[denaturalization] is more serious than a taking of one’s property or the
imposition of a fine or other penalty. * * * Once conferred [citizenship]
should not be taken away without the clearest sort of justification and proof.
* * * The facts and the law should be construed as far as is reasonably
possible in favor of the citizen.  Especially
is this so when the attack is made long after the time when the certificate of
citizenship was granted, and the citizen has meanwhile met his obligations and
has committed no act of lawlessness” (Schneiderman vs. U.S.,
supra).

ACCORDINGLY, we vote to grant the appellee’s motion for
reconsideration, and to reverse the decision this Court of July 30, 1966.

Makalintal, J., concurs in this
separate opinion of J. Castro.

SEPARATE OPINION

DIZON, J.:

Before Us is a motion filed by respondent-appellee Francisco
Cokeng for the reconsideration of our decision of July 30, 1966 reversing the
one rendered by the Court a quo on December 11, 1961, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of citizenship of Cokeng firstly, because of
the latters failure to state in his amended application for na­turalization his
residence at 28, 12th Street, Corner Broadway, Quezon City, and secondly,
because of the underdeclaration of his income for several years, thereby
evincing lack of that irreproachable conduct which the law requires of
applicants for citizenship.

A perusal of the majority resolution penned by the Acting Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, concedes – albeit reluctantly – “that
the second charge of under-declaration of his income has not been clearly
established”.   With this the
undersigned agrees.

It is now clear, therefore, that whether Cokeng should be
denaturalized or not depends exclusively upon the first charge – his alleged
failure to state in his amended application his former residence at the place
mentioned heretofore.  Considering the
undeniable gravity of the consequences of de­naturalizing appellee – or any
other naturalized Filipino citizen, for that matter – and the forceful motion
for reconsideration now before Us, our duty to
re-examine the case fully is inescapable.

It is not disputed that Cokeng became a naturalized Fili­pino
citizen on December 29, 1958
and that after taking his oath of allegiance on the same date the corresponding
certificate of naturalization was issued to him.  All this took place after and as a result of
a regular hearing held upon his amended application with due notice to the
State.  No question having been raised up
to now regarding the publication required by law in cases of the same nature, We must assume that the hearing was held only after Cokeng’s
amended appli­cation was published in accordance with law.

On March 7, 1961 – apparently upon promptings from sources outside
the government with unfriendly relations with Cokeng – the then Solicitor
General instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila – the same court
that granted him his Filipino citizenship – a proceeding for his
denaturalization, claiming that he had obtained his certificate of
naturalization fraudulently and/or illegally by making it appear in the
corresponding proceedings (1) that he was a resident of Manila when in fact he
resided at 28, 12th Street, Broadway, Quezon City; and that (2) he had on several
occasions concealed his taxable income and thus evaded payment of taxes due
from him to the government.  After
hearing the parties, the Court rendered its decision refusing to deprive Cokeng
of his certificate of citizenship.  From this the State appealed to Us.  On July 30, 1966 We
rendered the decision now sought to be reconsidered reversing that of the lower
court and ordering the cancellation of Cokeng’s certificate of citizenship upon
the two grounds relied upon by the State.

After reviewing the evidence of record, We
said the following, inter alia, in our decision just mentioned:

“x x x The only conclusion that can be made of these is that
as of 1951, respondent-appellee had two known residences – No. 28, 12th Street,
Broadway, Quezon City, and No. 428 Sto. Cristo, Manila.  As it is not disputed that the only place of
residence mentioned in the amended petition for naturalization which was
published in the Official Gazette and of the ‘Daily Record’ was No. 428 Sto.
Cristo, Manila, the said petition
should have been denied by the lower court for non-compliance with Section 7 of
Commonwealth Act 473 as amended.”

We thus held that, as of 1951, Cokeng had two known
residences.  To the undersigned this does
not now seem to be correct.  As it is not
the normal thing for a person to have simultaneously two different residences,
whatever appears upon the face of the documents that led us to this erroneous
conclusion should have been given not a literal interpretation but one that is
more reasonable and more in conformity with everyday experience.  Considering that Cokeng had, during all the
material years, considered 428 Sto. Cristo Street,
Manila, as his true residence -and this he
positively alleged in his applications – it is logical and reasonable to assume
that he regarded the house in Quezon City
not as a second residence but only as a place where – aside from his
true residence – he could also be found or contacted whenever necessary.  This assumption would appear to be fully
justified upon consideration of these facts: 
firstly, that at all the time material to this matter, Cokeng was
already a married man, with a living wife and children, with a wide and
extensive business of his own, and, therefore, in a position to live
independently of and separately from his then ailing father who was the one
living at the Quezon City house; and secondly, that Cokeng was, if I am not
mistaken, one of the two living sons of his father.  Therefore, while as a married man, with a
wife and children, he needed and had, for obvious reasons of personal
convenience – an independent residence of his own, it was not at all strange
that he should frequent the Quezon City house which he himself had bought for
his ailing father, to the extent that he could consider it as an address or a
place where he could easily be contacted by others.  His amended application, therefore, did not
lie in this regard, not even by omission; it simply set forth the facts as the
applicant, in all good faith, thought and knew they were.  Of course, one may feel an urge to assume
that he had acted in bad faith; that he knew all along that the Quezon City
house was also his residence; that his purpose in giving it merely as an
address or as a house owned by him was to prevent “the public and the in­vestigating
agencies of the government an opportunity to gather information and express
objection relative to the petition”, but it pays to remember that bad
faith is never presumed nor lightly to be charged.

In the resolution of the matter before Us We must, I submit, be
guided by the wise and humane considerations which animated respected members
of the Supreme Court of the United States
in deciding similar cases.

In the case of Schneiderman vs. United
States, 320 U.S.,
118, decided on June 21, 1943,
Mr. Justice Murphy said:

“This is not a naturalization proceeding in which the
Government is being asked to confer the privilege of citizenship upon an
applicant.  Instead the Government seeks
to turn the clock back twelve years after full citizenship was conferred on
petitioner by a judicial decree, and to deprive him of the priceless benefits
that derive from that status.  In its
consequences it is more serious than a taking of one’s property, or the
imposition of a fine or other penalty. 
For it is safe to assert that nowhere in the world today is the right of
citizenship of greater worth to an individual than it is in this country.  It would be difficult to exaggerate its value
and importance.  By many it is regarded
as the highest hope of civilized men. 
This does not mean that once granted to an alien, citizenship cannot be
revoked or cancelled on legal grounds under appropriate proof.  But such a right once conferred should not be
taken away without the clearest sort of justification and proof.  So, whatever may be the rule in a
naturalization proceeding (see United States vs. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463, 467, 72 L
ed 654-655, 48 S Ct 323), in an action instituted under Sec. 15 for the purpose
of depriving one of the precious right of citizenship previously conferred, we
believe the facts and the law should be construed as far as is reasonably
possible in favor of the citizen. 
Especially is this so when the attack is made long after the time when
the certificate of citizenship is granted and the citizen has meanwhile met his
obligations and has committed no act of lawlessness. x x x” (at pp.
122-123).

“x x x (the) remedy afforded the Govern­ment by the
denaturalization statute has been said to be a narrower one than that of the
direct appeal from the granting of a petition.” (at p. 125, citing Tutun
v. United States, 270 U.S. 568; 579, 70 L ed 738, 46 S Ct 425; Cf. United
States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 325, 62 L ed 321, 324, 38 S Ct 118)

“x x x rights once conferred should not be lightly revoked x x
x more especially is this true when the rights are precious and when they are
conferred by a solemn adjudication, as is the situation when citizenship is
granted.” (at p. 125)

“x x x (the court is) dealing here with a court decree entered
after an opportunity to be heard.” (at p. 123)

“x x x a denaturalization proceeding, and it is a judgment,
not a mere claim or a grant, which is being attacked.” (at
p. 135)

In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Douglas
said:

“Citizenship can be granted only on the basis of the statutory
right which Congress has created.  Tutun
v. United States,
270 U. S. 568,
70 L ed 738, 46 S Ct 425, supra.  But where it is granted and where all the
express statutory conditions precedent are satisfied
we should adhere to the view that the judgment of naturalization is final
and conclusive except for fraud.” (at p. 165;
underlining ours)

For his part, Mr. Justice Rutledge had this to say in his
concurring opinion:

“x x x if, seventeen years after a federal court adjudged him
entitled to be a citizen, that judgment can be nullified and he can be stripped
of this most precious right, by nothing more than re-examination upon the
merits of the very facts the judgment 
established, no naturalized person’s citizen­ship is or can be
secured.” (at p. 166)

“If this is the law and the right the naturalized citizen
acquires, his admission creates nothing more than citizenship in attenuated,
if not suspended, animation.  He
acquires but prima facie status, if that. 
Until the government moves to cancel his certificate and he knows the
outcome, he cannot know whether he is in or out.  And when that is done, nothing forbids repeat­ing
the harrowing process again and again, unless the weariness of the courts
should lead them finally to speak res judicata.” (at pp. 166-167; underlining ours)

“It may be doubted that the framers of the Constitution
intended to create two classes of citizens, one free and independent, one
haltered with a lifetime string tied to its status.” (at
p. 167)

Almost exactly one year later – on June 21, 1944 – in deciding
the case of Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said: 

“x x x We are fully mindful that due observation of the law
governing the grant of citizenship to aliens touches the very well-being of the
Nation.  Nothing that we are now deciding
is intended to weaken in the slightest the alertness with which ad­mission to
American citizenship should be safeguarded. 
But we must be equally watch­ful that citizenship once bestowed should
not be in jeopardy nor in fear of exercising its
American freedom through a too easy finding that citizenship was disloyally
acquired.  We have sufficiently indicated
the considerations of policy, derived from the traditions of our people,
that require solid proof that citizenship was falsely and fraudulently pro­cured.  These considerations must guide our judicial
judgment.” (at p. 676)

In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Murphy
said:

“The decision in the Schneiderman case was not merely a decision
of an isolated case.  It was a
formulation by a majority of the Court of a rule of law governing all
denaturalization proceedings.” (at p. 678;
underlining ours)

While the undersigned does not feel too strongly inclined to
invoke and follow legal precedents laid in foreign juris­dictions, he submits
that in the construction of the provisions of our naturalization law, which is
obviously patterned after United States statutes on the same subject, the
doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court of that country must be accorded at
least persuasive force.

In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the undersigned can
not bring himself to agree to deprive Cokeng of his
citizenship upon what appears to be the dubious ground of his alleged failure
to disclose in his application a former place of residence.

But the State claims that Cokeng’s failure to list the Quezon
City house either as a residence simultaneously with
the Sto. Cristo, Manila home, or a
former residence, had deprived the general public and the proper agencies of
the government of the opportunity to gather material information regarding his
qualifications and/or disqualifications.

This smacks of an attempt to rely upon a purely technical defect
– if it is one at all – in the proceedings for the purpose of completely
setting to naught judicial proceedings had admittedly without fraud against the
State and in the course of which the latter was fully represented.  It is noteworthy that neither in the State’s
petition to denaturalize Cokeng filed on March 2, 1961 nor at any time
thereafter up to the present has the State made any claim or pretense that
either before March 1961 or thereafter it had obtained positive in­formation or
tangible evidence of misconduct on the part of Cokeng, which the public or the
investigating agencies of the government could have timely discovered and,
therefore, the Solicitor General could have alleged as grounds of objection
against Cokeng’s application for citizenship, if the latter had disclosed in
his application his alleged residence in Quezon City.  To be remembered too is the fact that since
Cokeng became a naturalized Filipino citizen (December 29, 1958), almost ten years have elapsed as of now.  What the State claims, therefore, is simply
this:  that as Cokeng did not clearly
allege that he was residing, at the time of the filing of his amended
application, or that before that time he had resided in Quezon City, he must
now be deprived of his citizenship notwithstanding the serious consequences,
both personal and economic, that would result from such a drastic measure.  This, the undersigned believes, is in accord
neither with justice nor with equity. 
Due regard for the finality and integrity of judicial determinations;
full respect and adherence to the implied commitments assumed by the State
when, through its duly constituted courts, it grants citizenship to an alien
who has in good faith applied for it, demand either (1) that the petition to denaturalize
Cokeng be denied or (2) that before We finally set aside and declare of no
value all the judicial proceedings that cul­minated in the grant of citizenship
to him, the State should come forward with a clear statement that it has
presently in its possession tangible evidence it failed to discover on time due
to Cokeng’s alleged failure to allege that he had also resided in Quezon City,
and that such evidence is sufficient to have induced the trial court to deny
his ap­plication for citizenship.  Unless
the State is in a position to do so, the undersigned feels that any attempt to
deprive Cokeng of his citizenship should fail.

Therefore, to the extent that the majority resolution holds that
there is no clear proof of tax evasion committed by Cokeng, I concur with
it.  However, in so far as it denies the
motion for reconsideration on the sole ground of Cokeng’s alleged failure to
state in his amended application that at the time of the filing thereof or
before that time, he was and/or had resided in Quezon City, I dissent.  In this connection, my affirmative vote on
the motion for reconsideration is to set aside our original decision as well as
that of the Court of First Instance, and to remand the case to the latter for
further proceedings intended to give the general public and the State, once and
for all, the opportunity to produce any evidence they may have showing Cokeng’s
lack of qualification, or his disqualification to become a Filipino citizen in
accordance with our laws.