GERONIMO B. ZALDIVAR, PETITIONER, VS. HON. NUMERIANO ESTENZO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ORMOC CITY, AND SOTERO PEPITO, RESPONDENTS.

The specific question that
confronts this Court in this petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction, one that is novel and unique, is the competence of a court of first instance to pass upon and entertain a
special civil action to prohibit
municipal mayors, presumed to be partial to the candidacy of a congressional
candidate, from appointing special
policemen, and agents with the sole purpose, so it is alleged, to terrorize voters and thus frustrate the basic objective of the Election Code,
which is to assure the free and honest expression of popular will.  Respondent Judge, by no means free from
suspicion of sympathy for the other candidate, had no
doubt about his power to act in the premises. 
With unusual celerity and
dispatch, he granted ex–parte the
preliminary injunction sought.  This
Court is of a different mind.

Such an assumption of jurisdiction, considering that the
Commission on Elections is by the Constitution vested with “exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections * * *,”^[1]
is as war with the plain constitutional command the implementing statutory provisions, and the hospitable scope
afford such grant of authority so clear and
unmistakable in recent decisions. 
Moreover, if respondent Judge were of a similar persuasion, the tradition of impartiality so necessary and vital to maintain unimpaired
respect for the judiciary would have been upheld and the doubts, whether
well-founded or not, as to a court lending its prestige and its authority to favor a congressional aspirant would not have
arisen.

In the language of the
petition, dated May 9, 1966, petitioner being Geronimo Zaldivar
and the principal respondent, Judge Nume­riano Estenzo, of the Court of First Instance of Ormoc City, it was filed “for the purpose of setting
aside (a) the decision dated April 28, 1966, rendered by the Honorable Judge Numeriano Estenzo of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte, 13th Judicial District,
Fifth Branch, Ormoc City, in Special Civil Case No.
753-O, entitled ‘Luis Porcare and Sotero
Pepito, petitioners, versus Feliciano Larrazabal, in his official capacity as Mayor of Kananga, Leyte, and Geronimo Zaldivar, in his official capacity as Mayor of Albuera, Leyte, respondents;’ (b)
the order for the arrest of petitioner issued in said case on the same date
that the decision was promulgated; (c) the warrant of arrest issued
pursuant to said order; (d) the order issued in said case dated November 5,
1965, granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; and (e) the
writ of preliminary injunction so
issued on the same date, on the
ground that said decision, orders, warrant of arrest and writ of preliminary
injunction were issued by the trial court without jurisdiction.”^[2]

Petitioner was then the
incumbent municipal mayor of Albuera, Leyte, named respondent in the special civil case
referred to, while the other respondent, Sotero Pepito, was one of the petitioners in such case.  The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for
was granted by this Court in a resolution of May 20, 1966, which gave due course to the petition.

While the answer of respondent Judge Estenzo, dated June 15, 1966, contained his
own version of the facts, there is no question that a decision in favor of the
petitioner, now respondent, Pepito, and against the
respondent, now petitioner Zaldivar,
in the above special civil action was rendered on April 28, 1966;^[3] an ex–parte
order for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and the
writ itself were issued on the same day the special civil action was filed;^[4] and the arrest of petitioner immediately
followed by a warrant of arrest were ordered by respondent Judge.^[5]

The decision assailed, as
well as the challenged orders and actuations of respondent Judge, was the
direct consequence of his assumption of jurisdiction over the special civil
action of prohibition with preliminary injunction, filed in his court by now
respondent Sotero Pepito,
one of the petitioners in that
case, along with a certain Luis Porcare.  As already indicated, had there been more
hesitancy and doubt as to his competence resulting in more circumspection and
less eagerness to act on the matter, respondent Judge might have reached a
contrary conclusion as to the correctness of his assumption of
jurisdiction.  The wording of the
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, considering the
applicable law, ought to have warned and cautioned respondent Judge against a
determination that he could validly act on the premises.

A recital of the contents
of the petition will explain why.  The petitioners,
both of whom were municipal councilors and, according to their petition,
“local leaders and supporters of the candidacy for reelection of
Congressman Dominador M. Tan, * * *,” alleged
that now petitioner Zaldivar, therein named as respondent, with a municipal mayor
of another municipality, a certain Feliciano Larrazabal,
“acting in their official capacities as Municipal Mayors, are known to be
sympathetic to the candidacy of Rodolfo Rivilla, and
with grave abuse of discretion have caused to appoint special policemen and
agents to be paid from public
funds and to be provided with uniforms and firearms for the sole purpose of
utilizing said special policemen and agents to terrorize and arrest electors
sympathetic to Congressman Dominador M. Tan during
the elections of November 9, 1965, in the aforesaid municipalities within the
4th District of Leyte; * * *.”^[6] It was the contention of petitioners
that respondents, as municipal mayors, acted “without and in excess of
their powers as executives of their respective jurisdictions, as no authority
or sanction has been obtained from the Executive Secretary and the Commission
on Elections, and the exercise of such powers would be detrimental to the
interest of the electorate which they are bound to protect.”^[7]
From which it was their conclusion that such “consummation of the intended
acts of respondents in their respective jurisdiction would frustrate the will
of the people to vote freely for the men of their choice during the elections
of November 9, 1965.  * * *.”^[8]
As noted earlier, respondent Judge, based on such a petition, decided that he
had jurisdiction and saw to it that an order for the issuance ex–parte of the preliminary injunction was handed down
to be followed by the writ itself on November
5, 1965, the very same day the action was filed.

It thus admits of no doubt that the grievances, if any, of
respondent Pepito, as one of the petitioners in that
special civil action before respondent Judge, arose from an alleged abuse of
authority on the part of now petitioner, respondent therein, Zaldivar, as municipal mayor, in appointing “special
policemen and agents” so that they could be utilized solely for the
purpose of terrorizing and arresting voters sympathetic to one of the
congressional candidates and thus frustrating “the will of the people to
vote freely for the men of their choice” in the election to be held on
November 9, 1965.  Nothing could be
clearer then than that such an alleged abuse of power was inextricably linked
with the poll to be held four days later. 
As noted in the petition, if successful, such a scheme would be a denial
of the right of the electorate to give free expression to their
convictions.  It is indisputable,
therefore, that on its face, the petitioner sought the avoidance of acts that
would be violative of the Election Code, which is
designed primarily to assure that the right to vote on the part of each and
every elector be respected and safeguarded to the fullest extent.

Under the Constitution, the Commission on Elections has
“exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law.”^[9]
In the implementation of the above constitutional prerogative, the Commission
on Elections is vested under the Election Code with “direct and immediate
supervision over the provincial, municipal, and city officials designated by
law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections.”^[10]
It could even suspend “from the performance of said duties any of said
officials who shall fail to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions, or
rulings and appoint their temporary substitutes and, upon recommendation of the
Commission, the President of the Philippines may remove any or all such
officials who shall be found guilty of non-feasance,
malfeasance, or misfeasance in connection with the performance of their duties
relative to the conduct of elections.”^[11]

In the special civil action for prohibition before respondent
Judge, its essentially political character is manifest, the main allegation
being the alleged utilization of the power of petitioner Zaldivar,
municipal mayor named respondent therein, to avail himself of the authority of
his office to appoint special policemen or agents to terrorize voters so that
they would support the congressional candidate of his choice.  Both under the Constitution and the Revised
Election Code, it is not so much the power, but the duty of the Commission on
Elections to exercise supervision over
municipal officials precisely to enforce the Election Code.  No other agency is better suited to preclude
abuse of authority on the part of local officials, the sanction being that it
could recommend to the President their removal if found guilty of “non-feasance, malfeasance or misfeasance in connection with the
performance of their duties relative to the conduct of elections.”^[12]

Moreover, this Court,
from the creation of the Commission on Elections, has accorded full amplitude
to the wide discretion vested in the Commission on Elections in the
performance of its constitutional functions. 
As early as 1941, in Sumulong v. Commission on
Elections,^[13] full recognition and awareness of the
crucial role to be played by the Commission in the conduct of elections was
evident, the language employed in the opinion of the then Justice Abad Santos being quite explicit.  Thus: 
“The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body.  It is intended to play a distinct and important
part in our scheme of government.  In the
discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that
would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization.  The Commission may err, so may this court
also.  It should be allowed considerable
latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly
and honest elections.  We may not agree
fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly
illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion this court should not
interfere.  Politics is a practical
matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically not from the
standpoint of pure theory.  The
Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts
with political strate­gists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience
in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous
position to decide political questions.”

So it has continued up to
the present.  To speak of more recent
cases, there was stress laid in Lucas v. Canton^[14] on its “constitutional duty of
administering and enforcing the laws relative to the conduct of elections with
a view to promoting clean and honest elections the very purpose for which the
Commission on Elections was created constitutional mandate.” As
was emphatically observed by Justice Zaldivar,
speaking for the Court:  “It would
indeed be absurd to say that the Commission on Elections has a legal duty to
perform and at the same time it is denied the necessary means to perform said
duty.” The same trend is evident in three decisions of this Court
in December 1967, Espino v. Zaldivar,^[15] Demafiles v.
Commission on Elections^[16] and Estrada v. Navarro,^[17] and one in January 1968, Ong v. Commission on
Elections.^[18]

The question may be asked: 
Why should not the judiciary be a co-participant in this particular
instance of enforcing the Election Code as its authority was invoked?  The obvious answer is the literal language of
the Constitution which empowers the Commission on Elections to “have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of the elections.” Moreover,
as was so aptly observed by the
then Justice Frankfurter, although the situation confronting the United States
Supreme Court was of a different character: 
“Nothing is clearer than that this controversy concerns matters
that bring courts into immediate and active relations with party contests.  From the
determination of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof.  It is hostile to a democratic system to
involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.  And it is not less pernicious if such
judicial intervention in an essentially political contest be dressed up in the
abstract phrases of the law.”^[19] Then
too reference by analogy may be made to the principle that sustains Albano v. Arranz.  For even without the express constitutional
prescription that only this
Court may review the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on
Elections, it is easy to
understand why no interference whatsoever with the performance of the
Commission on Elections of its functions should be allowed unless emanating
from this Court.  The observation of
Acting Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Albano v. Arranz,^[20] while not precisely in point, indicates the
proper approach.  Thus:  “It is easy to realize the chaos that would
ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to arrogate
unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the
Commission on Elections; that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to
impotence.”

This conclusion finds support from a consideration of weight and influence.  What happened in this case could be repeated
elsewhere.  It is not improbable that
courts of first instance would be resorted to by leaders of candidates or
political factions entertaining the belief whether rightly or wrongly that local officials would employ all the power at their
command to assure the victory of their candidates.  Even if greater care and circumspection, than
did exist in this case, would be employed by judges thus appealed to, it is not
unlikely that the shadow of suspicion as to alleged partisanship would fall on
their actuations, whichever way the matter before them is decided.  It is imperative
that the faith in the impartiality of the judiciary be preserved
unimpaired.  Whenever, therefore, the
fear may be plausibly entertained that an assumption of jurisdiction would lead
to a lessening of the undi­minished trust that should be reposed
in the courts and the absence of authority discernible from the wording of
applicable statutory provisions and the trend of judicial decisions, even if no
constitutional mandate as that present in this case could be relied upon, there
should be no hesitancy in declining to act.

One
last point.  The north expected of a judge, expressed in
language both lucid and forceful by Justice Dizon,
bears reiteration:  “It has been
said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial
and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is en­titled to nothing
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge * * *.  Moreover, second only to the duty of
rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not
arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge.”^[21]
It is difficult enough to attain the
ideal of a presiding judge being “wholly free, disinterested, impartial
and independent,” as was noted in the Gutierrez decision.  It becomes doubly difficult for such
qualities to be in evidence whenever the matter before him is so enmeshed and
so intertwined with partisan considerations that even if he could justly lay claim to such attributes, he still
would be susceptible to the suspicion, by whichever group may feel that its just claim is rejected, that he
acted not in accordance with the cold dictates of reason, but with the
promptings and urgings of his sympathy and predilections in whatever direction
they may lie.  To repeat, the conclusion
reached as to the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of first instance in
litigations of this character would go far in fortifying and bolstering the
belief in the reality of a truly independent judiciary, free from partisanship
and aloof from politics.

WHEREFORE, the writ for certiorari prayed for is
granted; the decision rendered by respondent Judge on April 28, 1966, in
Special Civil Case No. 753-0 in his sala, the order
for the arrest of petitioner, the warrant of arrest, the order dated November
5, 1966, granting the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction; and the writ of preliminary injunction so
issued on the same date set
aside; and preliminary injunction
issued by this Court dated May 26, 1966 made permanent.  No special pronouncement as to costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Sanchez,
Castro, and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Art. X, Sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines.

^[2] Petition, opening
paragraph.

^[3]
Petition, Annex L.

^[4]
Petition, Annexes B
and C.

^[5]
Petition, Annexes M
and N.

^[6]
Petition, Annex A,
pars. 1-4.

^[7]
lbid, par. 5.

^[8]
Ibid, par. 6.

^[9]
Art. X, Sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines.

^[10]
Section 3, Revised Election Code, Republic Act No. 180.

^[11]
Ibid, Revised Election Code.

^[12]
Ibid, Revised Election Code.

^[13]
73 Phil. 288, 294-295.

^[14]
L-25467, April 27, 1967.

^[15]
L-22325, December 11, 1967.

^[16]
 L-28396, December 29, 1967.

^[17]
L-28340 and L-28374, December
29, 1967.

^[18]
L-28415, January 29, 1968.

^[19]
Colegrove v. Green, 328 US 549, 553-554 (1946).

^[20]
L-19260, January 31, 1962.

^[21]
Gutierrez v. Hon. Santos,
L-15824, May 30, 1961.  The
above except was quoted with approval in Austria v. Masaquel,
L-22536, August
31, 1967.